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Dealing with ‘Rogue’ States: A Case Study of Serbia
Abstract
T h i s  th e s i s  e x a m in e s  t h e  im p a c t  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  c o e r c iv e  p o l i c i e s  o n  d e m o c r a t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  o p e r a t in g  w i th in  ‘r o g u e ’ s ta te s .  U s in g  S e r b i a  b e tw e e n  1 9 9 2  a n d  
2 0 0 0  a s  a  c a s e  s tu d y ,  t h e  a im  o f  th i s  r e s e a r c h  i s  to  e v a lu a t e  t h e  im p a c t  o f  t h e  
in t e r n a t io n a l  c o m m u n i t y ’s  c o e r c io n  o f  S e r b i a  o n  t h e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  t h e  S e r b ia n  
d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  in  t h e i r  c a m p a ig n s  a g a in s t  t h e  M i lo s e v ic  r e g im e .  In  o r d e r  to  
e x p lo r e  th i s  i s s u e ,  t h e  t im e  p e r i o d  f r o m  1 9 9 2  to  2 0 0 0  is  b r o k e n  d o w n  in to  f iv e  s u b ­
p e r io d s  in  e a c h  o f  w h ic h  S e r b i a ’s  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  c o e r c io n  d i f f e r e d  in  
t e r m s  o f  i t s  n a tu r e  a n d / o r  e x te n t .  W i t h i n  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  s u b - p e r io d s  t h e  i s s u e s  o f  
w h e t h e r  S e r b i a ’s  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  h e ld  p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  d i f f e r e d  f r o m  th o s e  o f  t h e  
M i lo s e v ic  r e g im e  o n  i s s u e s  t h a t  w e r e  o f  k e y  in t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n c e r n ;  t h e  e x t e n t  a n d  
n a tu r e  o f  l in k s  b e tw e e n  th e  S e r b ia n  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  a n d  th e  in t e r n a t io n a l  
c o m m u n i ty ;  a n d  th e  im p a c t  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  p o l i c y  o n  th e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  th e  
d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  in  o p p o s i n g  th e  M i lo s e v i c  r e g i m e  i s  in v e s t ig a t e d .  T h e  f in d in g s  
o f  th i s  r e s e a r c h  s h o w  th a t  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  w e r e  
o f t e n  c lo s e r  to  t h o s e  o f  t h e  in t e r n a t io n a l  c o m m u n i t y  th a n  w e r e  t h o s e  o f  t h e  M i lo s e v ic  
r e g im e ,  a n d  th a t  f o r  m u c h  o f  t h e  t i m e  in t e r n a t i o n a l  c o e r c io n  o f  S e r b i a  u n d e r m in e d  
S e r b i a ’s  o p p o s i t i o n  in  i t s  e f f o r t s  to  o p p o s e  M i lo s e v i c .
A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s
I w o u ld  e s p e c i a l ly  l i k e  to  t h a n k  m y  s u p e r v i s o r ,  J o h n  D o y le ,  f o r  h i s  g u id a n c e ,  s u p p o r t  
a n d  p a t i e n c e  a s  I w r o te  th i s ,  in  a d d i t i o n  to  a l l  t h e  r e s e a r c h  s t u d e n t s  a n d  s t a f f  a t  t h e  
S c h o o l  o f  L a w  a n d  G o v e r n m e n t ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  A d a m  M c A u l e y  a n d  F r a n c e s c o  
C a v a t o r t a  w h o  o f f e r e d  v a l u a b l e  a d v ic e .  P a r t i c u l a r  t h a n k s  a r e  a l s o  d u e  to  J a s m i n a  
B e h a n ,  V io l e t a  C u c o v ic ,  a n d  S a n d r a  G r o z d a n ic  f o r  a l l  t h e i r  h e lp  a n d  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  
a s  I t r i e d  to  l e a r n  t h e i r  l a n g u a g e  a n d  a ls o  f o r  c h e c k i n g  m y  t r a n s l a t i o n ;  to  R a f e t  a n d  
J e l e n a  C u c o v ic  in  N o v i  S a d  w h o s e  h o s p i t a l i t y  e n a b le d  m e  to  e x p e r i e n c e  M i lo s e v i c 's  
S e r b i a  f o r  m y s e l f ,  e v e n  i f  o n ly  b r i e f ly ;  to  M a i r e a d  M u l l e n  in  B e l g r a d e  f o r  h e r  h e lp  in  
t r a c k i n g  d o w n  v a r io u s  m a te r i a l ;  a n d  to  C la i r e  M o lo n e y  f o r  w a s t i n g  a  p e r f e c t l y  g o o d  
S u n d a y  r e a d in g  p a r t s  o f  th i s  t h e s i s .  I w o u ld  a l s o  l ik e  to  t h a n k  th o s e  m e m b e r s  o f  m y  
f a m i ly  w h o  s u p p o r t e d  m e  a s  I t r i e d  to  w r i t e  t h i s ,  m y  m o t h e r  E le a n o r ,  m y  s i s t e r  S a r a h ,  
m y  b r o t h e r  A n d y ,  a n d  a ls o  A n d y ,  S ta c ie ,  A o i f e  a n d  J a c k .  T h a n k s  a l s o  to  I s a b e l l  
S m y th ,  R o s y  F i t z g e r a ld ,  L o r r a in e  S l a t t e r y - F a r r e l l ,  M ic h a e l  M u r r a y ,  B r e n d a  D u r k a n ,  
A n d y  M u l le n ,  G a r y  Q u in n ,  A f r a  S a j j a d ,  a n d  H e g e  N y g a a r d  w h o  a l l  p l a y e d  a  b i g  p a r t  
in  h e l p i n g  m e  to  d o  th i s  a t  v a r io u s  p o i n t s  in  t im e ,  a n d  to  P a t r i c k  R o y c r o f t  f o r  c o n s t a n t  
m o r a l  s u p p o r t  a n d  v e r y  g o o d  a d v ic e ,  w h ic h  I p r o b a b l y  s h o u ld  h a v e  p a id  m o r e  
a t t e n t io n  to  th a n  I d id ,  a n d  a l s o  to  t h e  m a n y  o th e r s  w h o  h a v e  h e lp e d  m e  a lo n g  th e  
w a y .  F in a l ly ,  I w o u ld  l i k e  to  t h a n k  th e  I r i s h  R e s e a r c h  C o u n c i l  f o r  t h e  H u m a n i t i e s  a n d  
S o c ia l  S c i e n c e s  w h o  p r o v i d e d  m u c h  o f  t h e  f u n d in g  f o r  t h i s  r e s e a r c h .  T h i s  i s  f o r  
T h o m a s ,  w h o  k e p t  m e  c o m p a n y  f o r  t h e  y e a r s  t h a t  I s p e n t  w r i t i n g  th i s  b u t  d i d n ’t  m a k e  
i t  to  t h e  e n d .
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t h e  f i r s t  c h a p t e r  o f  th i s  th e s i s  w i l l  o u t l i n e  th e  im p o r t a n c e  o f  g a in in g  a  g r e a t e r  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  c o e r c iv e  p o l i c i e s  o n  d o m e s t i c  o p p o n e n t s  o f  t a r g e t e d  
r e g im e s .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  w i l l  a l s o  c o n s id e r  th e  t a s k s  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  
o p e r a t i n g  in  c o m p e t i t i v e  a u th o r i t a r i a n  r e g im e s  s u c h  a s  M i l o s e v i c ’s. T h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  
th a t  h a s  b e e n  u s e d  in  c a r r y in g  o u t  th i s  s tu d y  i s  A l e x a n d e r  G e o r g e ’s  m e t h o d o l o g y  o f
Introduction
1
s t r u c tu r e d ,  f o c u s e d  c o m p a r i s o n  a n d  th e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  t a k i n g  th i s  a p p r o a c h  w i l l  b e  
d i s c u s s e d  in  c h a p te r  tw o .
M i l o s e v i c ’s  S e r b i a  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e f u l  a s  a  c a s e  s tu d y  in  w h ic h  to  a d d r e s s  
t h e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  in  th i s  t h e s i s  f o r  tw o  m a in  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t l y ,  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  t im e  
p e r io d  in  w h ic h  S e r b i a  w a s  s u b je c t e d  to  in t e r n a t i o n a l  c o e r c io n ,  th e r e  w e r e  d e m o c r a t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  o p e r a t i n g  w i th in  S e r b i a  w h ic h  r e g u l a r l y  c h a l l e n g e d  t h e  r e g im e ,  
e i t h e r  th r o u g h  e l e c t io n s  o r  m a s s  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s .  S e c o n d ly ,  a s  w i l l  b e  o u t l i n e d  in  
c h a p te r  tw o ,  S e r b i a  w a s  s u b je c t  to  a  v a r i e ty  o f  c o e r c iv e  p o l i c i e s  i n c lu d in g  
c o m p r e h e n s iv e  U N  s a n c t io n s ,  s a n c t io n s  t a r g e t e d  a t  t h e  M i lo s e v ic  r e g im e  d i r e c t ly ,  a n d  
e v e n  m i l i t a r y  a c t io n ,  a n d  s o  a l lo w s  f o r  a  c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  a  r a n g e  o f  
c o e r c iv e  s t r a t e g i e s  e m p lo y e d  b y  th e  IC .
C h a p te r s  t h r e e  to  e ig h t  a r e  th e  f iv e  c a s e  s tu d ie s  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  c o r e  o f  th i s  
r e s e a r c h  a n d  e a c h  c o v e r s  a  p a r t i c u l a r  t im e  p e r io d  in  w h ic h  S e r b i a ’s  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
in t e r n a t io n a l  c o e r c io n  d i f f e r e d .  In  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  c a s e  s tu d ie s  t h r e e  m a in  t h e m e s  w i l l  b e  
a d d r e s s e d .  F i r s t ly ,  th e  e x t e n t  to  w h ic h  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  c a n  b e  
c o n s id e r e d  to  h a v e  b e e n  a  c r e d ib l e  a l t e r n a t iv e  p a r t n e r  f o r  t h e  IC  w i l l  b e  a s s e s s e d  b y  
c o m p a r in g  th e i r  p o s i t i o n s  o n  th e  i s s u e s  t h a t  w e r e  o f  c e n t r a l  im p o r t a n c e  to  t h e  IC  to  
t h o s e  o f  t h e  M i lo s e v ic  r e g im e .  S e c o n d ly ,  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  th e  IC  
a n d  th e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  w i l l  b e  o u t l in e d .  A n d  f in a l ly ,  t h e  im p a c t  o f  
i n t e r n a t io n a l  p o l i c y  o n  th e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s ’ 
c a m p a ig n s  a g a in s t  t h e  M i lo s e v ic  r e g im e  w i l l  b e  e x a m in e d .  T h e  a im  w i l l  b e  to  
e v a lu a t e  w h e t h e r  i n t e r n a t io n a l  c o e r c iv e  p o l i c i e s  a c te d  to  u n d e r m i n e  o r  e n h a n c e  th e  
e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  S e r b i a ’s  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  in  t h e i r  c a m p a ig n s  a g a in s t  t h e  
M i lo s e v ic  r e g im e .
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C h a p t e r  1 :  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o e r c i o n  a n d  i t s  I m p a c t  o n  
D e m o c r a t i c  O p p o s i t i o n  P a r t i e s  i n  ‘ R o g u e ’  S t a t e s
W h i l e  i n t e r n a t io n a l  c o e r c io n  is  n o t  a  n e w  p h e n o m e n o n  in  i n t e r n a t io n a l  
r e l a t i o n s ,  i t s  u s e  a s  a  to o l  in  a n  e f f o r t  to  c o m p e l  t a r g e t  s t a t e s  to  c h a n g e  b e h a v i o u r  
c o n s id e r e d  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  b y  o t h e r  s t a t e s  a n d  in t e r n a t io n a l  a c to r s  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  in  th e  
p o s t - C o l d  W a r  p e r io d .  T h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  m a n d a t o r y  U N  s a n c t io n s  i n c r e a s e d  
d r a m a t i c a l l y  d u r in g  th e  1 9 9 0 s ,  w h i l e  in  t h e  p o s t - 9 /1 1  p e r io d  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  h a s  b e e n  
u s e d  a g a in s t  A f g h a n i s t a n  a n d  I r a q . F u r th e r m o r e ,  b o th  I r a n  a n d  N o r t h  K o r e a  h a v e  b e e n  
th r e a t e n e d  w i th  s im i l a r  c o e r c iv e  m e a s u r e s  in  a n  e f f o r t  to  f o r c e  th e m  to  c o m p ly  w i th  
t h e  d e m a n d s  o f  o t h e r  s t a te s  a n d  in t e r n a t io n a l  a c to r s .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  a n a ly s t s  h a v e  d e v o te d  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n  to  s u c h  i s s u e s ,  a n d  in  p a r t i c u l a r  to  t h e  u s e ,  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  a n d  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  s a n c t io n s .  H o w e v e r ,  g iv e n  th e  c e n t r a l i t y  o f  s t a te s  a n d  
g o v e r n m e n t s  in  m u c h  in t e r n a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s  th e o r y ,  i t  is  u n s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  th e  f o c u s  o f  
t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  th i s  w o r k  h a s  b e e n  o n  th e  s t a te s  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  a n d  
c o e r c e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  w i th  s c a n t  a t t e n t io n  b e i n g  p a id  to  t h e  im p a c t  o f  s u c h  p o l i c i e s  o n  
d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  w i th in  t h e  t a r g e t  s ta te s .  T h e s e  a c to r s  a r e  n o t  i n s ig n i f i c a n t  
h o w e v e r ,  a s  u s u a l l y  i t  i s  t h e s e  p a r t i e s  w h o  w i l l  f o r m  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h e  c o e r c e d  
s t a t e  o n c e  th e  ‘r o g u e ’ r e g i m e  h a s  b e e n  r e m o v e d .  R e c e n t  d i f f i c u l t y  s u r r o u n d i n g  th e  
f o r m a t io n  o f  a  g o v e r n m e n t  in  p o s t - S a d d a m  I ra q  h ig h l ig h t s  t h e  im p o r t a n c e  o f  s u c h  
a c to r s  a n d  th e  n e e d  f o r  b o th  p o l i c y m a k e r s  a n d  a n a ly s t s  to  r e a c h  a  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
o f  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  w i th in  t h e  s t a t e s  t h a t  a r e  s u b je c t  to  i n te r n a t io n a l  
c o e r c io n .  E x p e r i e n c e  in  b o th  I r a q  a n d  A f g h a n i s t a n  c l e a r ly  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  ‘r e g i m e  
c h a n g e ’ i s  a  c o n s i d e r a b l y  m o r e  c o m p le x  p r o c e s s  th a n  m e r e l y  r e m o v i n g  a n d  r e p l a c i n g  
a n  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  l e a d e r  o r  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  i t  is  a  p r o c e s s  t h a t  w i l l  i n v o l v e  d o m e s t i c
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p o l i t i c a l  a c to r s ,  m a n y  o f  w h o m  w i l l  h a v e  a t t e m p te d  to  o p e r a t e  w i th in  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a t e  
w h i l e  i t  w a s  s u b je c t  to  in t e r n a t io n a l  c o e r c io n .  I t i s  t h e s e  a c to r s  t h a t  a r e  t h e  c e n t r a l  
f o c u s  o f  th i s  s tu d y .
T h i s  r e s e a r c h  e x a m in e s  t h e  im p a c t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o e r c iv e  a c t io n  o n  th e  
in te r n a l  p o l i t i c s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a te ,  u s i n g  S e r b i a  d u r in g  t h e  M i lo s e v ic  e r a  a s  a  c a s e  
s tu d y .  T h e  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  o f  th i s  s t u d y  is  M a y  1 9 9 2  w h e n  S e r b i a  w a s  f i r s t  s u b je c t e d  to  
U N  s a n c t io n s ,  w h i l e  t h e  e n d  p o in t  i s  t h e  v i c t o r y  o f  S e r b i a ’s  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  
p a r t i e s  in  t h e  S e p te m b e r  2 0 0 0  e l e c t io n s  a n d  th e  e v e n tu a l  o v e r t h r o w  o f  M i lo s e v ic  
f o l lo w in g  a  m a s s  u p r i s i n g  in  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 0 ;  f o l l o w i n g  th i s  S e r b i a ’s  in t e r n a t io n a l  
i s o l a t i o n  w a s  g r a d u a l ly  r e d u c e d .  W h i l e  S e r b i a  d i f f e r s  in  s i g n i f i c a n t  w a y s  f r o m  I ra q , 
I r a n , A f g h a n i s t a n  a n d  N o r th  K o r e a ,  a s  d o  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  s t a t e s  f r o m  e a c h  o th e r ,  i t  
n e v e r th e l e s s  p r o v id e s  a n  u s e f u l  c a s e  s tu d y  w h e n  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  i s s u e  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  
in t e r n a t io n a l  c o e r c io n  o n  in t e r n a l  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s .
T w o  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  S e r b i a ’s  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  c o e r c io n  m a k e  i t  a  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u i t a b l e  c a s e  s tu d y  f o r  c o n s i d e r i n g  th e  im p a c t  o f  c o e r c iv e  p o l i c i e s  o n  
d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s .  F i r s t ly ,  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  t i m e  p e r io d  in  w h ic h  S e r b i a  w a s  
s u b je c t  to  in t e r n a t i o n a l  c o e r c io n ,  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  o p e r a t e d  w i th i n  S e r b ia  
a n d  r e g u l a r l y  c h a l l e n g e d  th e  M i lo s e v ic  r e g i m e  in  f e d e r a l ,  r e p u b l i c a n  a n d  lo c a l  
e l e c t io n s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h r o u g h  o r g a n i s i n g  m a s s  p r o t e s t s  a n d  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s .  T h i s  
p r o v id e s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  to  e x a m in e  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c t io n  o n  th e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h o s e  w h o  w e r e  c h a l l e n g i n g  M i lo s e v ic .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  m o s t  
o p p o s i t i o n  a t t e m p t s  to  u n s e a t  M i lo s e v ic  f a i l e d ,  th i s  c h a n g e d  in  2 0 0 0  w h e n  d e m o c r a t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  c h a l l e n g e d  th e  r e g i m e  in  f e d e r a l  e l e c t io n s  a n d  
s u b s e q u e n t l y  d e f e n d e d  th a t  v i c t o r y  a g a in s t  M i l o s e v i c ’s  a t t e m p t s  to  h a v e  i t  o v e r tu r n e d .  
T h i s  a l l o w s  f o r  a n  e x a m in a t i o n  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  a c to r s  in  t h e s e  e v e n t s  a n d
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p r o v i d e s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  to  c o n s i d e r  w h e t h e r  c h a n g e s  in  t h e  I C ’s  a p p r o a c h  to  S e r b i a  
a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  c o n t r i b u t e d  to  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n ’s  s u c c e s s .
A  f u r th e r  f e a tu r e  o f  S e r b i a ’s  e x p e r i e n c e  d u r in g  th e  1 9 9 0 s  t h a t  m a k e s  i t  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u i t a b l e  a s  a  c a s e  s tu d y  w i th in  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  is  t h e  v a r i e t y  o f  
c o e r c i v e  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  t h e  IC  u s e d  w h e n  d e a l i n g  w i th  S e r b ia .  T h e s e  i n c lu d e d  
m a n d a t o r y  U N  s a n c t io n s  in  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  th e  1 9 9 0 s , t a r g e t e d  s a n c t io n s  in  t h e  l a t t e r  
h a l f  o f  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  a n d  e v e n  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  in  1 9 9 9 , in  a d d i t i o n  to  a  p e r io d  f o l l o w in g  th e  
D a y to n  a g r e e m e n t  d u r i n g  w h ic h  t h e  c o e r c io n  a n d  i s o l a t i o n  o f  S e r b i a  w e r e  r e l a t i v e l y  
lo w . T h i s  r a n g e  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  a t t e m p t s  to  c o e r c e  th e  M i l o s e v i c  g o v e r n m e n t  m a k e s  i t  
p o s s i b l e  to  c o m p a r e  th e  im p a c t  o f  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  c o e r c iv e  p o l i c i e s  o n  th e  d e m o c r a t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  t h a t  w e r e  o p e r a t i n g  in  S e r b ia  d u r i n g  th i s  t im e .
T h e  e x t e n t  to  w h ic h  th e  I C ’s  c o e r c iv e  p o l i c i e s  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  S e r b ia  im p a c te d  
o n  th e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  i s  h e a v i ly  d e p e n d e n t  o n  th e  c o n te x t  in  w h ic h  
t h e s e  e v e n t s  t o o k  p la c e .  T h e  d e c i s io n s  m a d e  b y  i n d iv id u a l  a c to r s  w i th i n  t h e  S e r b ia n  
d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  w i l l  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  f r o m  a  c o m p le x  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  f a c to r s ,  o f  
w h ic h  in t e r n a t io n a l  p o l i c y  w i l l  o n l y  h a v e  b e e n  o n e .  F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  i t  i s  im p o r t a n t  to  
l o o k  in  s o m e  d e ta i l  a t  t h e  c o n te x t  in  w h ic h  th e s e  d e c i s i o n s  w e r e  m a d e  in  o r d e r  to  
c o n s i d e r  w h ic h  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n ’s a c t io n s  w e r e  in f lu e n c e d  b y  
in t e r n a t io n a l  p o l i c y .  F o r  th i s  r e a s o n  a  c a s e  s tu d y  r e s e a r c h  s t r a t e g y  w i l l  b e  u s e d  in  
c a r r y in g  o u t  th i s  s tu d y .  A s  Y in  s ta te s ,  a  c a s e  s tu d y  is  ‘a n  e m p i r i c a l  i n q u i r y  t h a t  
i n v e s t ig a t e s  a  c o n t e m p o r a r y  p h e n o m e n o n  w i th in  i t s  r e a l - l i f e  c o n te x t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n  
th e  b o u n d a r ie s  b e tw e e n  p h e n o m e n o n  a n d  c o n te x t  a r e  n o t  c l e a r ly  e v i d e n t ’ ( Y in ,  2 0 0 3 :  
1 3 ) . O n ly  t h r o u g h  a d o p t in g  a  c a s e  s tu d y  r e s e a r c h  s t r a t e g y  w i l l  i t  b e  p o s s i b l e  to  
t h o r o u g h l y  e x a m in e  th i s  c o n t e x t  a n d  a d d r e s s  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  p o s e d  b y  th i s  s tu d y .  
A l te r n a t i v e  a p p r o a c h e s ,  s u c h  a s  a n  e x p e r im e n ta l  r e s e a r c h  s t r a t e g y  o r  a  s t a t i s t i c a l  o r
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s u r v e y  b a s e d  r e s e a r c h  s t r a t e g y ,  w o u ld  s im p ly  n o t  b e  s u i t a b l e  f o r  a d d r e s s i n g  t h e s e  
i s s u e s .  Y in  s t a te s  t h a t  a  c a s e  s tu d y  r e s e a r c h  s t r a t e g y  h a s  a  d i s t i n c t  a d v a n t a g e  o v e r  
o t h e r  r e s e a r c h  s t r a t e g i e s  in  s i t u a t io n s  w h e n  ‘a  “ h o w ”  o r  “ w h y ”  q u e s t i o n  is  b e i n g  a s k e d  
a b o u t  a  c o n t e m p o r a r y  s e t  o f  e v e n t s  o v e r  w h ic h  th e  i n v e s t i g a t o r  h a s  l i t t l e  o r  n o  c o n t r o l ’ 
( Y in ,  2 0 0 3 :  9 ) . T h i s  i s  c e r t a i n l y  t h e  c a s e  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  t h e  c e n t r a l  f o c u s  o f  th i s  
r e s e a r c h .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  ‘t h e  c a s e  s t u d y  m e th o d  a l lo w s  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  to  r e t a in  t h e  
h o l i s t i c  a n d  m e a n in g f u l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  r e a l - l i f e  e v e n t s ’ ( Y in ,  2 0 0 3 :2 ) .  In  a d d i t i o n  
to  t h e s e  c o n s id e r a t io n s  r e g a r d i n g  th e  g e n e r a l  s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  a  c a s e  s t u d y  a p p r o a c h ,  t h e  
s p e c i f i c  m e th o d o l o g y  c h o s e n  f o r  th i s  s tu d y ,  A l e x a n d e r  G e o r g e ’s  m e t h o d  o f  s t r u c tu r e d ,  
f o c u s e d  c o m p a r i s o n ,  is  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w e l l  s u i t e d  g iv e n  th e  a im s  o f  t h e  m e th o d o lo g y .  
G e o r g e  d e v e lo p e d  th i s  m e t h o d o l o g y  in  o r d e r  to  b e  a b l e  to  a g g r e g a t e  t h e  f in d in g s  o f  
c a s e  s tu d i e s  in to  a  f o r m  o f  p o l i c y - r e l e v a n t  t h e o r y  a b o u t  t h e  u s e s  a n d  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  
s t r a t e g i e s  s u c h  a s  d e t e r r e n c e ,  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  c o e r c i v e  d i p l o m a c y  ( G e o r g e ,  
1 9 9 1 : x i i i ) .  A s  s u c h ,  th i s  i s  b r o a d l y  in  l in e  w i th  t h e  a im s  a n d  s u b je c t  m a t t e r  o f  th i s  
t h e s i s .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  in  t e r m s  o f  t h e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  th i s  a p p r o a c h ,  G e o r g e  n o te s ,  
‘i n t e n s iv e  a n a ly s i s  o f  a  f e w  c a s e s  m a y  b e  m o r e  r e w a r d i n g  th a n  a  m o r e  s u p e r f i c ia l  
s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  o f  m a n y  c a s e s ’ ( G e o r g e ,  1 9 7 9 :  5 0 ) .  T h i s  m e t h o d o l o g y  w i l l  b e  
d i s c u s s e d  in  g r e a t e r  d e ta i l  in  c h a p te r  2 .
In  c o n s i d e r i n g  th e  im p a c t  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  a c t io n s  o n  S e r b i a ’s  i n te r n a l  p o l i t i c s  
d u r i n g  t h i s  t im e ,  t h e  p r i m a r y  f o c u s  w i l l  b e  o n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  th a t  c h a l l e n g e d  M i lo s e v ic  f o r  p o w e r .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e s e  w e r e  n o t  t h e  o n ly  
a c to r s  t h a t  o p p o s e d  th e  M i lo s e v ic  r e g i m e  a t  th i s  t im e .  T h r o u g h o u t  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  
M i l o s e v i c  w a s  c h a l l e n g e d  b y  b o th  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  a n d  n o n - p a r t y  o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s ,  
f o r  e x a m p l e  th e  m a s s  m o v e m e n t  O t p o r  in  t h e  l a t e  1 9 9 0 s ;  a r m e d  g r o u p s  s u c h  a s  t h e  
K o s o v o  L ib e r a t io n  A r m y  ( K L A )  in  K o s o v o ;  a n d  f r o m  1 9 9 7  th e  e l e c t e d  g o v e r n m e n t  o f
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M o n te n e g r o ,  S e r b i a ’s  o n ly  p a r t n e r  in  t h e  Y u g o s l a v  f e d e r a t i o n .  W h i l e  a l l  o f  t h e s e  
g r o u p s  p l a y e d  s ig n i f i c a n t  r o l e s  in  o p p o s in g  a n d  w e a k e n i n g  M i lo s e v ic  a n d  h i s  r e g im e ,  
t h e  d e c i s io n  to  f o c u s  o n  th e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  h a s  b e e n  m a d e  f o r  tw o  
r e a s o n s .
F i r s t ly ,  in  s p i t e  o f  t h e  p o te n t i a l  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  in  
s t a te s  t h a t  a r e  s u b je c t  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o e r c io n ,  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  l i t t l e  a t t e n t io n  p a id  to  
t h e  im p a c t  o f  c o e r c io n  a n d  i s o l a t i o n  o n  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  in  t h o s e  s ta te s .  
T h e  a im  o f  th i s  th e s i s  i s  to  m a k e  th e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  t h e  c e n t r a l  f o c u s  o f  
i n q u i r y  a n d  to  c o n s id e r  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  p a r t i e s  a n d  th e  IC  th r o u g h o u t  
t h e  e n t i r e  t im e  p e r io d  in  w h ic h  S e r b i a  w a s ,  to  a  g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s e r  d e g r e e ,  
i n t e r n a t io n a l ly  i s o l a t e d  a n d  s u b j e c t  to  c o e r c io n .  T h e  c e n t r a l  q u e s t io n  th a t  w i l l  b e  
c o n s id e r e d  is  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  in t e r n a t io n a l  i s o l a t i o n  a n d  o t h e r  c o e r c iv e  m e a s u r e s  
s e r v e d  to  u n d e r m i n e  o r  e n h a n c e  th e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s ’ a b i l i t y  to  o p e r a t e  
e f f e c t i v e l y  a g a in s t  t h e  M i lo s e v ic  r e g im e .
T h e  s e c o n d  r e a s o n  f o r  s e l e c t i n g  th e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  a s  th e  
c e n t r a l  f o c u s  o f  th i s  r e s e a r c h ,  r e l a t e s  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th i s  s tu d y  w i l l  b e  c o n s id e r in g  th e  
im p a c t  o f  in t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  a s  f o r m u la t e d  b y  s ta te s  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n s t i tu t io n s .  
U n d e r s t a n d a b l y  a n d  in e v i t a b ly ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  M i l o s e v i c ’s  S e r b ia  
w i l l  h a v e  b e e n  d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d s  a t t e m p t in g  to  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c i e s  a n d  a c t io n s  t h a t  
t h e  IC  c o n s id e r e d  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  w o u ld  b e  h a l t e d  o r  r e v e r s e d .  U n t i l  t h e  l a te  1 9 9 0 s ,  t h e  
p r i m a r y  m e a n s  b y  w h ic h  t h e  IC  a t t e m p te d  to  a c h i e v e  i t s  o b j e c t iv e s  in  S e r b i a  w a s  
t h r o u g h  th e  c o e r c io n  o f  t h e  S e r b ia n  a u th o r i t i e s  in  a n  e f f o r t  to  m a k e  c o m p l i a n c e  w i th  
i n t e r n a t io n a l  d e m a n d s  a  m o r e  a t t r a c t i v e  o p t i o n  th a n  c o n t in u e d  d e f ia n c e .  A t  i s s u e  h e r e  
is  w h e t h e r  a n d  h o w  th i s  a p p r o a c h  to  S e r b i a  o n  th e  p a r t  o f  t h e  IC  im p a c t e d  o n  th e  
e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  in  t h e i r  c a m p a ig n s  a g a in s t  t h e
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r e g im e .  G iv e n  t h a t  s u c h  a n  a p p r o a c h  m a y  h a v e  e f f e c t i v e l y  r u l e d  o u t  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  
m e a n s  b y  w h ic h  th e  IC  c o u ld  h a v e  a c h ie v e d  i t s  o b j e c t i v e s  in  S e r b ia  - t h a t  i s  t h r o u g h  a  
c h a n g e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  t h a t  w o u ld  h a v e  p u r s u e d  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c i e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  
t h r o u g h  c o e r c io n  o f  t h e  a u th o r i t i e s  th e n  in  p o w e r  - th i s  i s  a  q u e s t io n  t h a t  d e s e r v e s  
c o n s id e r a t io n .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  in  t h e  S e r b ia n  c o n te x t ,  h a d  th e  IC  c h o s e n  s u c h  a  s t r a te g y ,  
i t  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o p p o s i t i o n  to  M i lo s e v ic  t h a t  w o u ld  h a v e  f o r m e d  a n  
a l t e r n a t iv e  to  t h e  M i lo s e v ic  r e g im e ,  a n d  th u s  i t  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  t h e s e  p a r t i e s  t h a t  th e  
IC  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  d e a l i n g  w i th  in  o r d e r  to  a c h ie v e  i t s  g o a ls .  H o w e v e r ,  th i s  i s  n o t  to  
i m p ly  th a t  h a d  th e  IC  p u r s u e d  a  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g y  in  S e r b i a  t h a t  i n v o lv e d  b o l s t e r i n g  
th e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  th a t  th i s  w o u ld  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  in  t h e  o v e r th r o w  o f  th e  r e g im e  
a n d  th e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  IC  g o a l s ;  a t  b e s t ,  s u c h  c o n c lu s io n s  c a n  b e  n o t h i n g  o th e r  th a n  
s p e c u la t iv e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  is  p o s s i b l e  to  a n a ly s e  t h e  im p a c t  o f  IC  p o l i c y  o n  t h e  
d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  a n d  to  d r a w  c o n c lu s io n s  r e g a r d i n g  th e  e x t e n t  to  w h ic h  
IC  p o l i c y  m a y  h a v e  e i t h e r  u n d e r m in e d  o r  e n h a n c e d  th e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  t h e  
d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n .
G iv e n  th e  a im s  o f  th i s  r e s e a r c h ,  a n  i m p o r t a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  is  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  
a n  in t e r n a t i o n a l l y  a c c e p t a b le  a l t e r n a t iv e  to  t h e  M i lo s e v ic  r e g im e  e x i s t e d  in  S e r b ia  
d u r in g  th e  t im e  p e r io d  b e i n g  c o n s id e r e d  in  th i s  r e s e a r c h .  A s  s u c h  a  m a j o r  c o n c e r n  is  to  
e x a m in e  th e  e x t e n t  to  w h ic h  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  in  S e r b ia  h e ld  p o s i t i o n s  
t h a t  w e r e  d i f f e r e n t  to  t h o s e  o f  t h e  M i lo s e v i c  r e g i m e  o n  th e  i s s u e s  t h a t  w e r e  o f  k e y  
i m p o r t a n c e  to  th e  IC , a n d  a n s w e r in g  th i s  q u e s t io n  w i l l  b e  t h e  f i r s t  t a s k  o f  th i s  s tu d y .
O n c e  i t  h a s  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  
d id  h o ld  p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  w e r e  c lo s e r  to  t h o s e  o f  t h e  IC  th a n  w e r e  th e  p o s i t i o n s  o f  th e  
M i lo s e v ic  r e g im e ,  a n d  a s  s u c h  r e p r e s e n te d ,  a t  l e a s t  in  p r in c ip l e ,  a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  p a r t n e r  
f o r  t h e  IC , th e r e  w i l l  th e n  b e  a n  e x a m in a t io n  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  c o e r c i v e
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p o l i c i e s  o n  th e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  a n d  t h e i r  a c t iv i t i e s .  T h i s  w i l l  b e  d o n e  
t h r o u g h  a  s e r i e s  o f  f i v e  c a s e  s tu d ie s ,  in  e a c h  o f  w h ic h  S e r b i a ’s  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
in t e r n a t io n a l  i s o l a t i o n  a n d  c o e r c io n  w a s  d i f f e r e n t ,  a n d  th i s  w i l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  in  g r e a t e r  
d e ta i l  in  c h a p te r  2 . H o w e v e r ,  b e f o r e  p r o c e e d i n g  to  a n a ly s e  t h e  im p a c t  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  
p o l i c y  o n  th e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  in  S e r b i a  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  to  c o n s id e r  t h e  u s e  o f  
c o e r c i v e  p o l i c i e s  in  g e n e r a l ,  t h e i r  i m p a c t s  a n d  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  a n d  w h e t h e r  e x i s t i n g  
th e o r i e s  m ig h t  g iv e  a n y  i n d ic a t io n  o f  w h a t  t h e  l i k e ly  e f f e c t  o f  c o e r c io n  o n  d e m o c r a t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  m ig h t  b e .
International Coercion and ‘Rogue’ States
T h e  i n c r e a s i n g  u s e  o f  c o e r c io n  a n d  in t e r n a t io n a l  i s o l a t i o n  to  b r i n g  a b o u t  p o l i c y  
c h a n g e s  in  ‘r o g u e ’ s t a te s  h a s  le d  to  d e b a te  r e g a r d i n g  th e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  s u c h  
p o l i c i e s .  A t  p r e s e n t  th e r e  is  l i t t l e  a g r e e m e n t  a m o n g  a n a ly s t s  a s  to  w h e th e r ,  o r  u n d e r  
w h a t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  c o e r c i v e  p o l i c i e s  c a n  b e  c o n s id e r e d  to  b e  e f f e c t iv e  o r  to  h a v e  
s u c c e e d e d  in  b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  th e  c h a n g e s  d e s i r e d  b y  t h e  c o e r c e r  s t a t e s  a n d  in s t i tu t io n s .  
I n d e e d ,  th e r e  is  e v e n  d i s a g r e e m e n t  r e g a r d i n g  h o w  ‘s u c c e s s ’ s h o u ld  b e  d e f in e d .  
L a r g e ly  a b s e n t  f r o m  th i s  d e b a te ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  d e t a i l e d  a n a ly s i s  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  
c o e r c i v e  p o l i c i e s  o n  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  o p e r a t i n g  w i th in  s u c h  s ta te s .  T h i s  is  
in  s p i t e  o f  t h e  p o te n t i a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  s u c h  a c to r s ,  a s  w i l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  in  g r e a t e r  
d e ta i l  b e lo w .  A  f u l l e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  c o e r c io n  o n  d e m o c r a t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  w i th i n  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a te  a n d  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  th e  IC  a n d  
d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  s h o u ld  b e  c o n s id e r e d  w h e n  d e c i d in g  w h e t h e r  c o e r c iv e  
p o l i c i e s  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  c o u r s e  o f  a c t io n  in  p a r t i c u l a r  s i tu a t io n s .  T h i s  
s e c t io n  w i l l  b e g i n  w i th  a  b r i e f  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  h o w  ‘r o g u e  s t a t e s ’ a r e  to  b e  d e f in e d  in
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t h i s  s t u d y  a n d  th e  p r i m a r y  m e a n s  b y  w h ic h  th e  IC  m o s t  c o m m o n l y  t r i e s  to  c o e r c e  s u c h  
s t a t e s  in to  c h a n g in g  t h e i r  b e h a v io u r .  T h i s  w i l l  b e  f o l l o w e d  b y  a  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
m a in  t h e m e s  in  t h e  d e b a t e  s u r r o u n d i n g  t h e  u s e ,  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n d  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  
c o e r c i v e  p o l i c i e s ,  a n d  t h e  p o te n t i a l  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  c o n s i d e r i n g  th e  im p a c t  s u c h  p o l i c i e s  
h a v e  o n  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  w i th in  t h e  t a r g e t  s ta te .
T h e  t e r m  ‘r o g u e  s t a t e ’ h a s  b e c o m e  p a r t  o f  t h e  l e x i c o n  o f  p o s t - C o l d  W a r  
in t e r n a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  u s e d  r e g u l a r l y  b y  p o l i c y m a k e r s ,  j o u r n a l i s t s  a n d  a c a d e m ic s .  In  
t h e  c o n t e m p o r a r y  c o n te x t ,  u s a g e  o f  t h e  t e r m ,  a n d  o f  s y n o n y m s  s u c h  a s  ‘p a r i a h  s t a t e ’ , 
‘o u t l a w  s t a t e ’ o r  ‘o u tc a s t  s t a t e ’, c o n ju r e  u p  im a g e s  o f  t e r r o r i s t - s p o n s o r i n g  s ta te s  o f  th e  
m i d d l e - E a s t  t h a t  a r e  p u r s i n g  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  w e a p o n s  o f  m a s s  d e s t r u c t i o n  ( W M D )  
a s  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  s t r u g g l e  a g a in s t  ‘W e s t e r n ’ ( o r  m o r e  p r e c i s e l y  A m e r i c a n )  v a lu e s .  
A c c o r d i n g  to  th i s  s t e r e o ty p e ,  S e r b i a  in  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  w o u ld  n o t  q u a l i f y  a s  a  ‘r o g u e  s t a t e ’ . 
H o w e v e r ,  th i s  u s a g e  r e f l e c t s  t h e  c o n t e m p o r a r y  c o n c e r n s  o f  U S  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y m a k e r s  
a n d  ig n o r e s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  r o g u e  s ta te s  h a v e  e x i s t e d  t h r o u g h o u t  h i s t o r y  a n d  h a v e  b e e n  
s e e n  a s  s u c h  f o r  a  v a r i e t y  o f  r e a s o n s  r e l a t e d  to  b o t h  t h e i r  in te r n a l  a n d  e x te r n a l  
b e h a v io u r .  In  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h ,  a n d  d r a w i n g  o n  th e  w o r k  o f  D e o n  
G e ld e n h u y s ,  ‘r o g u e  s t a t e s ’ w i l l  b e  d e f in e d  a s  t h o s e  s t a te s  t h a t  a r e  s u b j e c t e d  to  a  p o l i c y  
o f  e n f o r c e d  i n t e r n a t io n a l  i s o l a t i o n  ( G e ld e n h u y s ,  1 9 9 0 ) .
A t te m p t s  to  d e f in e  r o g u e  s ta te s  in  t e r m s  o f  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  t h a t  t h e y  e n g a g e  in  
h a v e  p r o v e n  to  b e  u n s u c c e s s f u l ,  a s  is  a c k n o w le d g e d  b y  m a n y  a u th o r s  w h o  h a v e  
w r i t t e n  o n  th e  s u b je c t  ( C h o m s k y ,  2 0 0 0 ;  H o y t ,  2 0 0 0 ,  K la r e ,  1 9 9 5 ;  L i t tw a k ,  2 0 0 0 ;  
T a n te r ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  T h e  l a c k  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y  i n h e r e n t  in  t h e  l a b e l l i n g  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  s t a te s  a s  
r o g u e s  m a k e s  d e f i n i n g  th e  t e r m  w i th  r e f e r e n c e  to  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  d e s ig n a te d  
s ta te s  p r o b l e m a t i c ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  a  d i f f e r e n t  a p p r o a c h  is  n e e d e d .  In  th i s  r e g a r d ,  D e o n  
G e l d e n h u y s ’ w o r k  o n  i s o l a t e d  s t a t e s  is  p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e f u l  ( G e ld e n h u y s ,  1 9 9 0 ) .  F o r
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G e ld e n h u y s ,  ‘p a r i a h  s t a t e s ’ o r  ‘o s t r a c i s e d  s t a t e s ’ a r e  m e r e l y  a  c a t e g o r y  o f  i s o l a t e d  
s t a t e  ( G e ld e n h u y s ,  1 9 9 0 :  2 ) . W h i l e  a c k n o w le d g in g  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  s t a t e s  c a n  b e  
v o l u n t a r i l y  i s o l a t e d  o r  i s o l a t e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  i n t e r n a t io n a l  i n s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  
G e l d e n h u y s ’ 1 9 9 0  s tu d y  is  a  c o m p a r a t iv e  a n a ly s i s  o f  s e v e r a l  s t a t e s  t h a t  w e r e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  i s o l a t e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  d e l i b e r a t e  a c t io n  o n  th e  p a r t  o f  o u t s i d e  s ta te s .  
G e ld e n h u y s  d e f in e s  e n f o r c e d  i s o l a t i o n  a s  ‘a  d e l i b e r a t e  p o l i c y  p u r s u e d  b y  tw o  o r  m o r e  
s t a te s  a g a in s t  a n o th e r ,  o v e r  a  p e r io d  o f  t im e ,  a im e d  a t  s e v e r i n g  o r  c u r t a i l i n g  t h e  
l a t t e r ’s in t e r n a t i o n a l  i n t e r a c t io n s  a g a in s t  i t s  w i l l ’ ( G e ld e n h u y s ,  1 9 9 0 : 6 ) . T h i s  ty p e  o f  
p o l i c y  is  ‘d e s ig n e d  to  c o m p e l  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a te  to  a d ju s t  o r  a b a n d o n  v a lu e s  t h a t  a r e  
o f f e n s iv e  to  o u t s id e  p o w e r s ’ ( G e ld e n h u y s ,  1 9 9 0 : 7 ) . D e f i n i n g  th e  o s t r a c i s e d  s t a t e  a s  
o n e  th a t  i s  s u b je c t e d  to  a  p o l i c y  o f  e n f o r c e d  i s o l a t i o n  b y  o u t s i d e  p o w e r s  c a p tu r e s  th e  
r e a l i t y  o f  c o n t e m p o r a r y  in t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  a n d  a v o id s  t r y i n g  to  f o r m u la t e  a n  
o b je c t iv e  d e f in i t i o n  f o r  w h a t  is  in  e s s e n c e  a  h i g h l y  s u b j e c t i v e  c o n c e p t .  W h e n  
G e l d e n h u y s ’ f r a m e w o r k  f o r  m e a s u r i n g  in t e r n a t i o n a l  i s o l a t i o n  is  a p p l i e d  to  S e r b ia  
d u r in g  th e  M i lo s e v ic  e r a  i t  m a k e s  i t  p o s s ib l e  to  b r e a k  d o w n  th e  t im e  p e r io d  u n d e r  
c o n s id e r a t io n  in  th i s  s tu d y  in to  f i v e  s u b - p e r io d s ,  in  e a c h  o f  w h ic h  S e r b i a ’s e x p e r i e n c e  
o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  i s o l a t i o n  w a s  d i f f e r e n t ,  a n d  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  s u b - p e r io d s  r e p r e s e n t s  a  
d i s t i n c t  c a s e  s tu d y  w i th i n  th i s  r e s e a r c h .  G e l d e n h u y s ’ f r a m e w o r k  a n d  i ts  u s e f u ln e s s  in  
r e l a t i o n  to  S e r b i a  w i l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  f u l ly  in  c h a p t e r  2 .
Sanctions
T h e  p r i m a r y  m e a n s  b y  w h ic h  th e  IC  a t t e m p t s  to  c o e r c e  a  s t a te  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  
d e s ig n a te d  a s  a  p a r i a h  o r  o u tc a s t  a r e  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  s a n c t io n s  a n d  th e  u s e  o f  
m i l i t a r y  f o r c e ,  w i th  s a n c t io n s  o f t e n  s e e n  a s  a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  to  t h e  u s e  o f  f o r c e  ( P a p e ,
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1 9 9 7 : 9 0 ) .  T h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  s a n c t io n s  i s  n o t  a  r e c e n t  p h e n o m e n o n  in  i n t e r n a t io n a l  
r e l a t i o n s ,  b u t  t h e i r  u s e  h a s  g r o w n  s in c e  W o r l d  W a r  I ( P a p e ,  1 9 9 7 : 9 0 ;  R o s e ,  2 0 0 5 :  
4 5 9 ) .  T h e  p o s t - C o ld  W a r  e r a  s a w  a  s ig n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  in  t h e  u s e  o f  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
s a n c t io n s .  U n t i l  1 9 9 0  th e  U N  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c i l  h a d  i m p o s e d  m a n d a t o r y  s a n c t io n s  o n ly  
tw ic e ,  a g a in s t  R h o d e s i a  in  1 9 6 6  a n d  S o u th  A f r i c a  in  1 9 7 7 . H o w e v e r ,  t h e  e n d in g  o f  t h e  
s u p e r p o w e r  c o n f l i c t  f a c i l i t a t e d  a g r e e m e n t  b e t w e e n  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ’s  p e r m a n e n t  
m e m b e r s ,  a n d  U N  s a n c t io n s  w e r e  im p o s e d  o n  12  o c c a s i o n s  d u r i n g  th e  1 9 9 0 s , l e a d in g  
C o r t r ig h t  a n d  L o p e z  to  r e f e r  to  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  a s  ‘T h e  S a n c t io n s  D e c a d e ’ ( C o r t r ig h t  a n d  
L o p e z ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  O u t s i d e  o f  t h e  U N , o t h e r  i n t e r n a t io n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  a n d  in d iv id u a l  
s t a te s  a l s o  i m p o s e  s a n c t io n s ,  w i th  t h e  U S  a n d  th e  E U  im p o s i n g  m o s t  o f  t h e  n o n - U N  
s a n c t io n s  t h a t  w e r e  p u t  in  p l a c e  d u r in g  th e  1 9 9 0 s  ( C o r t r ig h t  a n d  L o p e z ,  2 0 0 0 :  1 3 ). 
T h e  U S  h a s  m a d e  r e g u l a r  u s e  o f  s a n c t io n s  a s  p a r t  o f  i t s  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  w i th  K a e m p f e r  
a n d  L o w e n b e r g  n o t i n g  t h a t  in  2 0 0 1  ‘th e  U S  h a d  u n i l a t e r a l  e c o n o m i c  s a n c t io n s  e i t h e r  
in  p l a c e  o r  p e n d i n g  a g a in s t  7 4  c o u n t r i e s ’ ( K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g ,  2 0 0 4 :  3 1 ) . 
I n d e e d  th e  u s e  o f  s a n c t io n s  h a s  b e e n  s o  p r e v a l e n t  in  r e c e n t  t i m e s  th a t  b y  1 9 9 8  a lm o s t  
h a l f  o f  t h e  w o r l d ’s p o p u l a t i o n  l iv e d  in  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  w e r e  s u b je c t  to  s a n c t io n s  ( R o s e ,  
2 0 0 5 :  4 5 9 ) .
In  s p i t e  o f  t h e  w i d e s p r e a d  u s e  o f  s a n c t io n s ,  m a n y  a n a l y s t s  a r g u e  t h a t  s u c h  
m e a s u r e s  a r e  n o t  a n  e f f e c t i v e  m e a n s  o f  a c h i e v i n g  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h o s e  im p o s i n g  
s a n c t io n s ,  a  s i t u a t io n  B a ld w in  h a s  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  th e  ‘b a s i c  p a r a d o x  a t  t h e  h e a r t  o f  th e  
s a n c t io n s  d e b a t e ’ ( B a ld w in ,  1 9 9 9 : 8 0 ) . F u r th e r m o r e ,  r e s e a r c h  i n d ic a t e s  t h a t  s a n c t io n s  
h a v e  b e c o m e  le s s  e f f e c t i v e  o v e r  t im e  w i th  l e s s  t h a n  a  q u a r t e r  b e i n g  j u d g e d  to  h a v e  
a c h ie v e d  t h e i r  o b j e c t iv e s  in  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  1 9 8 0 s  ( E l l i o t t ,  1 9 9 8 :  5 0 ) . In  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  
h u m a n i t a r i a n  s u f f e r in g  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  c a u s e d  b y  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  t r a d e  s a n c t io n s  h a s  le d  
s o m e  a n a ly s t s  to  d i s p u t e  t h e i r  n o n - v i o l e n t  c h a r a c t e r  ( V a n  B r a b a n t ,  1 9 9 9 : 1 5 ) , w h i l e
12
th e  p e r c e p t io n  th a t  s a n c t i o n s  m i g h t  p r o v i d e  a  c h e a p  a l t e r n a t i v e  to  t h e  u s e  o f  f o r c e  is  
a l s o  q u e s t io n e d  ( V a n  B r a b a n t ,  1 9 9 9 : 7 ; G a l tu n g ,  1 9 6 7 :  4 1 2 ) .  It i s  n o t  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  
t h i s  s tu d y  to  e x a m in e  th e  u t i l i t y  o r  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  s a n c t io n s  a n d  o t h e r  c o e r c i v e  
p o l i c i e s .  H o w e v e r ,  g iv e n  th e  e x t e n s iv e  u s e  o f  s u c h  m e a s u r e s ,  i t  i s  im p o r t a n t  t h a t  t h e i r  
im p a c t  a n d  c o n s e q u e n c e s  a r e  f u l ly  u n d e r s to o d ,  a n d  to  d a t e  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a  l a c k  o f  
a t t e n t io n  p a id  to  t h e  im p a c t  t h a t  s u c h  p o l i c i e s  h a v e  o n  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  
in  t a r g e t  s ta te s .  A s  w i l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  b e lo w ,  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  in  a n y  s ta te  
s u b je c t  to  c o e r c io n  a r e  p o t e n t i a l l y  h i g h l y  s ig n i f i c a n t  a c to r s ;  in d e e d  s o m e  a r g u e  th a t  
t h e y  a r e  t h e  k e y  a c to r s  in  s t a te s  s u b je c t  to  s a n c t io n s  ( K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g ,  
1 9 9 9 ) .  A s  s u c h ,  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  h o w  s a n c t io n s  a n d  o t h e r  c o e r c i v e  p o l i c i e s  im p a c t  o n  
d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  a c to r s  m a y  a l s o  b e  u s e f u l  in  t e r m s  o f  i d e n t i f y i n g  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  
w h ic h  s a n c t io n s  a r e  m o r e  l i k e ly  to  b e  e f f e c t iv e ,  a n d  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  in  w h ic h  th e y  m a y  
b e  in a p p r o p r i a t e .
T h e r e  is  n o  s in g le  d e f in i t i o n  o f  s a n c t io n s ,  b u t  m o s t  d e f in i t i o n s  s h a r e  a  n u m b e r  
o f  c o m m o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  s a n c t io n s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s id e r e d  to  b e  c o e r c iv e ,  to  b e  
a im e d  a t  e f f e c t in g  c h a n g e  in  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a te ,  a n d  a r e  im p o s e d  in  
p u r s u i t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r a th e r  th a n  e c o n o m ic  g o a ls .  P a p e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  e c o n o m i c  s a n c t io n s  
f r o m  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  e c o n o m ic  p r e s s u r e  s u c h  a s  t r a d e  w a r s  o r  e c o n o m ic  
w a r f a r e ,  a r g u in g  t h a t  ‘s a n c t io n s  s e e k  to  l o w e r  t h e  a g g r e g a te  e c o n o m ic  w e l f a r e  o f  a  
t a r g e t  s t a t e  b y  r e d u c i n g  i n t e r n a t io n a l  t r a d e  in  o r d e r  to  c o e r c e  th e  t a r g e t  g o v e r n m e n t  to  
c h a n g e  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  b e h a v i o u r ’ ( P a p e ,  1 9 9 7 : 9 3 - 9 4 ) .  D r u r y  o f f e r s  a  s im i l a r  d e f in i t i o n  
c l a i m i n g  th a t  e c o n o m ic  s a n c t io n s  a r e  ‘ f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  t o o l s  u s e d  b y  th e  s e n d e r  c o u n t r y  
to  p r e s s u r e  t h e  t a r g e t  c o u n t r y  to  c o n f o r m  to  t h e  s e n d e r ’s  d e m a n d s ’ ( D r u r y ,  2 0 0 1 :  
4 8 8 ) .  W h i l e  C h a n  a n d  D r u r y  in c lu d e  th e  ‘t h r e a t e n e d  w i th d r a w a l  o f  e c o n o m ic  
r e s o u r c e s ’ in  t h e i r  d e f in i t i o n  o f  s a n c t io n s ,  t h e y  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  s u c h  a
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s t r a t e g y  is  to  b r in g  a b o u t  a  c h a n g e  o f  p o l i c y  in  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a t e  ( C h a n  a n d  D r u r y ,  2 0 0 0 :  
1 -2 ) .
T h e s e  d e f in i t i o n s  f o c u s  o n  e c o n o m ic  s a n c t io n s ,  b u t  i t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  f o r  s t a te s  
to  b e  i s o la te d  in  o t h e r  a r e a s  a s  w e l l ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l ,  d ip lo m a t i c ,  m i l i t a r y  a n d  
c u l tu r a l  s p h e r e s  ( D o x e y ,  1 9 9 6 :  1 1 ; H a a s s ,  1 9 9 8 :  1 ). G e ld e n h u y s ,  w h o  d e s c r ib e s  
s a n c t io n s  a s  ‘t h e  c u t t i n g  e d g e  o f  i s o l a t i o n ’ ( G e ld e n h u y s ,  1 9 9 0 :  2 0 ) ,  c l a im s  th a t  a  s t a t e  
c a n  b e  s u b je c t  to  i n t e r n a t io n a l  i s o l a t i o n  in  f o u r  a r e a s :  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  d ip lo m a t i c ,  
e c o n o m ic ,  m i l i t a r y  a n d  s o c io - c u l tu r a l ,  a n d  h e  p r o v i d e s  a  d e t a i l e d  l i s t  o f  in d i c a to r s  o f  
in t e r n a t io n a l  i s o l a t i o n  b y  w h ic h  th e  e x t e n t  o f  a  s t a t e ’s  i s o l a t i o n  c a n  b e  m e a s u r e d  
( G e ld e n h u y s ,  1 9 9 0 ) .
W h i l e  i t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  s a n c t io n s  i s  a  c o e r c iv e  
m e a s u r e  d e s ig n e d  to  e f f e c t  p o l i t i c a l  c h a n g e  in  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a te ,  s o m e  a u th o r s  n o te  t h a t  
s a n c t io n s  m a y  h a v e  o t h e r  g o a l s ,  o f t e n  u n s p e c i f i e d ,  a n d  t h a t  in  e v a lu a t in g  s a n c t io n s  
t h e s e  u n s t a t e d  g o a l s  s h o u ld  b e  c o n s id e r e d  in  a d d i t i o n  to  t h e  in s t r u m e n ta l  g o a l s  o f  
b e h a v i o u r  m o d i f i c a t io n .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  t r u e  
g o a l  o f  s a n c t io n s  m a y  b e  ‘to  s e r v e  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  p r e s s u r e  g r o u p s  w i th in  th e  
s a n c t io n in g  c o u n t r y ’ ( K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g ,  1 9 8 8 :  7 8 6 ) ,  w h i l e  C o r t r i g h t  a n d  
L o p e z  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  s a n c t i o n s  c a n  b e  im p o s e d  f o r  s y m b o l i c  p u r p o s e s  in  a d d i t i o n  to  
t h e  s t a te d  o b je c t iv e s  o f  t h e  s e n d e r s .  T h e s e  f a c to r s ,  t h e y  a r g u e ,  n e e d  to  b e  ‘c o n s id e r e d  
in  e v a l u a t i n g  th e  p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  s a n c t i o n s ’ ( C o r t r i g h t  a n d  L o p e z ,  1 9 9 0 :  1 6 ). 
In  a  s im i l a r  v e in ,  D a s h t i - G i b s o n  e t  a l  s t a te  t h a t  th e y :
s u s p e c t  t h a t  s a n c t io n s  a r e  n o t  a lw a y s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e s ig n e d  to  s u c c e e d ,  o r  
a t  l e a s t  n o t  to  s u c c e e d  in  t h e i r  o s t e n s ib l e  ( i .e . ,  p u b l i c l y  s t a t e d )  g o a ls .  I f , 
in s t e a d ,  t h e  a c tu a l  g o a l s  a r e  p u r e l y  s y m b o l i c  o r  e x p r e s s iv e ,  t h e y  c a n  
h a r d l y  f a i l  to  s u c c e e d  in  t h e i r  t r u e  g o a l  o f  s h o w in g  d i s a p p r o v a l ,  b u t  a r e  
n o n e t h e l e s s  j u d g e d  a s  u n s u c c e s s f u l  b e c a u s e  th e y  d id  n o t  p r o d u c e  th e
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c h a n g e  in  b e h a v i o u r  t h a t  w a s  th e  o f f i c i a l ,  r h e t o r i c a l  g o a l  ( D a s h t i - G ib s o n  
e t  a l ,  1 9 9 7 : 6 1 6 ) .
B a ld w in  a ls o  a r g u e s  t h a t  e v a l u a t i n g  th e  s u c c e s s  o f  a  s a n c t i o n s  p o l i c y  s h o u ld  e n ta i l  
m o r e  th a n  s im p ly  c o n s i d e r i n g  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  s t a te d  g o a l s  o f  t h e  s e n d e r s  w e r e  
a c h ie v e d .  H e  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  a  s a n c t io n s  p o l i c y  o u g h t  to  b e  e v a lu a t e d  w i th  
r e f e r e n c e  to  t h e  c o s t s  to  b o t h  th e  u s e r  a n d  th e  t a r g e t  a n d  th e  s t a k e s  f o r  b o t h  th e  u s e r  
a n d  th e  t a r g e t ,  in  a d d i t i o n  to  t h e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  in  a c h i e v i n g  g o a l s  
( B a ld w in ,  1 9 9 8 : 9 0 ) .
O th e r  a n a ly s t s  h o w e v e r ,  c o n s id e r  t h a t  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  s t a te d  g o a l s  o f  t h o s e  
i m p o s i n g  s a n c t io n s  w e r e  a c h ie v e d  is  c e n t r a l  to  t h e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  t h e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  a  
s a n c t io n s  p o l i c y  ( P a p e ,  1 9 9 7 : 9 7 ;  M o r g a n  a n d  S c h w e b a c h ,  1 9 9 7 :  2 9 ) ,  w h i l e  V a n  
B r a b a n t  a r g u e s  t h a t  s a n c t io n s  c a n  o n ly  b e  c o n s id e r e d  s u c c e s s f u l  ‘in  t h e i r  e x p r e s s iv e  
f u n c t io n ,  i f  o n e  ig n o r e s  t h e  s u f f e r i n g  o f  c iv i l i a n s  n o t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  t h e  t a r g e t  r e g im e  
t h a t  t h e y  m a y  c a u s e ’ ( V a n  B r a b a n t ,  1 9 9 9 : 3 4 ) .  W h i l e  s a n c t io n s  m a y  s e r v e  p u r p o s e s  
b e y o n d  th a t  o f  c h a n g in g  th e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  t a r g e t ,  i t  i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  th e  
i m p o s i t i o n  o f  s a n c t io n s  i s  u s u a l l y  a c c o m p a n ie d  b y  d e m a n d s  f o r  b e h a v i o u r  
m o d i f i c a t i o n  o n  th e  p a r t  o f  t h e  s e n d e r s  a n d  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  to  a s s u m e  t h a t  a n  o p t im a l  
o u t c o m e  w o u ld  b e  th a t  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a t e  c o m p l i e s  w i th  t h e s e  d e m a n d s .  A s  s u c h ,  w i th in  
t h e  c o n te x t  o f  th i s  s tu d y ,  w h e n  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n s  o f  t h o s e  i m p o s i n g  
s a n c t io n s  i t  w i l l  b e  t h e i r  s t a te d  d e m a n d s  f o r  b e h a v i o u r  c h a n g e  o n  th e  p a r t  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  
s t a te ,  in  t h i s  c a s e  M i l o s e v i c ’s S e r b ia ,  t h a t  w i l l  b e  c o n s id e r e d .  G iv e n  th a t  t h e  e m p h a s i s  
h e r e  is  o n  th e  im p a c t  o f  s a n c t io n s  a n d  o t h e r  c o e r c i v e  p o l i c i e s  o n  t h e  i n te r n a l  p o l i t i c s  
o f  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a t e  t h e  i s s u e  o f  w h e t h e r  s a n c t io n s  m a y  b e  f u l f i l l i n g  f u n c t io n s  b e y o n d  
t h e  t a r g e t  s t a t e  is  n o t  o f  c e n t r a l  c o n c e r n .  A s  s u c h ,  w i th i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  th i s  s tu d y ,
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s a n c t i o n s  w i l l  b e  d e f in e d  a s  c o e r c i v e  m e a s u r e s  i n t e n d e d  to  i n d u c e  t h e  t a r g e t  r e g i m e  to  
c h a n g e  i t s  b e h a v i o u r  in  l i n e  w i th  t h e  s t a te d  d e m a n d s  o f  t h o s e  i m p o s i n g  th e  s a n c t io n s .
The Political Impact of Sanctions
In  i m p o s in g  s a n c t io n s ,  t h e  s e n d e r  s t a t e ( s )  h o p e  t h a t  t h e  c o s t s  i m p o s e d  o n  th e  
t a r g e t  s t a t e  w i l l  b e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  h i g h  t h a t  t h e  t a r g e t  g o v e r n m e n t  w i l l  d e c id e  to  c h a n g e  
i t s  b e h a v i o u r  r a t h e r  t h a n  c o n t i n u e  to  i n c u r  t h e s e  c o s t s .  T h u s ,  o n e  p o te n t i a l  m e a s u r e  o f  
t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  a  s a n c t io n s  r e g im e  is  t h e  e x t e n t  to  w h ic h  i t  i s  s u c c e s s f u l  in  i s o l a t i n g  th e  
t a r g e t  s t a t e  a n d  th e  e x t e n t  o f  d a m a g e  t h a t  i t  c a n  i n f l i c t  o n  th e  t a r g e t ’s  e c o n o m y .  
H o w e v e r ,  e x p e r i e n c e  h a s  s h o w n  t h a t  s u c c e s s  in  i s o l a t i n g  a  t a r g e t  s t a t e  a n d  in f l i c t i n g  
s e v e r e  e c o n o m i c  d a m a g e  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  l e a d  to  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
o b j e c t iv e s  ( C o r t r ig h t  a n d  L o p e z ,  2 0 0 0 :  3 ) . I n d e e d ,  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
c h a n g e  i n d u c e d  b y  s a n c t io n s  is  p r o p o r t i o n a t e  to  t h e  le v e l  o f  d a m a g e  th a t  c a n  b e  
in f l i c t e d  u p o n  th e  t a r g e t  e c o n o m y  h a s  b e e n  d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  ‘n a i v e  t h e o r y ’ o f  
s a n c t io n s  ( G a l tu n g ,  1 9 6 7 : 3 8 8 ) .  T h a t  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  i s o l a t i o n  o f  a  t a r g e t  s t a t e  c a n n o t  
b e  a s s u m e d  to  l e a d  to  c o m p l i a n c e  w i th  in t e r n a t io n a l  d e m a n d s  r a i s e s  q u e s t io n s  
r e g a r d i n g  h o w  s a n c t io n s  o p e r a te .  W h a t  i s  c l e a r  h o w e v e r ,  i s  t h a t  i f  s a n c t i o n s  a im  to  
a l t e r  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  r u l i n g  e l i t e s  in  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a te ,  t h e  d e s i r e d  c h a n g e s ,  s h o u ld  th e y  
o c c u r ,  w i l l  t a k e  p l a c e  w i th i n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  o f  t h e  s a n c t io n e d  s ta te .  In  
o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  s a n c t io n s  is  to  a l t e r  t h e  in te r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  d y n a m i c s  w i th in  
t h e  t a r g e t  s t a t e  in  s u c h  a  w a y  t h a t  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a t e  c o n c e d e s  to  t h e  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  
s a n c t io n e r s .  T h i s  p o i n t  i s  m a d e  b y  C o r t r i g h t  a n d  L o p e z  w h o  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  ‘p o l i t i c a l  
i m p a c t  o f  s a n c t io n s  u l t i m a t e l y  d e p e n d s  o n  in te r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  d y n a m ic s  w i th i n  t h e  
t a r g e t e d  c o u n t r y ’ ( C o r t r ig h t  a n d  L o p e z ,  2 0 0 0 :  2 2 ) .  F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  a  p r o p e r
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u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  s u c h  p o l i c i e s  o n  t h e  i n te r n a l  p o l i t i c s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a t e ,  
b o t h  in  t e r m s  o f  h o w  th e y  a f f e c t  t h e  r u l i n g  e l i t e  a n d  h o w  th e y  a f f e c t  d o m e s t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s ,  i s  a  c r u c ia l  f a c to r  to  b e  c o n s id e r e d  w h e n  c o n t e m p l a t in g  th e  
e f f e c t iv e n e s s  a n d  s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  s a n c t io n s  to  b r i n g  a b o u t  s u c h  c h a n g e .
A s  P a p e  n o te s ,  s a n c t io n s  c a n  c o e r c e  a  t a r g e t  s t a t e  in  tw o  w a y s ,  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  
t h r o u g h  ‘p e r s u a d i n g  t h e  t a r g e t  g o v e r n m e n t s  t h a t  t h e  i s s u e s  a t  s t a k e  a r e  n o t  w o r th  t h e  
p r i c e ,  o r  in d i r e c t l y ,  b y  i n d u c in g  p o p u l a r  p r e s s u r e  to  f o r c e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  to  c o n c e d e ,  
o r  b y  i n d u c in g  a  p o p u l a r  r e v o l t  t h a t  o v e r t h r o w s  th e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  r e s u l t i n g  in  th e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  g o v e r n m e n t  t h a t  w i l l  m a k e  c o n c e s s i o n s ’ ( P a p e ,  1 9 9 7 : 9 4 ) . I m p l ic i t  
in  P a p e ’s  a n a ly s i s  is  t h e  im p o r t a n c e  o f  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  in  e i t h e r  s c e n a r io .  
In  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  d i r e c t  im p a c t ,  i t  i s  h o p e d  t h a t  s a n c t io n s  w i l l  b e  s e e n  a s  to o  c o s t ly  b y  
th e  r u l in g  r e g im e ,  w h ic h  w i l l  t h u s  a l t e r  i t s  b e h a v i o u r  to  c o m p ly  w i th  in t e r n a t io n a l  
d e m a n d s ,  in  w h ic h  c a s e  s a n c t io n s  c o u ld  b e  j u d g e d  to  h a v e  b e e n  e f f e c t iv e .  In  s u c h  a  
c a s e  t h e  t a r g e t e d  g o v e r n m e n t ’s  c a l c u l a t i o n s  a r e  l i k e ly  to  i n c lu d e  s o m e  c o n s id e r a t io n  
o f  t h e  s t r e n g th  o f  o p p o s i t i o n  to  t h e  r u l in g  r e g im e .  T h i s  p o i n t  i s  c l e a r ly  s t a te d  b y  
C o r t r ig h t  a n d  L o p e z :
S a n c t io n s  s u c c e e d  w h e n  t a r g e t e d  d e c i s i o n  m a k e r s  c h a n g e  t h e i r  
c a l c u l a t io n  o f  c o s t s  a n d  b e n e f i t s  a n d  d e t e r m i n e  t h a t  t h e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  
c o o p e r a t io n  w i th  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c i l  r e s o l u t i o n s  o u tw e ig h  th e  c o s t s  o f  
c o n t in u e d  d e f i a n c e  o f  e x p r e s s e d  g lo b a l  n o r m s .  O n e  o f  t h e  k e y  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  in  a  l e a d e r s h i p ’s  c a l c u l a t io n  o f  c o s t s  is  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  
o p p o s i t i o n  f r o m  d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s t i t u e n c ie s .  T o  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
s a n c t io n s  s t r e n g th e n  o r  e n c o u r a g e  t h e s e  o p p o s i t i o n  c o n s t i t u e n c ie s ,  th e y  
a r e  m o r e  l i k e ly  to  a c h ie v e  s u c c e s s  ( C o r t r ig h t  a n d  L o p e z ,  2 0 0 0 :  2 2 ) .
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In  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n d i r e c t  s c e n a r io ,  i t  i s  h o p e d  t h a t  s a n c t io n s  w i l l  l e a d  to  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  b e n d i n g  to  i n te r n a l  p r e s s u r e  o r  b e i n g  o v e r t h r o w n  b y  a  d i s s a t i s f i e d  
p o p u l a t i o n  th a t  b l a m e s  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  f o r  t h e  p r e d i c a m e n t  in  w h ic h  i t  f in d s  i t s e l f .  I f  
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  is  o v e r th r o w n ,  i t  i s  h o p e d  t h a t  a  g o v e r n m e n t  t h a t  i s  m o r e  a m e n a b l e  to  
i n t e r n a t io n a l  d e m a n d s  w i l l  r e p l a c e  th e  t a r g e t  r e g im e .  A s  s u c h ,  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  
f o r c e s  a r e  a l s o  l i k e l y  to  b e  k e y  p l a y e r s  in  s u c h  a  s c e n a r io  a n d  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  
p a r t i e s  c o u ld  p l a y  a  r o l e  in  c h a n n e l l i n g  p o p u l a r  d i s s a t i s f a c t io n ,  a t t e m p t i n g  to  d e p o s e  
th e  r u l i n g  r e g im e  a n d ,  o n  t a k i n g  p o w e r ,  b e h a v i n g  in  a  w a y  w h ic h  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  
d e m a n d s  o f  t h o s e  w h o  i m p o s e d  s a n c t io n s .
In  s p i t e  o f  t h e  p o te n t i a l  c e n t r a l i t y  o f  s u c h  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s ,  m u c h  
a n a ly s i s  c o n c e r n i n g  th e  p o l i t i c a l  im p a c t  o f  s a n c t io n s  f o c u s e s  a t t e n t io n  p r i m a r i l y  o n  
th e  t a r g e t  g o v e r n m e n t ,  w i th  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  g iv e n  to  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  im p a c t  o f  
s a n c t io n s  m a y  b e  to  s t r e n g th e n  r a t h e r  th a n  w e a k e n  t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t  ( G a l tu n g ,  1 9 6 7 : 
4 0 9 ;  H a a s s ,  1 9 9 8 : 2 0 3 ;  D o x e y ,  1 9 9 6 : 1 0 4 ; K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g ,  2 0 0 4 :  2 9 ;  
C o r t r ig h t  a n d  L o p e z ,  2 0 0 0 :  2 0 ) .  T h e r e  a r e  a  n u m b e r  o f  w a y s  in  w h ic h  i t  i s  p e r c e iv e d  
th a t  s a n c t io n s  m a y  b e n e f i t  t h e  r u l in g  e l i t e  in  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a te ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  c r e a t io n  o f  
a  ‘r a l l y  a r o u n d  th e  f l a g ’ e f f e c t  w h ic h  r e s u l t s  in  d o m e s t i c  g r o u p s  s u p p o r t i n g  th e  
g o v e r n m e n t  in  t h e  f a c e  o f  a n  e x t e r n a l  th r e a t  ( D r e z n e r ,  2 0 0 0 :  2 1 4 ) ,  a n d  th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  
e c o n o m i c  a d v a n ta g e s  f o r  t h e  r u l i n g  e l i t e  a n d  i ts  s u p p o r t e r s  w h o  c a n  m a k e  s ig n i f i c a n t  
g a in s  f r o m  s m u g g l i n g  a n d  b l a c k  m a r k e t  a c t iv i t i e s  ( C o r t r ig h t  a n d  L o p e z ,  2 0 0 0 :  2 0 ) .  
T h i s  c a n  l e a d  to  t h e  c r i m i n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  s o c ie ty ,  a n  e f f e c t  t h a t  c a n  e n d u r e  l o n g  
a f t e r  t h e  s a n c t io n s  h a v e  b e e n  l i f t e d  ( A n d r e a s ,  2 0 0 5 :  3 3 5 ) .  F u r t h e r  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  m ig h t  
a c c r u e  to  t h e  t a r g e t  g o v e r n m e n t  f o l lo w in g  th e  im p o s i t i o n  o f  s a n c t io n s  i n c lu d e  
p r o v i d i n g  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  t h e  r u l i n g  e l i t e  to  u s e  s a n c t i o n s  a s  a  s c a p e g o a t  f o r  i t s  
o w n  f a i lu r e s ;  a n d  e n a b l in g  g o v e r n m e n t s  to  b e c o m e  e v e n  m o r e  r e p r e s s iv e ,  a s  o c c u r r e d
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in  H a i t i  ( V a n  B r a b a n t ,  1 9 9 9 :  3 4 ) .  A s  G a l tu n g  n o te s ,  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  c o u ld  b e  h i g h l y  
d e t r im e n ta l  n o t  o n ly  f o r  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a t e  b u t  a l s o  f o r  t h o s e  w h o  i m p o s e  t h e  s a n c t io n s  
b e c a u s e  ‘th e  s e n d in g  n a t i o n ( s )  n o t  o n ly  m a y  f a i l  to  a c h ie v e  t h e i r  g o a l s ,  b u t  m a y  e v e n  
c o n t r ib u te  to  e x a c t ly  th e  o p p o s i t e  o f  w h a t  t h e y  h o p e d  f o r ’ ( G a l tu n g ,  1 9 6 7 : 4 0 9 ) .  In  a  
s im i l a r  v e in ,  V a n  B r a b a n t  d i r e c t l y  a d d r e s s e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  n e g a t iv e  im p a c t  o n  
d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s ,  s t a t i n g  th a t  ‘t r a d e  e m b a r g o e s  . . .  c a n  u n d e r m i n e  d o m e s t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  to  th e  t a r g e t  r e g i m e  a n d  th e  l o n g e r - t e r m  f o u n d a t io n  f o r  a  m o r e  d e m o c r a t i c  
c u l t u r e ’ ( V a n  B r a b a n t ,  1 9 9 9 : 5 ) .
A l th o u g h  n o t  e n t i r e ly  i g n o r e d ,  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  g iv e n  to  th e  
im p a c t  o f  s a n c t io n s  o n  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  o p e r a t i n g  in  t h e  t a r g e t  s ta te .  T h i s  
is  n o te d  b y  C o r t r ig h t  a n d  L o p e z  w h o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  ‘S y s t e m a t i c a l l y  u n d e r r e p r e s e n t e d  
in  m a n y  a n a ly s e s  o f  s a n c t io n s  im p a c t  h a s  b e e n  th e  e x t e n t  to  w h ic h  s a n c t io n s  a f f e c t  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a n d  p o w e r  o f  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s  w i th in  t h e  t a r g e t e d  
n a t i o n ’ ( C o r t r ig h t  a n d  L o p e z ,  2 0 0 0 :  2 0 )  A l th o u g h  th e y  a r e  n o t  e n t i r e l y  u n n o t i c e d  in  
s o m e  o f  t h e  l i t e r a tu r e ,  th e r e  a p p e a r s  to  b e  a n  a s s u m p t i o n  th a t  i f  s a n c t io n s  c a n  a c t  to  
w e a k e n  t h e  t a r g e t  g o v e r n m e n t  - a n d  a s  n o te d  a b o v e  th i s  i s  n o t  a lw a y s  t h e  c a s e  - t h a t  
t h e r e  m a y  b e  in d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  f o r  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s .  E l l i o t t  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
s a n c t io n s  c a n  c o n t r ib u te  to  i n c r e a s i n g  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  to  t h e  r u l i n g  r e g i m e  a n d  
c a n  a l s o  s e r v e  a s  a  s ig n a l  ‘e i t h e r  t h a t  s u p p o r t  f o r  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  is  e x p l i c i t  o r  t h a t  
s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  r u l i n g  r e g i m e  h a s  b e e n  w i t h d r a w n ’ ( E l l i o t t ,  1 9 9 8 : 5 5 ) . H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  
is  n o  a t t e m p t  to  c o n s id e r  t h e  im p a c t  t h a t  s u c h  a  s ig n a l  m ig h t  h a v e  o n  d o m e s t i c  
o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  th e r e  is  a n  a s s u m p t io n  th a t  th i s  im p a c t  
w o u ld  b e  p o s i t i v e .  W h i l e  i t  m a y  s e e m  lo g ic a l  to  c o n c l u d e  th a t  u n d e r m i n i n g  th e  r e g im e  
a n d  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  th e  o p p o s i t i o n  a r e  tw o  s id e s  o f  t h e  s a m e  c o in ,  th i s  c o n te n t io n  h a s  
n o t  b e e n  t e s t e d ,  a n d ,  in  t h e  c a s e  o f  S e r b ia ,  th e r e  i s  e v id e n c e  t h a t  th i s  m a y  n o t  a lw a y s
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b e  th e  c a s e . A s  G o r d y  n o te s ,  t h e  d e c l in e  in  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  M i lo s e v ic  r e g i m e  
th r o u g h o u t  th e  1 9 9 0 s  w a s  n o t  a lw a y s  ‘m e t  b y  a  c o r r e s p o n d in g  g r o w th  o n  th e  p a r t  o f  
t h e  o p p o s i t i o n ’ ( G o r d y ,  2 0 0 0 :  7 9 ) .  W h i l e  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  S e r b ia n  o p p o s i t i o n ’s 
i n a b i l i t y  to  c a p i t a l i z e  o n  th e  M i lo s e v i c  r e g i m e ’s l o s s e s  m a y  b e  e n t i r e ly  d u e  to  i t s  o w n  
w e a k n e s s  a n d  d e f i c i e n c i e s ,  w i th  in t e r n a t io n a l  p o l i c y  b e i n g  o f  l i t t l e  o r  n o  r e l e v a n c e ,  i t  
is  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  IC  a c t io n s  im p a c te d  o n  th e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  in  s u c h  
a  w a y  a s  to  u n d e r m i n e  i t s  a b i l i t y  to  e f f e c t i v e l y  o p p o s e  th e  M i l o s e v i c  r e g im e .
K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g  s u g g e s t  a  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  l a c k  o f  a t t e n t io n  p a id  to  
in te r n a l  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s ,  s e e in g  i t  a s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  d e f i c i e n c y  o f  m u c h  o f  th e  
l i t e r a tu r e  o n  s a n c t io n s ,  b o t h  w i th in  t h e  f i e ld s  o f  e c o n o m ic s  a n d  i n t e r n a t io n a l  r e l a t io n s ,  
w h ic h ,  t h e y  a r g u e ,  h a s  t e n d e d  to  v ie w  s ta te s  a s  s in g le ,  r a t i o n a l  a c to r s .  K a e m p f e r  a n d  
L o w e n b e r g  e s c h e w  th i s  p o s i t i o n  a n d  c h o o s e  in s t e a d  to  u n d e r t a k e  ‘a n  a n a ly s i s  o f  
d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  in  b o th  s a n c t io n in g  a n d  t a r g e t  n a t i o n s ’ ( K a e m p f e r  a n d  
L o w e n b e r g ,  1 9 9 9 : 3 8 ) .  W h i l e  t h e  d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  t h a t  l e a d  s ta te s  to  
im p o s e  s a n c t io n s  a g a in s t  o t h e r  s t a t e s  a r e  n o t  r e l e v a n t  in  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  th i s  s tu d y ,  t h e  
c e n t r a l i t y  o f  t h e  in te r n a l  p o l i t i c s  o f  th e  t a r g e t  s t a t e  in  K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g ’s  
w o r k  e m p h a s i s e s  t h e  im p o r t a n c e  o f  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  in  t h e  t a r g e t  s ta te .
T h e  th e o r e t i c a l  w o r k  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g  ( 1 9 8 8 ;  1 9 9 9 )  
a n d  K a e m p f e r ,  L o w e n b e r g  a n d  M e r t e n s  ( 2 0 0 4 )  r a i s e s  a  n u m b e r  o f  q u e s t io n s  
c o n c e r n i n g  th e  p r e s u m e d  m e c h a n i s m s  t h r o u g h  w h ic h  s a n c t io n s  o p e r a t e ,  a n d  th e  
p o te n t i a l  im p o r t a n c e  o f  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s  w i th in  th e  t a r g e t  s ta te .  In  e s s e n c e ,  
K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g  a r g u e  in  f a v o u r  o f  t a r g e t e d  s a n c t io n s ,  c l a im in g  th a t  s u c h  
s a n c t io n s ,  w h ic h  in f l i c t  o n ly  m in im a l  e c o n o m ic  d a m a g e ,  m a y  b e  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  th a n  
a n  u n ta r g e t e d  s a n c t io n s  r e g im e  t h a t  c a u s e s  s e v e r e  d a m a g e  to  th e  t a r g e t  e c o n o m y  
( K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g ,  1 9 8 8 : 7 8 6 ) .  R e je c t in g  th e  ‘n a i v e  t h e o r y  o f  s a n c t i o n s ’
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d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e ,  K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g  a r g u e  t h a t  s a n c t io n s  w o r k  ‘t h r o u g h  t h e i r  
im p a c t  o n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  w i th in  t h e  t a r g e t  
c o u n t r y ’ a n d  f o r  th i s  r e a s o n ,  f o r  s a n c t io n s  to  b e  e f f e c t iv e  t h e y  ‘m u s t  b e  a p p l i e d  in  
s u c h  a  w a y  a s  to  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h o s e  g r o u p s  in  th e  t a r g e t  c o u n t r y  
w h o s e  p o in t  o f  v ie w  is  f a v o u r e d  b y  t h e  s a n c t io n e r s  w h i l e  d i m i n i s h i n g  th e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  
t h e  g r o u p s  w h o s e  p o s i t i o n  is  to  b e  t h w a r t e d ’ ( K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g ,  2 0 0 4 :  3 0 ) . 
T h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  im p a c t  t h a t  s a n c t io n s  h a v e  o n  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s  m a y  b e  
d e c i s iv e  in  t e r m s  o f  a c h ie v in g  th e  s t a te d  g o a l s  o f  b e h a v i o u r  m o d i f i c a t i o n  w i th in  th e  
t a r g e t  s t a te ,  a n d  th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s  in  th i s  r e g a r d  is  s e e n  a s  
p a r a m o u n t .  A c c o r d i n g  to  K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g ,  s a n c t io n s :
c a n  o n ly  h a v e  a  f a v o u r a b l e  im p a c t  o n  p o l i c y m a k i n g  in  t h e  t a r g e t  s t a te  i f  
t h e r e  e x i s t s  w i th in  t h a t  c o u n t r y  a  r e a s o n a b l y  w e l l - o r g a n i s e d  o p p o s i t i o n  
g r o u p  w h o s e  p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  c o u ld  b e  e n h a n c e d  a s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  
o f  s a n c t io n s .  In  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s u c h  a  g r o u p ,  t h e  s a n c t io n s  m ig h t  o n ly  
s t r e n g th e n  th e  r e g i m e ’s p u r s u i t  o f  i t s  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  p o l i c y  b y  h e lp in g  to  
r a l l y  p u b l i c  o p in io n  a r o u n d  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  ( K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g ,
1 9 9 8 : 5 1 ) .
W h i l e  r e c o g n i s i n g  th e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  s a n c t io n s  to  h a v e  a  n e g a t iv e  im p a c t  o n  
o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s ,  th e y  c l a im  th a t  i f  t a r g e t e d  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  s a n c t io n s  c a n  e n h a n c e  th e  
e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s ,  s t a t i n g  th a t  ‘s a n c t io n s  o f t e n  w o r k  b y  
h e l p i n g  s u c h  o p p o s i t i o n  m o v e m e n t s  g a in  s u p p o r t  a m o n g  th e  p o p u l a c e  a n d  g iv in g  
e n h a n c e d  l e g i t i m a c y  to  t h e i r  s t r u g g l e s ’ ( K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g ,  1 9 9 9 : 5 1 ) . 
H o w e v e r ,  w h i l e  K a e m p f e r  a n d  L o w e n b e r g  a r g u e  th a t  d o m e s t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s  a r e  
a  c r u c ia l  f a c t o r  to  c o n s i d e r  w h e n  c o n t e m p l a t in g  s a n c t io n s ,  t h e i r  w o r k  is  e n t i r e ly  
th e o r e t i c a l  a n d  is  n o t  t e s t e d  in  r e l a t i o n  to  s p e c i f i c  c a s e s .
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Kaempfer and Lowenberg are not alone in considering that targeted sanctions 
may represent a more effective and less detrimental alternative to the type o f wide- 
ranging, comprehensive sanctions that were put in place against states such as Iraq 
and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Experience o f sanctions during the 1990s, and o f their 
detrimental humanitarian consequences, in particular in Iraq, led to efforts to develop 
‘sm art’ sanctions that ‘are understood to be better targeted and/or more humane 
sanctions’ (Van Brabant, 1998: 2). At the policy level, a series o f initiatives was 
undertaken to investigate the possibility o f employing sanctions that are targeted 
directly at particular groups and governments deemed objectionable by the senders o f 
sanctions. The first o f these initiatives, known as the Interlaken Process1, investigated 
the possibility o f using targeted financial sanctions, while the Bonn-Berlin Process 
dealt with arms embargoes, and travel and aviation related sanctions .2 A third 
initiative, the Stockholm Process dealt with the implementation o f targeted sanctions .3
In addition, a number o f analysts have also considered the relative utility o f 
targeted sanctions, with some arguing that they are more likely to be effective than the 
type o f comprehensive sanctions that were employed against countries such as Iraq 
and Yugoslavia in the first half o f the 1990s. Morgan and Schwebach, while generally 
pessimistic about the effectiveness o f sanctions, claim that targeted sanctions could be 
a more effective option (Morgan and Schwebach, 1997: 46-47), while Dashti-Gibson 
et al argue that if  the goal o f sanctions is to moderate behaviour then financial
1 Two reports were published by the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs: ‘Expert 
Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions’, March 17-19 1998, and ‘2nd International Seminar on 
Targeting UN Financial Sanctions’, March 29-31 1999. Available from:
http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/aussenwirtschafl/sanktionen/smart_sanctions/unterseite00361/index.
html?lang=en.
2 ‘Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes, Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results o f 
the “Bonn-Berlin” Process’, edited by Michael Brzoska. Available at: 
http://www.bicc.de/events/unsanc/index.php.




sanctions targeted at the ruling elite have a greater chance o f success than do trade 
sanctions that inflict punishment on the entire population o f the target state (Dashti- 
Gibson et al, 1997: 615). However, some remain sceptical that targeted sanctions are 
any more likely to be effective than comprehensive sanctions, with Haass describing 
them as ‘only a partial solution’ (Haass, 1997: 79). Haass argues that designing and 
implementing such sanctions is very difficult, particularly when the target state is run 
by an authoritarian government (Haass, 1997: 79-80). Similar concerns are also 
mentioned by Van Brabant (Van Brabant, 1999: 4).
One argument in favour o f financial sanctions is that they may reduce the 
advantages that target regimes often enjoy when sanctions take the form o f a 
comprehensive trade embargo. Thus, in the case o f financial sanctions it may be more 
difficult for the regime in power to rally support against such sanctions as they will 
affect only a small section o f the population, and could also deny the regime any 
potential earnings from smuggling and black market activities (Van Brabant, 1999: 
18). However, again largely absent from the debate is consideration o f their impact on 
domestic opposition forces in the target state. Rather, the debate regarding the 
differential impact o f ‘sm art’ sanctions has been focused on their purported ability to 
have less severe humanitarian consequences for the civilian population o f  the target 
state, and the extent to which they are more or less likely to lead to the type o f 
behaviour modification demanded by those imposing the sanctions.
From the above discussion it is clear that there is a need for consideration o f 
the impact o f sanctions on domestic opposition forces operating within the target 
state. This is the case with respect to both comprehensive sanctions and also targeted 
sanctions. As Serbia experienced both types o f sanctions at different times during the 
1990s it affords the opportunity to consider the way in which both impacted on the
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democratic opposition parties that were operating at that time, and to examine the 
issue o f whether the impact o f these approaches differed.
The International Community and Serbia’s Democratic 
Opposition Parties
The goal o f the democratic opposition parties in Serbia during the Milosevic 
era was to effect regime change through the removal o f Milosevic from power and the 
establishment o f a democratic political order. As a number o f theorists have 
emphasised, regime change and démocratisation are processes that have been 
amenable to international influence, particularly those that have occurred in post­
communist Europe (Diamandouros and Larrabee, 2000: 52; Pridham, 2000a: 13; 
Whitehead, 1996: 3). However, as Pridham, among others, acknowledges, the term 
‘international dim ension’ is a ‘collective term for diverse external factors and 
influences and a spread o f actors that are located or originated outside a country’s 
borders’; given this, Pridham notes that it is ‘misleading to emphasize the 
international dimension as if  it were some unitary experience’ (Pridham, 2000a: 285). 
Pravda provides a succinct breakdown o f the various elements that may be considered 
as international factors in the transition process: ‘transnational phenomena, 
regionalism, non-governmental organizations, and state as well as international 
institutional actors’ (Pravda, 2001: 7). From this list, what is o f concern within this 
study are states and international institutional actors. In his discussion o f the role o f 
individual states and international institutions in the transition process, Pravda notes 
the emphasis that is placed on democracy promotion by both states, and international 
political, economic and security institution (Pravda, 2001: 9-15).
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However, in the case o f M ilosevic’s Serbia, while the democratic opposition 
parties emphasised that a democratic Serbia was an essential prerequisite for lasting 
peace and stability in the Balkans, the outbreak o f war in the former-Yugoslavia 
meant that international actors ‘attributed priority to peace building over the 
promotion o f democratic goals’ (Vukadinovic, 2001: 437). International
preoccupation with stability in the Balkans and international perceptions regarding 
how best to achieve this meant that until 1999 international policy with respect to 
Serbia paid little attention to Serbia’s internal political order. This situation changed 
abruptly following the Kosovo conflict and indictment o f Milosevic and several key 
regime figures by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). Following this, the IC’s focus with respect to Serbia was firmly on Serbia’s 
internal order. At this time the IC and the democratic opposition parties were, for 
once, pursuing the same goal: regime change in Serbia. As such, Carothers’ comment 
on US policy in this time period is equally applicable to the other international actors 
involved in formulating policy with respect to Serbia:
During the war in Bosnia ... US policy toward Serbia, Croatia, and the 
rest o f the former Yugoslavia had little to do with democracy. The 
administration felt it was necessary to deal cooperatively with Milosevic 
in Belgrade and Tudjman in Zagreb, dictators though they might be, for 
the sake o f peacemaking goals. After the Kosovo crisis and military action 
there, however, promoting democracy in Serbia -  or at least ousting 
Milosevic -  became something o f a priority (Carothers, 2000: 5).
Given this, it is important to remember when considering the impact o f international 
actions on the democratic opposition that for much o f this time period the democratic 
opposition parties and the IC were prioritising different objectives.
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Throughout the 1990s the democratic opposition parties in Serbia used a 
variety o f different strategies in its efforts to remove the Milosevic regime from 
power - including contesting elections, boycotting elections, urging the regime to 
negotiate fair electoral conditions and organising mass demonstrations. However, 
until 2 0 0 0  all o f these campaigns were unsuccessful, with the partial exception o f the 
victory o f the opposition’s Zajedno coalition in local elections held in 1996 and the 
successful defence o f that victory following regime attempts to annul it. This 
happened in a context in which Milosevic and his SPS party experienced declining 
popularity. In fact, as Gordy noted in 1999, ‘Aside from its long list o f failures, the 
party in power has not once received a majority o f votes in an election,’ (Gordy, 
1999: 1). This state o f affairs led Pavlovic to claim that, until the 2000 elections, the 
Serbian opposition, and in particular the leaders o f its main parties, was ‘the worst 
opposition in Europe’, because while it had the opportunity to do so, it failed to defeat 
Milosevic for ten years4 (Pavlovic, 2001: 2).
Undoubtedly, the environment in which it operated contributed to the 
opposition’s failure. While M ilosevic’s Serbia had many o f the features o f a formal 
democracy its reality was far from democratic, and one o f the means by which 
Milosevic and his allies maintained power was through electoral fraud and 
manipulation. A report by CeSID, the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy, notes 
that, from 1990 to 2000 there was not one free and fair election held in Serbia5 
(CeSID, 2000: 9). Similarly, M ilosevic’s survival in power is also partly attributable 
to his control o f much o f the Serbian media throughout the 1990s, a factor that is 
listed as one o f the key reasons for the SPS’s success in all federal and republican 
elections contested between 1990 and 1996 (Goati, 1998: 17; Sekelj, 2000: 61).
4 Author’s translation.
5 Pavlovic suggests that Milosevic most probably lost the 1992 elections in which he competed against 
Milan Panic, then Yugoslav prime minister, for the Serbian presidency (Pavlovic, 2001: 4).
However, as Pribicevic notes, M ilosevic’s manipulation and repression cannot wholly 
account for the opposition’s continued failure6 (Pribicevic, 1997: 34). This is clear 
when consideration is given to the fact that throughout the 1990s the Milosevic 
regime became increasingly repressive and as such, when the opposition did succeed 
against Milosevic, this was in spite o f the fact that it was operating in an environment 
that was, in many ways, less favourable than any which it had faced before. As such, 
at the time o f the September 2000 elections, few commentators expected that this 
would lead to the fall o f the Milosevic regime.
There are numerous explanations for the longevity o f the Milosevic regime, 
but arguing for or against any o f these is not the purpose o f this study. What is o f 
central concern here is the manner in which two factors that have been considered as 
being significant in terms o f the regim e’s survival have interacted throughout this 
time period, those factors being the weakness o f the democratic opposition in Serbia 
and international coercive policies. The issue that will be considered in this 
interaction is whether international policy may have either directly exacerbated 
weaknesses present in the Serbian democratic opposition or created conditions in 
which the opposition was significantly disadvantaged in its efforts to remove the 
regime.
In order to evaluate the impact o f international policy on the democratic 
opposition, and to consider the question o f whether it exacerbated the opposition’s 
weaknesses or undermined its ability to operate effectively against the regime, it is 
useful to consider the general question o f what constitutes effective action for a 
democratic opposition in an environment such as that which prevailed in Serbia under
6 Author’s translation.
27
Milosevic, and to this end Stepan’s work on the tasks o f a democratic opposition in an 
authoritarian regime is useful (Stepan, 2001).
The Tasks of a Democratic Opposition
The presence o f  a political opposition is a fundamental part o f any democratic 
political system, but in spite o f this, as Blondel notes, ‘the analysis o f the 
characteristics o f opposition, in democracies or elsewhere, has advanced rather less 
than other aspects o f comparative politics’ (Blondel, 1997: 462). Similarly, G el’man 
remarks that the ‘study o f political opposition is by no means the most popular field in 
contemporary political science’ (Gel’man, 2005: 228). W hile there is a relative lack o f 
attention paid to oppositions in general, this is even more the case with respect to 
political opposition in authoritarian or non-democratic regimes where they operate in 
significantly different conditions to their counterparts in liberal democracies 
(Franklin, 2002: 521). In attempting to devise a ‘theory o f political opposition in the 
contemporary w orld’ Blondel observes that the ‘factors which account for the nature 
and character o f opposition are so numerous and their relative incidence is so unclear 
that all that can be done is to suggest some trends and possible evolutions’ (Blondel, 
1997: 478). Some analysts argue that this is particularly true when considering 
opposition in authoritarian states. Blondel him self advises caution ‘in attempting to 
delineate the dynamics o f political opposition in authoritarian regim es’ (Blondel, 
1997: 484), while Posusney argues that a possible reason for the lack o f attention to 
how democratic opposition parties operate in authoritarian regimes ‘may be the 
difficulty o f generalization, given that how vulnerable authoritarian rulers are to 
opposition critiques and pressures will vary from country to country and, within
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countries, with changing political and economic circumstances’ (Posusney, 2002: 47- 
48).
Political opposition has, nevertheless, received some recent attention within 
debates regarding the ending o f  the authoritarian regimes in the formerly communist 
countries o f Europe. However, within this literature, the role o f democratic opposition 
parties per se has not received significant attention. Indeed, as Lawson points out, in 
much o f the démocratisation literature political parties are largely absent, noting that 
while the ‘importance o f this kind o f opposition is supported implicitly in 
democratization studies, it is rarely treated explicitly’ (Lawson, 1993: 184). Within 
the context o f the way opposition is treated in the démocratisation literature, Stepan 
notes the presence o f two bodies o f theory dealing with ‘the role o f the democratic 
opposition in the processes o f democratization’. The first o f these concerns ‘pacted 
transitions’ while the second deals with ‘the oppositional role o f “civil society against 
the state’” (Stepan, 2001: 167). While clearly the role o f political parties in pacted 
transitions is potentially significant, the conditions needed for such a transition clearly 
did not exist in M ilosevic’s Serbia. As such, the literature on pacted transitions is not 
o f great utility within the context o f this study. Similarly, while the role o f civil 
society is undoubtedly o f great importance in any democracy, whether in transition or 
well established, the focus o f this study is on political parties. A further limitation o f 
the démocratisation literature in analysing Serbia’s political parties is the severely 
coercive international policies to which it was subjected and its image as a pariah state 
for much o f this time. Indeed, Pridham argues that pariah regimes ought to be 
considered ‘as a category in its own right, all the more so as it hardly features in the 
democratization literature’ (Pridham, 2001: 6 6 ).
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Notwithstanding the above-mentioned limitations, it is, nevertheless, possible 
to identify some general points about the types o f tasks and tactics that democratic 
opposition parties, operating in regimes such as M ilosevic’s, need to employ in order 
to increase their effectiveness in opposing an authoritarian regime. However, it is first 
necessary to clarify the type o f authoritarian regime that is being examined within the 
context o f this study. Authoritarian or non-democratic regimes differ considerably in 
terms o f how they maintain power, the level o f repression they employ and the extent 
to which they are prepared to tolerate the presence o f opposition forces. This is 
acknowledged by Stepan when he mentions ‘the continuum o f changing relationships 
that characterize authoritarian system s,’ with ‘a strong regime ruling in an atmosphere 
o f widespread fear,’ and ‘a weakened and eroding regim e’ occupying opposite ends o f 
this continuum (Stepan, 2001: 160).
As Diamond notes, in the past, non-democratic regimes generally attempted to 
exert political control and maintain power through overtly authoritarian methods such 
as banning opposition parties or even the holding o f elections themselves. However, 
in recent decades ‘hybrid regim es’ -  those containing elements o f both democracy 
and authoritarianism -  have become increasingly common (Diamond, 2002: 24). As 
such, analysts have devoted considerable attention to attempting to classify the 
numerous variants o f hybrid regime that have developed and which lie somewhere 
between liberal democracies and closed authoritarianism. According to Diamond, 
non-democratic regimes can be divided into ‘those with multiparty electoral 
competition o f some kind (variously termed “electoral authoritarian,” 
“pseudodemocratic,” or “hybrid”) and those that are politically closed’ (Diamond, 
2002: 25). Clearly, M ilosevic’s Serbia can be counted among the electoral 
authoritarian regimes, as elections regularly took place in Serbia and the Yugoslavia
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throughout the 1990s. However, while it is acknowledged that the line between 
various regime types cannot always be clearly drawn, Diamond notes a further 
distinction between those electoral authoritarian regimes than can be considered to be 
competitive authoritarian regimes and those that are hegemonic authoritarian regimes 
(Diamond, 2002: 25). What differentiates competitive authoritarian regimes from 
hegemonic regimes is the presence o f democratic institutions that ‘offer an important 
channel through which the opposition may seek pow er;’ in contrast, a hegemonic 
regime is one in which ‘democratic rules simply serve as to legitimate an existing 
autocratic leadership.’ As such, in a competitive authoritarian regime, ‘even though 
democratic institutions may be badly flawed, both authoritarian incumbents and their 
opponents must take them seriously’ (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 54).
When some o f the characteristics o f competitive authoritarian regimes are 
considered, it is clear that M ilosevic’s Serbia qualifies as such a regime. According to 
Levitsky and Way, although in a competitive authoritarian regime ‘elections are 
regularly held and are generally free o f massive fraud, incumbents routinely abuse 
state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition 
candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results’ 
(Levitsky and Way, 2002: 53). In general, while M ilosevic’s regime veered in the 
direction o f outright authoritarianism towards the end o f his rule, throughout much o f 
the 1990s, such a description fits well with the situation in M ilosevic’s Serbia.
Democratic opposition parties that operate in such an environment face 
considerably different challenges than do their counterparts in liberal democratic 
regimes. As Diamond notes, while it is possible for the opposition to be victorious 
against such a regime, ‘it requires a level o f opposition mobilization, unity, skill, and 
heroism far beyond what would normally be required for victory in a dem ocracy’
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(Diamond, 2002: 24). Furthermore, while elections in a competitive authoritarian 
context may hold out the possibility o f an opposition victory, it is also the case that 
such contests can be used by the regime as ‘an instrument o f authoritarian control’ 
(Schedler, 2002: 36). As such, according to Posusney, for opposition parties ‘the 
invitation to participate in controlled elections represents both opportunities and risks’ 
(Posusney, 2002: 48).
Given the environment in which they operate, the tasks o f opposition parties 
operating in competitive authoritarian regimes differ from those o f opposition parties 
in liberal democracies. This is evident in Posusney’s discussion o f the strategies that 
opposition parties can employ when confronted with the prospect o f elections in an 
authoritarian setting. These include boycotting the election, forming an electoral 
coalition among opposition parties, monitoring the election, and trying to influence 
the rules under which the elections will take place (Posusney, 2002: 47-52). While the 
formation o f multi-party electoral coalitions is not unusual in liberal democracies, 
electoral competition in a democratic setting would rarely involve strategies such as 
electoral boycotts or attempting to alter the rules o f the game. As such, in order to 
evaluate the effectiveness o f democratic opposition parties operating in such an 
environment it must be kept in mind that this will involve different tasks than those 
needed for an effective opposition in a liberal democracy. Stepan’s work on 
democratic opposition movements in non-democratic regimes is particularly useful in 
helping to understand these tasks (Stepan, 2001).
Stepan considers that a non-democratic regime can be seen as ‘a set o f 
relationships o f dom ination’, and asserts that the main parties to such relationships are
( 1 ) the core group o f regime supporters (who find that their political,
economic, social or institutional interests are best served under the status
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quo); (2) the coercive apparatus that maintains the regime in power; (3) 
the regim e’s passive supporters; (4) the active opponents o f the regime; 
and (5) the passive opponents o f the regime (Stepan, 2001: 160).
He argues that the task o f the regim e’s active democratic opponents is to alter the 
power relations between all components o f the regime such that authoritarianism is 
weakened, while the conditions for démocratisation are improved (Stepan 2001: 160). 
Given this approach, Stepan outlines functions o f democratic opposition movements 
in authoritarian regimes, which he lists ‘in roughly ascending order o f complexity’ as 
being to resist integration into the regime; to guard ‘zones o f autonomy’ against the 
regime; to dispute the regim e’s legitimacy; to raise the costs to the regime o f 
authoritarian rule; and to create a credible democratic alternative to the regime 
(Stepan, 2001: 162). Through carrying out these various tasks, Stepan considers that 
the democratic opposition can contribute to a process o f ‘authoritarian erosion’ 
whereby the passive, and possibly even active supporters o f a non-democratic regime 
may be induced to switch sides and become passive or even active opponents o f the 
regime (Stepan, 2001: 160-162).
For Stepan, a democratic opposition movement consists o f more than just 
democratic opposition parties and his discussion includes other bodies such as trade 
unions, religious and cultural groups, and other civil society organisations. In 
addition, Stepan also acknowledges the range o f possible non-democratic regimes. As 
such, it is necessary to consider the tasks Stepan outlines in order to identify how they 
might be applied to democratic opposition parties -  a key element o f the active 
opposition - operating in a competitive authoritarian regime such as that which existed 
in Serbia in the 1990s.
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Resisting integration into the regime
For Stepan, resisting integration into the regime ‘is the sine qua non for an 
opposition in the first place’ (Stepan, 2001: 162). As such, if  the active opposition 
allows itself to be ‘co-opted into authoritarian institutions’ it ‘will have ceased to 
exist’ (Stepan, 2001: 162). In order to be able to carry out the other tasks o f a 
democratic opposition, the active opposition must maintain ‘some independent 
ideological, cultural, and above all institutional existence’ (Stepan, 2001: 162). An 
easily identifiable example o f co-optation would be if  an opposition party decided to 
abandon its opposition status and to enter into government with the authoritarian 
regime. However, Stepan’s description o f what is necessary to avoid integration into 
the regime makes clear that such an explicit step is not necessary for an opposition 
party to be co-opted. This is also illustrated in the work o f other authors who have 
argued that the presence o f opposition in an authoritarian regime does not necessarily 
imply the weakening o f that regime, but may in fact contribute to the survival in 
power o f the authoritarian elite (Albrecht, 1995; Zartman, 1988). In his study o f 
opposition in Egypt, Albrecht argues that, through repression and cooptation, Egypt’s 
opposition parties are prevented ‘from being serious contenders for power. Rather, 
they are players utilized to give the impression o f a multi-party system which, 
however, exists only in formal terms, to obscure the reality o f a dominant party 
regim e’ (Albrecht, 2005: 384). According to Albrecht, Egypt’s opposition parties 
have been co-opted to the extent that they ‘have come to a tacit agreement that Egypt 
is not yet “ripe” for dem ocracy’ (Albrecht, 2005: 384). Thus, without relinquishing 
their formal opposition status, Egypt’s opposition parties have not maintained an 
independent ideological, cultural and institutional existence and can, therefore, be
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considered to have been co-opted by the Mubarek regime, in spite o f the fact that they 
remain, formally, opposition parties. As such, in the context o f a competitive 
authoritarian regime such as M ilosevic’s Serbia, to carry out the task o f resisting 
integration into the regime, democratic opposition parties must ensure that they 
provide neither explicit nor tacit support to the authoritarian government.
Guarding zones o f  autonomy
If the opposition resists incorporation into the regime, according to Stepan ‘its 
next task (in order o f survival imperatives) is to encourage the growth o f passive 
opposition’ which can be done either through ‘contesting the government’s claims to 
legitimacy’ or through maintaining ‘some zones o f autonomy in which nonregime 
organizations can operate’ (Stepan, 2001: 162). While Stepan does not explicitly 
define ‘zones o f autonomy’, he discusses the need to maintain not just political 
parties, but also organisations such as trade unions, and religious and cultural 
organisations. He points out that the ‘more that new or preexisting democratic trade 
unions, parties, or community movements take root and flourish, the less space is left 
for the implantation o f new-model authoritarian institutions’ (Stepan, 2001: 163). As 
such, his conception o f guarding zones o f autonomy implies ensuring the continued 
existence and growth o f opposition organisations, including democratic opposition 
parties. The more that the democratic opposition can maintain these zones o f 
autonomy, the more effectively can they perform the other tasks o f a democratic 
opposition.
One o f the characteristics o f a competitive authoritarian regime such as the 
Milosevic regime is the holding o f multi-party elections, albeit under grossly unfair
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conditions, and as such, the existence o f political parties is also a feature o f  such 
regimes. Thus, in terms o f guarding zones o f autonomy in the sense o f ensuring their 
continued existence, democratic opposition parties in such regimes face a 
considerably less daunting task than if  they were operating in a more traditional 
authoritarian environment. Although harassment o f opposition parties was a feature o f 
M ilosevic’s rule, throughout the 1990s they were allowed to exist, and while there 
were very occasional suggestions that particular parties might be banned, this never 
occurred. As such, throughout the time period considered in this study, the democratic 
opposition parties in Serbia continued to exist, although the Milosevic regime ensured 
that the space in which they operated remained somewhat narrow. Thus, given the 
competitive authoritarian nature o f the Milosevic regime, the task o f ensuring 
continued existence was not a central issue for Serbia’s democratic opposition parties.
However, while Stepan does emphasise the importance o f the continued 
existence o f democratic opposition parties in his discussion o f guarding zones o f 
autonomy, he also implies that this task o f a democratic opposition goes beyond the 
mere survival o f institutions as is clear from his comments on the need for democratic 
institutions to ‘grow’ and ‘flourish’ and thereby enable the democratic opposition to 
carry out its other tasks more effectively ‘while building support for a democratic 
alternative’ (Stepan, 2001: 163). For this reason, Stepan argues, ‘grassroots 
campaigning to create non-or anttiregime subsystems -  and not direct assaults on the 
coercive elite-should be the active opposition’s main order o f  business’ (Stepan, 2001: 
163).
W hile building support for a democratic alternative is certainly an important 
activity in any non-democratic environment, what Stepan does not acknowledge here 
is that in a competitive authoritarian system such as M ilosevic’s Serbia - characterised
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by the holding o f multiparty elections even if  they are neither free nor fair -  
democratic opposition parties have powerful incentives to directly challenge the non- 
democratic regime. As noted above, while it is difficult for democratic opposition 
parties to unseat authoritarian regimes in these electoral contests, it is nevertheless 
possible and, as experience has shown, including in Serbia itself but also in other 
states such as the Ukraine, elections can provide an important focus for opposition 
activity. The attempts o f non-democratic elites to deny electoral victories to 
opposition parties following elections in these states provided the impetus for 
mobilising large segments o f the population to stage the massive demonstrations that 
ultimately led to the downfall o f these regimes.
Stepan notes that the purpose o f guarding zones o f autonomy is to encourage 
the growth o f passive opposition to the regime and he distinguishes guarding zones o f 
autonomy from contesting the government’s legitimacy as an alternative means o f 
increasing the level o f passive opposition. As such, what is at issue here is what is 
involved in ‘guarding zones o f autonomy’ and thereby increasing passive opposition 
for democratic opposition parties operating in a competitive authoritarian 
environment. In his discussion o f guarding zones o f autonomy, Stepan notes that the 
more effectively a democratic opposition can fulfil this task, ‘the less space is left for 
the implantation o f new-model authoritarian institutions’ (Stepan, 2001: 163). While 
clearly the continued survival o f opposition organisations and political parties 
(institutional autonomy) is important in this regard, democratic opposition parties also 
need to develop and maintain zones o f ideological autonomy if  they are to increase 
their ability to successfully challenge a competitive authoritarian regime. While 
democratic opposition parties need to maintain ideological independence, and this 
will be discussed more fully when considering the need to create a credible alternative
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to the non-democratic regime they are opposing, guarding zones o f ideological 
autonomy is an important consideration for political parties that are operating in an 
environment where the opportunity exists to challenge the regime in the electoral 
arena. While this is, to a certain extent, implied in Stepan’s discussion, he does not 
make this point explicitly. In the context o f this research, however, the need for 
Serbia’s democratic opposition parties to guard ideological zones o f autonomy will be 
considered as one o f the central tasks o f those parties.
Competitive authoritarian regimes such as M ilosevic’s Serbia have great 
potential to set the agenda for political competition within the electoral arena, 
invariably to the detriment o f the democratic opposition parties that are challenging 
them. This was clearly the case in M ilosevic’s Serbia where Milosevic, primarily 
through the state-controlled media, ensured that for much o f the 1990s political 
discourse was dominated by questions o f national and state survival, war, and 
international conspiracies against Serbia. This was clearly advantageous for the 
Milosevic regime in the early 1990s when, in spite one o f the most severe incidences 
o f hyperinflation, political discourse in Serbia was dominated by issues o f nationalism 
and war. Attempting to influence the political agenda in a system such as M ilosevic’s 
Serbia, and as such maintain a zone o f ideological autonomy, clearly poses enormous 
challenges for democratic opposition parties but is nevertheless an important task for 
these actors in their attempts to challenge the authoritarian regime. As such, in the 
context o f a regime such as M ilosevic’s Serbia, in order for democratic opposition 
parties to fulfil the task o f guarding zones o f autonomy, what is o f greatest importance 
is ideological autonomy, as institutional autonomy is relatively secure given the 
nature o f competitive authoritarian regimes. Given this, when considering whether 
Serbia’s democratic parties were successful in their task o f guarding zones o f
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autonomy, it will be ideological, and not institutional autonomy that will be 
considered. To this end, what will be examined is the extent to which the democratic 
opposition parties were able to influence the political agenda in order to limit the 
ability o f the regime to ensure that issues that would have been detrimental to it were 
excluded from political discourse.
Disputing the regime’s legitimacy and raising the costs o f  authoritarian rule
Although listed separately in Stepan’s list o f tasks for a democratic opposition 
in an authoritarian state, disputing the regim e’s legitimacy and raising the costs o f 
authoritarian rule are clearly linked: if  the opposition can successfully raise questions 
about the legitimacy o f the regime, this will inevitably increase the costs o f 
authoritarian rule. As Stepan him self notes, if  the costs o f authoritarian rule ‘are 
raised high enough, they can rob the government o f much o f its legitimacy in the eyes 
o f both its active and passive supporters’ (Stepan, 2001: 164). In terms o f raising the 
costs o f authoritarian rule, Stepan suggests that this can be achieved by encouraging 
activities such as strikes, protests, and ‘noncooperation generally’ thereby 
demonstrating that the regime is not ‘securely in control o f the political system ’ 
(Stepan, 2001: 164). He also states that a key task for the active opposition is to 
clearly highlight the costs to society o f the regim e’s policies to such an extent that it 
cannot rely on tacit support to maintain power, and is thus forced to rely more heavily 
on coercion (Stepan, 2001: 163).
In terms o f disputing the legitimacy o f an authoritarian regime, Stepan 
suggests that the democratic opposition should attempt to undermine the regime both 
internally and internationally (Stepan, 2001: 163). As Posusney notes, when
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authoritarian rulers decide to hold multiparty elections ‘they are vesting part o f their 
legitimacy in a competitive electoral process and the constitutional framework that 
accompanies this opening.’ This, she notes ‘gives democratic forces cards to play’ 
(Posusney, 2002: 47). As such, elections provide democratic opposition parties with 
opportunities to question the legitimacy o f the regime, whether through deciding not 
to contest the election under the prevailing undemocratic conditions; through 
attempting to alter the rules under which the elections are held; or through 
highlighting the inadequacy o f the electoral provisions, both domestically and 
internationally.
Stepan sees potential gains for the opposition if  it can undermine the regim e’s 
external legitimacy, pointing out that ‘the active opposition should appeal to world 
opinion by documenting and publicizing the regim e’s most flagrant violations o f 
civilized standards o f conduct’ (Stepan, 2001: 163). This, he argues, can increase 
international condemnation and further increase the costs o f authoritarian rule. This 
implies a need on the part o f the democratic opposition parties to maintain and 
develop international contacts where possible, as this provides a channel through 
which they can highlight the deficiencies in the regime, and appeal for international 
support in their campaigns against it.
As such, in order to carry out the tasks o f disputing the legitimacy o f the 
authoritarian regime, and raising the costs o f authoritarian rule, democratic opposition 
parties must make every effort possible to demonstrate to the population o f the non- 
democratic state the nature o f the authoritarian regime and the costs that such a 
regime imposes on the society over which it rules. In addition, democratic opposition 
parties must also make efforts to ensure that external actors are fully aware o f the
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abuses committed by the authoritarian regime in an effort to undermine its external 
legitimacy.
Creating a credible democratic alternative
According to Stepan, the democratic opposition to an authoritarian regime 
needs to combine elements o f both eroding authoritarianism while simultaneously 
constructing a credible democratic alternative. To a large extent Stepan considers this 
to be important in ensuring that the political order that emerges after the authoritarian 
regime is removed, is itself democratic and not merely an alternative authoritarian 
regime. This is evident in his statement that ‘If the opposition attends only to the task 
o f erosion, as opposed to that o f construction, then the odds are that any future change 
will merely be a shift from one authoritarian government to another, rather than a 
change from authoritarianism to democracy’ (Stepan, 2001: 165). However, in a 
competitive authoritarian regime where the democratic opposition parties have regular 
opportunities to challenge the authorities in multiparty elections, the construction o f a 
credible alternative can be an important element in removing the authoritarian regime. 
The necessity for an opposition to present a credible alternative to an authoritarian 
regime is also noted by Bemeo, who claims that ‘authoritarian regimes will not be 
transformed unless someone presents a “preferable” and (to be specific) “feasible” 
alternative’ (Bemeo, 1990: 368).
Stepan recognises that opposition unity is an important element in presenting a 
credible alternative to an autocratic regime, but, in common with a number o f 
analysts, he is nonetheless mindful o f the potential limits to such unity (Blondel, 
1997; Posusney, 2002; Albrecht, 2005; Stepan, 2001). Due to the potential difficulties
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o f reaching agreement among a number o f democratic opposition parties, Stepan 
argues that they ought to focus attention on trying to agree a ‘formula for the conduct 
o f democratic contestation’ and should avoid trying to formulate agreement on issues 
o f policy because ‘Premature wrangling over substantive issues could not only divide 
democrats, but could do so in a dangerously polarizing fashion’ (Stepan, 2001: 165). 
However, while agreement on procedural issues is undoubtedly important, democratic 
opposition parties also need to build popular support, or to use Stepan’s terms, to 
increase the level o f passive and active opposition to the ruling regime. As such, in 
order to gain popular support, particularly in a repressive context in which the costs o f 
supporting the opposition can be high, democratic opposition parties will need to 
present a credible and coherent programme and policies, especially if  they intend to 
challenge a competitive authoritarian regime in elections, difficult as this may be to 
achieve. As such, insofar as a united opposition is an important element in terms o f 
presenting a credible alternative to the ruling regime, agreement on substantive issues 
o f policy is likely to be necessary. Furthermore, reaching agreement on the rules o f 
political contestation in a competitive authoritarian regime is also a difficult 
undertaking. Posusney is considerably more pessimistic than Stepan on this point, 
noting the problems and dilemmas that can face democratic opposition parties faced 
with the prospect o f contesting multiparty elections in an authoritarian regime. She 
notes that ideological differences between opposition parties; their relative size; their 
goals and prospects in any given election; together with the extent o f their internal 
cohesiveness, make it difficult for opposition parties to agree joint strategies when 
confronted with an election in grossly unfair conditions (Posusney, 2002, 47-50).
In his discussion o f presenting a credible alternative, Stepan seems to be 
considering this only in the domestic context: if  the opposition can present a credible
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alternative this will increase the likelihood o f regime supporters becoming regime 
opponents and thereby weaken and undermine the regime. While this is undoubtedly 
o f great importance, Stepan neglects to draw attention to the fact that opposition 
groups frequently seek international support and as such also have to appear credible 
to potential foreign allies in addition to potential domestic supporters. W hile he does 
note the importance o f international support in his discussion on questioning the 
regim e’s legitimacy, his model is somewhat limited by not acknowledging the need 
for a democratic opposition to present a credible alternative to potential foreign allies 
in order to secure this support. This was certainly the case with the democratic 
opposition parties in Serbia who sought support from Western powers such as the US 
and the EC/EU and as such needed to be perceived as a credible alternative to the 
Milosevic regime from an IC perspective in addition to presenting a credible 
alternative in the democratic context. However, given that the democratic opposition 
and the IC were prioritising different objectives for much o f the 1990s, the 
requirement o f presenting a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime in the 
domestic context -  which was for much o f the 1990s dominated by issues related to 
the Serbian national question -  while also presenting a credible alternative to the IC -  
which was firmly opposed to the creation o f any sort o f greater Serbia -  may, at times, 
have been incompatible.
Given the above discussion o f how Stepan’s tasks o f a democratic opposition 
in an authoritarian regime might be applied to democratic opposition parties operating 
in a competitive authoritarian regime such as M ilsoevic’s Serbia, it is clear that with 
some modifications, Stepan’s model is a useful way o f considering what it is that 
democratic opposition parties in such an environment need to do in order to weaken 
the authoritarian regime in the hope o f removing it from power. As such, it provides a
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means by which to assess the effectiveness o f the opposition parties’ campaigns 
against the Milosevic regime: the greater the extent to which they could carry out 
these tasks, the more effective they can be considered to be. As such, when assessing 
the impact o f international policy on Serbia’s democratic opposition parties, what will 
be considered will be the extent to which the IC either undermined or enhanced the 
democratic opposition parties’ ability to carry out four tasks: resisting integration into 
the regime; guarding zones o f ideological autonomy; disputing the legitimacy o f the 
regime and raising the costs o f authoritarian rule; and presenting a credible alternative 
both internally and internationally.
The Weaknesses of the Serbian Democratic Opposition
A further consideration also needs to be taken into account when considering 
the impact o f international policy on the effectiveness o f Serbia’s democratic 
opposition parties and this relates to the weaknesses that characterised Serbian 
democratic opposition during the 1990s. The most significant o f these were the extent 
o f opposition disunity, opposition nationalism, and the inability o f the Serbian 
democratic opposition parties to present a credible alternative to the Milosevic 
regime. As will be discussed below, these weaknesses, at times, undermined the 
ability o f the democratic opposition parties to carry out some o f the tasks outlined 
above, and as such reduced the effectiveness o f the Serbian democratic opposition 
parties in their challenges to the Milosevic regime. As such, when evaluating the 
impact o f international policy on Serbia’s democratic opposition parties it will 




One o f the most frequently cited sources o f opposition weakness in Serbia 
during the 1990s was the extent o f disunity and fragmentation within the opposition 
(Pribicevic, 1997: 35; Anastasijevic, 2000: 14; Sekelj, 2000: 60). According to Goati, 
conflict between the main opposition parties enabled Milosevic to rule throughout the 
1990s in spite o f the failure o f his party to gain an absolute majority in the republican 
parliamentary elections o f 1992, 1993 and 1997 (Goati, 2000: 12). Similarly, Sekelj 
cites ‘fragmentation o f the opposition’ as one o f four reasons for M ilosevic’s victory 
in elections in Serbia throughout the 1990s (Sekelj, 2000: 59). This disunity hindered 
the democratic opposition parties in carrying out two o f the tasks outlined by Stepan: 
presenting a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime, and resisting integration into 
the regime.
The lack o f unity o f the Serbian opposition on issues o f policy, and in 
particular national policy, will be discussed in some detail below. However, Serbia’s 
democratic opposition parties were sometimes disunited even in terms o f the 
strategies that should be adopted against the Milosevic regime. Pribicevic draws 
attention to a particular facet o f opposition disunity that he considers to have been 
particularly damaging: the lack o f unity in the opposition parties’ relations towards 
M ilosevic’s SPS. Pribicevic points out that some parties either directly or indirectly 
co-operated with the SPS7 (Pribicevic, 1997: 38). This is a factor that Ilic also 
mentions alleging that ‘the opposition acts constantly as a second, reserve, echelon o f 
the regime; its leaders compete fiercely against each other mutually lowering their
7 Author’s translation
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worth8 (Ilic, 2000: 3). W hile it is clear that a divided opposition would indirectly be to 
the advantage o f  the Milosevic regime, Cevallos argues that M ilosevic also 
manipulated this friction in order to help him retain power, pointing in particular to 
the leaking o f information about meetings held between Milosevic and some 
opposition leaders at a time when the opposition was staging major demonstrations to 
protest at the annulment o f their victories in local elections held at the end o f 1996, 
and also to Milosevic bringing one o f  the most significant o f  Serbia’s democratic 
opposition parties, the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO -  Srpski Pokret Obnove), 
into government around the time o f the NATO bombing in 1999 (Cevallos, 2001: 3- 
4). As such, at times, some elements within the democratic opposition failed to fulfil 
the most central task o f resisting integration into the regime. W hile this is most clearly 
seen in the case o f the SPO’s decision to enter the federal government in 1999, 
another o f Serbia’s main democratic opposition parties, the Democratic Party (DS -  
Demokratska Stranka), while not going so far as to enter government with Milosevic, 
did negotiate with the Milosevic regime in the mid-1990s. Thus, to varying extents 
and at particular points in time, some o f Serbia’s democratic opposition parties were 
co-opted by the Milosevic regime. In spite o f these dealings with Milosevic, however, 
both the SPO and the DS can be considered as opposition parties for most o f the time 
period covered in this study. As will be seen in chapter 2, none o f the parties chosen 
for analysis here exemplifies what could be considered an ‘ideal’ democratic 
opposition party, but both the DS and the SPO, while they struggled at times to resist 
being co-opted into the regime, on balance remained opposition parties.
8 In their discussions of the opposition, both Pribicevic and Ilic include the SRS, which will not be 
considered as part of the democratic opposition in this study, partly because of its frequent co-operation 
with the MiloSevic regime. The point, nonetheless, remains valid even with the narrower conception of 
the democratic opposition that is used here, particularly in relation to the SPO which not only 
negotiated with the SPS regarding the possibility of entering government on a number of occasions, but 
which, in 1999, entered the federal government with the SPS, JUL and the SRS.
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Opposition disunity undoubtedly had an impact on the democratic opposition 
parties to effectively oppose the Milosevic regime. At times it limited the potential for 
co-ordinated anti-regime campaigns and activities. A further consequence was the 
disintegration o f successful and popular opposition coalitions, most notably Zajedno 
in the mid-1990s, which seriously damaged the credibility o f the democratic 
opposition parties (Judah, 2000: 2; Fatic, 1997: 150). Pavlovic singles out the break 
up o f Zajedno in his discussion o f opposition behaviour, claiming the central conflict 
between Djindjic and DraSkovic was over the question o f which o f  them was the 
leader o f the opposition. The result o f this, according to Pavlovic, was the break up o f 
Zajedno and three more years o f M ilosevic’s rule9 (Pavlovic, 2001: 3). Furthermore, 
in terms o f carrying out the tasks noted by Stepan, opposition disunity undermined the 
ability o f the democratic opposition parties to present a credible alternative to the 
Milosevic regime, and to resist integration into the regime.
While the presence o f disunity within the Serbian democratic opposition is 
beyond dispute, there is less attention paid to the factors that contributed to or caused 
such disunity. WTiile authors such as Cevallos note that Milosevic did much to 
exacerbate already-existing divisions within the opposition, and Pavlovic notes the 
centrality o f the personal animosity between Djindjic and Draskovic, little attention is 
paid to whether or not international policy may also have been a contributory factor. 
As such, in the context o f this research, the question o f whether or not international 
policy with respect to Serbia may have exacerbated existing divisions within the 





A further characteristic o f the Serbian democratic opposition that has been 
highlighted as a weakness is its alleged nationalism, and its attempts to compete with 
Milosevic on national issues, which was considered to be M ilosevic’s strongest 
terrain 10 (Pribicevic, 1997: 42). However, the extent to which Serbia’s democratic 
opposition parties espoused positions that were as nationalist as, or even more 
nationalist than those o f the Milosevic regime, requires clarification and will be one o f 
the central questions addressed in this research. With this qualification in mind, it is, 
nevertheless, undoubtedly the case that most major political parties in Serbia did 
espouse nationalist positions to some degree during the 1990s and analysts generally 
agree that, at least at times, this undermined the ability o f the democratic opposition to 
effectively oppose the M ilosevic regime particularly in terms o f presenting a credible 
alternative to the regime.
As noted above in the discussion on the tasks o f the democratic opposition 
parties, in order to secure both domestic and international support, the democratic 
opposition needed to present a credible alternative both to potential voters in Serbia, 
and also to those IC actors whose support it sought. Clearly, given the extent to which 
the central concerns o f the IC in its dealings with Serbia between 1992 and 2000 
related to issues involving Serbian nationalism, a hardline nationalist position would 
have seriously diminished its chances o f gaining such international support as a 
strongly nationalist opposition would not have represented a credible alternative to the 
M ilosevic regime from an IC perspective. However, for the first half o f the 1990s the 
Serbian national question was also central in domestic terms, possibly leaving the
10 Author’s translation.
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opposition in the position that if  it were to take positions on the national question that 
would be considered acceptable to the IC, this may have undermined their ability to 
present themselves as a credible alternative to the M ilosevic regime in the domestic 
context.
In terms o f Serbia’s internal politics this factor was important mainly in the 
early to mid-1990s, when, as Goati states, ‘the axis o f political controversies in all the 
republican and federal elections ... consisted o f issues o f national and state identity,’ 
which he attributes to the protracted disintegration o f the former Yugoslavia and the 
war that accompanied this (Goati, 1998: 17). Stojanovic points out that, at the time o f 
the establishment o f political parties in Serbia at the beginning o f the 1990s, most 
parties from the regime and the opposition, had the same national agendas, and as 
such were divided more in relation to their positions vis-à-vis communism, than in 
relation to the national question . 11 As a result, she claims, ‘the parties wasted time 
outdoing each other and the government in ‘patriotism ’, and in this game, the party in 
power had incomparably stronger arguments’ (Stojanovic, 2000: 456-7). Similarly, 
Mihailovic notes that all o f the bigger parties in Serbia, at least briefly, have at some 
time championed the nationalist cause 12 (Mihailovic, 1997: 58). As a result, he claims 
that the opposition parties lost their identity because the line between regime and 
opposition became less apparent (Mihailovic, 2001: 6 8 ).
Stojanovic goes on to outline the positions o f the main opposition parties in 
relation to the national question in the early 1990s, essentially a debate regarding the 
future o f the Yugoslav state and Serbia’s position within it. She demonstrates the
11 Stojanovic discusses the links between the regime and nationalist intellectuals in Serbia in the late 
1980s and early 1990s,and the extent to which this group offered support to MiloSevió and would later 
constitute the leadership of the opposition to the his regime, after he had effectively adopted their 
platform. These events are thoroughly examined in Jasna Dragovic-Soso’s (2002) Saviours o f  the 
Nation: Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival o f  Nationalism. London: Hurst.
12 Author’s translation.
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similarity o f their positions to those o f the Milosevic regime, stating that an analysis 
o f programmes o f the key opposition parties at this time, reveals that ‘at the time o f 
the breakup o f Yugoslavia, the most influential opposition parties in parliament did 
not publicly propose an alternative national programme which would in any way 
differ from the words o f Slobodan Milosevic, “all Serbs in one state’” (Stojanovic, 
2000: 466). However, as Stojanovic points out, at least for the SPO, this position 
began to change following the party’s shock defeat in elections in early 1991 in which 
the SPO had adopted a hard nationalist position. After this, she states, the ‘SPO would 
begin gradually to move towards the centre’ (Stojanovic, 2000: 468). Pribicevic also 
notes this change in SPO stance in the early 1990s when he states that almost all 
significant opposition parties, with the exception o f the SPO after 1992, tried to prove 
their nationalist credentials13 (Pribicevic, 1997: 42). Stojanovic argues that opposition 
attacks on the government regarding national issues at this time enabled Milosevic to 
push ‘them out to an extreme political position, by which the potential number o f their 
votes was reduced at the start’ (Stojanovic, 2000: 468). Similarly, in relation to the 
SPO specifically, Gordy notes that ‘M ilosevic’s party benefited tremendously from 
SPO’s extremism in 1990’ (Gordy, 1999: 34).
The time period covered by this study begins in 1992, and as such the position 
o f the democratic opposition parties with respect to national issues at the time o f the 
break up o f the former Yugoslavia is not o f considerable significance. However 
nationalism continued to be an issue for the democratic opposition parties at various 
times between 1992 and 2000. In the mid-1990s, both the DS and the Democratic 
Party o f Serbia (DSS -  Demokratska Stranka Sribje) took hardline positions with 
respect to the IC’s proposed solutions for the Bosnian conflict. As both Pribicevic and
13 Author’s translation
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Mihailovic point out, this issue resulted in a significant split between the main 
democratic opposition parties, thereby exacerbating the opposition’s weakness in that 
area also, and showing how opposition weaknesses reinforced one another14 
(Pribicevic, 1997: 39; Mihailovic, 1997: 56). Gordy notes that the DS’s decision to 
follow a more nationalist course weakened the chance o f a strong and united 
opposition bloc being formed, as it
made extremely unlikely the formation o f a proposed “3D” coalition o f 
the three self-described “democratic parties -  DS, DEPOS, and DSS -  
which in coalition with the ethnic minority parties could present a credible 
opposition to SPS. Instead, opposition parties generally continued their 
infighting and failed to take advantage o f the weakness demonstrated by 
SPS (Gordy, 1999: 50).
Furthermore, the dominance o f national issues in Serbia’s political life was still 
evident in the 1993 elections in which according to Sekelj the opposition failed to 
capitalise on the dire economic situation in Serbia at the time. He points out that in 
spite o f ‘a situation o f absolute international isolation... with inflation running at 
several billion % a year, absolute poverty and impoverishment, both the SPS and the 
so-called democratic opposition conducted election campaigns dominated by the 
Serbian national question’ (Sekelj, 2000: 65). The failure o f the democratic opposition 
to ensure that Serbia’s dire economic situation and the regim e’s responsibility for 
these circumstances became a significant electoral issue represents a failure to guard a 
zone o f ideological autonomy against the regime, and is a significant demonstration o f 
the ability o f the Milosevic regime to control the political agenda within Serbia. What 
is at issue here, however, and what will be addressed in this study, is the extent to
14 Author’s translation
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which international policy in relation to Serbia, which was also dominated by issues 
relating to Serbian nationalism and war, helped M ilosevic in his efforts to ensure 
nationalism remained at the top o f the political agenda in Serbia, and thereby 
contributed to undermining the effectiveness o f the democratic opposition parties.
The consequences o f the opposition parties’ nationalism in terms o f  its 
effectiveness in opposing the Milosevic regime are more complex and difficult to 
determine than are the comparatively straightforward consequences o f its disunity. It 
is certainly the case that, insofar as differences between the parties with respect to the 
national question led to serious rifts within the democratic opposition, opposition 
nationalism indirectly undermined the ability o f the parties to form a credible 
alternative to the Milosevic regime. However, Sekelj argues that opposition 
nationalism was also, at least in part, directly responsible for the fact that the 
opposition did not present a credible alternative to the regime, claiming that the 
inability o f the opposition to create an alternative programme was ‘primarily because 
the opposition tried to beat Milosevic on the national card, but without having an 
alternative national program m e’ (Sekelj, 2000: 61). Furthermore, as has been noted, 
opposition nationalism diminished the ability o f the Serbian opposition to present 
itself as a credible international partner to the Milosevic regime, making international 
support for its campaigns against Milosevic more difficult to attain. What is at issue 
here is the extent to which international policy contributed to the shortcomings o f the 
democratic opposition parties in this regard.
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Lack o f a Credible Alternative
A further weakness o f the democratic opposition parties that is mentioned by a 
number o f authors is that it did not present a credible alternative programme to that 
offered by the regime (Pribicevic, 1997: 40; Sekelj, 2000: 61). This, according to 
Stepan, is another one o f the central tasks o f a democratic opposition in an 
authoritarian state. While it has already been noted that, at times, opposition 
nationalism undermined its ability to present a credible alternative to the Milosevic 
regime, the opposition has also been criticised for having no policies or programmes 
to speak o f other than opposing Milosevic. According to Stojanovic, from the early 
1990s:
the nationalist opposition parties abandoned every policy, principle, 
programme and idea, and that the main focus o f  their political activity 
became Slobodan Milosevic. In time they would speak less about 
Serbdom, war, borders, Serbs, democracy, economic trade or any other 
question o f principle, and more about Milosevic and his activity. Their 
principle attitude became “be against, even when this requires a change in 
party policy, a split in the party, or compromise with the extreme war 
positions directed from Pale” (Stojanovic, 2000: 469).
Ilic makes a similar point, implying that through its focus on Milosevic, the 
opposition was neglecting attempts to construct a viable political programme: ‘The 
concept o f the political enemy is especially important in interpreting the opposition 
party scene in contemporary Serbia in view o f their extremely sketchy visions o f a 
desirable society’ (Ilic, 2000: 15).
Ilic also criticises the opposition on the grounds o f its ‘competence and 
political ability’ which he believes does not get the attention it deserves in evaluations
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o f the opposition (Ilic, 2000: 19). Ilic discusses in detail the promise that Djindjic 
made to resign if  M ilosevic was still in power by the beginning o f 2000, and the 
manner in which he evaded having to fulfil this promise. Although Ilic is critical o f 
Djindjic and his lack o f ‘political responsibility’, he qualifies this to a certain extent 
by noting that these events must be understood ‘in the context o f the nightmare o f 
Serbian politics in the past decade’ (Ilic, 2000: 21).
Similar criticisms o f the opposition which broadly relate to its lack o f 
competence and responsibility are also made by Goati. Goati claims that the 
opposition was ‘irresponsible’ and that it made unrealistic promises, giving the 
example o f the 1993 elections when the opposition ‘promised a spectacular 
improvement in the catastrophic economic situation in the country if  they came to 
power. They predicted an average wage increase o f 1,000 DEM from the current 20 
DEM ’ (Goati, 1998: 28). In a similar vein, Pribicevic is critical o f the frequent 
changes o f positions on the part o f the Serbian opposition 15 (Pribicevic, 1997: 46). As 
such, the fragmentation o f the opposition, its lack o f coherent and consistent policies, 
together with incompetence and lack o f political responsibility all contributed to the 
opposition’s failure to fulfil the task o f presenting a credible democratic alternative to 
the Milosevic regime.
In summary, the weaknesses that characterised Serbia’s democratic opposition 
parties undermined its ability to perform three o f the five tasks that have been 
identified as important for democratic opposition parties in a competitive authoritarian 
regime such as that o f M ilosevic’s Serbia: resisting integration into the regime, 
guarding zones o f ideological autonomy and presenting a credible democratic 
alternative to that regime both domestically and internationally. However, considering
15 Author’s translation
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the weaknesses o f the democratic opposition does not reveal anything significant in 
terms o f whether the democratic opposition successfully accomplished the linked 
tasks o f disputing the regim e’s legitimacy and raising the costs o f authoritarian rule, 
though this should be discemable through an examination o f their activities and 
campaigns against the regime throughout the 1990s.
The aim o f this research is to examine the impact o f IC policy on the 
effectiveness o f Serbia’s democratic opposition parties in their campaigns against the 
Milosevic regime. To operate effectively, democratic opposition must carry out the 
tasks identified as being important, while acting to overcome the weaknesses that 
hinder its ability to operate effectively. As such, consideration o f these issues provides 
a useful framework by which to evaluate the Serbian opposition’s campaigns and 
activities. In the context o f this research, what is being sought is evidence that the IC 
either facilitated or hindered the democratic opposition parties in carrying out the 
tasks and whether international policy may have exacerbated the weaknesses that 
were present in the democratic opposition, or helped the opposition parties to 
overcome them.
Research themes
This research will centre around three main themes: the extent to which the 
democratic opposition parties held different views to the Milosevic regime on the 
issues that were o f key importance to the IC; the nature o f the relationship between 
the democratic opposition parties and the IC; and the impact o f international policy on 
the democratic opposition parties’ effectiveness in challenging the regime. W hile the 
precise details o f what will be involved in addressing these questions will be fully
discussed in chapter 2 , this chapter will conclude with a brief discussion o f each o f 
these themes and how they are intended to highlight particular aspects o f the 
relationship between the democratic opposition parties and the IC during the 
Milosevic era.
Differences between the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime
The first point to establish is whether or not the democratic opposition parties 
held positions on the issues that were o f key importance to the IC that were different 
to those o f the Milosevic regime. This question is o f great importance for two main 
reasons. Firstly, in its dealings with Serbia throughout the 1990s the IC and its 
representatives continually sought, thorough coercive policies, to induce a change in 
behaviour on the part o f the Milosevic regime. Analysing the motives o f the IC in this 
regard is not the purpose o f this study. However, even without a detailed analysis o f 
the motives o f the international actors involved, it can be assumed that if  the IC was 
prepared to take such strong measures against the regime - whether through sanctions 
or the use o f military force - that it considered Serbia’s compliance with its demands 
to be o f some importance. As such, only if  the democratic opposition parties held 
positions that were different to those o f the Milosevic regime, and closer to those o f 
the IC than the Milosevic regime, could there have been any incentive on the part o f 
the IC to deal with or assist the Serbian opposition. If the opposition parties did hold 
positions that were different to those o f the regime on these key issues, and if  those 
positions were closer to those o f the IC than were the positions o f the Milosevic 
regime, then those parties can be considered to have been a credible alternative 
partner for the IC. As such, the IC, at least theoretically, could have chosen from
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options other than coercion in an attempt to achieve its goal o f behaviour 
modification. If the democratic opposition represented a credible alternative to the 
Milosevic regime, the IC could have pursued a policy o f strengthening the opposition 
in the hope that this would lead to regime change in Serbia; or it could have combined 
coercion with a programme o f support for the opposition. However, as will be seen, 
for much, though not all, o f the time period considered in this study, the main 
approach o f the IC was to coerce the Serbian authorities in the hope that this would 
induce the changes that were sought.
As will be shown, for much o f the time period considered here, the most 
important issues for the IC in its dealings with Serbia were the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia and Serbia’s role in those conflicts. As such, the issues that were o f key 
concern to the IC related directly to the Serbian national question. Much o f the 
literature dealing with the Serbian opposition argues that in relation to the Serbian 
national question the democratic opposition parties differed little from the Milosevic 
regime and offered essentially the same national programme (for example, Stojanovic, 
2000; Mihailovic, 1997; Sekelj, 2000). The apparent lack o f distinction between the 
Milosevic regime and the democratic opposition parties was also regularly noted in 
the media. This perception that there was no real difference between the democratic 
opposition and the Milosevic regime on these issues is the second reason why it is 
important to consider this issue. Although much commentary dealing with the Serbian 
opposition parties, and particularly media commentary, asserts that there were no real 
differences between the two, this has not been subject to detailed analysis.
As will be demonstrated in this study, there were significant, if  sometimes 
subtle, differences between the positions o f the Milosevic regime and the positions o f 
the democratic opposition on many o f the issues that were o f key concern to the IC,
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and it is believed that there are two main reasons why some studies o f the Serbian 
opposition indicate otherwise. Firstly, many o f those who criticise the opposition on 
these grounds include the SRS as part o f the opposition in their analyses (Stojanovic, 
2000; Pribicevic, 1997). While the SRS did, at times, operate in opposition to the 
Milosevic regime, more often than not it acted in support o f it. This support for the 
regime has taken the form o f informal parliamentary support in the early 1990s, joint 
participation in electoral coalitions in the latter half o f the 1990s, and participation in 
government, also in the late 1990s. Furthermore, although the SRS did at times 
oppose the Milosevic regime, within the context o f this study it policies preclude it 
from being considered as part o f the democratic opposition, and this will discussed 
more fully in chapter 2. As will be seen later in this thesis, when the democratic 
opposition parties are considered separately from the SRS, it becomes clear that there 
were differences between the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime 
on the issues that were o f key importance to the IC.
A further point worth noting in relation to criticism o f the Serbian opposition 
on the grounds o f  its similarity to the Milosevic regime is that often these criticisms 
relate to particular points in time, or the positions o f the opposition parties on specific 
events. Thus, for example, criticism o f the DS on the grounds o f its alleged 
nationalism usually cite the support given by this party, and in particular Zoran 
Djindjic, to the Bosnian Serb leadership following the decision o f Milosevic to 
withdraw his support (Pribicevic, 1997: 43). Similarly, criticism o f the SPO on the 
grounds if  its alleged nationalism often includes references to the party’s positions 
and those if  its leader in the early 1990s (Pribicevic, 1997; Stojanovic, 2000). While 
these criticisms may be valid with respect to those particular instances, they do not
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reflect the reality o f the differences between M ilosevic and the democratic opposition 
parties when considered over the entire time period that is covered in this research.
The relationship between the Serbian democratic opposition parties and the 
international community
The second theme in this research concerns the relationship that existed between 
the opposition parties and the IC, and the intention here is to get as full a picture o f 
possible regarding the nature and extent o f that relationship. As such, what will be 
considered will not just be whether there were any contacts or links between the 
democratic opposition parties and the IC, but also whether the IC offered support to 
the democratic opposition parties in any o f its campaigns against the Milosevic 
regime, and if  so, the extent o f that support. In addition, the perceptions that the IC 
and the democratic opposition parties held about each other will also be examined.
Clearly the first point that needs to be addressed regarding the relationship 
between the democratic opposition parties and the IC is whether any such relationship 
existed. As such, the first consideration is whether there were any contacts or 
meetings taking place between representatives o f the IC and the democratic 
opposition, and if  there were these formal contacts, at what level did they occur. In 
spite o f the IC’s coercion o f Serbia, IC representatives continued to meet with 
representatives o f the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities at least until the end o f the 
1990s. As such, it seems that the IC’s attention and focus in terms o f achieving its 
goals with respect to Serbia remained firmly fixed on Milosevic and his associates, at 
least until 1999. This is hardly surprising. Traditionally, the focus o f international
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interactions has been the governments or leaders o f individual states, with interference 
in the internal affairs o f any state being proscribed.
However, as noted above, coercion can operate in one o f two ways: directly - 
through causing the target regime to assess that the costs o f compliance are less than 
the costs o f continued defiance -  or indirectly - through bringing about a change in 
the internal politics o f the target state leading to regime change. W hile the principle o f 
non-interference in the domestic affairs o f states may have carried some weight 
throughout much o f the Cold War era, although it did not preclude covert attempts by 
states to alter the internal politics o f other states, recent experiences indicate that this 
principle has been eroding. This is most evident in terms o f  ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ where states now claim the right to intervene in the affairs o f other 
states, including with military force, if  the governments o f those states are subjecting 
their populations to human rights abuses. However, it is also the case that states have 
actively attempted to influence the internal politics o f numerous states with the 
intention o f bringing about regime change. This has been done successfully through 
providing support to opponents o f incumbent regimes in countries such as Georgia, 
Ukraine, and, as will be seen, Serbia in 2000, and also through the use o f force as has 
been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In the context o f this study, and with regard to the relationship between the IC and 
the democratic opposition parties in M ilosevic’s Serbia, it appears as though the IC 
changed its basic goals -  from accepting a Milosevic regime that would concede to its 
demands for much o f the 1990s to actively calling for the removal o f that regime from 
1999 on. However, what is being examined here is whether there is any evidence that, 
prior to 1999, the IC was offering support to the Serbian opposition - rather than 
focusing exclusively on the Milosevic regime -  as this will provide a complete picture
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o f the extent o f international support for the democratic opposition throughout the 
time period covered by this research.
The easiest way to gauge the extent o f international support for the democratic 
opposition is to focus on whether international support was offered to the numerous 
campaigns that the opposition parties mounted against the regime. These included 
election campaigns; mass demonstrations calling for M ilosevic’s resignation and 
democratic reforms; and frequent demands for changes in electoral conditions and the 
media. In considering international support it is important to recognise that not all 
support will be explicit, and as such there may have been implied or implicit support 
for some o f the opposition’s demands. Clearly explicit support will be easily 
recognised; it will be evident from IC statements and actions that it supported the 
opposition’s demands or campaigns. While implicit support will be slightly less 
obvious, it should nevertheless, be possible to discern. If, for example, an IC 
representative were to issue a statement on Serbia that included references to the 
undemocratic nature o f the Serbia’s electoral laws at the same time as the opposition 
was engaged in a campaign that aimed to have electoral laws changed, this could be 
taken as an indication o f implied support from the IC, even if  the democratic 
opposition and its campaign were not mentioned directly. A final consideration when 
gauging international support for the opposition relates to the level o f that support; 
there is a clear difference between a vague statement indicating displeasure with the 
regime on an issue o f relevance to the democratic opposition and threatening the 
regime with coercive measures should it not concede to the opposition’s demands. 
With these considerations in mind, it should be possible to create a clear picture o f the 
extent and nature o f international support for the Serbian opposition throughout the 
time period covered in this study.
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The impact o f  international policy on the democratic opposition
As has already been discussed, the issue o f whether and how the IC’s actions 
had an impact on the democratic opposition parties is at the centre o f this study, and 
the aim is to determine whether international policy may have undermined or 
enhanced the effectiveness o f the opposition in its battles against the Milosevic 
regime. The failure o f the opposition to defeat the Milosevic regime, in spite o f its 
increasing unpopularity in Serbia, most certainly resulted from a combination o f 
internal and external factors. A significant reason for its failures undoubtedly lies in 
its own weaknesses and shortcomings, but what is being considered in this study is 
whether the IC, through its actions and policies with respect to Serbia, exacerbated 
these weaknesses or made it more difficult for the opposition to operate. International 
actions may have had a direct impact on the democratic opposition, or that impact 
may have been indirect, through narrowing the political space in which the opposition 
operated for example.
As noted above, effective opposition to the Milosevic regime would require 
both overcoming the weaknesses that characterised the democratic opposition and 
carrying out the tasks identified above in order to weaken the regime. As such, in 
considering the impact o f international policy on the effectiveness o f the democratic 
opposition parties, analysis will centre on whether international policy with respect to 
Serbia acted to undermine or exacerbate the weaknesses o f the democratic opposition 
parties and whether it hindered the ability o f the democratic opposition parties to 
carry out the tasks o f resisting integration into the regime; guarding zones o f 
ideological autonomy; disputing the legitimacy o f the regime and raising the costs o f
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authoritarian rule; and presenting a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime both 
internally and internationally.
Conclusion
The aim o f this research is to provide a detailed analysis o f the relationship between 
Serbia’s democratic opposition parties and the IC throughout the time period in which 
Serbia was subjected to international coercion. The impact o f coercive policies on the 
effectiveness o f democratic opposition parties in the target state is not fully 
understood, in spite o f the potential significance o f these actors. As will be set out in 
chapter 2, Serbia’s experience o f international coercion varied over time, and the 
entire time period considered in this study can be broken down into five sub-periods, 
in each o f which Serbia’s experience o f international isolation differed in its nature 
and/or extent. Each o f these five sub-periods will be considered as a distinct case 
study in this study, and the relationship between the Serbia’s opposition and the IC 
will be analysed in each o f these time periods in order to determine the nature o f that 
relationship and its impact on the operations o f the democratic opposition. This will 
provide a full picture o f the interactions between the democratic opposition parties 
and the IC, and their impact, throughout the entire time period in which Serbia was 
subject to international isolation. In addition, because o f the variety o f coercive 
policies to which Serbia was subjected it will be possible to compare the impacts o f 
different coercive approaches which may help to shed light on the likely impact o f 
such policies on domestic opposition groups. While the findings o f this research relate 
solely to Serbia, it should, nevertheless, be possible to draw some tentative 




As outlined in chapter 1, the primary focus of this research is to consider the 
impact of coercive policies employed by the IC in its dealings with Serbia between 1992 
and 2000 on the democratic opposition to the Milosevic regime. This research will take 
the form of a case study, using Alexander George’s method o f structured, focused 
comparison (George, 1979). This chapter will begin with a brief note on what is meant by 
the term ‘international community’ within the context o f this research, in addition to 
identifying which political parties have been selected for inclusion as part of the 
democratic opposition in Serbia, and an explanation o f why these parties have been 
selected. Following this there will be a discussion o f the reasons for choosing a case 
study approach. In addition, the requirements o f George’s methodology o f structured, 
focused comparison and its application to this study will also be outlined. This chapter 
will conclude with a discussion of the research questions that form the basis o f this study.
Terminology
This research considers how the international community’s policies impacted on 
democratic opposition parties in Serbia, and as such it is important to clarify what is 
meant by the term ‘international community’ in the context o f this research and also 
which parties are being referred to when discussing the democratic opposition in Serbia. 
While the term ‘international community’ is open to different meanings, in the context of 
this research the term is used quite simply as a form of shorthand to denote the
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international institutions and individual states that played key roles in subjecting Serbia to 
international isolation and coercion. In the case of Milosevic’s Serbia, the states and 
international institutions that had the most influence differed over time, as will be seen in 
the detail of this thesis. However, referring to the time period from 1992 to 2000 as a 
whole, the most significant states and international institutions that were involved in the 
international response to events in Serbia and the former-Yugoslavia as a whole, included 
the US; the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) and its member states, in 
particular the UK, France and Germany; Russia; the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); the UN Security Council; the Contact Group (comprising 
France, Germany, the UK, Russia, the US and Italy); and NATO. While at times the 
states involved acted collectively, at other times they held different and even 
contradictory positions. This was the case, for example in the international debate 
regarding the possible use o f force in Bosnia -  which was supported, at times, by the US, 
but opposed by key EU member states such as the UK and France. In spite o f these 
differences however, it is still useful to think of IC engagement with Serbia because 
generally priority was given to maintaining international unity over formulating effective 
responses to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. As a result, the IC at times adopted 
‘lowest common denominator’ policies that ensured that relations between the Western 
powers would not be damaged as a result of the various conflicts that were taking place in 
the Balkans. As such, and as will be discussed later in this study, although the policies 
pursued may not have been adequate in terms o f successfully resolving the former 
Yugoslavia’s conflicts, they did, nevertheless, generally represent an ‘international’, as 
opposed to unilateral, response. Thus, in 1993, while the US may have favoured a ‘lift
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and strike’ policy in Bosnia, while the EC states were more inclined to support the 
proposed Vance-0wen peace plan which was unpopular with the Americans, the 
unwillingness to cause a transatlantic rift resulted in the abandonment of both, and the 
creation o f the so-called ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia.
Selection of Political Parties
Throughout the 1990s, a large number of political parties operated in opposition 
to the Milosevic regime. However, only four will be considered in this study and these 
have been selected on the basis of four criteria: that the party must have had a national 
platform and operated throughout Serbia throughout the time period considered here; that 
the party must have operated in opposition to the Milosevic regime throughout the time 
period considered here; that the party must have been predominantly democratically 
oriented; and that it must have been sufficiently large to be considered as a significant 
party. While these criteria constitute the guidelines for selecting parties to be included 
here, it must be noted that there are no parties that can be considered to have met all these 
criteria throughout the entire time period under consideration. As such it is necessary to 
examine Serbia’s opposition to identify which parties can be considered to have come 
closest to this ideal democratic opposition party. Drawing to a large extent on the work of 
a number o f Serbian social scientists four parties have been identified for inclusion in this 
study (Goati; 1997; Milosevic, 2000; Vukomanovic, 1998; Antonie, 2002). These are the 
SPO, the DS, the DSS and the GSS (Civic Alliance of Serbia -  Gradjanski Savez Srbije).
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Vladimir Goati, one of Serbia’s leading political scientists, has written extensively 
on the Serbia’s political parties and party system and this work is useful as an aid to 
identifying potential parties to be considered in this study. Goati argues that in spite of 
the large number o f political parties operating in Serbia during the Milosevic era, there 
are only five that could have been characterised as ‘relevant,’ which he defines as having 
received at least 4% o f the vote in parliamentary elections. These are the SPS (Socialist 
Party of Serbia - Socialisticka Partija Srbije), the SPO, the DS, the DSS, and the SRS 
(Serbian Radical Party - Srpska Radikalna Stranka) (Goati, 1998: 19; Milosevic, 2000: 
83). While Goati provides a sound basis for eliminating a large number of small and 
insignificant political parties his criteria forjudging the relevance o f the various political 
parties in Serbia are not synonymous with the criteria for selecting parties to be included 
in this research and as such it is necessary to look at these five parties individually to 
determine which o f them can be considered to be parties o f the democratic opposition.
O f the five parties identified by Goati, the case o f Milosevic’s SPS is the most 
straightforward. As this study focuses on the parties that opposed the Milosevic regime, 
the SPS can clearly be immediately eliminated from the analysis. However, deciding 
which of the other parties to include requires careful consideration, particularly as the 
manner in which these parties have operated, the issues that they have prioritised, and 
their status as opposition parties have not been consistent over time.
Different authors classify the various political parties in different ways which can 
be useful in trying to ascertain their suitability for inclusion in this study. Vukomanovic 
divides the various political opposition parties into three groups: nationalists, democrats 
and reformers (Vukomanovic, 1998: 36). She includes both the SPO and the SRS among
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the nationalists, while the DS and the DSS are included with the democrats. Similarly, 
Antonie argues that the political elite in Serbia throughout most of the time period 
covered by this research can be divided into three components: the statist, the national- 
populist and the liberal. According to Antonie, the SRS formed part of the national- 
populist bloc, while the DS, DSS and SPO were situated primarily in the liberal bloc 1 
(Antonie, 2002: 363).
The inclusion o f the DS and the DSS in both the democratic bloc in 
Vukomanovic’s scheme and the liberal bloc in Antonie’s indicates that, at least in terms 
of their political orientation, these two parties would be suitable for inclusion in this 
study. Although both parties have, at least at times, promoted a nationalist agenda (as 
have most major political parties in Serbia), neither Antonie nor Vukomanovic have 
included them among the more extreme nationalist parties, indicating that over time this 
has not been the most significant feature o f their political orientation. In addition to their 
generally democratic orientation both the DS and the DSS have acted primarily as 
opponents o f the Milosevic regime throughout the time period covered by this research. 
Although the DS leader Zoran Djindjic did appear willing on several occasions to enter 
into agreements with Milosevic, this never occurred, and the DS was a major participant 
in most of the significant anti-regime opposition coalitions that were formed throughout 
the time period considered in this research. Taken together, these factors warrant the 
inclusion o f both the DS and the DSS as parties o f the democratic opposition within the 
context o f this research.
During the 1990s the SRS was, at various times, both fiercely critical o f the 
Milosevic regime and a coalition partner with the SPS in government. In the early 1990s,
1 Author’s translation
the SRS, though not formally a member o f the government, nevertheless provided 
important parliamentary support for the SPS. Furthermore, according to Gordy, the SRS 
leader Vojislav Seselj was at this time one o f a series o f ‘ideological surrogates’ used by 
Milosevic to express extreme nationalist or other opinions, which he could later distance 
himself from should the need arise (Gordy, 1999: 17). Gordy also draws attention to the 
role o f Seselj and the SRS as a ‘counteropposition’, stating that ‘SeSelj came to be closely 
associated with the regime, emerging as a “counteropposition” attacking anti-war forces 
with a vehemence that the ruling party saw as beneath its own dignity’ (Gordy, 1999: 46). 
This period of co-operation came to an end however, when Milosevic decided to support 
the Vance-0wen peace plan for Bosnia. A period o f hostility between the Milosevic and 
the SRS followed, with the SRS continuing to back the Bosnian Serb leadership which 
had rejected the peace plan. This period of hostility saw the SRS achieve great success in 
the 1996 elections, following which the party became ‘the strongest individual Serbian 
opposition party’ (Vukomanovic, 1998: 37). However, following elections at the end of 
1997 the SPS found itself in need of a coalition partner in order to form a government, 
and in 1998 the SRS became part o f a Serbian coalition government headed by the SPS 
(Milosevic, 2000: 103). This pattern o f co-operation with, and opposition to, the regime 
makes it difficult to classify the SRS in terms o f whether it can be considered an 
opposition party in this study. While clearly opposed to Milosevic during the mid-1990s, 
the SRS offered both tacit and explicit support to the regime at different times during the 
time period covered by this research. However, even during the mid-1990s when the SRS 
operated as an opposition party, there was little co-operation between it and other 
opposition parties, and the SRS did not participate in any o f the significant alliances and
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coalitions that were formed by the democratic opposition parties during this time. 
Nevertheless, a willingness to co-operate with the regime or a lack o f willingness to co­
operate with other opposition parties are not the only determinants o f which parties 
should be included in this study.
In terms o f its political orientation Antonie places the SRS in the national-populist 
wing o f the political elite in Serbia, while Vukomanovic places it among the nationalist 
parties. Seselj and the SRS have been the most prominent promoters o f ‘Greater Serbian’ 
nationalism throughout the time period covered by this research. The Programme 
Declaration of the SRS adopted in February 1991 counts among the fundamental goals o f 
the party the restoration of an independent Serb state that would include:
all Serb lands, which means that within its boundaries it shall have, in 
addition to the present granted Serbian federal unit, the Serb Macedonia, the 
Serb Montenegro, the Serb Bosnia, the Serb Herzegovina, the Serb 
Dubrovnik, the Serb Dalmatia, the Serb Lika, the Serb Kordun, the Serb 
Banija, the Serb Slavonia, and the Serb Baranja (Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Serbia, 1997: 160).
The same declaration also outlines a series of measures for dealing with insurgence in 
Kosovo, including the immediate expulsion of 360,000 Albanian ‘emigrants’ and the 
postponement of any elections in Kosovo until the ‘ethnic structure o f the population is 
restored to the ratio which existed on 6  April 1941’ (The Helsinki Committee for Human 
Rights in Serbia, 1997: 162-163). Taken together, the extremism of the SRS and its 
willingness to provide both tacit and explicit support to the Milosevic regime, are
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sufficient grounds for its exclusion as a party o f the democratic opposition in Serbia 
within the context of this study.
The case for the SPO is also quite complex. Although opposing the regime for a 
considerable period o f time, the SPO and its leader Vuk Draskovic showed a willingness 
on several occasions to co-operate with the Milosevic regime and even went as far as to 
join the federal government in early 1999. As such the SPO does not have an 
unblemished record in terms of its opposition to the Milosevic regime. Furthermore, from 
1997 the SPO also controlled Belgrade’s city government with tacit support from the 
SPS. Nevertheless, this alone is not sufficient grounds to exclude the SPO as, throughout 
much of the time period covered, the party was active in its opposition to the regime and 
played a leading role in several of the most significant opposition coalitions that were 
established in Serbia during the time of Milosevic’s rule. Furthermore, Draskovic was 
one of the principal organisers of anti-Milosevic demonstrations in Serbia from 1991 
onwards. As Vukomanovic points out, in spite of its nationalist orientation the SPO 
‘positioned itself as a primarily anti-regime, anti-system party’ (Vukomanovic, 1998: 36). 
Furthermore, throughout most o f the time period covered here, the SPO was also the 
largest and most popular individual opposition party operating in Serbia.
As noted, Vukomanovic places the SPO in the nationalist group o f parties while 
Antonie classifies it, with some reservations, as a liberal party. Although it is certainly 
the case that the SPO, particularly in its early stages, did present a nationalist ideology, 
this alone cannot be considered grounds for its exclusion as, to a greater or lesser extent, 
most major political parties in Serbia during the 1990s could be considered to be 
nationalist. Furthermore, according to Vukomanovic, following his early promotion of
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Greater Serbian nationalism, Draskovic, ‘engaging himself against civil war in 
Yugoslavia ... induced a complete switch in [the SPO’s] policy’ (Vukomanovic, 1998: 
36). On these grounds the SPO can be considered to be a democratic opponent of the 
Milosevic regime for the purposes o f this study.
In addition to the three parties that Goati mentions as being relevant, I have 
decided to include a fourth that does not appear in Goati’s list. This is the GSS. Although 
not considered relevant by Goati on the grounds o f its small size and lack of electoral 
support, the GSS fits the other criteria for inclusion here to a greater extent than any o f 
the other three parties already included. In terms of its classification by Antonie and 
Vukomanovic the GSS is classed as a liberal and reformist party and is generally 
considered to be the most consistently moderate political party in Serbia, in that it has 
been a constant opponent o f nationalism, war and the Milosevic regime. Furthermore, as 
Vukomanovic points out, the GSS, through its prominent participation in major 
opposition coalitions, gave it an influence that far-exceeded its negligible electoral 
support (Vukomanovic, 1998: 39).
Methodology: Structured, focused comparison
The context dependent nature o f this study makes the use o f a case study research 
strategy essential in order to fully address the issues and questions raised within this 
thesis. While the advantages and suitability of this approach have been discussed in 
chapter 1 , here the limitations o f such a strategy will be considered together with the 
specific methodology to be employed - Alexander George’s methodology of structured, 
focused comparison - and how this can help to overcome these limitations. This will be
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followed by a discussion o f the nature o f the research findings that are likely to result 
from choosing this approach.
Overcoming the limitations o f  a case study research strategy
Although a case study research strategy has clear strengths within the context of 
this research, it is nevertheless true that such a strategy also has certain limitations. Case 
study based research has many detractors and one o f the foremost criticisms o f this 
approach concerns the extent to which generalisations can be made based on the findings 
of case study research. Yin addresses this question by pointing out that case studies are 
generalisable to ‘theoretical propositions’ rather than populations and universes, and thus 
the goal of a case study is to ‘expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and 
not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation)’ (Yin, 2003: 10). George’s 
method o f structured, focused comparison directly addresses the question o f the wider 
applicability of case study findings and their potential role in the development o f theory. 
Using his method o f structured, focused comparison it is possible both to acknowledge 
and understand the uniqueness of each case, while at the same time making some 
generalisations on the basis o f case study based research findings. He states that:
one can deal with unique cases by treating them as members o f a “class” or type 
o f phenomenon that one is interested to understand better ... the many instances 
o f each type can be grouped together and studied as a class of similar events 
rather than as unique occurrences. By following this research strategy it might be 
possible to develop scientific generalizations and general laws of at least a
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probabilistic character covering all the many instances/cases o f each type o f 
phenomena (George, 1979: 45).
In the case of this study, it is therefore possible to consider international coercion as the 
phenomenon in question, with the range of strategies that were employed by the IC in its 
dealings with Serbia representing individual examples o f this phenomenon.
George points out that not all types o f case study are suitable for the purposes of 
theory development. However, he states that what he describes as the ‘heuristic’ case 
study is a suitable variant for this purpose. This type o f case study is:
used as a means o f stimulating the imagination in order to discern important new 
general problems, identify possible theoretical solutions, and formulate 
potentially generalizable relations that were not previously apparent. In other 
words the case study is regarded as an opportunity to learn more about the 
complexity of the problem studied, to develop further the existing explanatory 
framework, and to refine and elaborate the initially available theory employed by 
the investigator in order to provide an explanation o f the particular case 
examined (George, 1979: 52).
George’s description o f the heuristic case study has many similarities with 
Lijphart’s ‘hypothesis-generating’ case study. This is a case study which:
starts out with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses, and attempts 
to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger 
number o f cases. Their objective is to develop theoretical generalisations in areas 
where no theory exists yet. Such case studies are of great theoretical value 
(Lijphart, 1971: 692).
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As noted in chapter one, the impact of international coercion on democratic opposition 
parties in target states has not been the subject o f a great deal o f analysis. In the case o f 
Serbia itself, while there has been some consideration o f whether international policy 
may have resulted in undermining the Milosevic regime, for example Dragovic-Soso’s 
(2003) study of the impact o f coercion on the support base and power resources of the 
regime, the impact on the democratic opposition parties has not been subject to 
systematic analysis, and as noted in chapter one, undermining the regime does not 
necessarily imply strengthening the democratic opposition. Given the lack of existing 
theory in this area the goals o f George’s heuristic case study and Lijphart’s hypothesis- 
generating case study make them particularly well suited in the context o f this study.
Nature o f Research Findings
George states that controlled comparison is particularly suited to developing 
typological theory and what he calls ‘rich, differentiated theory’ which, ‘in contrast to a 
general explanatory theory, is cast in the form of contingent generalizations and has the 
capability for more discriminating explanations’ (George, 1979: 59). He goes on to state 
that:
the investigator who employs the controlled comparison strategy seeks to 
identify the variety o f different causal patterns that can occur for the 
phenomenon in question. He (sic) seeks to identify the conditions under which 
each distinctive type of causal pattern occurs rather than attempting to address 
the questions o f how often each outcome and/or causal pattern does occur or can 
be expected to occur. Thus, controlled comparison is useful for developing a
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differentiated theory comprised o f conditional generalisations rather than 
frequency distributions’ (George, 1979: 60).
In the context of this research, the application of George’s method will allow for a 
comparison o f the impact on the democratic opposition parties of a range o f coercive 
policies as employed by international actors between 1992 and 2000. The purpose of such 
a comparison is to consider whether the different international policies produced different 
outcomes in terms of the effectiveness o f the democratic opposition in Serbia. The 
context-dependent nature o f this research means that any findings will apply only to 
Serbia during the time period being considered, but it will nevertheless be possible to 
generate some tentative hypotheses regarding the impact o f international coercion on 
democratic opposition parties operating in coerced states that could subsequently be 
examined in the context of other ‘rogue’ states.
In carrying out comparative research a researcher must address certain issues that 
have the potential to weaken the research findings if not adequately dealt with. Foremost 
among these is the selection o f appropriate and comparable cases. This need for 
comparability is reflected in George’s assertion that the cases to be examined must 
belong to one particular class of events. Lijphart defines comparable as ‘similar in a large 
number o f important characteristics (variables) which one wants to treat as constants, but 
dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each other’ 
(Lijphart, 1971: 687). For this reason, as Lijphart notes, the consideration of a series of 
cases from a single county over a period o f time, as is the case with this study, offers 
greater comparability than would be the case if examples were taken from several 
different countries (Lijphart, 1971: 689).
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Applying the methodology
George outlines three phases in any research process involving the structured, 
focused comparison methodology. These are the design phase, the case studies, and 
drawing theoretical implications of the case studies. While the case studies themselves 
will form the bulk of this thesis, and drawing implications from the findings will 
effectively be its conclusion, it is necessary here to make some points regarding the 
design phase o f this methodology. As has been noted, what is being investigated in this 
research is the effect that international coercive policies had on the democratic opposition 
parties in Serbia between 1992 and 2000. This will be evaluated according to how 
international actions may have either exacerbated or undermined the generally agreed 
weaknesses that characterised these parties, or hindered or helped the democratic 
opposition parties in carrying out the four tasks necessary to effectively oppose the 
regime identified in chapter one. The time period under consideration will be broken 
down into five sub-periods which are demarcated according to how the nature and/or 
extent o f the international coercion to which Serbia was subjected differed, and each of 
these individual time periods will constitute a single case study. This division o f the 
overall time period considered in this research into a series o f sub-periods is done through 
applying Geldenhuys’ framework for measuring international isolation to Serbia in the 
1990s, and this will be discussed in detail in the following section. In addition, the 
requirements o f George’s methodology are that each case study considered in any
particular study be subjected to the same set of questions in order to facilitate
*
comparison. In the context of this research, this will involve formulating a set of
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questions that can evaluate the impact of the IC’s coercive policies on the democratic 
opposition parties in Serbia. These questions will be based around the three research 
themes discussed at the end of chapter one, and will be outlined in detail later in this 
chapter, following which there will be a discussion of the data that are to be used in 
carrying out this research.
Geldenhuys’ framework
Geldenhuys devotes a considerable amount o f attention to developing a framework 
for the measurement of international isolation, seeing the degree of any state’s 
international isolation as being a point on a continuum, with no state ever being entirely 
isolated or entirely integrated (Geldenhuys, 1990: 13). He considers international 
isolation on a number of different levels, acknowledging that there are differences in 
terms o f the particular areas in which a state can be subject to isolation, in terms o f the 
geographical scope o f isolation, in terms of the specific targets o f an isolation policy and 
in terms of the aims and objectives o f the isolator states, and as such recognises that 
states that are subject to policies of enforced isolation each experience this in different 
ways.
Geldenhuys outlines four areas in which a state can be subjected to enforced 
isolation: the diplomatic and political; the economic; the military; and the socio-cultural. 
For each o f these four areas he has developed a set of indicators for determining the 
extent to which any given state is internationally isolated (Geldenhuys, 1990: 17-18). 
Geldenhuys also acknowledges that there are three possible targets for a policy of 
enforced isolation: the government of the target state, selected interest groups in that state
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or the population o f that state (Geldenhuys, 1990: 19-20). He points out that very often 
the government of the isolated state is the primary, if not the exclusive, target o f the 
isolation policy, but that in some cases other groups can be targeted as well. Geldenhuys 
also claims that it is possible to understand the objectives o f states carrying out the 
isolation policy by examining whether the isolation is state-, regime-, government-, or 
policy-directed, although he does acknowledge that these are not neatly separable 
categories (Geldenhuys, 1990: 22). Considering the case of Serbia’s international 
isolation, throughout most o f the time period from 1992-2000, this was policy-directed 
isolation, defined by Geldenhuys as ‘an attempt by foreign states to compel another to 
change or abandon specific actions they find unacceptable’ (Geldenhuys, 1990: 23). 
However, following the NATO bombing o f Kosovo in 1999 and the indictment of 
Milosevic and other senior regime officials, the IC’s objectives went beyond attempting 
to change the behaviour of the Serbian authorities, and international actors pursued a 
policy of, at a minimum, government-directed isolation, described by Geldenhuys as 
being ‘designed to force a particular government to renounce power’ (Geldenhuys, 1990: 
23). Geldenhuys himself claims that international objectives went beyond a change of 
government and constituted a policy of regime-directed isolation, which he states is 
‘designed to force wholesale or limited change in the norms, values and authority 
structure o f an offending state’ (Geldenhuys, 1990: 23). Commenting on the case of 
Yugoslavia in a later work, Geldenhuys notes that regime change ‘refers both to the 
introduction of a fully democratic political order in [Yugoslavia] and to the change in 
Kosovo’s status’ (Geldenhuys, 2004: 268).
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Through considering Serbia’s international isolation in terms o f the areas in which 
it was isolated, the scope o f that isolation and the targets o f the IC’s isolation policies, it 
becomes clear that this isolation varied in both its nature and its extent. When this is 
supplemented by considering other measures that the IC used to coerce Serbia it is 
possible to break down the entire time period from 1992 to 2000 into five sub-periods, 
each o f which will constitute a distinct case study in this research, although it must be 
acknowledged that these time periods did in practice overlap to a certain extent.
Geldenhuys’ framework and Serbia from 1992-2000
Before considering the specific measures that the IC implemented to isolate 
Serbia internationally, it is necessary to consider some aspects o f Serbia’s diplomatic and 
political isolation that apply throughout the entire time period being considered here. 
Some of these are not discernible through considering specific sanctions, while others 
predate the initial imposition o f sanctions. Geldenhuys lists seven indicators of political 
and diplomatic isolation: pariah image; international recognition o f the isolated state 
and/or its government; diplomatic relations; membership o f intergovernmental 
organisations and participation in international conferences; international treaties; official 
visits abroad by government/state representatives and visits o f foreign counterparts to the 
state; and international censure and support in intergovernmental organisations 
(Geldenhuys, 1990: 17). Considering Serbia’s experience in relation to these indicators, it 
can be demonstrated that even before the imposition o f formal sanctions, Serbia was 
already subject to a degree of international isolation.
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Geldenhuys distinguishes political isolation from diplomatic isolation, with the 
latter being a lack o f bilateral and multilateral interactions between governments, while 
the former is more concerned with the ‘image’ of a particular state, and whether or not it 
has acquired a ‘pariah image’. For Geldenhuys, the issue o f whether or not a state has a 
pariah image centres on ‘the general images that foreigners (governments and public) 
have’ of the ostracised state (Geldenhuys, 1990: 91), and he describes a pariah image as 
‘a popular international notion that [a state] is a deviant whose behaviour offends 
international conscience, or whose very claims to statehood have little or no validity in 
this day and age (Geldenhuys, 1990: 665).2
There is considerable evidence to support the conclusion that Serbia did indeed 
acquire a ‘pariah image’. Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ -  Savezna 
Republika Jugoslavije) were identified by numerous international actors of being the 
primary instigators o f conflict in the former-Yugoslavia.3 While Serbia’s image problems 
were probably alleviated slightly during the mid-1990s, with Milosevic’s acceptance of 
the Dayton Peace agreement and his role in bringing about this settlement, Serbia was 
never entirely rehabilitated, and its image problems intensified at the end o f the 1990s as 
a result of its actions in Kosovo and Milosevic’s indictment for war crimes.
2 Of all the indictors of international isolation that are included in his framework, Geldenhuys claims that 
all but two are quantifiable. Those that are not are the first two indicators of diplomatic and political 
isolation: pariah image and international recognition of the isolated state and/or its government 
(Geldenhuys, 1990: 90).
3 For example, UN General Assembly Resolution 47/121 identified the SRJ as the primary culprit in the 
Bosnian conflict and noted the ‘existence in Serbian and Montenegrin controlled areas of concentration 
camps and detention centres, in pursuit of the abhorrent policy of “ethnic cleansing”, which is a form of 
genocide’. Similarly, Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 identified the federal military and the 
Serbian government as being responsible for most of the gross abuses of human rights then taking place 
throughout the former Yugoslavia, and also noted that Serb insurgents in Croatia were acting ‘with the 
support of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s government’. In the same report, HRW also condemns 
the Serbian authorities for internal human rights abuses, pointing out that the Serbian government had, in 
1991, used ‘repressive methods against peaceful demonstrators in Belgrade on March 9 and 10’, and 
criticised an official report into these events as being neither objective nor free of government control.
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In addition to acquiring a pariah image, the SRJ at its inception, also had 
problems in the area of international recognition, another of the indicators o f diplomatic 
and political isolation identified by Geldenhuys, who notes that the denial o f recognition 
of statehood represents ‘the severest form of isolation to which an entity claiming 
statehood can be subjected’ (Geldenhuys, 1990: 142). At its inception, the SRJ claimed to 
be the sole successor state o f the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ - 
Socijalisticka Federativna Republika Jugoslavia) and the inheritor o f the rights and 
obligations o f the former state, including its membership of the UN. The IC rejected this 
claim, however, and as such the external legitimacy of the new state was questioned from 
the outset.4 Furthermore, in September 1992 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
777 which formally denied the SRJ the right to continue to occupy the seat o f the SFRJ in 
the UN, recommending to the General Assembly that the SRJ should not be allowed to 
participate in its work5. In response, at its meeting on 22 September the General 
Assembly voted to expel the SRJ.6 Security Council Resolution 821 of 28 April 1993 
reaffirmed the Security Council’s decision of Resolution 777 and recommended that the 
SRJ should not participate in the UN’s Economic and Social Council. In spite o f the 
UN’s non-recognition of the SRJ, however, Yugoslav diplomats maintained a presence at 
the UN, offsetting to a certain degree, the SRJ’s lack o f membership. However, in 2000, 
Richard Holbrooke, at the time the US ambassador to the UN, began a campaign to have 
these diplomats expelled.7 The SRJ did not become a member o f the UN until after
4 Evidence of the SRJ’s diplomatic isolation can be seen from the fact that its proclamation ceremony was 
boycotted by the majority of Western states, including the US, eleven of the twelve members of the EC (the 
exception being Greece which sent a low level delegation), Canada, Australia, Japan, the Scandinavian 
countries, and Austria, among others (United Press International, 27 April 1992).
5 UN Security Council Resolution 777, 19 September 1992.
6 Tanjug, 23 September 1992 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/1494/C/1, 24 September 1992.
7 International Herald Tribune, 15 August 2000.
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Milosevic had been deposed, and as such, throughout the time period considered here, the 
SRJ remained isolated according to this particular indicator.8 Furthermore, the SRJ was 
suspended from the CSCE in July 1992, with only Russia’s support preventing its 
expulsion, and was also prevented from participating in international financial institutions 
for most of the time period covered by this research.
Nevertheless, while the SRJ was denied a degree of external legitimacy as a result 
of its lack of UN membership, Geldenhuys draws attention to the fact that it is possible 
for the government of a state that is not formally recognised internationally to be engaged 
in international interactions that imply recognition (Geldenhuys, 1990: 126). A major 
indicator of implied international recognition is formal diplomatic relations (Geldenhuys, 
1990: 136). According to Geldenhuys, it would be expected that a state subject to 
enforced international isolation would be ‘forced by adverse external political 
circumstances to maintain diplomatic ties on a (numerical) level well below that which it 
desires or has the physical capacity to maintain’ (Geldenhuys, 1990: 144).
The impact of the break up o f the SFRJ on the Yugoslav foreign service combined 
with the imposition o f UN sanctions that called on all states to ‘reduce the level of the 
staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts’9 of the SRJ, caused significant disruption 
in the SRJ’s diplomatic relations. Furthermore, these diplomatic relations had been 
disrupted even before the Security Council passed Resolution 757, when EC member
8 While the SRJ’s statehood was, to some extent, undermined by its exclusion from the UN, it should be 
noted that the right of Serbia and Montenegro to form a new joint state was not in question; rather the issue 
was one of continuity of the old state. For example, a US State Department spokesperson expressed 
America’s ‘readiness to discuss with Serbia and Montenegro their plans to have a common state’ (US State 
Department Regular Briefing, 27 April 1992). This contrasts with more extreme cases of non-recognition 
of statehood identified by Geldenhuys, such as that of the Republic of China/Taiwan following admission 
of the Peoples Republic of China to the UN in the 1970s, and Israel, the very existence of which was 
questioned by most of its Arab neighbours.
9 UN Security Council Resolution 757, 30 May 1992.
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states and the US recalled their ambassadors from Belgrade. However, although its 
diplomatic relations were certainly curtailed, the SRJ did maintain diplomatic contacts 
with a large number of countries, though at a lower level than had been the case earlier. 
As Mitic points out, while a great many countries recalled their ambassadors from 
Yugoslavia after the imposition of UN sanctions, most states did not insist on a reduction 
of staff levels in consular posts (Mitic, 1998: 2).10 In addition to the formal diplomatic 
relations that were maintained even after sanctions were introduced, until mid-1999 the 
Serbian authorities continued to receive visits from representatives of foreign 
governments and also made official visits abroad. Serbia also participated in numerous 
international conferences that dealt with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and also 
signed peace treaties relating to these conflicts. As such, while Serbia was undoubtedly 
isolated in the diplomatic sphere, this isolation was far from total, and it was only after 
the Kosovo conflict that most, though not all, contacts between the Serbian authorities 
and other states, were severed. In the period following the NATO bombing in 1999, visits 
to Serbia by representatives of other states were extremely rare, as were visits abroad by 
representatives of the Serbian authorities. Indeed, such visits were made incredibly 
difficult as key members of the Serbian and Yugoslav governments, and their associates 
were prohibited from travelling to a large number of other states. Furthermore, Milosevic 
himself and some of his closest associates, as indicted war criminals, risked arrest should 
they have decided to leave the SRJ. As such, while Serbia was clearly subject to
10 M itic also  notes that the states w hich in terpre ted  R eso lu tion  757 in the m ost radical m anner w ere 
M alaysia , N ew  Z ealand , the US and C anada, w ith  M alaysia and N ew  Z ealand  o rdering  the closure o f  
Y ugoslav  em bassies on  the ir territory, and M alaysia  im posing  a ban on Y ugoslav  citizens en tering  the 
country. O f  g rea ter significance, how ever, w as the US reaction. B oth  the US and C anada, in addition  to 
ordering  a reduction  o f  s ta ff  at the ir Y ugoslav  em bassies, also  closed dow n all Y ugoslav  consu lates situated 
on their territo ry  (M itic, 1998: 3).
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diplomatic and political isolation throughout the entire time period considered in this 
research, this isolation varied over time, with a significant increase following the NATO 
bombing of the SRJ in 1999.
The Case Studies
Case Study 1: The Beginning o f Isolation: May 1992-September 1994
The starting point of this study is 30 May 1992 when the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 757 imposing wide-ranging sanctions against the SRJ. Even before this 
resolution was passed, however, Serbia was already subject to international isolation in 
the military sphere as UN Security Council Resolution 751, which was passed on 25 
September 1991, imposed an arms embargo against the SFRJ which continued to apply to 
all its successor states following the dissolution of the joint state. In addition, in 
November 1991, the EC also applied sanctions against the SFRJ,11 as did Canada12, 
Japan13 and the US.14 Measures imposed against the SRJ before Resolution 757 was 
passed included decisions by the EC15 and the US16 to recall diplomats from Belgrade, a
11 T hese included the suspension  o f  a trade and co -operation  ag reem ent w ith the SFR J, lim its on Y ugoslav  
tex tile im ports, and an end to certain  econom ic assistance to Y ugoslavia . Federal N ew s Service, N ew s 
conference regard ing  E uropean  C om m unity  sanctions against Y ugoslav ia  p resided  by D u tch  Foreign 
M in ister H ans V an D en  B roek, N A T O  S um m it C onference R om e, Italy, 8 N o vem b er 1991.
12 T he A ssocia ted  P ress, 8 N o vem ber 1991.
13 U nited Press In ternational, 12 N o vem ber 1991.
14 T he W ash ing ton  Post, 10 N ovem b er 1991.
15 U nited  Press In ternational, 12 M ay 1992.
16 D epartm en t o f  S tate D ispatch , 18 M ay 1992.
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US decision to deny landing rights to Yugoslav aircraft,17 and limited EC trade sanctions 
against the SRJ.18
Security Council Resolution 757 banned all exports and imports to and from 
Yugoslavia, including oil, but exempting food and medicine, and prohibited financial 
transactions. In addition the Resolution imposed a flight ban and called for the suspension 
of scientific, technical and cultural cooperation as well as barring the SRJ from 
participating in international sporting events.19 These sanctions amounted to a 
considerable degree of international isolation for Serbia in three of the four areas 
identified by Geldenhuys. Furthermore, subsequent UN Security Council resolutions 
focused on strengthening these sanctions and improving their enforcement, thereby 
increasing Serbia’s isolation.
While the impact of Resolution 757 on Serbia’s diplomatic relations has already 
been noted, Resolution 757 also isolated the SRJ in terms of yet another indicator of 
diplomatic and political isolation: international censure. In his discussion of international 
censure, Geldenhuys points out that he means more than verbal condemnation, asserting 
that ‘We are particularly interested in international censure that finds expression in 
collective action aimed at restricting a delinquent state’s external relations, while 
acknowledging that actual ostracist measures are typically preceded or accompanied by 
verbal castigation’ (Geldenhuys, 1990: 237). Resolution 757 is a clear example of 
international censure according to Geldenhuys’ definition.
Resolution 757 also involved a significant degree of economic isolation. In 
considering economic isolation, Geldenhuys lists eight indicators of economic isolation,
17 T he F inancial T im es, 23 M ay 1992.
18 U nited  Press In ternational, 28 M ay 1992.
19 U N  Security  C ouncil R eso lu tion  757, 30 M ay 1992.
that he divides into three main groups: those dealing with trade relations, those dealing 
with foreign investment, loans and technology transfer, and those dealing with foreign 
aid, though as he notes these groups and the indicators do overlap20 (Geldenhuys, 1990: 
282). The enforced international isolation to which the SRJ was subjected during this 
time period resulted in economic isolation according to all three groups of indicators. The 
initial sanctions imposed under Resolution 757 banned trade and the provision of 
financial and economic resources to the SRJ. These sanctions were tightened in 
Resolution 787 passed on 16 November 1992 which banned the transhipment of crude 
oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment and other commodities without 
the explicit authorisation of the sanctions committee; and in Resolution 820 passed on 17 
April 1993, which prohibited transhipment of goods on the Danube without specific 
authorisation, in addition to freezing SRJ assets abroad.21 Alongside the economic and 
financial sanctions contained in the UN Security Council Resolution, the SRJ was also 
prevented from assuming the SFRJ’s place in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, compounding the isolation that derived from the Security Council 
sanctions.
Under the UN sanctions regime, Serbia was also isolated in the socio-cultural 
sphere. Geldenhuys considers the measurement of international isolation in this sphere to 
be more difficult than in the other three areas. This, he explains, is due to the fact that 
‘the term “socio-cultural” embraces a wide range of interactions, from sport and tourism 
to art and religion. There is consequently a host of possible indicators of socio-cultural 
isolation’ (Geldenhuys, 1990: 536-537). While acknowledging the range of potential
20 T he individual ind icators o f  econom ic iso lation  are trade, trade ag reem ents, trade representation , trade 
prom otion, investm ents, loans, the transfer o f  technology  and foreign aid (G eldenhuys, 1990: 282).
1 Security  C ouncil R eso lu tion  820 also ex tended sanctions to Serb contro lled  areas o f  C roatia and B osnia.
indicators, Geldenhuys identifies nine which are sorted into three groups, though again he 
notes that these indicators are ‘not neatly separable and some also overlap those used to 
measure isolation in other spheres’ (Geldenhuys, 1990: 537). The three groups include 
official cultural agreements and membership of international non-governmental 
organisations; travel and tourism including air and sea links; and sports, art and 
entertainment, and also education (Geldenhuys, 1990: 537). Considering the UN 
sanctions that were applied against the SRJ at this time, it is clear that Serbia was also 
isolated in the socio-cultural sphere, as Resolution 757 included a flight ban, banned 
Yugoslavia’s participation in international sporting events and suspended scientific and 
technical co-operation and cultural exchanges.
Summing up Serbia’s experience at this time, UN sanctions against the SRJ were 
extensive, curtailing Serbia’s international interactions in all four areas identified by 
Geldenhuys. Furthermore, as these sanctions were imposed by the UN Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, their geographical scope was almost global. Thus, 
according to Woodward, ‘By the end of May, Serbia was being transformed into a pariah 
state, isolated by diplomatic, scientific, sports, and economic exchange until the fighting 
ceased in Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (Woodward, 1995: 288). In terms of the stated goals of 
the IC at this time, the UN Security Council Resolutions that applied and strengthened 
these sanctions all made reference to events in Bosnia, and as such the imposition of 
sanctions can be considered to have been intended to compel the Serbian and Yugoslav 
authorities to refrain from providing assistance to the Bosnian Serb forces there, and as 
such was policy-directed isolation according to Geldenhuys’ definition. However, while 
the goal of sanctions at this time may have been to influence government policy, there
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was no attempt made to target the Milosevic regime or select groups of its supporters, and 
the comprehensive nature of the sanctions impacted heavily on Serbia’s population.
Case Study 2: Ending the Bosnian War: January 1993-October 1996
This time period begins in early 1993, when the IC presented the Vance Owen 
Peace Plan (VOPP) as part of its efforts to bring the conflict in Bosnia to an end. While 
this was not the first such peace plan devised by the IC, it was the first that was supported 
by the Serbian authorities who advocated that it be accepted by the Bosnian Serbs. While 
this effort failed, it nevertheless marks a turning point in that from this time on, Milosevic 
agreed to accept international peace plans and exerted pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to 
do likewise. In recognition of these efforts the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
943 on 23 September 1994 allowing for the temporary suspension of some sanctions. 
Resolution 943 allowed for the resumption of civilian passenger flights to and from 
Belgrade and civilian passenger ferry services between Bar and Bari in Italy, together 
with the resumption of cultural and sports exchanges, thereby reducing Serbia’s 
international isolation in the socio-cultural arena. Following this, on 22 November 1995 
the Security Council passed Resolution 1022 suspending all sanctions that had been 
placed on the SRJ indefinitely, and also praising the SRJ government for its decision ‘to 
attend and participate constructively in proximity talks in the United States of America, 
and acknowledging with appreciation the efforts made by these Governments to reach a
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lasting peace settlement’.22 Finally, Resolution 1074 on 1 October 1996 terminated all 
sanctions against the SRJ.
As can be seen, this time period was marked by the gradual reintegration of the 
SRJ. The IC however, kept most sanctions in place until the end of 1995 when the 
Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, at which point they were suspended. Full 
revocation of the sanctions had to wait until the end of 1996 following the first post-war 
elections in Bosnia. Thus while Serbia’s isolation was diminishing, the IC kept the most 
serious sanctions in place to ensure Milosevic’s continued co-operation with international 
attempts to resolve the Bosnian conflict, and suspended rather than terminated these 
sanctions in late 1995. These attempts to ensure compliance through coercion again 
indicate a policy-directed strategy on the part of the IC, while the scope of Serbia’s 
isolation remained almost universal as the sanctions were imposed by the Security 
Council.
Case Study 3: Reintegration and the ‘outer wall’: October 1996-March 1998
This sub-period begins with the termination of UN sanctions against the SRJ and 
is characterised by a relatively high level of international integration for Serbia. However, 
Serbia was still subjected to a degree of international isolation through the maintenance 
of an ‘outer wall’ of sanctions. These sanctions were maintained primarily by the US, and 
blocked the SRJ from membership of international organisations such as the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO’s Partnership for Peace, in 
addition to preventing it from joining or having access to lending from international
22 U N  Security  C ouncil R eso lu tion  1022 (1995), 22 N o vem b er 1995.
financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (International Crisis Group, 2000: 2). While 
this involved a level of isolation in the political and diplomatic area as well as the 
economic area, the extent of Serbia’s international isolation was considerably reduced, 
even in these two areas, as was its geographical scope. The US insisted on maintaining 
the outer wall of sanctions until the situation in Kosovo improved, and also, following 
attempts on the part of the Milosevic regime to annul local election victories achieved by 
the opposition, the outer wall was also linked to a need for democratic reform in Serbia. 
However, the international response to Milosevic’s attempts at electoral fraud was, as 
will be seen, rather lukewarm. Although the US threatened the re-imposition of UN 
sanctions, this did not occur. The EU introduced limited economic sanctions, but these 
were removed very quickly following Milosevic’s decision to respect the election 
victories of the opposition Zajedno coalition. Although there were some verbal criticisms 
of the Milosevic regime for its authoritarian behaviour, this did not constitute 
international censure according to Geldenhuys’ definition as it amounted to little more 
than verbal castigation. Furthermore, there were no calls for Milosevic’s resignation from 
the IC, although this was being demanded by the democratic opposition. As such, 
sanctions which did remain in place against Serbia, still constituted policy-directed 
isolation.
Case Study 4: Kosovo, NA TO and the ICTY indictment: March 1998-June 1999
The relatively high level of international integration that Serbia enjoyed in the 
mid-1990s, came to an end in 1998 when the SRJ was subjected to increasing isolation as
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a result of the deteriorating security situation in Kosovo. The lead international actor 
responding to the crisis in Kosovo was the Contact Group which in March 1998 began to 
subject the SRJ to enforced international isolation. On 9 March 1998, the Contact Group 
imposed limited sanctions against the SRJ including some trade restrictions, and a visa 
ban against ten named senior Serbian and Yugoslav officials ‘responsible for repressive 
action by [Yugoslav] security forces in Kosovo.’23 The Contact Group also called on the 
UN Security Council to consider an arms embargo against the SRJ, and subsequently, on 
31 March 1998, the Security Council passed Resolution 1160, prohibiting the sale or 
supply of military equipment to the SRJ, including Kosovo.24 While the SRJ was already 
subject the EC arms embargo agreed in 1996, Resolution 1160 widened the geographical 
scope of its isolation in the military sphere.
When initial efforts to pressurise the Serbian authorities did not produce the 
desired results, the Contact Group introduced further sanctions on 29 April, freezing 
Yugoslavia’s overseas assets, and threatening to ban new investment if progress had not 
been made in resolving the Kosovo dispute by 9 May. When satisfactory progress was 
not forthcoming, on 9 May at a meeting of G-8 foreign ministers, the UK, the US, 
Germany, France, Italy and Canada banned new investment in the SRJ and froze
9 • • •Yugoslav assets abroad, leaving the country internationally isolated in the economic 
sphere. In addition, in late June, the EU also decided to ban flights by Yugoslav carriers
23 R A PID , C om m ission  o f  the E uropean  C om m unities, 20 7 5 th C ouncil m eeting  Justice and H om e A ffairs, 
B russels, 19 M arch  1998.
24 W eller poin ts out that the arm s em bargo ‘did not really  represen t s ign ifican t action  on the part o f  the 
C ouncil. B y 1998 B elgrade had rearm ed, u nd er a form al cooperatio n  ag reem en t w ith R u ssia ’ and had a 
‘s ign ifican t ind igenous arm s industry, at least in relation  to the less sophistica ted  w eapons system s w hich  
w ere o f  relevance to the fighting  in K o so v o ’ (W eller, 1999: 187).
25 C ontact G roup  statem ent on K osovo, 29 A pril 1998.
26 T he N ew  Y o rk  T im es, 10 M ay 1998.
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between the SRJ and EU member states,27 though this did not come into effect until 
September.
As fighting continued in Kosovo, the IC supplemented its isolation policy with 
the use military force in the form of a NATO bombing campaign in an effort to compel 
the Serbian authorities to comply with its terms. As the bombing continued, however, the 
IC continued to tighten sanctions against the SRJ, increasingly implementing measures 
designed to target the Milosevic regime directly. In late April 1999, the EU agreed to 
impose an oil embargo against Yugoslavia, which was supported by the US,28 and also 
extended to the visa ban to include Milosevic, his family, all Serbian and Yugoslav 
ministers and senior officials, and other individuals closely associated with the regime. In 
addition, the scope of the assets freeze was extended to cover individuals and private 
sector companies with links to the regime.29 The EU also imposed a total ban on flights 
between EU member states and the SRJ.30 Furthermore, while attempts to introduce a 
prohibition on sporting contacts with the SRJ were blocked by Greece and Italy on the 
grounds that this would be targeting Serbia’s population and not its government, the EU, 
nevertheless, recommended that sporting federations exclude the SRJ.31
While the sanctions that were imposed against the SRJ in 1998 and 1999 were 
more limited in geographical scope, being implemented primarily by the US and the EU 
rather than the UN, they did nevertheless subject Serbia to considerable international 
isolation in all four areas identified by Geldenhuys, and most of the sanctions were also 
supported by non-EU European states and Canada, thus extending the scope of Serbia’s
27 C ard iff  E uropean  C ouncil, D eclaration  on K osovo, 26 June 1998.
28 U S D epartm en t o f  State, D aily  Press B riefing, 27 A pril 1999.
29 Press R elease P R E S /9 9 /1 18, 2173rd C ouncil m eeting , G eneral A ffairs, L uxem bourg , 26 A pril 1999.
30 A gence F rance P resse, 21 M ay 1999.
31 A ssocia ted  P ress W orldstream , 26 A pril 1999.
isolation. However, while many of the sanctions were decided by the Contact Group, 
which included Russia, Russia dissociated itself from the Contact Group sanctions. As in 
earlier time periods, sanctions were imposed with the aim of coercing the Milosevic 
regime in the hope that this would result in a policy change, and as such this was policy- 
directed isolation. This time period also saw the first attempts to target sanctions directly 
at the Milosevic regime, although some sanctions such as the oil embargo and the flight 
ban clearly affected the entire population, as indeed, did the NATO air strikes.
Case Study 5: The IC and the Fall o f Milosevic
This time period begins in June 1999 with the end of the NATO bombing and 
continues until October 2000 with the fall of the Milosevic regime. At this time the 
approach of the IC was significantly different than had been the case in all previous time 
periods in that the IC now explicitly sought Milosevic’s removal from power and worked 
with Serbia’s democratic opposition forces in an attempt to achieve this aim. Throughout 
this time period, Serbia remained subject to international sanctions and was even refused 
reconstruction assistance while Milosevic remained in power. However, efforts were 
made to target sanctions directly at the regime, while simultaneously attempts were made 
to alleviate the damage caused to Serbia’s population. To this end, in September 1999 the 
EU rescinded its earlier recommendation on curtailing sporting links with the SRJ,32 and 
in February 2000 introduced a temporary suspension of the flight ban.33 In addition, a 
programme to provide heating oil to municipalities under the control of the democratic
32 R A PID , C om m ission  o f  the E uropean  C om m unities, C ouncil o f  M in isters Press release, PR ES 99/263 , 
2 2 0 1st C ouncil M eeting , G eneral A ffairs, B russels, 13 Sep tem ber 1999.
33 E uropean  R eport, 22 M arch 2000.
opposition parties, the Energy for Democracy programme, began in late 1999. In terms of 
attempts to target the regime directly, the EU and the US steadily increased the number of 
regime associates and supporters who were subject to its visa ban, while financial 
sanctions were also tightened with the EU banning all trade with any Serbian firms unless 
they appeared on the EU’s ‘white list’ of approved companies. The primary criterion for 
inclusion on the white list was that companies be able to withhold all earnings from the 
Serbian authorities.34
During this time period, Serbia was subject an extremely high degree of political 
and diplomatic isolation with very few contacts between the Serbian authorities and their 
counterparts in other states or international institutions. The extent of the isolation of the 
authorities is clear in both the refusal to grant travel visas to government officials, and 
also in the increasing contact between IC representatives and the leaders of the 
democratic opposition. Indeed, as shall be seen in chapter 7, at this time the democratic 
opposition increasingly came to be seen as Serbia’s legitimate representative in the 
international arena. At the beginning of this time period, Serbia was also isolated in the 
military, economic and socio-cultural spheres, though the level of this isolation was 
somewhat reduced throughout 1999 and 2000, particularly in the socio-cultural sphere. 
Furthermore, although Serbia was subject to economic isolation, attempts were made to 
alleviate the consequences to Serbia’s population, while measures targeting the regime 
were steadily increased. A further change that took place in this time period was the 
target of the isolation policy. While previously, coercive measures were intended to 
compel the Milosevic regime to comply with international demands, in this time period
34 E uropean  R eport, 27 Sep tem ber 2000
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the aim of international coercion was regime change, with the removal of the Milosevic 
regime becoming the key international objective at this time.
Through examining Serbia’s experience of international isolation within the 
context of Geldenhuys’ framework, and noting also the other measures that were 
employed by the IC in its efforts to pursue its objectives with respect to Serbia, the time 
period from 1992 to 2000 can be divided into a series of five sub-periods each of which 
involved a different strategy on the part of the IC. Given that the central focus of this 
study is to examine the impact of international policy and international actions on the 
democratic opposition parties in Serbia, the ability to break down the entire time period 
considered here into a series of sub-periods is fortuitous as it allows for comparison of 
the impact of a range of policy strategies on the part of the international community and 
to consider how these different strategies impacted on the Serbian democratic opposition 
and its effectiveness in opposing the Milosevic regime.
The Research Questions
As outlined at the end of chapter one, there are three main themes in this research: 
the extent to which the democratic opposition parties held different views to the 
Milosevic regime; the nature of the democratic opposition parties relationship with the 
IC; and the impact of international policy on the democratic opposition parties’ 
effectiveness. These themes form the basis of three research questions. Each of these 
themes or questions is rather broad and is intended to capture the range of factors that are 
significant in considering the impact of international policy on the democratic opposition 
parties. While the questions are broad, some of the information that is being sought is
quite specific, and as such it is necessary to devise a series of more specific sub-questions 
to capture the detail required to provide a meaningful answer to each of the three central 
research questions.
1. To what extent did the democratic opposition hold positions that were different to 
those of the Milosevic regime on the issues that were of key importance to the IC 
in its dealings with Serbia?
The first objective of this research will be to consider whether or not the democratic 
opposition parties held positions on key issues of international concern that differed from 
those of the Milosevic regime. In order to answer this question it is necessary to establish 
which international actors constituted the IC in each time period, and which issues it 
considered to be of central concern in its dealings with Serbia. It will be assumed that the 
most important issues are those which international actors raised regularly in the 
statements they made on Serbia. Of particular importance in this regard will be the stated 
reasons for the imposition of coercive policies. As such, the sub-questions to be 
considered when answering this particular question are:
• What actors constituted the IC in this time period?
• What were the issues that were of key importance to these actors in relation to 
Serbia?
• What were the stated reasons for subjecting Serbia to international isolation or 
other coercive measures?
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• Did the democratic opposition parties considered in this study hold positions that 
were different from those of the Milosevic regime on the issues that were 
highlighted by the IC as being important?
2. What was the relationship between the democratic opposition parties and the IC 
during this time period?
This question is designed to provide an overall picture of the relationship between the 
democratic opposition parties and the IC in each time period. This relationship will be 
examined in terms of the extent to which there was any formal contact between the two; 
the extent to which the IC provided support to the democratic opposition parties in their 
campaigns against the Milosevic regime; the extent to which the IC raised the same 
issues as the opposition during the same time periods; and also in terms of how each 
perceived the other. When considering formal contact between the democratic opposition 
parties and the IC, it will be necessary to establish whether meetings took place between 
representatives of the IC and representatives of the democratic opposition. In relation to 
whether there was international support for the opposition’s campaigns against 
Milosevic, it is important to consider the nature and extent of such support, if it existed. 
Support may have been merely verbal, or may have gone beyond this to provide direct 
assistance to the democratic opposition. Consideration will also be given to whether there 
is any evidence of tacit support to the democratic opposition, though it is acknowledged 
that this may be more difficult to identify than overt support. In relation to the attitudes of 
the democratic opposition parties towards the IC, the type of information being sought
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will be the extent to which they were critical of international policy and actions and on 
what grounds they based their criticism. Of particular importance will be whether the 
democratic opposition parties believed that international actors were undermining them in 
their campaigns against the regime, and also whether they perceived that the IC was 
either explicitly or implicitly supporting the Milosevic regime. The sub-questions that are 
designed to capture this information are as follows:
• What were the main activities of the democratic opposition parties in terms of 
their attempts to defeat the Milosevic regime?
• Did meetings take place between representatives of the democratic opposition 
parties and representatives of the IC? If so, what was their purpose?
• Were any differences that did exist between the democratic opposition parties and 
the Milosevic regime acknowledged by international actors?
• Did the IC voice support for the opposition’s campaigns against the Milosevic
regime? If so, was this followed by more concrete measures of support?
• Did the IC imply support for any of the opposition’s campaigns by raising the
same issues as the opposition parties in the same time period that the opposition
was campaigning?
• Were the democratic opposition parties critical of international policy with respect 
to Serbia?
• Did the opposition parties express concern that international policies may have 
been undermining their efforts against the regime?
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• Did the opposition parties feel that the IC was supporting the Milosevic regime or 
that international actors contributed directly to the failure of its campaigns?
3. What, if any, impact did the international policy have on the effectiveness of the 
democratic opposition parties in their campaigns against the Milosevic regime?
This question directly addresses the issue at the heart of this research. Using the criteria 
established in chapter one, the impact of the IC on the democratic opposition parties will 
be judged according to whether international policy or actions with respect to Serbia 
hindered or helped the democratic opposition parties in carrying out the tasks of resisting 
integration into the regime; maintaining zones of ideological autonomy; questioning the 
legitimacy of the regime and raising the costs of authoritarian rule; or presenting a 
credible alternative to the Milosevic regime in both the international and the domestic 
arena. In addition, evidence as to whether international policy or actions exacerbated the 
weaknesses of the democratic opposition parties or helped them to overcome those 
weaknesses will also be considered. When considering the impact of international policy 
on the democratic opposition parties both direct and indirect impact will be considered.
• What were the key factors contributing to the success/failure of the opposition’s 
campaigns in this time period?
• Did international policy play a role in helping/hindering the democratic 
opposition parties in carrying out the four tasks identified as being important in 
effectively opposing the Milosevic regime?
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• Did international policy play a role in exacerbating the weaknesses of the 
democratic opposition parties or in helping the opposition parties to overcome 
those weaknesses?
• Did international policy contribute to the success or failure of the opposition’s 
campaigns, either directly or indirectly?
In essence there are two sets of data necessary to address these questions, that relating to 
the international community and that relating to Serbia’s democratic opposition parties. 
As noted, the key international actors dealing with Serbia changed over time, with 
different combinations of states and international institutions taking the lead in each of 
the five time periods that are considered in this study. As such, the data needed will be 
gathered from a variety of sources. Between 1992 and 2000 the international actors that 
played the most prominent role in the events that are outlined in this research were the 
UN Security Council, the EC/EU and its member states, the US, NATO, the 
CSCE/OSCE and the Contact Group. As such, the material consulted in order to identify 
the central issues for the IC will be:
• UN Security Council Resolutions
• Press statements, speeches and policy documents from the EC/EU gathered from 
Lexis Nexis and the European Commission press release database, Rapid.
• Statements, press releases and interviews from the US State Department and the 
White House, gathered from the US State Department online archive, the Federal
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Documents Clearing House documents available through Lexis Nexis and other 
press material available through Lexis Nexis
• CSCE/OSCE statements, press releases and reports
• NATO statements, press releases and report
• Contact Group statements
In relation to the Serbian democratic opposition parties, the focus will be on what the key 
figures within the democratic opposition parties had to say about these events at the time 
that they occurred. While occasionally retrospective accounts of events by the party 
members may be used, this will be clearly noted. As such, the primary data involved will 
be the statements of the democratic opposition parties and their leaders, and media 
interviews and documents relating to the issues that are being examined. As such, the 
primary sources of material relating to the democratic opposition parties will be:
• The BBC Summary of World Broadcasts and BBC Monitoring, both accessed 
through Lexis Nexis
• NIN news magazine archive (1996-2000) 
http://www.nin.co.yu/arhiva/index.html
• Vreme CD-ROM (Complete edition 1997-2000)
• Vreme News Digest Agency (1991 -1997). 
http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/
• B92 news archive (1999-2000) 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/old_archive.php
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Institute for War and Peace Reporting Balkan Crisis Report (1999-2000) 
http://www.iwpr.net
AIM press -Alternative Information Network 
http://www.aimpress.ch
C h a p t e r  3 : T h e  B e g i n n i n g  o f  I s o l a t i o n
This case study begins in May 1992 when the UN Security Council first imposed 
sanctions against the SRJ and continues until December 1992 and the opposition’s 
unsuccessful challenge to the Milosevic regime in federal and republican elections. The 
imposition of UN sanctions in May marked the beginning of Serbia’s international 
isolation and throughout the remainder of 1992 the IC strengthened and tightened these 
sanctions. The coercive measures imposed against Serbia in this period were in response 
to the conflicts that were occurring in the former Yugoslavia, in particular the war that 
was taking place in Bosnia, and this conflict was the central focus of the IC in its dealings 
with Serbia throughout this time period.
Between May and December 1992, the democratic opposition mounted three 
significant challenges against the Milosevic regime: a boycott of the May 1992 federal 
elections, their challenge to the regime in the December 1992 elections for the federal 
and republican parliaments and the republican presidency, and a series of anti-regime 
protests in June 1992 that aimed to bring about Milosevic’s resignation. All three of these 
challenges failed.
As most IC dealings with Serbia during this time period occurred within the 
context of the dissolution of the SFRJ and the ensuing conflict, the international actors 
that had the most significant impact on Serbia were those that were most heavily involved 
in efforts to formulate an international response to these events: the EC, the CSCE, the 
UN Security Council and the US. This chapter will be begin by looking at the statements 
of international actors dealing with Serbia, and also at the reasons for the imposition of
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sanctions against Serbia. This will identify the key issues for the IC during this time 
period. Following this the opposition’s challenges to the Milosevic regime - the May and 
December elections and the June 1992 protests - will be considered, as will the challenge 
posed by Milan Panic as federal prime minister. Given that these challenges occurred at a 
time when the IC was taking its first steps to isolate Serbia this case study allows for an 
examination of the reaction of the democratic opposition to these moves and to consider 
how they affected the relationship between the democratic opposition parties and the IC, 
and how they impacted on the effectiveness of the opposition’s challenges to the 
Milosevic regime.
Key Issues for the International Community
When war began in Bosnia in the spring of 1992, Serbia began to come under 
significant international pressure as the IC identified the Serbian authorities as the main 
instigators of the conflict and increasingly threatened international isolation if Serbia did 
not change its behaviour. On 15 April 1992 the CSCE issued a statement calling for the 
withdrawal from Bosnia of forces of the former Yugoslavia’s army, the JNA, by 29 April 
and for the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities to respect Bosnia’s independence and its 
legitimate government.1 The US was particularly harsh in its condemnation of the 
Serbian authorities at this point, and at the CSCE meeting the US representative John 
Komblum made a strongly worded statement condemning Serbian actions in Bosnia and
1 A gence France P ress, 16 A pril 1992.
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threatening Serbia with expulsion from the CSCE.2 Some weeks later, Komblum called 
for Yugoslavia’s immediate suspension from the CSCE.3 However, although supported 
by the EC,4 the move to exclude the SRJ from the CSCE was blocked by Russia.5 
Nevertheless, on 12 May, the CSCE decided to exclude the SRJ from any decisions 
relating to Bosnia until 29 June, when the situation would again be reviewed.6
The EC was also increasingly critical of the Serbian authorities.7 On 11 May EC 
foreign ministers issued a statement which identified the Yugoslav army and the Belgrade 
authorities as the parties most to blame for ‘the present state of affairs.’8 Threatening 
Serbia with international isolation, the EC foreign ministers decided to recall their 
ambassadors from Belgrade for consultations, and requested the EC Commission to 
examine possible economic sanctions against the SRJ.9 This was followed by a US 
decision to recall its ambassador from Belgrade.10
While the Serbian authorities condemned the EC’s statement, the democratic 
opposition used these initial moves towards isolating Serbia to criticise the regime, 
choosing to highlight the costs of Milosevic’s policies rather than allying with the regime 
against an external aggressor. Mihailo Markovic of the SPO stated that ‘the EC move
2 US D epartm en t o f  S tate D aily  B riefing  # 5 7 ,  15 April 1992. A State D epartm en t spokesperson  reiterated  
this condem nation  and stated  that i f  S erb ia ’s leaders ‘continue the ir ag gression  ag ainst B osnia, and to deny 
hum an rights to S e rb ia ’s ow n citizens, Serbia will very qu ick ly  becom e an  in ternational p a ria h .’
3 US D epartm en t o f  State D aily  B riefing  # 69, 6 M ay 1992. K o m blum  also  dem anded  an im m ediate  end to 
v io lence and respect fo r ceasefire  ag reem ents, the w ithdraw al o f  the JN A  from  B osnia o r its subm ission  to 
the leg itim ate B osnian  au thorities, and honest co -operation  w ith the EC peace process and the U N  and EC 
m ission.
4 The Guardian , 12 M ay 1992.
5 T anjug , 7 M ay 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, EE/13 75/C 1/1, 8 M ay 1992.
6 Federal N ew s Service, 12 M ay 1992.
7 O n 1 M ay, the EC had suspended the peace talks that had been tak ing p lace because o f  Serbian vio la tions 
o f  ceasefire  ag reem ents that had been reached in m id-A pril (T he A ssocia ted  P ress, 1 M ay 1992).
8 U n ited  P ress In ternational, 12 M ay 1992. T he EC dem anded  a com plete  w ithdraw al o f  the JN A  from  
B osn ia and the reopening  o f  Sarajevo  airport to allow  for the d istribu tion  o f  hum anitarian  aid.
9 U n ited  Press In ternational, 12 M ay 1992.
10 D epartm en t o f  S tate D ispatch , 18 M ay 1992.
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should not be [a] surprise for Serbia. It is addressed to its government and the military, 
and it shows the EC has lost patience with Milosevic.’11 Similarly, DS Deputy Mirko 
Petrovic stated: ‘It is good to ask what led Europe to act this way. Although no side is 
innocent in the Bosnian conflict, a very big responsibility lies on Milosevic’.12
International pressure was further increased when the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 752 on 15 May. This resolution called for an end to the fighting and the 
resumption of peace talks; and demanded that external interference in Bosnia cease, and 
that units of the Croatian and Yugoslav armies in Bosnia be withdrawn or subjected to 
the authority of the Bosnian government or disbanded and disarmed.13 These demands for 
an end to external interference in the Bosnian conflict were to remain the central concern 
for the IC throughout the time period considered in this case study and it was the failure 
of the Serbian authorities to comply with demands of Resolution 752 that led to the initial 
imposition of UN sanctions under Resolution 757.14
In spite of the last minute efforts of Milosevic to avoid international sanctions,15 
on 30 May the Security Council passed Resolution 757.16 As noted above, the sanctions 
were imposed because of the alleged failure of the Serbian authorities to comply with the
11 IPS -In ter Press Service, 14 M ay 1992.
12 IPS -In ter Press Service, 14 M ay 1992.
13 U N  Security  C ouncil R eso lu tion  752. R eso lu tion  752 also called  for an end to forced expulsions or 
attem pts to change the ethnic co m position  o f  the population , and the unhindered  delivery  o f  hum anitarian  
aid, inc luding secure and safe access to B o sn ia ’s airports.
14 S erb ia ’s iso lation  w as also  increased  in advance o f  the im position  o f  U S sanctions, w ith the US refusing 
landing rights to JA T  airlines in US airports in m id-M ay; and closing tw o o f  the three rem ain ing  Y ugoslav  
consu lates, w ithdraw ing  its m ilitary  attachés from  B elgrade and o rdering  the ex pulsion  o f  th e ir Y ugoslav  
counterparts from  the US on 22 M ay (U S D epartm en t o f  State D aily  B rie fing  #79 , 20 M ay 1992; The 
Financial Times, 23 M ay 1992). In addition  the EC  im posed lim ited trade sanctions against the SRJ on 27 
M ay and called  on the U N  to im pose an oil em bargo  and an asset freeze. T hese calls w ere supported  by the 
US (U nited  Press In ternational, 28 M ay 1992).
15 T hese included an offer to w ork w ith the U N  to bring  about an end to the fighting  in B osnia; a p ledge to
urge the B osnian  Serbs to cooperate  w ith the U N , and a proposal that arm ed forces in B osnia be p laced
under jo in t U S -R ussian  contro l (The independent, 27 M ay 1992; A gence F rance Presse, 30 M ay 1992).
16 T he vote was passed  by 13-0 w ith C hina and Z im babw e abstain ing.
107
demands of Resolution 752 and as such Serbia was subjected to international isolation on 
the grounds that the Belgrade authorities were interfering in the Bosnian conflict and 
providing support to Bosnian Serb forces.
Throughout June and July 1992 the Western European Union (WEU), the EC, the 
CSCE and the G7 issued declarations on the situation in former Yugoslavia and these 
statements clearly show the extent to which the Bosnian conflict was the central concern
17of the IC in its dealings with Serbia. The conflict in Bosnia and the humanitarian 
situation there are the primary focus of all these statements, which condemned the 
Serbian authorities for their role in the conflict. While the CSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly’s ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’ does make reference to the situation inside 
Serbia, this is exclusively related to the need to respect rights of minorities within Serbia, 
and in particular the Kosovo Albanians.18 Similarly, the EC’s ‘European Council 
Declaration on the Former Yugoslavia’, called on the Serbian leadership to refrain from 
repression in Kosovo.19 None of the statements made any reference to the undemocratic 
nature of the Milosevic regime, or called for democratic reform within Serbia.
From the above statements and resolutions it is clear that, at this time, in all its
dealings with Serbia, the IC’s primary focus was on the Bosnian conflict and the role of
the Belgrade authorities in giving support to the Bosnian Serb forces there. This was the 
reason for the imposition of UN sanctions, and when the initial sanctions failed to induce
17 W E U  D eclaration  on the Y ugoslav  C risis, B onn, 19 June 1992; E uropean  C ouncil in L isbon  (26-27 June 
1992): C onclu sion  o f  the P residency, 27 June 1992; B udapest D eclaration  o f  the C SC E  Parliam entary  
A ssem bly , 5 Ju ly  1992; D eclaration  on F orm er Y ugoslavia , G 7 Sum m it, 7 Ju ly  1992; T anjug , 12 July  1992 
in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1432/C  1 /1 , 14 July 1992. In addition  to the statem ents on 
Y ugoslav ia  that the C SC E  m ade at this tim e, its C om m ittee o f  Sen ior O fficials also increased S erb ia ’s 
in ternational iso lation  w hen it decided  to suspend the S R J’s m em bership  o f  the institu tion  until 14 O ctober. 
O nly R u ssia ’s refusal to back Y u go slav ia ’s com plete ex clusion  from  the C SC E  saved it from  expulsion  
{The Washington Times, 9 July 1992).
18 B udapest D eclaration  o f  the C SC E  Parliam entary  A ssem bly, 5 Ju ly  1992.
19 E uropean  C ouncil in L isbon (26-27 June 1992): C onclusion  o f  the P residency, 27 June 1992.
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the change in behaviour that the IC hoped they would, the international response was to 
increase the pressure through tightening these sanctions. As will be seen, while the IC 
was aware of the undemocratic nature of Milosevic’s rule, and of the obstacles that the 
democratic opposition parties faced in their struggles against the regime, this was not of 
central concern to any significant international actor throughout the time period 
considered in this case study.
Differences between the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime
In order to evaluate the differences between the positions of the democratic 
opposition parties and those of the Milosevic regime, on the issues that were of central 
concern to the IC, it is first necessary to briefly outline the position of the Milosevic 
regime. It is not the purpose of this research to analyse the role played by Milosevic and 
his associates in the conflicts that occurred in the former-Yugoslavia, but there is a 
general consensus that Milosevic fomented conflict in other former-Yugoslav republics in 
order to maintain power (Gagnon, 1994: 118; Gordy, 1999: 24; Ramet, 2002: 338). 
Gagnon argues that the wars in Croatia and Bosnia had ‘been part of a purposeful and 
rational strategy planned and carried out by the minority of political actors in Serbia who 
were most threatened by democratizing and liberalizing currents within the Serbian 
Communist party’ (Gagnon, 1994: 118). Similarly, Gordy argues that war ‘constituted a 
vital part of the destruction of alternatives’ that enabled the regime to maintain power, 
and supports the argument that ‘war was permitted to happen because if it had not, 
democratic reforms might have happened’ (Gordy, 1999: 24). Milosevic and his allies in 
the Serbian communist party attempted to extend their control throughout the former
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Yugoslavia in an effort to build a more centralised state. When this failed, and as other 
former Yugoslav republics declared independence from the joint state, Milosevic and his 
allies attempted to carve out a ‘greater Serbia’, and realise the Serbian nationalist goal of 
building a state in which all Serbs could live (Gagnon, 1994: 118). As such, at the 
beginning of this time period, Milosevic was attempting to carve out a ‘greater Serbia’ 
from the ruins of the former-Yugoslavia, using armed conflict in those former-Yugoslav 
republics that had a sizable Serbian minority. Therefore, in order to compare the positions 
of the democratic opposition parties with those of the regime at this time, it is necessary 
to ascertain the attitudes of those parties to the creation of a Greater Serbia, and their 
positions regarding whether they believed that war was an appropriates means of 
achieving such ends. An examination of the positions of the parties included in this study 
indicates that, during the latter half of 1992 at least, their positions can be considered to 
have differed from those of the Milosevic regime in subtle but significant ways.
As noted in chapter two, in its early days the SPO had advocated an extreme 
nationalist position and was fully in favour of the creation of a unified state of all Serb 
lands that had been part of the former-Yugoslavia. Following its defeat in elections in 
1990, however, the party moved towards the centre and began to prioritise democracy 
over national issues, while opposing violent conflict. As Stojanovic notes, ‘[Draskovic’s] 
anti-war messages announced before the outbreak of war show that he had rejected 
national extremism and that he would offer Serbia different rhetoric in stormy times 
ahead’ (Stojanovic, 2000: 468-469). Thus, although still resorting to nationalist rhetoric 
on occasion, for example his appeal to the IC to ‘stop the Ustasa hordes now ravaging
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Bosnia-Hercegovina’ at an opposition rally in July 1992,20 by May 1992, Draskovic and 
the SPO had become outspoken critics of the Milosevic regime’s war policies.21 While 
Draskovic clearly condemned the Serbian regime for its actions with respect to the 
Bosnian war, he was also critical of the leaderships of the other Bosnian communities, 
and emphasised that some of the war’s victims were Serbs.22
Throughout the time period considered in this case study, Draskovic spoke out 
forcefully against the war in Bosnia, and as such, even if he did not abandon the hope that 
there may some day be a greater Serbian state, he clearly did not advocate that this should 
be achieved through force. Therefore, the position of the SPO clearly differed from that 
of the Milosevic regime and was closer to that of the IC at this time.
In common with the SPO, the GSS also condemned the war in Bosnia and the 
actions of the Milosevic regime. At its foundation, the GSS included among its goals the 
pacification of Serbia and its liberation from nationalism, the moving of Serbia from the 
path of war towards peace, the establishment of normal relations with the other former- 
Yugoslav republics with negotiations on the rights of Serbs living within these states, and 
the resolution of the autonomy and status of Kosovo and Vojvodina.23 The very identity 
of the GSS was as an anti-nationalist and anti-war party and as such its positions 
throughout the time period covered by this case study differed significantly from those of 
the Milosevic regime, supporting neither the war, nor the creation of a greater Serbia.
20 T anjug , 5 July 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1424/C 1/2 , 7 July 1992.
21 D raSkovic’s opp osition  to the w ar is also  ev iden t in an article he w rote titled  ‘A ppeal to the citizens o f  
B osn ia and H erceg o v in a’ published at the beginn ing  o f  A pril 1992, in w hich he called  on all nations in 
B osnia to rejec t w ar (T hom as, 1999: 119). F urtherm ore, speak ing  to jo u rna lis ts  in M ay 1992 DraSkovic 
claim ed that he w anted to go to Sarajevo ‘to convey a g rea t apo logy  in the nam e o f  the Serbian nation 
w hich  did not w ant this and w as never asked for its co n sen t’ (R adio  B elgrade , 31 M ay 1992, in BBC  
Summary o f  World Broadcasts , E E /1396/C 1/1 , 2 June 1992).
22 T anjug , 4 June 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1399/C 1/7 , 6 June 1992.
23 T anjug , 10 June 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1405/C 1/1 , 12 June 1992.
I l l
From its inception, the identity of the DS ‘fluctuated constantly between liberal 
democratic and nationalist’, with the national questions being ‘a constant source of 
discord’ within the party, and a factor in some of its numerous splits (Vukomanovic, 
1998: 37-38). These different perspectives are evident when considering the attitudes of 
some of the senior DS members in 1992. In July 1992, DS leader Dragoljub Micunovic 
travelled to the US to discuss DS proposals on an international peace conference with the 
aim of resolving the Bosnian conflict known as the ‘five plus five’ initiative. According 
to this plan, a peace conference would be held under the auspices of the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, together with representatives of Bosnia’s three 
national groups, and representatives from Yugoslavia and Croatia. The SRJ and Croatia 
‘would undertake an obligation to respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina 
and that they would not encourage secession in this republic.’24 This plan clearly does not 
indicate support for Milosevic’s objectives of securing a greater Serbia through force. In 
addition, future party leader Zoran Djindjic criticised Milosevic’s means in trying to 
achieve Serbia’s national goals: ‘One must not forget: the problems of the Serbs are real. 
... Milosevic’s means are wrong. Of course the problem is integration of the people who 
live scattered over a small area. Those people should be truly connected, so that they will 
pulsate [as] a whole, and then [one should] draw borders.’25 While this does indicate a 
level of support for the creation of some sort of ‘greater Serbia,’ Djindjic nevertheless 
does not agree with Milosevic’s methods. As such, while it can be argued that some DS 
leaders favoured the creation of a greater Serbia, there is little evidence of support for
24 T anjug , 15 Ju ly  1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1436 /C 1 /1 , 18 Ju ly  1992.
25 D jind jic  cited  in A nastasijevid , 2000: 114-115.
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achieving this goal through armed conflict, and as such, at this time, the DS also differed 
from Milosevic on the positions that were of key concern to the IC.
Although the DSS was to become a party with a strongly nationalist orientation, 
its initial focus was on Serbia, rather than the Serb populated lands of other former- 
Yugoslav republics (Stojanovic, 2000: 470; Thomas, 1999: 151). Although Kostunica did 
aspire to a state in which all Serbs could live, he did not see this is as something that 
could be achieved through the means employed by Milosevic. Speaking in 1992, 
Kostunica noted that: ‘The political and cultural unity of Serbs within the area of the 
former Yugoslavia -  which is one of the goals of the DSS ... can be achieved, of course, 
gradually, on condition that Serbia becomes a strong and democratic country.’26 In 
addition, KoStunica’s participation in the recently formed Democratic Movement of 
Serbia27 (DEPOS -  Demokratski Pokret Srbije), an opposition coalition led by the SPO, 
at this time a firmly anti-war party, would also indicate that at in 1992 the DSS did not 
support the use of force to create a greater Serbia.
From the above, it is, therefore, clear that while some of the parties considered 
here may have expressed support for the creation of a greater Serbian state, none had 
argued that this should be achieved through war. Given this, it is possible to state that the 
policies of the democratic opposition parties were not identical to those of the Milosevic 
regime on the issues that were of key importance to the IC. While there may have been a 
certain agreement on what should be Serbia’s ultimate goals, there appears to have been 
no support for Milosevic’s approach of achieving these goals through war. Furthermore,
26 K oStunica cited  in C igar, 2001: 34.
27 D E PO S was form ed in M ay 1992, by the SPO  and a num ber o f  sm aller parties. W hile the DS decided not 
to jo in  D E PO S, a faction w ith in the party, headed by V ojislav  KoStunica, supported  the coalition , and w hen 
this faction  split o f f  from  the DS in July 1992 to form  the D SS, K oStunica’s party  jo in ed  D EPO S.
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given that these views were publicly stated, the IC should have been well aware that in 
1992 the positions of the democratic opposition parties on the issues that were of central 
concern to international actors were closer to those of the IC than they were to those of 
the Milosevic regime.
Challenges to the Milosevic Regime
The May 1992 elections
Following international recognition of other former Yugoslav republics as 
independent states, without consulting the opposition, the Serbian and Montenegrin 
authorities announced the creation of a new Yugoslav state comprising the two republics, 
announced that federal elections would take place on 31 May and passed electoral laws 
that would govern those elections, again without consulting the opposition whose 
demands for improved electoral conditions were ignored.28 In protest, and openly 
disputing the legitimacy of the new state, the opposition responded by boycotting the 
elections, with all parties considered here agreeing on this strategy. However, in spite of 
the opposition boycott the turnout was 56% in Serbia (Goati, 1998: 13). Although not 
particularly high, this figure nonetheless was considerably higher than the opposition 
must have hoped for. Nevertheless, the boycotting of the first SRJ elections by much of 
the political opposition further undermined the internal political legitimacy of the new 
state (Sekelj, 2000: 63), and as such is a clear illustration of the democratic opposition 
fulfilling the task of questioning the regime’s legitimacy.
28 W hile the opp osition  did no t ob ject to the creation  o f  the new  state in princip le , it d id ob jec t to the 
m anner in w hich this w as b rought about (G oati, 1998: 1). G oati argues that the m anner in w hich  the SRJ 
w as created, using the rem nants o f  the SFR J assem bly , was designed to s trengthen the argum ent tha t it was 
the sole successo r o f  the SFR J (G oati, 1998: 12-13).
An opposition demonstration, supported by the Centre for Anti-War Action, the 
SPO and the DS, was held on May 31, the day of the election, to protest about the 
holding of the elections and to commemorate those killed in the fighting in Bosnia and 
Croatia.30 Coming the day after the passing of Resolution 757, this meeting gave 
opposition leaders a chance to comment on the sanctions, and Draskovic used the 
occasion to lay the blame for Serbia’s international isolation on the Milosevic regime 
rather than the UN or the IC. According to DraSkovic: The enemies of the Serbian 
people are not abroad but in Belgrade.’31 Draskovic expressed the view that the sanctions 
were being directed against the regime and even appeared to welcome them as something 
which could help the opposition in its struggle against Milosevic.32 However, while he 
described sanctions against the regime as ‘indispensable,’ Draskovic emphasised that 
they should not be directed against the Serbian people, as they were ‘not to blame.’33 
Draskovic was not entirely uncritical of the sanctions, however. In late June he wrote to 
the UN Secretary General, complaining that sanctions were ‘punishing only the Serbian 
people, despite the fact that opposition to war in the former Yugoslavia was never as 
strong and nowhere as unanimous and determined than in Serbia and Montenegro.’ He 
called for sanctions to be lifted in advance of opposition demonstrations scheduled for 28 
June, and criticised the UN for its ‘benevolent stand towards the fascist militarism of
9Q
29 T he C entre for A n ti-W ar A ction was founded in July  1991,w hen hostilities began  in S lovenia, as a group 
to represen t c itizens opposed  to w ar in the form er Y ugoslavia . V esna PeSi£ w as a co -founder and director. 
See §u§ak, 2000.
30 T he A ssocia ted  Press, 31 M ay 1992.
31 T he A ssocia ted  Press, 31 M ay 1992. DraSkovic repeated  his assertion  that the real enem ies o f  Serbia 
w ere the B elgrade au thorities rather than the IC  at a p ress conference held four days later, T anjug , 4 June 
1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /1399/C 1/7 , 6 June 1992.
32 D rask o v tf stated  th a t:‘T he (U N ) sanctions are not against the S erbian  people. T hey are against the 
regim e. T hey  are a support to us to stand up against . .. com m unism  and rising  fasc ism ’ (U nited  Press 
In ternational, 31 M ay 1992).
33 T anjug , 31 M ay 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /1 396 /C 1/1 , 2 June 1992.
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Croatian President Franjo Tudjman,’ which, he argued ‘is practically encouraging the 
crimes of one side.’ Draskovic also expressed surprise that Europe and the UN were 
negotiating with the Belgrade and Zagreb regimes, while at the same time ‘punishing 
millions of people who do not want the war.’34
Leading members of the DS were also critical of the decision to impose sanctions 
against Serbia and expressed concern at the possible consequences of these actions. 
Micunovic argued that sanctions were harming Yugoslavia’s citizens and were ‘hurting 
least of all the current government,’ and envisaged long lasting consequences ‘from 
which even our descendents will suffer.’35 Speaking in the context of the danger of civil 
war in Serbia, Djindjic noted that the ‘blockade and international isolation of Serbia 
further strengthened already existing political tensions.’36 Kostunica also expressed 
concern when, speaking in advance of the decision to impose the sanctions, he stated that 
economic sanctions ‘might be counterproductive.’37
The external pressure on Milosevic and the imposition of UN sanctions reinforced 
his domestic opponents as many of them began to call for his resignation in order to get 
the sanctions lifted. Undoubtedly, at this time, the sanctions provided the opposition with 
a stick with which to beat the Milosevic regime and numerous opposition members made 
statements linking the removal of Milosevic with an end to Serbia’s international 
isolation. Although the Security Council had not specified that this was what was 
required to ensure the lifting of sanctions, the democratic opposition appeared to believe 
that this was the case, or, at a minimum, used this argument to strengthen themselves vis­
34 T anjug , 26  June 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, H E /1419/C  1 /1 , 29 June 1992
35 T anjug , 2 June 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts , E E /1 3 99 /C 1 /1 , 5 June 1992
36 IPS -In ter Press Service, 17 June 1992
37 A B C  W orld  N ew s T onigh t transcrip t, 28 M ay 1992
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a-vis the regime. According to Draskovic: ‘I am sure after forcing Milosevic to resign,
10
the blockade of our people will be finished.’ Others did not consider that the removal of 
Milosevic was all that would be necessary to have the sanctions removed, but 
nevertheless, still seemed to see the two as linked. A leading member of Kostunica’s pro- 
DEPOS wing of the DS, stated that ‘The choice is very simple. With Milosevic, the 
sanctions remain and we are certainly dead. Without him we may live.’39
It is interesting to note that most of the focus of the opposition’s calls to have 
sanctions lifted centred on the need for Milosevic’s resignation, even though this was not 
explicitly stated as something that was required to achieve Serbia’s reintegration into the 
world community, and which ultimately proved to be unnecessary. Although many 
opposition politicians spoke out against the war in Bosnia, and Milosevic’s war policies, 
this issue received considerably less attention from the democratic opposition when it 
discussed the need to end Serbia’s international isolation, in spite of the fact that it was 
Serbian actions with respect to the Bosnian war that resulted in the sanctions being 
imposed in the first place. A notable exception in this regard was Vesna PeSic who called 
for an immediate end to the conflict and the recognition of the former Yugoslav 
republics, as the only measure that would bring Serbia’s international isolation to an 
end.40
38 IP S -In ter Press Services, 13 June 1992. M atija  B eckovic, an o ther p rom inen t D E PO S m em ber, also 
seem ed to believe that the rem oval o f  M ilosev ic was w hat was requ ired  i f  the sanctions w ere to be lifted 
and stated  that ‘R eplacing  the regim e that had b rought Serbia to its knees is a sm all price to pay fo r the U N  
sanctions to be lif ted ’ (IP S -In te r Press Services, 10 June 1992).
39 T he A ssocia ted  Press, 24 June 1992. S lobodan Selenic, also a D E PO S m em ber expressed a sim ilar 
opinion: ‘i t ’s quite sure there can be no talks w ith  those  w ho im posed sanctions on Serbia w hile 
[M ilosevic] is in pow er. H is resignation  is one o f  the preconditions for the talks so s ta r t’ (IP S -In ter Press 
Services, 10 June 1992).
40 V esna PeSié, quoted  in D im itrijevié and Pejié, 1992, p. 9.
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Nevertheless, while there was condemnation of the sanctions, at this time the 
democratic opposition parties did not seem to view international isolation and the 
imposition of sanctions as something that was undermining their campaigns against 
Milosevic. On the contrary, and as is also noted by Dimitrijevic and Pejic, the sanctions 
‘deepened existing political differences, even weakened official Serbia and spurred the 
opposition to increasingly vehement criticism of and action against the government’ 
(Dimitrijevic and Pejic, 1992: 5). Furthermore, the democratic opposition parties, though 
critical of the sanctions, did not launch any concerted campaign against the IC for 
imposing them, rather, Milosevic was blamed for the fact that Serbia was now 
internationally isolated.
The Vidovan Sabor
Throughout June 1992, Milosevic faced a series of protests and demonstrations 
from the democratic opposition and other groups, including students and the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. The culmination of this anti-regime activity was the Vidovdan Sabor, a 
series of demonstrations organised by DEPOS which began on 28 June and lasted until 5 
July, and which ran parallel with a series of student demonstrations that had begun on 4 
June and continued for forty days (Thomas, 1999: 113).
DEPOS had written to Milosevic in early June giving him seven days to resign or 
to face street protests that would begin on 21 June.41 In advance of the protests, Milosevic 
had taken steps in an attempt to alleviate internal pressure. On 26 June, the Serbian 
parliament voted in favour of holding parliamentary elections by the end of the year,
41 IP S -In ter Press Service, 10 June 1992
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while an earlier move was the election on 15 June by the federal parliament of Dobrica 
Cosic as the first president of the SRJ. Cosic, a former dissident, declared patriot, well- 
known writer and anti-communist, was highly regarded within Serbia. Through his 
appointment Milosevic believed that the opposition could be placated, and that the newly 
formed federal state may gain some legitimacy. Antonie also believes that Milosevic 
would have calculated that Cosic would be politically naive42 (Antonie, 2002: 130). 
Following Cosic’s election and his call for federal elections to be held before the end of 
the year, DEPOS had postponed the demonstrations, which began a week later on 28 
June.
At the outset of the DEPOS demonstrations the coalition issued a list of demands, 
including Milosevic’s resignation, the formation of a multiparty ‘government of national 
salvation’, the dissolution of the Serbian parliament, and media freedom. DEPOS pledged 
that the protests would continue until these demands were met.43 Draskovic clearly hoped 
that the experience of other Eastern European countries that had ousted communist 
leaders through massive protests could be emulated in Serbia and stated that ‘We want 
Belgrade to be Prague or Sofia.’44 The initial rally on 28 June attracted large numbers of 
supporters, making it ‘the largest protest yet against Milosevic.’45 Furthermore, a DEPOS 
delegation met with Milosevic and presented him with a list of their demands. Milosevic 
responded by agreeing to test his support in elections or a referendum, (although no date 
was specified), and also agreed to consider the convening of round table talks.46 
Nevertheless, Draskovic’s hopes that large numbers of protestors would stay on the
42 A u th o r’s translation
43 IPS -In ter Press Service, 29 June 1992
44 IPS -In ter Press Service, 29 June 1992
45 The Washington Post, 29 June 1992
46 IPS-In ter Press Service, 29 June 1992
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streets for days until Milosevic was forced to resign were disappointed and the 
demonstrations were finally called off on 5 July.47 Furthermore, while round table talks 
between government and opposition representatives to discuss the electoral conditions 
which led to concessions on the part of the regime, these were insufficient to ensure that 
the December 1992 elections would be free and fair.48
There was a limited international reaction to the protests in Serbia and no 
significant international actors expressed support for the Serbian democratic opposition’s 
demands that Milosevic resign. Throughout June and July 1992, the time in which the 
opposition was engaged in large-scale demonstrations with the aim of removing the 
regime, the WEU, the EC, the CSCE and the G7 issued declarations on the situation in 
former Yugoslavia. None of these referred to the demonstrations taking place in Serbia, 
or expressed support for the opposition’s attempts to oust Milosevic and as noted in 
chapter two, only two of the statements acknowledged repression inside Serbia (the
47 In spite o f  the failure o f  the protests to force M ilosevic to resign, D E PO S leaders rem ained  upbeat. W hile 
V ladeta  Jankovic conceded that D E PO S dem ands had no t been m et, he nevertheless procla im ed the 
dem onstrations to have been a success. In addition, DraSkovic c la im ed that ‘the regim e is shaken, its fall is 
only a m atter o f  days aw ay, we m ight as well let it happen w ithout b lo o d sh ed ’ (A gence F rance Presse, 6 
July 1992). T he student pro tests that included large dem onstrations and a strike by B elgrade university  
students also had the rem oval o f  M iloSevid as their aim  and also  used the im position  o f  sanctions to 
illustrate the dam age tha t the regim e was doing  to Serbia (IP S -In te r Press Services, 10 June 1992)
48 R ound table talks w ere held at bo th  the federal and repub lican  levels. T he m ost s ign ifican t concession  
m ade to the opposition  at the federal level related  to the nature o f  the electoral system . T he SPS w anted a 
m ajority  system  but gave in to opposition  dem ands for a p roportional system . H ow ever, the opposition  
parties w ere deeply  d issatisfied  w ith both  the repub lican  level and federal level talks and the subsequent 
electoral law s that w ere passed. See T anjug , 5 A ugust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts 
E E/1453/C  1/1, 7 A ugust 1992; T anjug , 28 S ep tem ber 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, 
E E /1501/C 1/1 , 2 O ctober 1992; T anjug , 6 O ctober 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts,
E E /1 507 /C 1/1 , 9 O ctober 1992; T anjug , 10 O ctober 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts,
E E /1 509 /C 1 /1 , 12 O ctober 1992; T anjug , 20 O ctober 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts,
E E /1 5 18/C 1/1, 22 O ctober 1992; T anjug , 29 O ctober 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts,
E E /1526/C  1 /1 , 31 O ctober 1992; T anjug, 2 N ovem b er 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts,
E E /1529/C  1/1, 4 N ovem b er 1992; T anjug , 4 N ovem b er 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, 
E E /1530/C 1/1 , 6 N o vem b er 1992.
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‘European Council Declaration on the Former Yugoslavia’ and CSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly’s ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’), but referred only to the situation in Kosovo 
and the repression of other ethnic minorities in Serbia.49
At the US State Department daily briefing held on 29 June 1992, a spokesperson 
commented that the scale of the demonstration indicated that ‘many in Belgrade do not 
support their regime’s current policies’. However, she stopped short of endorsing the 
demands of the protestors for Milosevic’s resignation, stating merely that the US 
‘supports the democratic forces in Serbia and Montenegro.’50 Furthermore, US Secretary 
of State James Baker, following a meeting between Baker and Milan Panic51 at the CSCE 
summit meeting in Helsinki, was directly questioned about the possibility and 
consequences of Milosevic’s resignation. He refused to comment on whether this issue 
had arisen during his discussions with Panic, and also refused to answer a question on 
whether or not Milosevic’s resignation would constitute an improvement in relation to 
events in the former Yugoslavia, on the grounds that it was ‘hypothetical.’52
Given that the opposition was arguing for Milosevic’s resignation and the IC was 
laying the blame for the wars in Croatia and Bosnia at the feet of the Milosevic regime, it 
could be argued that there was a confluence of interests between the IC and the 
democratic opposition. However, the IC was preoccupied with the conflict in Bosnia and
49 W ith respect to K osovo, the E uropean  C ouncil stated that it expected  the ‘S erbian  leadership  to refrain  
from  fu rther repression  and to engage in serious d ia logue w ith  rep resen ta tives o f  this te rrito ry ’ (E uropean  
C ouncil in L isbon  (26-27 June 1992): C onclusion  o f  the P residency, 27 June 1992). W hile the C SC E  
declaration  condem ned  S erb ia ’s v io la tion  o f  C SC E com m itm ents and ‘the denial o f  fundam ental rights and 
freedom s o f  ethnic A lbanians in K osovo, and o f  H ungarian , M uslim  and o ther m inorities on the territo ry  o f  
Serbia, especially  in V ojvodina , and o f  M ontenegro  (B u dapest D eclaratio n  o f  the C SC E  Parliam entary  
A ssem bly , 5 Ju ly  1992).
50 US D epartm en t o f  State D aily  B riefing  # 99, 29 June 1992
51 M ilan  Panic, chosen  by M ilosev ic to be the first SRJ P rim e M inster was a successful, expatriate 
businessm an w ho had defected  from  Y u goslav ia  in the 1950s and was a na tu ra lised  US citizen. A ccording 
to T hom as, M ilosev ic ca lcu lated  that ‘Pan ic w ould  pro ject a m oderate im age for the governm ent at hom e 
and ab road w hile being easy  to contro l p o litica lly ’ (T hom as, 1999: 123).
52 State D epartm en t B riefing , Federal N ew s Service, 10 July 1992
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paid little attention to Serbia’s internal politics. The focus of the IC at this time was very 
much on the Serbian government, which it hoped it could force to alter its behaviour 
through a policy of enforced international isolation, and there appears to have been little, 
if any, formal contact between representatives of the IC and representatives of the 
democratic opposition parties (though there was extensive contact between Panic and IC 
representatives as will be seen). While comments by the US State Department show that 
there was some level of general, rhetorical support for democratic forces within Serbia, 
no international actors at this time expressed explicit support for the demands of the 
democratic opposition parties and other organisations within Serbia, that Milosevic 
resign.
While the opposition protests garnered little international support, it is worth 
noting that the opposition parties do not appear to have asked for international support, 
nor do they seem to have considered that the lack of support had any bearing on the 
failure of the demonstrations to bring about Milosevic’s resignation. PeSic considered that 
failure resulted from that fact that the opposition itself was not ‘strong enough to make 
Milosevic leave.’53 Other factors noted by Pesic included the fact that ‘People here are 
loyal to authorities. People can’t imagine that they, as citizens, can change anything’ and 
that Milosevic was doing ‘a pretty good job in terms of what he promised people. He 
took one-third of Croatian territory and he took two-thirds of Bosnia.’54 For Draskovic, 
the crucial determining factor in relation to whether the demonstrations could succeed 
appeared to be the extent to which they received popular support. This reasoning is clear 
in his statement that unless one million people turned up to protest, the demonstrations
53 The Ottawa Citizen, 3 Ju ly  1992
54 The Ottawa Citizen, 3 Ju ly  1992
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would fail. While Kostunica noted that ‘The time is not yet right to finish Milosevic, 
because both the regime and the people have not yet felt all the consequences of UN 
sanctions.’55 Kostunica’s comments also imply that he considered that UN sanctions 
could facilitate the removal of Milosevic.
While the demonstrations did not succeed in achieving their central demand that 
Milosevic resign, they did, nevertheless, succeed in gaining some concessions from the 
regime such as securing promises of early elections and consideration of the conditions in 
which they would be held, which allowed the democratic opposition to exert pressure on 
the regime to keep its promises in the months that followed. Furthermore, through 
highlighting the undemocratic nature of Milosevic’s rule, the opposition succeeded in 
questioning the legitimacy of the regime, one of the tasks necessary to effectively oppose 
the regime identified in chapter one.
Milan Panic and the London Conference
Following the imposition of sanctions against the SRJ, the most significant 
political development within Serbia was the election of Milan Panic as Yugoslav prime 
minister, and the challenges he mounted against Milosevic. Panic challenged Milosevic 
both internally and externally. Internally, Panic challenged Milosevic directly by deciding 
to run against him in the election for Serbian president in December 1992, and externally 
he challenged Milosevic through his attempts to cooperate with international efforts to 
resolve the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. The external dimension of Panic’s challenge 
to the Serbian leadership was highlighted at the London Conference chaired jointly by the 
EC and the UN at the end of August 1992. Panic’s attitudes and behaviour at this
55 The Washington Post, 29 June 1992
conference, which were to have serious consequences for his position within Serbian 
politics, illustrate the extent to which his attitudes towards the conflict in the former- 
Yugoslavia and the need to meet IC demands, were significantly different to those of 
Milosevic. In addition, Panic also demonstrated that he was prepared to fight the regime 
in an effort to implement his policies.
Before taking up his post, Panic included bringing the war in Bosnia to an end, 
and democratic and economic reform in Yugoslavia among his main goals as Yugoslav 
prime minister, stating also that one of his first acts would be ‘to see that free, fair and 
democratic elections take place at all levels throughout the country within a matter of 
months.’56 In an address to the federal parliament on 14 July Panic outlined his 
programme and explained that his policies were designed to ensure that the IC would 
‘accept Yugoslavia as a democratic, civil state and as an equal partner.’ In relation to 
Bosnia Panic proposed demilitarisation under UN supervision, and promised to do all he 
could to withdraw any heavy weapons that were the property of the former JNA. He also 
acknowledged that Bosnia was an independent state and a member of the UN and stated 
that he wished to re-establish mutual trust and co-operation between the SRJ and the new 
states of the former Yugoslavia. To this end, Panic declared, ‘the federal government will 
... take all necessary steps regarding mutual recognition and establishment of inter-state 
relations’ and stated that the SRJ ‘has no territorial claims against neighbouring states.’57
With a programme that was closer to that of the democratic opposition parties 
than to the SPS, Panic initially received qualified support from the democratic opposition.
56 T anjug , 2 July 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /1 42 4 /C 1 /1 , 4  July 1992
57 T anjug , 14 July  1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1434/C 1/1 , 16 July 1992 Pani£ also 
p rom ised  to call fo r elections at all levels in Y ugoslav ia  tha t his governm en t w ould  ‘call on  leaders o f  all 
po litical parties to start negotiations in a dem ocratic  atm osphere regard ing  election  rules and the 
observance o f  dem ocratic  p ro ced u re .’
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The DEPOS leadership welcomed Panic’s readiness to consider round-table talks
ro
between the government and the opposition and to call free elections, but was also a 
little cautious in terms of what Panic could achieve.59 Micunovic’s reaction was also 
positive, and he noted that the basic orientation of Panic’s programme was in line with 
the basic commitments of the DS.60
In spite of his pledges to introduce policy changes that were broadly in line with 
those demanded by the UN and other international institutions, Panic’s appointment did 
not elicit much of a response within the IC. A US State Department spokesperson 
commented that the US ‘does not endorse, or support or have any views about him 
serving as Prime Minister.’61 Following a meeting with Panic in July, James Baker noted 
that Panic was in agreement with the US in relation to the importance of complying with 
UN resolutions and that the US did not question Panic’s motives, which Baker described 
as ‘noble’. He did, however, express doubts regarding how effective Panic would be.62 
Dimitrijevic and Pejic argue that both the IC and domestic political actors were slow to 
recognise that Panic was anything more than a tool of the Milosevic regime, noting that 
‘it took some time ... to distinguish between the federal government and the government 
of Serbia. ... Support for Panic by the anti-Milosevic opposition in Serbia was reserved, 
and pressure from abroad on Panic was as strong as it would have been on Milosevic’ 
(Dimitrijevic and Pejic, 1992: 2).
58 T anjug , 15 July  1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /1435/C 1/1 , 17 July  1992.
59 T anjug , 17 July  1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1437/C  1/1, 20 July 1992.
60 T anjug , 16 July  1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /1 438/C 1/1 , 21 July 1992 Panic also 
secured approval for his efforts to bring about dem ocratic  change in Serbia from  the B elgrade U niversity  
s tudents w ho had been strik ing (T anjug, 9 July 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1429/C 1/6 , 
11 July 1992).
61 US D epartm en t o f  State D aily  B riefing  #101, 2 July 1992.
62 Federal N ew s Service, State D epartm en t B riefing , 10 July  1992.
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Following his formal election in mid-July, Panic set about trying to implement his 
programme and to improve the image and international position of the SRJ.63 He met 
with leaders of other former Yugoslav republics, travelling to Sarajevo to visit 
Izetbegovic within days of his appointment,64 and Panic also met briefly with Franjo 
Tudjman in Helsinki. In addition, Panic repeatedly reiterated his position that the SRJ 
was prepared to recognise the borders of the former-Yugoslav republics, and officially 
recognised Slovenia on 12 August.65 Many of Panic’s pronouncements and programmes 
put him at odds with the Milosevic regime and its supporters, a conflict that came to a 
head at the London Conference in late August 1992.
The London Conference
In a letter to the UN Security Council Panic again expressed his willingness to 
recognise the former Yugoslav republics and stated that Yugoslavia had ‘no territorial 
pretensions towards its neighbours,’66 and on 21 August, in advance of his departure for 
the London Conference, Panic reiterated this point in an address to the Federal Parliament 
in which he outlined the steps that had been taken in order to meet the SRJ’s obligations
63O n 21 A ugust Pan ic announced  that he had already  visited 16 countries and m et ‘o ver 50 em inen t w orld 
fig u res’ (R adio  B elgrade, 21 A ugust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1467/C 1/1 , 24 
A ugust 1992).
64 D uring  his visit to Sarajevo, Panic m ade a speech in w hich he condem ned ‘cheap po litic ians w ho have 
p layed on nationalism  and created  a civil w a r’, in w hat T hom as describes as a ‘th in ly -veiled  critic ism  o f  
S lobodan M ilo sev ic ’ (T hom as, 1999: 123).
65 T anjug , 17 A ugust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1463/C 1/1 , 19 A ugust 1992. Panic 
also took ac tion  to deal w ith the issue o f  national m inorities w ith in  Serbia, estab lish ing  a M inistry  for 
H um an and M inority  R ights (T anjug, 4 A ugust 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1452/C 1/1 , 
6 A ugust 1992). H e also took steps aim ed at the réin troduction  o f  A lbanian  language schoo ling  in K osovo 
and instructed  the SRJ Justice M inistry  to bring  K o so v o ’s legal system  fully into line w ith  C SC E  norm s in 
relation  to hum an rights. In addition , he appealed  to the C SC E  to help facilita te talks betw een  the SRJ 
governm ent and K osovo A lbanian  represen ta tives (T anjug, 20 A ugust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World 
Broadcasts E E /1 466/C 1/1 , 22 A ugust 1992).
66 T anjug , 17 A ugust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1463/C 1/1 , 19 A ugust 1992.
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to the Security Council.67 The federal parliament, however, attempted to limit Panic’s 
room to manoeuvre in London when it adopted a six-point platform for the conference 
which was more uncompromising than Panic was prepared to be regarding the 
recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, the issue of the continuity of the SFRJ and
/o
the possibility of international mediation in Kosovo. The final point in the six-point 
declaration, described by Anastasijevic as ‘a thinly veiled threat to oust Panic’s 
government if it agreed to any settlement that did not meet the five other 
“recommendations,”’69 asserted that any major departure from the adopted political 
platform would have ‘constitutional and legal consequences.’70
The London Conference brought the battle between Panic and Milosevic into the 
open, and the fallout of this struggle between the two leaders would have serious 
consequences for Panic when he returned to Belgrade. The tension between Panic and 
Milosevic was evident when at one point Panic told the conference that Milosevic was 
not authorised to speak, and at another point held up a piece of paper in front of
67 R adio  B elgrade, 21 A ugust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1467/C 1/1 , 24 A ugust 1992. 
Panic also foreshadow ed his show dow n w ith M ilosevic w hen he stated  that: ‘I have already  let it be know n 
that the conduct o f  Y u g o slav ia ’s foreign po licy  is the responsib ility  o f  m y governm ent and o f  m y se lf as the 
Prim e M inister. N obody  else can speak w ith m ore au thority  than m e or m y governm en t on  b e h a lf  o f  
Y ugoslav ia  on occasions w hen Y ugoslav ia  is represen ted  in te rn a tion a lly ’.
68 T he A ssem bly  declaration  stated  that B osnia could only  be recognised ‘sub jec t to an ag reem en t on 
b o rd e rs ’, and that C roatia  could  be recognised only ‘w ith in  the borders w hich are not und er U N P R O F O R  
protection . A s far as the territo ry  under U N P R O F O R  pro tec tion  is concerned  the [SRJ] will accept 
w h ichever po litical so lu tion  is reached w ith the consent o f  the S erbian  people in the K ra jin as’. In addition, 
the declaration  stated  tha t the SRJ delegation  should  ‘insist upon the co n tinu ity  o f  Y u g o slav ia ’, did not 
allow  for in ternational m ediation  in K osovo, and stated that the issue o f  P rev laka, ‘to w hich the R epublic o f  
C roatia  lays legally  untenab le c la im s’, should be raised a t the conference (T anjug, 21 A ugust 1992, in BBC  
Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1467/C 1/1 , 24 A ugust 1992).
69 U nited  Press In ternational, 21 A ugust 1992.
70T anjug , 21 A ugust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1467/C 1/1 , 24 A ugust 1992.
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Milosevic with the words ‘shut up’ written on them as Milosevic was asking to speak71 
(Silber & Little, 1996: 260).
At the London Conference it was agreed that sanctions against Serbia would be 
tightened, though no new sanctions were imposed, and that international monitors would 
be placed along Yugoslavia’s borders and on the Danube, though not on its border with
72Bosnia. The conference also established the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICFY) as a negotiating framework based in Geneva, with further 
negotiations scheduled to begin on 3 September.73 The outcome of the London 
Conference also included a set of ‘peace principles’ which included the rejection of 
violence; respect for human and minority rights; an agreement that any settlement of the 
Yugoslav crisis must include the recognition of Bosnia as an independent state by all 
former Yugoslav republics; and respect for all current borders unless changes were 
agreed through negotiations, all of which were agreed to by Panic. The conference also 
called for the sending of human rights observers to Kosovo and other parts of Serbia with 
significant ethnic minorities. While Milosevic refused to accept the presence of
71 Panic also  issued w arn ings to M iloSevid after the conference , s ta ting  that he w as ‘satisfied  that M r. 
M ilosevic has private ly  supported  m y program m e. I now  w ant to g ive him  a public w arning. A ctions are 
im portant, not w ords. T his peace proposal is now  an official peace p lan for the [SR J]. I expect M r. 
M ilosevic to com ply -  o r else . ..  I f  the P residen t o f  Serbia fails to fulfil his prom ise, I will consid er it my 
duty  to dem and his res ign a tio n ’ (T anjug, 28 A ugust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, 
E E /1473/C 1/1 , 31 A ugust 1992).
72 T he L ondon C onference w as held in the w ake o f  h igh ly  pub lic ised  accoun ts o f  atroc ities com m itted  in 
Serb deten tion  cam ps in B osnia and in this a tm osphere Serbia and the B osn ian  Serbs w ere w idely 
condem ned by m ost partic ipan ts at the conference , w ith G erm an foreign m in ister K laus K inkel going so far 
as to accuse the Serbs o f  genocide (D D P new s agency , 26  A ugust 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World 
Broadcasts E E /1471/C 2/1 , 28 A ugust 1992).
73 O ther agreem ents m ade at the L ondon C onference included  an ag reem en t tha t the B osnian  Serb heavy 
w eapons around Sarajevo and o ther B osn ian  tow ns w ould  be p laced  und er U N  contro l; tha t thousands m ore 
peacek eep ers w ould be deployed to p ro tec t hum anitarian  aid convoys; and that the U N  Security  C ouncil 
w ould  create  a new  peacek eep ing  force. O n 14 Sep tem ber 1992, the Security  C ouncil passed  R eso lu tion  
776 estab lish ing  U N P R O F O R  II. T he conference partic ipan ts also agreed  to co nsid er estab lish ing  a no-fly  
zone over B osnia (S ilber & L ittle, 1996: 260-261).
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international observers in Kosovo, Panic approved the despatch of a CSCE mission to the 
province, which Milosevic would expel in 1993 (Silber & Little, 1996: 261).
The IC assessed Panic’s participation at the London conference, and his efforts to 
bring peace to the former Yugoslavia, in a generally positive light, though there were 
doubts as to whether he had the power to deliver on his promises. The letter Panic sent to 
the UN Secretary General in advance of the conference was well received, with John 
Major commenting that it ‘struck a note of realism and moderation.’74 In addition to the 
positive assessments from the IC, most opposition political actors within Serbia also 
considered the conference to have been a success. Panic himself stated that he believed 
that it represented a breakthrough towards peace in the former Yugoslavia, and claimed 
that many countries had begun to show understanding for the positions of his 
government, and recognised him as the ‘new leader’ of Yugoslavia,75 while Cosic said he 
felt more optimistic following the conference.76 Djindjic assessed that the conference had 
been ‘relatively successful,’77 while Draskovic praised Panic’s contribution stating that 
the outcome ‘would have been far more difficult for us, had it not been for Milan Panic’s
74 IPS -In ter Press Service, 26 A ugust 1992. T he conference produced  a ‘C o -C ha irm en ’s P ap er O n Serbia 
and M o n ten eg ro ’ w hich included the follow ing: ‘I f  as suggested  by M r. P an ic’s recen t le tter to the 
Presiden t o f  the Security  C ouncil o f  the U N , Serbia and M ontenegro  do intend to fulfil these ob ligations in 
deed as well as w ord they will resum e a respected  position  in the in ternational com m unity . T hey  will be 
enabled  to trade, to receive assistance and to en joy the full coopera tio n  o f  all m em bers o f  the in ternational 
com m unity . I f  they do not com ply the Security  C ouncil will be invited to apply  stringent sanctions leading 
to the ir total in ternational iso la tion ’ (US D epartm en t o f  S tate D ispatch  S upplem ent, Vol. 3, N o. 7).
75 T anjug , 28 A u gust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1473/C 1/1 , 31 A ugust 1992; Tanjug, 
29 A ugust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1473/C 1/1 , 31 A ugust 1992.
76 T anjug , 28 A ugust 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1473/C 1/1 , 31 A ugust 1992.
77 U nited Press In ternational, 28 A ugust 1992.
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exceptional diplomatic activity and reasonable behaviour on the international stage.’78
Although the democratic opposition parties were generally positive in their 
assessment of the London Conference and Panic’s role in it, this was not the case for 
Milosevic’s allies, the SRS, nor for some of the parliamentary representatives from 
within the SPS. Upon his return from the conference Panic found himself and his 
performance at the conference as the subject of a confidence debate in the federal 
parliament which represented the beginning of a phase in which Milosevic and his allies 
consistently attempted to undermine Panic, and ultimately to successfully remove him 
from his position as Yugoslav prime minister. These events will be considered in greater 
detail in the section dealing with the December 1992 elections.
Following the London Conference Panic and Cosic co-operated with Vance and 
Owen in their attempts to resolve the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and on 30 
September Cosic and Tudjman signed a joint declaration reaffirming commitments made
70
at the London Conference. This was followed on 20 October by another joint 
declaration between the SRJ and Croatia which again reaffirmed earlier commitments 
and provided for the re-opening of the Belgrade to Zagreb road and the establishment of 
liaison offices in Belgrade and Zagreb as part of their efforts to normalise relations
78 R adio B elgrade, 2 S ep tem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1477/C 1/1 , 4 S ep tem ber 
1992. A n ex cep tion  to these positive assessm ents w as the position  taken  by PeSid w ho had opposed  the 
conference from  the ou tset and partic ipated  in an ‘a lte rnative co n fe ren ce’ that w as organ ised  in L ondon  by 
opposition  politic ians from  all parts o f  the fo rm er Y ugoslavia . PeSic w arned  tha t carv ing  up B osn ia into 
ethnic can tons w ould  be detrim ental to the cause o f  peace: ‘W e should  preserve B osnia and recognise the 
bo rders tha t are there now . I f  we recognise changes or borders, the w ar w ill not stop but w ill sp read ’ (The 
Guardian , 27 A ugust 1992).
79 T hese  included a co m m itm en t to the d em ilitarisa tion  o f  P rev laka and the s ta tion ing  o f  U N  observers 
there by 20 O ctober, and to estab lish ing  a m echan ism  to facilita te  the retu rn  o f  d isp laced  persons to their 
hom es (T anjug, 1 O ctober 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1501/C 1/1 , 3 O c to ber 1992). 
Subsequently , the Serbian  governm en t, in an e ffo rt to underm ine Pani6, refused to take part in talks w ith  
C roatia  and accused  the federal gov ernm en t o f  be tray ing  the C roatian  Serb (The Financial Times, 13 
O ctober 1992).
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between the two countries. However, in spite of this progress, limited though it might 
have been, the IC decided to increase Serbia’s isolation further in the following months 
by strengthening the sanctions and excluding the SRJ from the UN; a move that led to an 
intensification of the conflict between Panic and the Milosevic regime.
As noted in chapter one, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 777 in 
September 1992 denying the SRJ the right to continue to occupy the seat of the SFRJ in 
the UN, following which, on 22 September, the General Assembly voted to expel the 
SRJ. This decision was made in spite of an appeal by Panic to allow his country to remain 
within the UN. Panic argued that expelling the SRJ would undermine him in his struggle 
against Milosevic and his hard-line allies who thrived on isolation.81
When it became clear to Panic that there would be a vote on the issue, he 
announced that he was going to propose that the federal government take a decision to 
apply for membership in the UN and other international organisations.82 The issue of the 
possible exclusion of the SRJ from the UN, and of Panic’s proposal proved to be 
contentious within Serbia. Panic’s statement prompted a backlash among his opponents, 
with SPS President Borisav Jovic threatening to call a vote of no confidence in Panic’s 
premiership. In addition, the Serbian government issued a statement challenging the
8ft
80 The New York Times, 21 O ctober 1992. O n 25 O ctober, C roatian  Serb nationalists  b locked  the reopening 
o f  the road in a m ove tha t m any suspected  was encouraged  o r supported  by M ilosev ic  (The New York 
Times, 26 O c tob er 1992).
81 T he A ssocia ted  P ress, 22 Sep tem ber 1992
United Press In ternational, 17 Sep tem ber 1992
83 U nited  Press In ternational, 17 Sep tem ber 1992
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While there was much criticism of Panic’s statement from Milosevic and his 
allies, many within the democratic opposition took a more pragmatic approach. 
Draskovic stated that Panic merely wanted ‘something that reflects sheer political 
reality’, and announced his support for Panic’s move because ‘this is the only way to stop 
the downfall of our people.’85 The DSS also expressed support for Panic stating that he 
had ‘been compelled to make such a move, a move which is possibly not a most fortunate 
one,’ and went on to condemn the Serbian government’s statement as an attempt ‘to 
avoid their own responsibility.’ Similarly, Micunovic did not condemn Panic either, 
noting that the most important thing was that the SRJ remain a member of the UN. 
According to Micunovic, if the SRJ were expelled, ‘it would be prudent for us to go and 
apply for membership ... We should issue a statement in which we state that we do not 
insist on succession as such, but that we insist on remaining a member.’87 Micunovic did, 
however, express surprise that some within the IC wanted to see the SRJ excluded from 
the UN, stating that ‘we expected that after the London Conference some agreement
legality o f Panic’s move.84
84 T he statem ent declared  that it was the SRJ parliam ent, not its governm ent, tha t m ade decisions on jo in in g  
international o rgan isations, and that furtherm ore, the SRJ parliam ent could  not m ake such a decision  as it 
w ould breach the SRJ constitu tion , w hich ‘explicitly  estab lishes a co n tinu ity  in the subjec tiv ity  o f  
Y u goslav ia .’ R adio B elgrade, 17 Sep tem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E / 1490/C  1/1, 
19 S ep tem ber 1992 T he Serbian governm en t sta tem ent goes on to state that, g iven the E U  conditions for 
international recognition , the recognition  o f  the SRJ w ould ‘dem and the prio r fu lfilm ent o f  unacceptab le  
conditions -  special status for K osovo-M etohija , V ojvodina, Sandzak, the part o f  M ontenegro  settled  by the 
M uslim s and the A lbanians, and probably  for the territory  populated  by the B u lgarian  ethnic m inority , 
together w ith a real th rea t o f  dem ilitarising  these regions w ith  the aim  o f  reducing  Serbia to the borders 
p rio r to the B alkan W ars ’.
85 B elgrade T V , 17 S ep tem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1493/C 1/1 , 23 S eptem ber 
1992
86 T anjug , 18 Sep tem ber 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1493/C 1/1 , 23 S ep tem ber 1992
87 B elgrade T V , 17 Sep tem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1493/C 1/1 , 23 S ep tem ber 
1992. D jindjic also took a pragm atic approach  stating that ‘the Federal gov ernm en t m ust do every th ing  for 
the Federal R epublic o f  Y u goslav ia  to survive in the U nited  N ations o r to apply  for ad m iss ion ’ (T anjug, 18 
S ep tem ber 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1493/C 1/1 , 23 S ep tem ber 1992).
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would be reached and that Panic’s government would be given a chance to do something 
serious for peace.’88
The December 1992 elections
In October 1992 it was announced that elections would take place on 20 
December for both the Serbian parliament and the Yugoslav Chamber of Deputies. 
However, when the elections were announced it was not certain that the opposition 
parties would participate, as they were dissatisfied with the conditions in which they 
would have to contest them, and this issue revealed serious tensions between the 
opposition parties. Panic, convinced that a united opposition would stand a greater chance 
of defeating the SPS, played an important role in attempting to foster opposition unity. 
However, in spite of Panic’s attempts to unite the opposition, including the creation of a 
short-lived coalition that included DEPOS, the DS, and the GSS, on 16 November it was 
announced that the opposition would present a united front at the elections, but with two 
separate election lists, one being centred around DEPOS, and the other around the DS.89
Although he had started out as an ally of Milosevic, by the end of 1992 Dobrica 
Cosic was openly critical of the Serbian president and spoke out in support of Milan 
Panic and the federal government. When, in late November, as expected, the SPS 
announced that Milosevic would be its candidate for the Serbian presidency, the 
opposition had wanted Cosic to stand as a candidate for the united opposition. Cosic,
88 B elgrade T V , 17 Sep tem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1493/C 1/1 , 23 S ep tem ber 
1992.
89 T anjug , 16 N o vem b er 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts , E E /1541/C 1/1 , 18 N o vem ber 1992. 
W hile tensions arose w ith in  D E PO S regard ing w hether the co alition  should  contest the election , w ith the 
DSS being  opposed  to partic ipation  w hile the SPO  favoured it, at a D E PO S o f  the co a litio n ’s ru ling  council 
in N o vem b er narrow ly  voted  in favour o f  partic ipation  (Tanjug, 18 N o vem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  
World Broadcasts, E E /1 542 /C 1/1 , 19 N o vem ber 1992).
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however, ruled himself out. In addition to suffering from health problems, Cosic claimed
Oft 'that if he were to stand he would have to resign his post as federal president. Cosic also 
failed to endorse any of the parties contesting the elections.91
With Cosic having ruled himself out, on 30 November Panic announced that he 
would stand against Milosevic.92 This was followed by pledges of support from all the 
democratic opposition parties including Draskovic, who had been nominated himself, but 
who promised to withdraw if Panic’s candidacy was accepted by the republican electoral 
commission.93 However, Panic’s candidacy was called into question when the electoral 
commission ruled that, as a result of a law which had been passed only a couple of weeks 
earlier, Panic was ineligible to stand for the Serbian presidency as he had not been 
resident in the republic for twelve months. Amid threats of an opposition electoral 
boycott, a legal battle ensued with Panic appealing to the constitutional court, which 
overturned the decision, only to have the electoral commission again reject his candidacy. 
It was not until 9 December, less than two weeks before the election was due to be held, 
that the constitutional court again overturned the electoral commission’s ruling and Panic 
was eventually allowed to stand (Thomas, 1999: 128). While there was no sustained 
international criticism of the Serbian authorities for these attempts to remove Panic, the
90 T anjug , 21 N ovem b er 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts , E E /1546/C  1/1, 24 N o vem ber 1992
91 t o s i e  c la im ed that tha t ‘m y desire  to be the P residen t o f  all the c itizens o f  Serbia and M ontenegro  
w ithout separa ting  them  into parties, prevents m e from  nam ing  the party  and those people w ho are closest 
to m y b e lie fs .’ (T anjug, 21 N o vem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts , E E /1546 /C 1/1 , 24 
N o v em b er 1992).
92 P an ic ’s an nouncem ent cam e after B elgrade U n iversity  studen ts subm itted  in excess o f  the 10,000 
signatu res in suppo rt o f  his candidacy  to the S erbian  electoral com m ission , and nom inated  him  as a 
presiden tia l candidate  (T he Press A ssociation , 29 N o vem b er 1992).
93 R adio  B elgrade, 1 D ecem ber 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /15541 , 3 D ecem ber 1992.
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State Department noted that these efforts were seen as ‘part of a pattern of actions which 
could preclude the possibility that free and fair elections could be held.’94
Milosevic attempted to weaken Panic in advance of the elections, with several 
Milosevic loyalists within the federal government resigning their posts as part of an effort 
to undermine Panic’s government.95 The reasons given by the ministers for their 
resignations generally involved Panic’s alleged ‘anti-Serbian’ policies,96 allowing 
‘foreign powers dominate the government’s policy,’97 and similar charges. Furthermore, 
there were also several attempts to remove Panic through no confidence votes in the 
federal parliament, which he survived largely due to the support of the Montenegrin 
representatives. The first of these occurred immediately after the London Conference, 
when the SRS tabled a motion of no confidence in the prime minister on the grounds that 
he had disregarded the conclusions of the federal assembly while he was attending the
QO
conference. Draskovic spoke out in favour of Panic and called on people to demonstrate 
in support of him.99 Micunovic also criticised the confidence motion,100 as did the DSS101
r % f 1 0 2and Cosic. Panic survived the confidence vote because Milosevic did not intend to 
have him removed at this point and the SPS urged its members to support him in the 
vote.103 A second vote of no confidence in Panic took place in early November. The 
motion had been proposed by the SRS on 16 October when Panic was accused of having
94 US D epartm en t o f  State D aily  B riefing  # 176, 3 D ecem ber 1992.
95 Federal foreign m in ister V ladislav  Jovanovic has resigned in Septem ber, w hile m in ister w ithout portfo lio  
R adm ila M ilentijevic resigned on 28 N ovem ber, econom y m in ister N ik o la  Sainovic resigned on 29 
N o vem b er and deputy  prim e m inister O skar K ova£ resigned on 30 N ovem ber.
96 U nited  Press In ternational, 10 S ep tem ber 1992; U nited  Press In ternational, 28 N o vem b er 1992.
97 U nited  Press In ternational, 29 N o vem b er 1992.
98 BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1474/i, 1 Sep tem ber 1992.
99 R adio B elgrade, 2 S ep tem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1477/C 1/1 , 4 S ep tem ber 
1992.
100 T anjug , 1 Sep tem ber 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1476/C 1/1 , 3 S ep tem ber 1992.
101 T anjug , 1 Sep tem ber 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1476/C 1/1 , 3 S ep tem ber 1992.
102 T anjug , 2 Sep tem ber 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1477/C 1/1 , 4 S ep tem ber 1992.
103 T anjug , 2 Sep tem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1 4 7 7 /C 1 /1 ,4 S eptem ber 1992.
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‘breached the decisions of the Federal parliament, assisted the enemies of the Serbian 
people and threatened the basic interests of the state.’104 This time the SPS supported the 
motion105 but Panic survived, by one vote, thanks to Montenegrin representatives in the 
Chamber of Republics.106
While the IC had remained largely silent on the issue of the upcoming elections, 
there was a limited international reaction to the moves against Panic. Following the 
attacks on the federal prime minister on the grounds of his behaviour at the London 
Conference, Cyrus Vance, the UN’s representative in the ICFY, spoke in support of 
Panic. When asked if Panic’s removal would make the peace process more difficult 
Vance stated that it would, praising the ‘constructive suggestions’ that Panic had made 
and asserting that ‘he ought to stay and see what can be done to build on some of those 
suggestions.’107 However, this clearly did not represent unequivocal support for Panic 
from the US, as when asked whether or not he had any comment on the issue, a State 
Department spokesperson stated that he had nothing to say.108
The December 1992 election campaign: ‘Patriots vs Traitors9
Throughout the election campaign, Milosevic and the SPS emphasised their 
patriotic credentials (Andrejevich, 1993: 16; Thomas, 1999: 131). In contrast, both Panic 
and the main democratic opposition parties ran elections campaigns that were
104 T anjug , 16 O ctober 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1515/C 1/1 , 19 O ctober 1992.
105 T anjug , 2 N o vem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1 52 9 /C 1 /1 , 4 N o vem ber 1992.
106 T he A ssocia ted  Press, 3 N o vem ber 1992.
107 T he M acN eil/L ehrer N ew s H o u r (transcrip t), 1 Sep tem ber 1992.
108 US D epartm en t o f  S tate D aily  B riefing  #121, 2 S ep tem ber 1992.
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significantly more moderate on national issues.109 The approach of DEPOS and the DS to 
the elections was based on a promise of peace and the lifting of international sanctions 
against Serbia (Mihailovic, 1997: 53; Thomas, 1999: 131). The core of Panic’s campaign 
for the Serbian presidency was a pledge to end the war in Bosnia and to get the sanctions 
against Serbia lifted (Andrejevich, 1993: 14). On the domestic front his key pledges were 
economic and democratic reform (Goati, 2001a: 100). Speaking when he formally 
announced that he would stand against Milosevic, Panic noted the dire state of the 
Serbian economy and Milosevic’s inaction in relation to such issues, calling on Serbs ‘to 
vote for peace and economic revival.110
Once the elections were announced there was an acknowledgement on the part of 
the State Department that they were unlikely to be free and fair and an indication of 
support for the opposition’s demands with respect to electoral conditions. According to a 
spokesperson, the Belgrade authorities had a responsibility to ensure that ‘the elections 
adhere to internationally accepted standards,’ with the opposition parties having equal 
access to the media and adequate resources to conduct their campaign, and that the voting 
should be ‘conducted according to international norms.’111
There was little international response to Panic’s announcement that he would 
oppose Milosevic in the December elections, and no significant international actors 
explicitly endorsed his candidature, though there were some suggestions of support. In 
response to a question as to whether the US would prefer a victory for Milosevic or
109 G oati notes that the national issue w as the sub jec t o f  43%  o f  SRS slogans, 22%  o f  SPS slogans and only 
17%  o f  D E PO S slogans (G oati, 2001a: 70).
110 U nited  Press In ternational, 1 D ecem ber 1992.
111 US D epartm en t o f  S tate D aily  B riefing  # 175, 2 D ecem ber 1992. E xpressing  concern  regard ing w hether 
such conditions w ould  be m et, the spokesperson  w ent on to state that ‘Initial reports regard ing m edia access 
and regula tions govern ing  the electoral process give reason  for scep tic ism  that the process will be free and 
fa ir .’
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Panic, State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher declared that the US was not 
concerned about individuals but policies, and a ‘change in those policies that would be 
brought about by Mr. Panic or any other candidate through a democratic process would 
be a welcome development. ... But we don’t endorse particular candidates.’112
In addition to the suggestions of support for Panic that came from the US, the EC 
also implied support for Panic, though fell short of explicitly endorsing his candidature. 
In a statement issued by the European Council in December it was implied that should 
there be a change of government in Serbia that this could lead to lifting the sanctions.113 
Further implied support for Panic also came from the CSCE which issued a statement 
expressing support for ‘the efforts of those political forces in Serbia that are striving to 
bring about full co-operation with the peace process.’114 In addition a joint US-Russian 
statement issued on 14 December at the CSCE meeting explicitly noted the possibility of 
sanctions being removed. The statement declared that if the people of Serbia made the 
‘correct choice ... Russia and the United States pledge to work with the government of 
Serbia to restore its position in the world’. If this were followed by a fundamental change 
in policy ‘the eventual relaxation and removal of the sanctions would be possible.’115
According to Owen some unnamed ‘US supporters of Panic’ were pressurising 
himself and Vance to speak out in favour of Panic. Owen however, states that he believed
1,2 US D epartm en t o f  State D aily  B riefing  #175, 2 D ecem ber 1992.
113 E uropean  C ouncil in E dinburgh  -  11 and 12 D ecem ber 1992 -  C onclusions o f  the Presidency. 
A ccord ing  to the statem ent: I f  there is a radical change o f  po licy  and genuine co operatio n  in the peace 
process, Serbia will be gradually  readm itted  to the in ternational com m unity . T he E uropean  C ouncil 
supports the efforts o f  those po litical forces w ho are trying to bring  Serbia back  from  the brink. If, on the 
o ther hand, the B elgrade regim e continues its p resen t po licies, the in ternational co m m unity  will take sterner 
action, inc luding tigh ten ing  and ex tending  ex isting  sanctions and preven ting  Serb partic ipation  in any 
international body, w hich w ill to ta lly  isolate Serbia for a long tim e to com e.
114 C SC E, S um m ary  o f  C onclusions D ecision on Peaceful Settlem ent o f  D isputes, S tockholm  1992.
115 US D epartm en t o f  S tate D ispatch , 28 D ecem ber 1992. O n the day o f  the election , bo th  B ush and M ajor 
declined the opp ortun ity  to com m ent on the elections, w ith M ajo r cla im ing  that ‘com m enting  on elections 
is a dangerous, hazardous b u sin e ss’ (Public Papers o f  the P residen ts, Pres. D oc. 2371, R em arks w ith P rim e 
M in ister John M ajo r o f  the U nited  K ingdom  and an E xchange w ith R ep o rte rs ,’ 20 D ecem ber 1992).
138
only Cosic could have beaten Milosevic, and that rather than explicitly endorse Panic 
they decided to issue a ‘declaration that had been carefully designed to sound supportive 
of Panic -  as we were -  but to avoid attracting allegations of interference.’ Owen goes on 
to state that both himself and Vance thought it ‘wiser to keep our lines of communication 
open to all, including Milosevic, and eschew any further involvement in the elections’ 
(Owen, 1996: 82-83). While the above statements do indicate that the IC would have 
liked to see Panic defeat Milosevic, there was however, no significant support given to 
the opposition for their campaign or even for Panic’s presidential campaign. As Sekelj 
points out, in spite of the fact that Panic had ‘advocated the fulfilment of the conditions 
posed by the international community’ he nevertheless ‘never secured any real support 
from the European Community or the United States’ (Sekelj, 2000: 65).
While there may have been a degree of rhetorical support for Panic within the IC, 
his requests for direct assistance were largely unheeded. As the central message of his 
electoral campaign was the need for an end to Serbia’s international isolation and its 
reintegration into the IC, he pleaded with IC representatives for sanctions to be lifted for 
a trial period of sixty days in order to demonstrate to the Serbian electorate that real 
benefits could follow should he win the election. Addressing the EC Parliament’s foreign 
affairs and security committee in early November, Panic argued that the conflicts in 
Croatia and Bosnia could not be seen separately from the battle for democracy in the SRJ, 
warning that: ‘If the forces of democracy lose this battle due to lack of understanding and 
support on the part of the West then the other, more visible battle, in villages and towns 
of Bosnia ... will most likely further intensify and spread until it covers the entire Balkan
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peninsula.’116 Panic called on Europe to recognise the difference between those among 
the Bosnian Serb and Serbian leaderships that were engaging in war and conflict on the 
one hand, and those who were ‘trying to set Yugoslavia on a course of peace and 
democracy’ on the other.117 He asked that the sanctions be relaxed for a sixty day period 
for humanitarian reasons, to be reintroduced if the UN confirmed that the elections were 
not free and fair, and stated that ‘I’m convinced we can win, but not without your help 
and understanding.’ In addition to asking for the temporary relaxation of sanctions, Panic 
also asked for other assistance and requested a clear statement that the declared policy of 
the Yugoslav government met the criteria for official recognition; help from ‘experts and 
advisors’ to organise for elections and ‘to encourage our people to aspire to democratic 
changes;’ assistance for the non-state media to import paper and for the electronic media 
to increase its broadcasting range and possibilities.118
During the course of the election campaign, the IC did provide an element of 
support in terms of Panic’s specific requests. Monitors were sent to Serbia by the US 
based International Republican Institute, with the approval of the State Department, 
which also obtained an exemption from the UN Sanctions Committee in order to send 
broadcasting equipment to an independent television station based in Belgrade.119 
However, with respect to Panic’s key request - the relaxation of sanctions - the IC not 
only refused to grant this request, but in fact tightened international sanctions against the 
SRJ on 17 November 1992 when Resolution 787 was passed by the UN Security Council. 
Owen appears to believe that some concession to Panic on the sanctions issue could have
116 T anjug , 5 N o vem ber 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1532/A 1, 7 N o vem ber 1992.
117 T anjug , 5 N o vem ber 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1532/A 1, 7 N ovem b er 1992.
1,8 T anjug , 5 N o vem ber 1992 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1532/A 1, 7 N ovem ber 1992.
119 The Washington Post, 26 N o vem ber 1992.
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been useful, stating that ‘in ICFY we felt the rigidity of a Security Council that either 
could not see the merit of or could not deliver the diplomatic carrot which could be as 
valuable as the stick of sanctions’ (Owen, 1996: 61). Dimitrijevic and Pejic also note that 
this move was ‘badly timed’ (Dimitrijevic and Pejic, 1992: 20).
Even those within Milosevic’s own party recognised the potential impact of such a 
move. Commenting on the IC’s decision to strengthen sanctions at a time when Panic 
was trying to persuade the IC to suspend them in order to strengthen his chances against 
Milosevic, Mihailo Markovic of the SPS stated, ‘Whatever we do, we are punished. This 
gives people reason to think that Milosevic was right because Panic only got a tightening 
of sanctions. ... It will help Milosevic win the election.’120 Panic was similarly dismayed, 
and noted bitterly: ‘If you had supported démocratisation in Yugoslavia, rather than the 
sanctions, they would have been lifted by now ... But instead I received only further 
threats from your governments ... That is what I received from you, while some people 
here accused me of being your agent, a traitor, or spread other similar stupidities.’121
In summary, while the IC did imply a certain level of support for Panic’s candidacy 
in the Serbian presidential elections, there is no evidence that international actors were 
considering the possibility of regime change at this time. In spite of the implied support 
for Panic, international policy remained focused on achieving IC goals through 
attempting to coerce the Milosevic regime to induce a change in its behaviour, even when 
such policies acted to the detriment of Panic’s campaign, as was the case with the 
tightening of UN sanctions in November 1992.
120 M arkov ic cited  in T hom as, 1999: 130-131.
121 T anjug , 19 D ecem ber 1992, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /1569/C  1/1, 21 D ecem ber 1992.
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The results of the December 1992 elections were a disappointment for the 
democratic opposition parties. Milosevic secured 55.9% of the vote in the presidential 
elections, significantly less than the 65.3% he had won in the 1990 presidential elections, 
to Panic’s 34.3%, thus retaining the Serbian Presidency. In addition the SPS, remained 
the single largest party in both republican and federal parliaments, although its support 
had diminished considerably from the 46.1% it attained in 1990 (See Table 1). While 
DEPOS performed reasonably well, showing a slight increase from the 15.8% that the 
SPO had won in 1990, it came in third place to the SRS, which had not contested the 
1990 elections.
FEDERAL PARLIAMENT REPUBLICAN PARLIAMENT
Share of vote Seats Share of vote Seats
SPS 31.5% 47 (43.5%) 28.8% 101 (40.4%)
SRS 21.8% 30 (27.8%) 22.6% 73 (29.2%)
DEPOS 17.2% 20(18.5%) 16.9% 50 (20%)
DS 6% 5 (4.6%) 4.2% 6 (2.4%)
Table 1: Results of the December 1992 elections held in Serbia for the Yugoslav Chamber of Citizens 
and the Serbian Parliament. (Figures from Goati et al, 1993: 200-204)
Although the SPS remained the single largest party following the 1992 elections, 
Goati points out that its results could not be considered to have been a great success as it 
showed that support for the party had dropped significantly since the first multiparty 
elections held in 1990 (Goati: 2001, 97). As a result, the SPS lost its majority in the 
Serbian parliament and needed the support of the SRS in order to form a government.
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While the two parties did not enter into a formal coalition, the SRS was willing to 
provide support to an SPS government.
Following his defeat in the presidential elections, Panic’s fate was sealed when he 
lost a confidence motion in the federal parliament on 29 December and was immediately 
replaced by Radoje Kontic. Although he had pledged to resign if reformists were not 
successful in the elections, Cosic stayed in his position as Federal President and 
supported Kontic’s instatement (Thomas, 1999: 143). However, following the removal of 
Panic, the Radicals soon turned their attention to Cosic, who came increasingly under 
attack, and was eventually ousted at the end of May 1993.
Goati argues that the December 1992 elections were highly significant, marking a 
‘crucial “political crossroads’” in Serbia’s and Yugoslavia’s political life, as they 
represented a choice between international reintegration and continued international 
isolation and its devastating impact’ (Goati, 2001a: 101). In his consideration of why 
Serbia’s voters opted for the latter he raises two important points. Firstly, voters did not 
have access to the relevant information needed to make such a choice as the Serbian 
media presented a distorted image of Panic’s programme and claimed that ‘by 
compromising [Panic] has actually been challenging the independence and dignity of the 
country in favour of foreign powers, above all the USA’ (Goati, 2001a: 101). In addition, 
Goati notes, there are good reason to doubt the validity of the results of these elections 
given the number of irregularities that occurred (Goati, 2001a: 102). While it is not 
known precisely to what extent electoral manipulation and fraud contributed to 
Milosevic’s victory over Panic, it is nevertheless worth noting that some commentators
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have suggested that it was only through such manipulation that he retained his position as 
Serbia’s president (Pavlovic, 2001: 4; Ramet, 2002: 339).122
Given the significance of the December 1992 elections, the strength of Panic’s 
direct challenge to Milosevic, and the relative unity of the opposition, some authors have 
seen this election as something of a missed opportunity for Serbia. Stojanovic notes that:
DEPOS’s success and that of Milan Panic ... showed that at that moment, up 
to the time of the outbreak of war in Bosnia and the imposition of sanctions 
against Serbia, there was perhaps space in Serbia to offer a programme 
founded on a completely different concept, but no one took the risk of 
“national betrayal”(Stojanovic, 2000: 466).
While Stojanovic seems to consider that it was the democratic opposition parties 
themselves that missed this crucial opportunity for change, Dragovic-Soso believes that it 
was it was the IC. She argues that by focusing exclusively on coercion, the IC missed a 
chance ‘to aid and advise the opposition to bring about regime change’ (Dragovic-Soso, 
2003: 131).
In addition to factors such as the unfair electoral conditions in which the 
opposition had to operate, the likelihood of electoral fraud and the abuse of the state 
media to demonise opposition candidates, that characterised all elections considered in 
this research, analysts note several factors that contributed to the victory of Milosevic and 
the SPS in the December 1992 elections. The dominance of the national question and the
inability of the democratic opposition parties to formulate a significantly different
122 A ccord ing  to R am et, M ilosevic w on the election  ‘on ly  by invalidating  the registration  o f  m any voters, 
by o rchestratin g  the s lander o f  his rival in the regim e press (w hile denying  Pan ic the possib ility  o f  any 
reply), and even by hold ing up approval o f  P an ic ’s candidacy  until c lose to election  day, thus p reven ting  
his rival from  having  air tim e until late in the race ’ (R am et, 2002: 339).
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solution to that offered by the SPS and the SRS is considered to be of primary 
significance by several authors (Goati, 2001a: 104; Slavujevic, 1998: 98, Stojanovic, 
2000: 465). In addition, Sekelj notes the significance of an essentially ‘unproportional 
election system’ and the boycotting of the elections by Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian 
population, noting that ten per cent of all MPs were elected by less than 100,000 Kosovo 
Serbs (Sekelj, 2000: 64).
However, it is the inability of the opposition to formulate a credible alternative to 
regime, in particular in relation to the national question, which dominates these analyses. 
Stojanovic notes that although, through DEPOS, ‘for the first time the opposition raised 
some existential social questions ... and it was clearly emphasized that Serbia could not 
be subordinated to ‘peripheral parts of Serbdom’ ... this was not sufficient to create an 
authentic opposition identity founded on a programme qualitatively different from that of 
the government’ (Stojanovic, 2000: 466). She goes on to point out that the ‘programmes 
of the associated opposition parties who formed the coalition did not allow an essential 
withdrawal from the idea of uniting all Serbs’ (Stojanovic, 2000: 466). However, it is 
worth noting in the context of this research, that Goati states that the democratic 
opposition parties, and especially the SPO, were opposed to the forceful ethnic division 
of Bosnia and Croatia (Goati, 2001a: 103). Slavujevic makes a similar point, noting that 
the dominance of the national question was detrimental to the democratic opposition, and 
arguing that the parties could not formulate an effective response to the central theme of 
the SPS and SRS campaigns and ‘in fact almost ignored it’; this was particularly the case 
with respect to the DS who ‘missed the main theme of the campaign’ by focusing on 
economic issues (Slavujevic, 1998: 98).
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Goati asserts that the inability o f the democratic opposition parties to provide an 
effective response to the national question was matched by its inability to present other 
issues, such as the need for democratic change, as being o f equal significance, again 
emphasising the inability o f the democratic opposition parties to provide a credible 
alternative to the Milosevic regime.123 (Goati, 2001a: 104). While the focus of the 
election was firmly on the national question, it seems clear that the opposition did not 
attempt to compete with the regime on this terrain, but chose to emphasise the need for 
democratic and economic reform. As such, it can be argued that while the opposition 
parties were attempting to maintain a zone of ideological autonomy through attempting to 
ensure the that the failure o f the regime’s domestic policies appeared on the electoral 
agenda, this probably proved detrimental.
Conclusions
D i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  a n d  t h e  M i l o s e v i c  r e g i m e
The issue that was of central concern to the IC in its dealings with Serbia during 
this time period was the conflict in Bosnia and Serbia’s actions in support o f the Bosnian 
Serbs. Serbia’s internal politics were not considered to be o f significant importance by
123 Goati also argues that support for the idea of unity of all Serbs existed not only within the political elite, 
but was one that was prevalent among the supporters of the SPS, the SRS and DEPOS. Citing a survey of 
these parties’ supporters carried out in October 1992, Goati notes that only 18.3% of SPS supporters, 
21.4% of SRS supporters, and 28.1% of DEPOS supporters believed that there should be unconditional 
recognition of the internal borders of the former-Yugoslav republics as international borders (Goati, 2001a: 
72). On the other hand, Dimitrijevic and Pejic cite research on the linked issue of what type of support 
Serbia should offer to those Serbs living outside Serbia which showed that 51% believed that they should 
be ‘politically supported and materially within the limits of [our] means’, while only 2.6% believed that 
they should be supported ‘in weapons and manpower’; this represented a significant decrease from 32.4% 
the previous November (Dimitrijevic and Pejic, 1992: 12).
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any international actors at this time, and the statements that were issued by those dealing 
with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia made no mention o f the need for democratic 
reform in Serbia. Rather, the focus o f all these statements was on the conflict in Bosnia 
and the humanitarian situation arising from that conflict. Where there were comments 
made on the situation inside Serbia these related to the rights o f ethnic minorities and not 
to breaches of the civil rights o f Serbia’s population in terms o f the undemocratic nature 
of the Milosevic regime and its clear attempts to perpetrate electoral fraud and 
manipulation.
In terms o f the differences between the democratic opposition parties and the 
Milosevic regime, the opposition parties considered in this study did not support the 
creation o f a greater Serbian state through the use o f force, and as such held positions that 
were different to those o f the Milosevic regime on the issues that were o f central concern 
to the IC. Outside o f the parties’ own pronouncements, evidence that they opposed the 
regime’s policies can be seen in their expressions o f support for Milan Panic and his 
government. The democratic opposition parties welcomed Panic’s appointment as 
Yugoslav prime minister, supported his participation in the London Conference, and also 
supported his decision to apply for UN membership. While it could be argued that the 
parties considered here did not publicly advocate some of the more controversial 
positions taken by Panic, it is also true that there was no outright condemnation o f his 
policies. In addition, Panic’s performance at the London Conference, where he publicly 
stated his commitment to actions such as recognition o f the other former-Yugoslav 
republics and the need to resolve the conflict in the former-Yugoslavia by peaceful 
means, was assessed positively by most o f the democratic opposition. Although this does
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not necessarily amount to a total endorsement o f Panic’s positions, it does imply a certain 
degree o f support for Panic’s approach, and perhaps a realisation that in order to 
reintegrate Serbia into the IC such steps would be necessary, if not wholly welcomed. As 
such, the democratic opposition parties did present a credible alternative partner for the
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  I C  a n d  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s
While some members o f the democratic opposition parties did have contact with 
IC representatives during the time period considered here, for example Micunovic’s visit 
to the US to discuss his proposals for a peace conference where he met with US and UN 
officials including Cyrus Vance, Lawrence Eagleburger and Boutros Boutros-Ghali,124 
there appears to have been little sustained or regular contact between the two during this 
time period and no formal links, although there was extensive contact between Panic and 
international representatives resulting from Panic’s status as federal prime minister. That 
Panic held positions that were different from those of the Milosevic regime does appear 
to have been acknowledged by IC representatives by the time of the December elections, 
and his candidacy for the Serbian presidency did receive some implicit support, though in 
general the IC did not endorse his candidacy or his call for the suspension o f sanctions 
and did not openly call for Milosevic’s removal. Rather, there seems to have been a 
reluctance among some elements o f the IC to alienate Milosevic by calling for his 
removal. This reflects an unwillingness to become involved in Serbia’s internal politics 
and a general lack o f confidence in Panic’s ability to implement the policies that he and
134 Tanjug, 15 July 1992 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/1436/C1/1, 18 July 1992.
his government formulated. With regard to the democratic opposition parties themselves, 
the IC did not clearly acknowledge the differences between their positions and those o f 
the Milosevic regime, and does not appear to have paid them any significant degree o f 
attention, except insofar as they were associated with Panic.
The campaigns mounted by the democratic opposition parties during this time 
period received little international support, either direct or implied. While there were 
acknowledgements on the part o f the IC that neither the May 1992 nor the December 
1992 elections could be considered to be free, fair and democratic, there had been no 
declarations of support for the opposition’s attempts to negotiate fair electoral conditions 
during the round table talks that were held at both republican and federal levels. Neither 
were there any significant IC comments on the need for democratic reforms in Serbia at 
this time that could be construed as implied support for the opposition’s demands. 
Furthermore, the demand for Milosevic’s resignation, made at the time of the Vidovdan 
Sabor, was not endorsed by any significant international actors. Thus, the minor 
concessions gained by the democratic opposition during this time period were secured 
solely through the parties’ own efforts. That the Milosevic regime was under significant 
pressure from the opposition parties during this time period is clear from that fact that 
Milosevic did make concessions to the demands of his opponents throughout the second 
half o f 1992.
While the democratic opposition did not receive international support for its 
attempts to ensure fair conditions for future elections, once these elections were 
announced, the IC did express a degree o f support for the democratic opposition and for 
Panic’s attempt to defeat Milosevic in the elections for the Serbian presidency. While this
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did not amount to an explicit endorsement of Panic’s candidacy, there is evidence o f 
implied support, in particular from David Owen and Cyrus Vance o f the ICFY. However, 
in spite o f this, Panic’s request for assistance in the form o f a suspension of UN sanctions 
in advance of the elections was refused, and sanctions were tightened at this time; a move 
which undermined Panic in his attempts to defeat Milosevic.
In terms of how the democratic opposition parties viewed the IC and its actions 
during this time period, while there was criticism of a number o f policies and decisions, 
there is no evidence o f any sustained anti-Westernism or anti-Western rhetoric on the part 
o f the parties considered in this research. Furthermore, while the opposition did object to 
the sanctions that were imposed against Serbia, most o f their criticism was directed at the 
Milosevic regime and it was the regime rather than the IC that was blamed for Serbia’s 
international isolation. Indeed, the opposition used the imposition of sanctions to bolster 
calls for Milosevic’s resignation, and Draskovic, at least initially, even appeared to 
welcome them. Where the democratic opposition parties were critical o f the sanctions 
this was because the sanctions were viewed as something that would cause harm and 
suffering to the Serbian population rather than the Milosevic regime, and also because 
other former Yugoslav republics, in particular Croatia, were not subjected to similar 
measures for their actions in the Bosnian conflict.
It needs to be noted that while Panic appealed to the IC for support for his 
campaign against Milosevic in December 1992, the democratic opposition parties 
themselves do not seem to have paid significant attention to securing international 
support. In addition, while there is some evidence that the democratic opposition parties 
were disappointed with the level o f international support for Panic’s campaign, this was
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not a significant theme in opposition discourse at this time. Panic himself was 
considerably more vocal on this issue than were the democratic opposition parties. 
Furthermore, there is little evidence that the democratic opposition parties blamed 
international factors for their failure to defeat Milosevic at this time.
T h e  i m p a c t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  o n  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  
p a r t i e s
As noted above, the inability of the democratic opposition parties to present a 
credible alternative to the Milosevic regime domestically, particularly with regard to the 
Serbian national question, has been identified as its most significant weakness in the 
December 1992 election campaign. As such, the democratic opposition parties failed to 
carry out one of the tasks necessary to effectively oppose the regime outlined in chapter 
one (resisting integration; maintaining a zone of ideological autonomy; questioning the 
legitimacy o f the regime and raising the costs o f authoritarian rule; and presenting a 
credible alternative domestically and internationally). While the opposition parties 
emphasised the need for political and economic reform in their election campaigns, 
Milosevic’s ability to control the agenda ensured that the national question dominated, 
and the IC and its policies facilitated Milosevic’s exploitation of this issue giving him a 
distinct advantage over his opponents through narrowing the political space in which the 
opposition could operate. Furthermore, specific IC actions in the period before the 
December elections made the task of the democratic opposition more difficult. In 
particular, the decision to tighten UN sanctions at a time when Panic was asking for them
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to be suspended worked to the advantage of the Milosevic regime, while the decision to 
exclude the SRJ from UN membership and Panic’s announcement that the SRJ should 
apply for membership, were exploited by Panic’s opponents and used to discredit and 
undermine him. These events suggest that international policy does seem to have 
undermined the opposition’s ability to present a credible alternative to the Milosevic 
regime, and also to maintain a zone o f ideological autonomy. As such, international 
policy undermined the ability of the opposition to two of tasks necessary to effectively 
oppose the regime. It is worth noting that this occurred at time when the democratic 
opposition parties could be considered to have represented a credible alternative to the 
Milosevic regime at the international level, though there is no evidence that the 
democratic opposition parties were attempting to secure international support at this time. 
However, the regime’s efforts to ensure that the national question remained the dominant 
issue in Serbian politics at this time resulted in a significant degree o f nationalist 
sentiment among the Serbian population, and support for policies that attempted to forge 
a common Serb state out of the Serb populated areas of the former Yugoslavia. In such an 
atmosphere, presenting a credible alternative at the international level was probably 
incompatible with presenting a credible alternative at the domestic level.
In terms o f carrying out the other tasks of a democratic opposition, all the parties 
considered here successfully resisted integration, with none offering either tacit or 
explicit support to the regime. The opposition parties also performed reasonably well in 
terms o f the linked tasks o f disputing the legitimacy o f the regime and raising the costs o f 
authoritarian rule. The opposition’s initial reaction to the imposition o f UN sanctions was 
to blame Milosevic and his associates for Serbia’s predicament thereby highlighting the
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costs of his rule. In addition, the opposition parties clearly disputed the legitimacy o f the 
regime when it boycotted the May 1992 elections, and also through the holding o f public 
demonstrations in May and June 1992 and the calls for fair electoral conditions. Evidence 
of the opposition’s success in pressuring the regime through these activities is the 
concessions that they gained, which while significant were insufficient to ensure that the 
December elections would be free and fair.
While the democratic opposition parties enjoyed some success in their efforts to 
dispute the regime’s legitimacy, this does not appear to have been acknowledged by the 
IC. In spite o f the fact that Milosevic was already under a certain amount o f pressure 
internally, the lack o f IC support for the opposition’s demands regarding fair electoral 
conditions enabled Milosevic to make only limited concessions to the democratic 
opposition parties, certain that there would be no international outcry regarding electoral 
theft or manipulation. In spite o f widespread acknowledgement that the elections were 
unfair, and the analysis o f some commentators suggesting that only through manipulation 
was Milosevic able to retain power, there was no international condemnation. Taken 
together these factors suggest that the IC, through failing to support the democratic 
opposition parties in their efforts to ensure fair electoral conditions, did to some extent 
undermine the efforts o f the democratic opposition to dispute the legitimacy o f the 
regime and raise the costs of authoritarian rule. This general lack of international support 
for Serbia’s democratic opposition indicates that at this time regime change in Serbia was 
not being considered by the IC. However, as Stepan notes, efforts to dispute the 
legitimacy of an authoritarian regime must also be directed at the IC (Stepan, 2001: 163), 
but there is little evidence that the democratic opposition parties actively sought
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international support for their campaigns in 1992 and there is little evidence that the 
democratic opposition parties sought international support to pressurise Milosevic to 
reform the electoral laws that disadvantaged the democratic opposition parties in the 
December 1992 elections.
While it is impossible to know for sure whether more sustained international 
support for the opposition might have led to a different outcome in the December 1992 
elections, what can be said for certain is that the IC had no strategy for supporting the 
democratic opposition as an alternative government at this time. The December 1992 
elections represented one of the most significant challenges to the regime throughout the 
entire time period covered in this research. Although the opposition was divided to a 
certain extent, with the DS remaining outside the DEPOS coalition in addition to tension 
between those parties within DEPOS, the democratic opposition parties were, 
nevertheless, united in their support for Panic’s direct challenge to Milosevic in the 
Serbian presidential election. This level of unity in support of a challenge to the 
Milosevic regime would not be repeated again, even in the September 2000 elections in 
which the SPO remained outside the DOS coalition and failed to support Kostunica’s 
candidacy for the Yugoslav presidency.
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C h a p t e r  4 :  B o s n i a
This case study begins in the spring o f 1993 and continues until UN sanctions 
were indefinitely suspended following the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in 
November 1995. Although the sanctions were not terminated until after the first post-war 
elections were held in Bosnia in 1996, the indefinite suspension o f sanctions that 
occurred in 1995 effectively brought to an end the period o f international isolation to 
which Serbia had been subjected during the years o f the Bosnian war. While Serbia 
began this time period subject to a high degree o f international isolation, this began to 
change in 1994 when Milosevic decided to co-operate with international efforts to bring 
the war in Bosnia to an end. International efforts to resolve the conflict led to the 
formulation o f a series of peace plans, the most significant of which were the Vance- 
Owen peace plan (VOPP), the Contact Group peace plan and the Dayton agreement. 
These proved to be highly controversial within Serbia and led to significant divisions 
between the democratic opposition parties, in addition to causing a rift between the SPS 
and the SRS which led Milosevic to dissolve the Serbian parliament and call elections in 
December 1993. In addition to the various peace plans that were proposed by the IC, its 
efforts to deal with the Bosnian conflict also involved the use o f NATO air strikes against 
the Bosnian Serbs in September 1995, and this also caused controversy within Serbia.
With the war in Bosnia and the international response to it dominating the 
political agenda in Serbia throughout this time period, the democratic opposition parties 
made only two major challenges to the Milosevic regime. These were a campaign to 
secure the release from custody o f Vuk Draskovic who was arrested and detained in June
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1993, and elections for the Serbian parliament in December 1993. The campaign to 
secure Draskovic’s release marks the first time between 1992 and 2000 that the IC openly 
and explicitly supported the democratic opposition in a campaign against the Milosevic 
regime. Furthermore, international engagement was a key factor in the success o f that 
campaign. As such, this case study provides the opportunity to examine the relationship 
between the IC and democratic opposition parties at a time when, albeit in relation to 
only one issue, they were pursuing the same goals and to examine whether this had any 
impact on relations between the opposition parties and the IC. The first half o f this 
chapter will look at the issues that were o f central concern to the IC in this time period, 
and the attitudes and positions o f the democratic opposition parties to these issues. The 
second half of the chapter will examine the two major opposition challenges to the 
Milosevic regime.
Key issues for the International Community
With the fighting in Bosnia continuing throughout most o f the time period 
covered by this case study, the IC’s attention remained focused on resolving this conflict 
and it continued to exert pressure on Serbia in an effort to secure Milosevic’s assistance 
in bringing the conflict to an end. These efforts to pressurise the regime involved the 
tightening o f UN sanctions against the SRJ following the Bosnian Serbs rejection of the 
VOPP in April 1993, marking the high point o f Serbia’s international isolation during the 
1990s. Following Milosevic’s decision to co-operate with the IC and to exert his own 
pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, the IC gradually reduced Serbia’s international isolation,
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suspending and eventually terminating UN sanctions. For a brief period in 1993, while 
Draskovic was in detention, the IC was also concerned with the internal political order in 
Serbia and the undemocratic nature o f the Milosevic regime, with the issue of 
Draskovic’s detention featuring prominently in IC statements. Once this situation had 
been resolved however, international concern for Serbia’s internal politics receded and 
the Bosnian conflict again became the central focus o f IC attention.
Given the continuation of the fighting in Bosnia, and the international 
preoccupation with this conflict in its dealings with Serbia, the international actors that 
were most influential in dealing with Serbia between 1992 and 1995 are largely the same 
as those who had been dealing with the conflict in the previous case study, namely the 
UN, the US, the EC and its member states. While the CSCE played a less significant role 
than it had in the early stages of the Yugoslav conflict, this period saw the formation of a 
new group, known as the Contact Group, which would become a key actor dealing with 
Serbia.1 In addition, NATO also took on a more significant role in dealing with the 
Yugoslav crisis, most notably through its military campaign against the Bosnian Serbs in 
1995.
In order to determine the extent to which the democratic opposition parties held 
positions that differed from those o f the Milosevic regime on the issues that were most 
important for the IC at this time, this section will consider their positions on the VOPP, 
the Contact Group peace plan, and the Dayton agreement.
1 The Contact Group was an ad hoc group formed specifically to deal with the crisis in Yugoslavia. Its 
members are the US, the UK, France, Germany, Russia and Italy.
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The Vance-Owen Peace Plan
In the spring o f 1993, international efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia led to 
the formulation of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), which had profound 
consequences for the internal political situation within Serbia, both for the Milosevic 
regime and for the democratic opposition. The VOPP was formulated within the 
framework o f the ICFY, and was presented by the IC in January 1993. The plan would 
recognise Bosnia within its existing borders, but envisioned the division of the country 
into ten provinces, each of which would be granted substantial autonomy and would be 
defined primarily on ethnic grounds. Bosnia would have a central government, although 
this government would have limited powers (Silber & Little, 1996: 276).
Although he had initially expressed reservations about the plan, by the end of 
April Milosevic had been persuaded to accept it (Silber & Little, 1996: 277-278). Owen 
argues that the prospect o f further sanctions had a critical influence on Milosevic’s 
decision to accept the VOPP, and to pressurise the Bosnian Serb leadership to do 
likewise. He identifies this as a major turning point in terms o f Milosevic’s attitudes to 
the Bosnian conflict and argues that from the end of April 1993 Milosevic abandoned the 
greater Serbia project, prioritising instead the interests o f the SRJ (Owen, 1996: 153).2 
However, according to UN Security Council Resolution 820, which had been passed on 
17 April 1993, sanctions against Yugoslavia and Serb-held territories in Croatia and 
Bosnia were to be strengthened in the event that the Bosnian Serbs did not accept the 
VOPP. As such, the Republika Srpska (RS) assembly’s decision to reject the plan on 27
2 Thomas also considers that the desire to avoid further sanctions was a factor in MiloSevid’s decision to 
accept the VOPP, but also notes Milosevic’s belief that elements of the plan would be unenforceable as 
being significant (Thomas, 1999: 147).
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April triggered the tightening of UN sanctions and this marked the high point o f Serbia’s 
international isolation in the first half o f the 1990s.
In spite o f the Pale assembly’s decision to reject the VOPP, Milosevic and the IC 
continued to exert pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership and, at a meeting in Athens in 
early May under considerable pressure, the RS political leader Radovan Karadzic signed 
the VOPP. His acceptance was, however, conditional on its being approved by the RS 
assembly, which again refused to endorse the plan. In an effort to exert pressure on the 
Bosnian Serbs, Milosevic imposed a temporary blockade on the River Drina which 
separated RS from Serbia, allowing only food and medicine to cross the frontier, and also 
prevented senior Bosnian Serb leaders from entering Serbia. The embargo, however, was 
abandoned within days o f being announced (Silber & Little, 1996: 335).
While the initial reaction o f all the democratic opposition parties considered here 
to the VOPP when it was first announced in early 1993 was generally favourable in spite 
of some reservations,3 this changed when the Bosnian Serbs voted to reject the plan, 
marking the beginning o f a period in which the democratic opposition parties would 
become bitterly divided, with the national question a key point o f contention. While the 
SPO, the GSS and the DS were all critical o f the Bosnian Serbs’ decision not to sign the 
VOPP, the DSS supported the RS leadership.
3 DraSkovic argued that the plan should have been signed and stated that it had become clear ‘that the doors 
were wide open for developing and modifying the Vance-Owen plan after the establishment of peace’ [in 
Bosnia] (Tanjug, 26 April 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1674/C1, 28 April 1993). He 
also expressed a preference for Bosnia to be divided into six as opposed to 10 provinces which could be 
subdivided into smaller cantons (United Press International, 5 February 1993). While the DS supported the 
plan, Micunovic urged Bosnian Serb negotiators not to give up the land corridor linking Bosnian Serb 
territory with both Serbia and Krajina (Andrejevich, 1994: 14), an issue that was also important to 
DraSkovid (Tanjug, 8 January 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1583/C1, 11 January 
1993). At this stage even the DSS spoke in favour of the plan, stating that it had made it possible to hope 
that ‘peace will finally be restored, which will enable the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate their rightful position 
under international law’ (Tanjug 15 January 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1587/C1, 15 
January 1993).
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Draskovic described the decision o f the Bosnian Serb assembly to reject the plan 
as ‘irresponsible from the human point o f view’ and ‘more than catastrophic for Serbia, 
Montenegro and the entire Serbian people.’4 He blamed Milosevic for the Bosnian Serbs’ 
refusal to endorse the plan, and used the opportunity to call for both Milosevic’s and 
Cosic’s resignations.5 The GSS was also critical o f the Bosnian Serbs’ rejection o f the 
plan with Ratomir Tanic, a senior party member, accusing the Bosnian Serb leadership o f 
showing ‘massive irresponsibility when the decision in question was one on which life 
and death depended.’6
Further evidence o f opposition support for the VOPP was the willingness of some 
opposition leaders to countenance the enforcement of the VOPP. Micunovic called on the 
UN to ignore the decision o f the Bosnian Serb assembly and to deploy peacekeepers 
(Thomas, 1999: 153), while Draskovic questioned the legitimacy o f the Pale Assembly’s 
decision not to endorse plan. Draskovic argued that there had been no elections in 
Republika Srpska since it had been proclaimed, and that those representatives who sat in 
the assembly had been elected in 1990 to a parliament in a state that had disintegrated. 
For this reason, he argued, ‘From the legal point o f view, Radovan Karadzic’s Athens 
signature is still valid,’7 and he urged the IC not to recognise the legitimacy o f the
oBosnian Serb Assembly.
Kostunica, however, stressing the importance o f settling the question o f a land 
corridor, claimed that the Vance-Owen map did not constitute a guarantee for Serbs
4 DraSkovic also argued that the plan should have been signed and stated that it had become clear ‘that the 
doors were wide open for developing and modifying the Vance-Owen plan after the establishment of 
peace’ [in Bosnia].
5 Tanjug, 6 May 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1683/C1/1, 8 May 1993.
6 Tanic quoted in Thomas, 1999, p. 153.
7 Tanjug, 6 May 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1683/C 1/1, 8 May 1993.
8 Croatian Radio, 6 May 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1683/C1/1, 8 May 1993.
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living in Bosnia and should therefore be rejected.9 As Thomas notes, the DSS decision to 
reject the VOPP ‘marked a major turning point in its attitude to national issues from a 
position where the interests of the Serbs o f Serbia [Srbijanci] were of primary importance 
to one where solidarity with the communities o f Serbs outside Serbia became a key 
theme’ (Thomas, 1999: 151). Kostunica’s support for the creation of a greater Serbia is 
clear. Speaking in late 1993 he stated that Serbia was in the process of creating ‘our 
national state’ which would:
be created gradually, it will probably be created from the outlines of those 
countries that today comprise Serbia, Yugoslavia, the so-called Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, and from other ethnic areas 
of ours: the Serbian Republic [in Bosnia-Hercegovnia] and the Republic of 
Serbian Krajina. This process will be lengthy ... but for us there is simply no 
way out, no solution, no stability if we do not create a Serbian state.’10
Differences with respect to the VOPP led to turmoil, both within and between 
some of the democratic opposition parties. The decision to support the VOPP caused a 
major rift within the SPO, characterised by Goati as a struggle between those who 
supported a ‘civic’ orientation and those who supported a ‘national’ orientation for the 
party (Goati, 2001a: 115). Draskovic, however, maintained control of the party and the 
Main Committee of the SPO voted to support the VOPP.11 In addition, the different
9 Tanjug, 22 April 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1671/Cl, 24 April 1993.
10 Montenegrin TV, 28 November 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1859/C, 30 November 
1993.
11 Yugoslav Telegraph Service, 30 April 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/1679/Cl, 4 May 
1993.
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positions o f the SPO and the DSS regarding the plan strained already tense relations 
within the DEPOS coalition.12
In late May 1993, however, the IC abandoned the VOPP. The primary factor 
undermining it was a lack of US support. Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the 
UN had described the plan as ‘rewarding aggression and punishing the victims’ and 
refused to support a UN Security Council draft resolution which endorsed the plan. 
Further US reservations about the VOPP related a to belief on the part o f some, including 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, that the plan could not be implemented (Honig 
and Both, 1996: 111). On 22 May, Christopher, backed by the UK, France, Russia and 
Spain, announced a new initiative for resolving the conflict known as the Joint Action 
Program (JAP). Through the JAP, the IC hoped to contain the Bosnian conflict, and the 
program advocated the continuing enforcement o f sanctions and the no-fly zone, in 
addition to the creation of several ‘safe areas’ within Bosnia.13 As Silber & Little point 
out, the JAP represented ‘the final nail in the coffin o f Vance-Owen, formulating the 
embryo for the next stage o f peace talks: a three-way partition whose terms were dictated 
by the Serbs and Croats’ (Silber & Little, 1996: 289). The IC’s acceptance o f an 
ethnically based partition o f Bosnia provided a considerable boost to Milosevic as it 
amounted to a de facto recognition of the existence o f a Bosnian Serb entity within 
Bosnia, enabling Milosevic to claim that Serb national interests in Bosnia had been 
effectively protected. As will be seen, this seriously undermined the democratic 
opposition parties in the December 1993 election.
12Further sources of tension within DEPOS in 1993 included the SPO’s decision to abandon a 
parliamentary boycott that had begun in January 1993. In addition, the coalition was also weakened when 
six members of the non-party group within DEPOS resigned at the end of April 1993 (Antonie, 2002: 152 -  
author’s translation).
13 Department of State Dispatch, US Department of State, 24 May 1993.
The abandonment o f the VOPP and the adoption o f the JAP were welcomed by 
the Bosnian Serb leadership and also by SeSelj and the SRS in Serbia, but criticised by 
the GSS and the SPO. Pesic was highly critical stating that the JAP ‘strengthens the 
nationalists and the extremists. Giving in to those who divided up territory will encourage 
the Albanians. I’m afraid it’s a signal for the next flashpoint, Kosovo.’14 Pesic later stated 
that she was surprised that ‘the world accepted Milosevic’s and Tudjman’s proposals on 
the division o f Bosnia.’15 Both the SPO and the GSS also expressed concern about the 
impact that the abandonment o f the VOPP would have on the possibility of democratic 
reform within Serbia and this notion that IC policy was undermining the development of 
democracy in Serbia was to become a key feature o f opposition rhetoric throughout most 
of the time period covered in this research. According to Pesic:
Now the US, Britain and Russia have decided to cut up Bosnia, the 
opposition in Serbia has no chance and everything we said in favour of 
human rights and against ‘ethnic cleansing’ looks ridiculous. ... The West has 
recognised the use of force to change borders, betraying their own values.
Lord Owen is the real war criminal in all this. After he endorsed genocide in 
Bosnia against Muslims you may as well forget democracy inside Serbia.16
Similarly, Mihailo Markovic o f the SPO stated that:
Europe and the US have given Milosevic the green light in Bosnia, and that 
will have an impact a big impact on us inside Serbia. ... Lord Owen has 
pronounced him a big peace-maker and a factor o f stability in the Balkans. He 
naively thinks Milosevic will calm down the war for him. He never
14 Financial Times (London), 26 May 1993.
15 ‘We Are No Moral Lighthouse,’ Vesna PeSic interviewed by Vesna Bjekic, AIM, 19 January 1994.
16 The Independent (London), 24 June 1993.
163
understood the man who set Yugoslavia on fire will never put the fires out, 
that the lifeblood of the Serbian government is w ar.17
In summary, the VOPP, while initially given a cautious welcome by all of the democratic 
opposition parties, led to a rift within the SPO, and between the DSS and the SPO within 
the DEPOS coalition. However, with the exception o f the DSS, the democratic opposition 
parties were prepared to accept the plan and criticised the Bosnian Serb leadership for 
rejecting it, in essence the same position as that o f the IC. However, the position o f the 
Milosevic regime at this time, at least publicly, was also one of support for the plan. The 
GSS argued that the abandonment o f the VOPP and the acceptance o f the ethnically 
based division o f Bosnia represented a victory for nationalist forces in Serbia, and 
undermined the position of those parties who had opposed the war from the outset. The 
SPO was also critical o f the decision to abandon the VOPP, and criticised the IC for 
considering that Milosevic could be a peacemaker and factor for stability in the former 
Yugoslavia.
T h e  C o n t a c t  G r o u p  P e a c e  P l a n
The next international peace plan for Bosnia that was to have a significant impact 
on the internal political situation in Serbia was the Contact Group Peace Plan. This plan 
preserved Bosnia within its internationally recognised borders, but divided the country 
into two parts, with fifty-one per cent o f the territory going to the Bosnian Serbs and the 
remaining forty-nine per cent to the newly-established Croat-Muslim federation (Silber & 
Little, 1996: 337). Milosevic, still keen to get the sanctions lifted, supported the Contact
17 The Independent (London), 24 June 1993
Group plan and urged the Bosnian Serbs to do the same. The Bosnian Serbs, however, 
were less impressed with the plan, and the RS assembly voted to accept it only as the 
basis for renewed negotiations. The Contact Group had, however, presented its plan on a 
‘take it or leave it’ basis, and as such the Bosnian Serbs conditional acceptance was seen 
as an outright rejection (Thomas, 1999: 201-202).
On 2 August 1994, the day before the Bosnian Serb assembly was due to discuss 
the Contact Group plan, the Serbian government sent a letter to the RS leadership urging 
it to accept the plan. The strongly worded letter amounted to an attack on the Bosnian 
Serb leaders and warned them that, should they reject the plan, this would ‘destroy any 
possibility o f our further relations.’18 In spite o f these warnings, on 3 August the Bosnian 
Serb assembly again failed to give its unqualified support to the plan. Milosevic’s 
response was considerably more resolute than had been the case with regard to the 
rejection o f the VOPP. On 4 August the Belgrade authorities ordered that political and 
economic relations between Yugoslavia and RS be broken off, that members o f the RS 
leadership be refused entry to the SRJ, and that the RS-SRJ border be closed to all goods 
with the exception o f food, medicine and clothing (Owen, 1996: 320).
As had been the case with the VOPP, attitudes to the Contact Group peace plan 
and the blockade imposed on the Bosnian Serbs became the key political division on the 
Serbian political scene at this time. Both the SPO and the GSS supported the Contact 
Group plan and condemned the Bosnian Serb leadership for rejecting it. The DS
18 Tanjug, 2 August 1994 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/2065/C, 4 August 1994. The letter 
went on to state that by delaying acceptance of the plan, and the lifting of sanctions, that the Bosnian Serbs 
were ‘inflicting huge damage to the whole of the nation and to all the citizens of the [SRJ]’, asserting that if 
the plan were rejected that this would represent ‘the greatest ever treason of Serbian national interests’, and 
warning the RS leadership not to ‘hide behind a referendum’ because they had ‘no right to decide on the 
fate of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in a referendum.’
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however, engaging in increasingly nationalist rhetoric, joined the DSS in firmly opposing 
both the terms of the plan and the Milosevic regime’s sanctions against the Bosnian 
Serbs. The DS proposed that the Contact Group plan should not be accepted unless a 
confederation could be established between Serbia and RS, along the lines o f a similar 
arrangement that had already been established between Croatia and the Muslim-Croat 
federation. Djindjic argued that without this there would be ‘no guarantee that the 
(Bosnian) Serbs will reach their objective, that o f not separating from Yugoslavia.’19 By 
late 1993 it had become clear that Djindjic was beginning to promote a more nationalist 
position and was more unequivocal in his support for the creation o f a greater Serbia than 
had been the case in 1992.20 However, Djindjic continued to maintain that the use of 
force to achieve these goals was inappropriate. Commenting on his decision to go to Pale 
for talks with Karadzic, Djindjic commented that ‘national interests can be successfully 
protected with the policy o f peace’ and revealed that he and Karadzic had agreed that ‘the 
Serb Republic in Bosnia should join Serbia,’ but that ‘everything should be done in 
agreement with the international community, which I believe would have no objections 
on condition there is peace.’
The reaction of the DSS to the Contact Group’s proposals was also negative, and 
Kostunica criticised both the quality o f the lands offered to the Bosnian Serbs, and the 
links between them. Kostunica also condemned the plan because he believed that it did 
not allow for the linking of Republika Srpska with the SRJ, even at a confederal level. He
19 Agence France Presse, 25 August 1994.
20 Serbian TV, 30 October 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1834/C, 1 November 1993. 
Djindjic expressed similar statements in late November when he made reference to that fact that ‘a 100- 
year-old national programme is being fulfilled (Serbian Radio, 25 November 1993, in BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, EE/1857/C, 27 November 1993).
21 ‘Eight Hours With Karadzic,’ Djindjic interviewed by Uro§ Komlenovic, Vreme NDA No. 127, 28 
February 1994.
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argued that there should be a referendum on the plan involving the entire Serb people, 
because ‘acceptance or rejection o f the plan will affect both the Bosnian Serbs and the 
citizens o f Serbia and Montenegro.’22
While the DS and the DSS were becoming increasingly nationalist, the SPO 
maintained its moderate position and argued that the Contact Group plan should be 
signed. In addition, the party issued a statement in support of Milosevic’s acceptance of 
the plan and ‘in all his efforts for peace.’ The statement went on to say that ‘Peace is the 
primary and most important national interest o f the Serbian nation today - as the SPO has 
been stressing since the beginning of the war - and the struggle for peace and for lifting 
the sanctions therefore comes before all party and political disagreements.’23 However, 
Draskovic was not entirely averse to nationalist rhetoric and argued that acceptance o f the 
Contact Group plan, in addition to democratic reforms in Serbia, would act to unite the 
Serb populations o f the former Yugoslavia, claiming that ‘Peace will destroy the 
unnatural marriage between Croats and Muslims, and democratically transformed Serbia 
and Montenegro will draw unto themselves all of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Serbian 
Krajina as well.’24
While Milosevic was coming under some internal pressure in relation to his 
acceptance o f the plan, the IC reacted with cautious optimism to Milosevic’s decision to 
break ties with the Bosnian Serbs. However, before offering any sanctions relief, the IC
22 Tanjug, 13 July 1994 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/2048/C, 15 July 1994.
23 Tanjug, 31 July 1994 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/2063/C, 2 August 1994. Milan 
Komnenic, also of the SPO stated in October that the Contact Group plan should be accepted by the 
Bosnian Serbs, because their refusal to sign it ‘provided Muslim killers, although inadvertently, with a 
cover for crimes like the one on Mt Igman by saying the Serbs favored war’ (Tanjug, 11 October 1994 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/2125/C, 13 October 1994).
24 Tanjug, 25 August 1994 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/2086/C, 29 August 1994.
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insisted that the blockade had to be assessed by international monitors.25 While Milosevic 
was initially reluctant to accept this,26 under pressure he relented. When the monitors 
reported that the blockade was being enforced, the Security Council passed Resolution 
943 on 23 September 1994 suspending certain sanctions for a period of one hundred 
days. Resolution 943 allowed for the resumption of civilian passenger flights to and from 
Belgrade and civilian passenger ferry services between Bar and Bari in Italy, together 
with the resumption o f cultural and sports exchanges, and this marked the beginning o f 
the end o f Serbia’s first period o f enforced international isolation. On the same day the 
Security Council also passed Resolution 942, which imposed stringent sanctions against 
the Bosnian Serbs for their failure to accept the Contact Group peace plan. While the 
democratic opposition parties welcomed the lifting o f some sanctions they were critical 
of the fact that not all sanctions had been lifted.27 Furthermore, both the DS and DSS 
were critical of the decision to impose sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs.
The democratic opposition parties’ reactions to the Contact Group peace plan 
revealed the increasing divisions within the Serbian opposition. While the SPO and the 
GSS remained supportive o f ongoing efforts to resolve the Bosnian conflict, the DS and 
the DSS were taking ever more hard line nationalist positions as Milosevic increasingly 
adopted the role o f peacemaker. While the SPO and the GSS essentially maintained 
positions that were close to those o f the IC, Milosevic’s willingness to co-operate with 
international efforts to resolve the conflict, together with the increasingly nationalist tone
25 The Associated Press, 10 September 1994.
26 The Associated Press, 30 August 1994. Aside from the fact that this would have increased criticisms of 
him on the part of the opposition, Milosevic was apparently also concerned at how this would play within 
his own party, the SPS (The Christian Science Monitor, 2 September 1994).
27 Tanjug, 24 September 1994 and Tanjug, 25 September 1994 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
EE/2111/C, 27 September 1994.
28 Tanjug, 24 September 1994 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/2111/C, 27 September 1994.
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of the DS and the DSS, meant that, by 1994, there was no incentive for the IC to consider 
the democratic opposition parties as a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime.
T h e  D a y t o n  A g r e e m e n t
The Bosnian war formally ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
in late 1995, which Milosevic signed on behalf o f the Bosnian Serbs as head o f a joint 
Serb delegation that had negotiated its terms. Milosevic was swiftly rewarded for his 
efforts to force the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the terms of the peace agreement and 
on 22 November, the day after the initialling o f the peace agreement in Dayton, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 1022 which indefinitely suspended the sanctions 
against the SRJ, thereby bringing to an end the period o f international isolation 
experienced by Serbia during the years o f the Bosnian war. The sanctions were 
subsequently permanently removed in 1996 following the first postwar elections in 
Bosnia.
The reaction o f the democratic opposition parties to the Dayton agreement was 
mixed. While all o f the parties considered in this study welcomed the ending o f the war 
in Bosnia, the DS and DSS were more critical of the provisions o f the Dayton Accords 
than were the SPO and GSS. Both the SPO and the GSS were reluctant to criticise 
Milosevic for accepting the terms o f the Dayton agreement, with Draskovic stating that 
he did not want to ‘join those accusing President Milosevic of selling out the Serbs on the 
other side o f the River Drina in Dayton and humiliating them here. ... Milosevic simply 
accepted what had to be accepted,’29 while Zarko Korac o f the GSS asserted that: ‘it’s
29 Tanjug, 5 December 1995 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D2480/A, 6 December 1995.
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unreasonable for us to oppose Milosevic now just to oppose him, because he’s doing the 
right thing.’30
While the DS also welcomed the end o f the conflict in Bosnia, Djindjic stated that 
‘There is no particular reason for euphoria or triumphalism because a difficult period o f 
renewal in the lands o f the former Bosnia-Hercegovina lies ahead o f us, as well as the 
task o f building democratic institutions in Serbia and Yugoslavia.’31 The DSS also 
welcomed the end o f the war in Bosnia. Vladan Batic, speaking after the agreement was 
reached in Dayton, stated that it was ‘high time peace is made in the area o f former 
Yugoslavia. ... I hope the peace accord is not at the expense o f the Serbian people. I 
consider that after four years o f a senseless war, everybody lost something, there is no 
winner in this war, and therefore I hail peace.’32 Kostunica accepted the Dayton 
agreement, claiming that ‘in these conditions this was the only solution’33 but he was not 
entirely satisfied with it, describing it as a ‘peace with little justice.’34 In November 
Kostunica stated that Dayton contained less for the Serbs than for other groups in Bosnia, 
and claimed that the strengthening and deepening o f ties between Serbia and the SRJ 
must now be o f ‘paramount importance.’35 KoStunica was also critical o f the IC which he 
accused o f bias in terms o f its approach to the conflict in Bosnia, as a result o f its failure 
to deal with the large presence o f Croatian forces that had been active in the conflict.36 
Cigar summarises some of Kostunica’s objections:
30 The Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 October 1995.
31 Djindjic quoted in Thomas, 1999, p. 250.
32 United Press International, 21 November 1995.
33 Serbian Radio, 14 December 1995, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/D2488/A, 15 December 
1995.
34 KoStunica quoted in Thomas, 1999, p. 250.
35 Tanjug, 22 November 1995 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D2469/A, 23 November 1995.
36 Tanjug, 11 October 1995 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D2433/A, 13 October 1995.
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When Milosevic signed the Dayton Accords, Kostunica was predictably 
critical, labelling that ‘a great political failure of the ruling regime’, in 
particular because he saw the ‘independence o f Republika Srpska as 
restricted’ and condemned Milosevic personally for having ‘in practice 
slammed the door to any significant tie between [the SRJ] and the Republika 
Srpska’. Specifically, he castigated Milosevic for not doing anything ‘to 
enable the Bosnian Serbs to concretize at least part of the right to establish 
links with the mother country [i.e. Serbia] (Cigar, 2001: 43).
With the ending of the Bosnian war and the diminishing importance o f this as an 
issue within Serbia, the opposition again began to turn its attention to the political 
situation inside Serbia and the undemocratic nature o f the Milosevic regime. Some 
opposition leaders at this time began to talk o f the possibility that the IC might force 
some concessions from Milosevic in terms of democratic reform within Serbia. Speaking 
in advance o f the Security Council’s decision to indefinitely suspend sanctions against 
Serbia, Zarko Korac of the GSS argued that the West should demand some democratic 
changes in Serbia in exchange for lifting the sanctions.37 Similarly, Draskovic, while 
welcoming the Dayton agreement, expressed concern that it may strengthen Milosevic,38 
and warned that:
If the United States and Europe insist that Serbia must change from within, 
[Milosevic’s] hopes o f a communist revival will die. He will buy time to keep 
in power. Maybe he will become a champion o f capitalism. Maybe he will 
attack communism. ... But if they give in, the Balkans will have its own 
North Korea.39
37 The Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 October 1995.
38 The New York Times, 22 November 1995.
39 The Associated Press, 28 October 1995.
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Djindjic questioned Milosevic’s motivation for attempting to bring the war in Bosnia to 
an end, arguing that this was done merely to stay in power, but also noting that ‘The 
sanctions, the loss o f stature Yugoslavia has suffered worldwide and the unpopularity of 
the war are elements that are leading to political instability and weakening Milosevic’s 
grip-’40
In summary, while at end o f 1992 the democratic opposition parties were highly 
critical of the Milosevic regime for instigating conflict in the former Yugoslavia and 
bringing about a situation in which Serbia was subjected to stringent international 
sanctions, this consensus began to break down during 1993 and 1994. A clear division 
emerged between the SPO and the GSS who remained committed to international efforts 
to bring the Bosnian conflict to an end, and the DS and the DSS who adopted 
considerably more nationalist positions with respect to this conflict, siding with the 
Bosnian Serb leadership against both the Milosevic regime and the IC, and opposing 
international peace plans designed to bring the fighting to an end. As such, while the GSS 
and the SPO maintained positions that were close to those o f the IC, the DS and the DSS 
adopted positions that were incompatible with the IC’s goals. This, and the fact that 
Milosevic was co-operating with international efforts to bring the conflict to an end -  and 
as such held a position that was close to that o f the IC -  meant that there was neither 
motive nor incentive for the IC to consider the democratic opposition as a credible 
alternative to the Milosevic regime at this time.
40 The New York Times, 21 September 1995.
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Challenges to the Milosevic Regime
T h e  a r r e s t  o f  V u k  D r a s k o v i c
In June 1993, the Milosevic regime came under both internal and international 
pressure following the arrest and detention of Vuk Draskovic. Draskovic’s arrest came 
about following demonstrations outside the federal parliament building which resulted in 
the death o f a police officer.41 That night police arrested 121 people, including Draskovic 
and his wife - who were both severely beaten - and raided the main offices of the SPO. 
Draskovic and his wife were accused of several offences including preventing officials 
from carrying out security duties, attacking the constitutional order, and treason, for 
which they could receive a ten year prison sentence.42 It was also announced that 
Draskovic and his wife would remain in custody for thirty days while the allegations 
against them were investigated. The Milosevic regime portrayed the events leading up to 
Draskovic’s arrest as an attempt on the part o f the opposition to seize power by force and 
there were calls to ban the SPO on the grounds that it had, on previous occasions, called 
for the overthrow of the state (Thomas, 1999: 157-158).
Draskovic’s plight attracted both internal and international sympathy, with 
opposition parties in Serbia mobilising in support o f the SPO leader, and calls by
41 The demonstrations took place following an incident when an SRS deputy knocked a prominent SPO 
representative unconscious in the federal parliament after the removal of Cosic as Federal President.
42 IPS-Inter Press Service, 8 June 1993.
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numerous states and international institutions to have him released.43 While these 
international calls for Draskovic’s release did not contain explicit threats against 
Milosevic, some did link the issue to the prospect o f continued international isolation for 
Serbia if the opposition leader was not released. This was implied in a letter to Milosevic 
from French President Mitterand who stated that ‘Only if the Serbian authorities 
demonstrate a readiness to respect human rights and to guarantee the affirmation o f basic 
social values, including the right of the individual to freely express his opinion, can 
Serbia hope to return to the community of European nations.’44 Similarly, an EC 
statement issued on 29 June asserted that ‘The detention, ill treatment and lack of 
information on the health o f Mr. and Mrs. Draskovic constitute flagrant violations of their 
human rights’ and that this represented ‘a further illustration of the irresponsible policy o f 
the Serbian leadership that will contribute to isolate Serbia-Montenegro from the 
international community, carrying serious consequences for the Serbia-Montenegrin 
population.’45
Internally, many democratic opposition parties and NGOs in Serbia also appealed 
for Draskovic’s release. The DS made its first appeal on 6 June and also demanded the 
resignation o f Interior Minister Zoran Sokolovic and called for a parliamentary debate on 
the powers o f the Interior Ministry.46 On 5 June a number o f political parties and NGOs 
united to form the Committee o f the Democratic Public for the Release o f Vuk Draskovic
43 In the days immediately following DraSkovid’s arrest, calls for his release came from Greece, France, 
Poland, the UN Human Rights Commission, the UK, Russia, the US, the EU and the CSCE, among others 
(Tanjug, 6 June 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1709/C1/1, 8 June 1993; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 June 1993 in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 7 July 1993; Agence France Presse, 7 June 
1993; PAP Polish Press Agency, 14 June 1993; IPS-Inter Press Service, 15 June 1993; The Press 
Association, 16 June 1993; United Press International, 7 July 1993).
44 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 June 1993 in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 7 July 1993.
45 Agence France Presse, 29 June 1993.
46 Tanjug, 6 June 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1709/C1/1, 8 June 1993.
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and for the Defence o f Democratic Liberties. This group included the Serbian Liberal 
Party (SLS), a minor party that has split off from the DS in 1991; the Centre for Anti-War 
Action, an anti-war group formed in 1991 of which PeSic was co-founder and director; 
and the GSS.47
The democratic opposition parties appealed directly to the IC for support in trying 
to secure Draskovic’s release. On 9 June representatives from the SPO, DSS and GSS 
met with Owen and Stoltenberg48 in the hope that they could exert pressure on Milosevic 
to secure Draskovic’s release.49 However, their appeals to Milosevic had no effect and, 
during a break in his talks with the two mediators, Milosevic, in his first public comment 
on the case, told journalists that Draskovic’s release was ‘not a matter o f political 
discussion. It’s a matter o f criminal responsibility.’50
In spite o f this pressure, the regime initially refused to release Draskovic, and on 
29 June he was formally indicted on charges o f ‘preventing an authorised official from 
performing security duties’ and, together with Danica Draskovic, ‘of rallying a large 
group of citizens by their influence and activities and directing them to perform violent 
acts’ that resulted in the death o f a person.51 This prompted Draskovic to begin a hunger 
strike on 1 July.52 However, on 9 July Milosevic caved in to pressure and released 
Draskovic and his wife. The move came amid reports from Draskovic’s medical team
47 Tanjug, 5 June 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1709/Cl, 8 June 1993. The authorities 
obstructed opposition efforts to secure DraSkoviö’s release by banning demonstrations, arresting activists 
for trying to organise petitions demanding his release, and blocking streets to prevent protestors from 
holding a rally outside the prison where DraSkovic was being held.
48 Thorvald Stoltenberg replaced Cyrus Vance as Co-Chairman of the ICFY in May 1993.
49 Tanjug, 9 June 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1712/C 1, 11 June 1993.
50 The Associated Press, 9 June 1993.
51 Tanjug, 30 June 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1730/C1, 2 July 1993.
52 Agence France Presse, 1 July 1993.
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that he was close to death,53 and the day before a planned demonstration was due to take 
place in Belgrade.54 Milosevic attributed his decision to drop the charges against 
Draskovic to international pressure, asserting that the publicity surrounding Draskovic’s 
detention was ‘creating a bad image o f our country among those people who have 
inflicted the blockade on Serbia because o f our fight for freedom against those who are 
committing genocide against us.’55
While there was a certain degree of cooperation among the various opposition 
parties in their efforts to secure Draskovic’s release, this is not considered to have be a 
crucial factor in the decision to free him. Stojan Cerovic, a highly regarded independent 
journalist noted that: ‘The opposition was pretty ineffectual. Some of the parties, like the 
Democratic Party, don’t like Draskovic and even some o f the SPO leaders are jealous o f 
him and would like to replace him. A lot of them were just afraid. This is a land o f fear.’ 
However Cerovic emphasised the importance of what Draskovic had achieved, stating 
that it showed ‘that Milosevic and his police are not invincible.’56 Antonie also notes that 
support from the other parties was hardly overwhelming, pointing out that at the most 
significant public demonstrations in support o f Draskovic, the other opposition party 
leaders were notable by their absence. For Antonie, the decisive factor in the decision to 
release Draskovic was that Draskovic’s detention was casting a shadow over Milosevic’s 
attempts to forge a new co-operative relationship with the IC57 (Antonie, 2002: 153-154). 
Pesic clearly recognised the limits o f the opposition’s co-operation over the Draskovic
53 The Associated Press, 8 July 1993.
54 Tanjug, 8 July 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1737/Cl, 10 July 1993.
55 The Observer, 11 July 1993.
56 The Observer, 11 July 1993.
57 Author’s translation.
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affair, acknowledging that the events had ‘managed to bring about some unification 
among the opposition,’ but stating that she doubted that this would last.58
In summary, the international condemnation of the Serbian authorities over the 
detention of Draskovic marked the first time between 1992 and 2000 that the IC sided 
with the democratic opposition parties against Milosevic and made Serbia’s internal 
political order the focus of its criticisms o f the Milosevic regime. The appeals o f the 
democratic opposition parties to the IC to intervene to help secure Draskovic’s release 
not only raised their international profile but also constituted a clear example o f their 
highlighting the regime’s lack o f legitimacy internationally and also raising the costs to 
Milosevic o f his authoritarian actions, one o f the key tasks necessary to effectively 
oppose the regime. That Milosevic was amenable to international pressure at this time 
was clear in his decision to concede and release Draskovic, and his desire to forge a new, 
co-operative relationship with the IC is considered to have been a crucial and possibly 
decisive factor in this decision.
T h e  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 3  r e p u b l i c a n  e l e c t i o n
Milosevic’s decision to support the VOPP and his subsequent attempts to 
pressurise the Bosnian Serbs into accepting the plan led to a rift between his party and the 
SRS, and a breakdown in co-operation between the two parties at the parliamentary level. 
Tension between the SPS and the SRS mounted throughout 1993, and in October, facing 
a vote o f confidence in the Serbian parliament that he was sure to lose, Milosevic 
dissolved the parliament and called elections for 19 December 1993 (Mihailovic, 1997:
58 The Observer, 11 July 1993.
53-54). At this time the democratic opposition was in considerable disarray. Divisions 
between the parties were greatly exacerbated by their differences regarding the situation 
in Bosnia and the international response to the conflict, and there was significant tension 
not just between the parties, but also within the DS and the SPO, with one o f the most 
significant sources o f tension being differences regarding the Serbian national question 
and the conflict in Bosnia.
In addition to the tensions within the SPO, and between the DSS and the SPO 
within DEPOS, that have already been mentioned, there was also a serious rift 
developing between Djindjic and Micunovic within the DS. Both put forward proposed 
platforms for the election campaign and on 30 October the DS Main Committee opted for 
Djindjic’s proposals. While Micunovic formally remained as party president, this period 
essentially marked the beginning o f Djindjic taking control o f the DS.59 As has been 
mentioned above, there was also a rift within the SPO regarding Draskovic’s decision to 
support the VOPP, with some senior party members criticising Draskovic and advocating 
a more strongly nationalist position (Goati, 2001a: 115).
Similar divisions between the parties in the DEPOS coalition proved irreconcilable 
and in late October any prospect of the DSS remaining within DEPOS was shattered 
when the party issued a statement on its position with respect to the alliance, asserting 
that political differences between the DSS and the SPO were too great for the DSS to 
continue within DEPOS. Among the policy differences between the SPO and the DSS 
that Kostunica emphasised were national policy and the VOPP.60
59 Anastasijevic places much blame on Djindjic’s shoulders for the frequent splits within the DS, drawing 
parallels between MiloSevid’s rise to power within the SKS, through the elimination of his own mentor, 
Ivan Stambolic, and the manner in which Djindjid ousted Micunovic (Anastasijevid, 2000: 105).
60 Serbian TV, 28 October 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1833/C, 30 October 1993
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DEPOS, as it had existed for the December 1992 elections, was now in tatters, as 
both the DSS and the SLS announced that they would not participate in the forthcoming 
elections as part of the alliance.61 Draskovic, however, still believed that a united 
opposition stood a better chance o f defeating the Milosevic regime in the forthcoming 
elections and so began to look for alternative coalition partners. On 15 November it was 
announced that a reconstituted DEPOS (sometimes referred to as DEPOS II), comprising 
the SPO, GSS and the smaller Nova Demokratija (ND),62 would contest the forthcoming 
elections (Thomas, 1999: 183).63
Concerned about the unfavourable conditions in which the opposition parties 
would have to operate, and also about the limited time that would be available for them to 
mount their election campaigns, Draskovic initially stated that the SPO would be 
boycotting the forthcoming elections.64 However, when it became clear that the other 
opposition parties would not join the SPO in an electoral boycott, Draskovic changed his 
mind, alleging that ‘DEPOS had been forced to contest the elections by less democratic
61 The alliance had also been weakened earlier in the year by the departure of six of the parliamentary 
representatives who had been selected from the group of prominent intellectuals who had been part of the 
coalition. These individuals not only withdrew from the parliament but also announced that they would be 
retiring from politics altogether (Thomas, 1997: 150).
62 ND was a small political party that was close to the SPO and had also been a member of the original 
DEPOS coalition.
63 Talks were held with the aim of extending DEPOS to include the DS and the DSS but these ultimately 
failed, with DEPOS blaming Kostunica and Djindjic. In his rejection of the possibility of a unified 
opposition contesting the elections, KoStunica again raised the issue of differences with respect to the 
national question, stating that ‘It is not possible to unite the parties that advocate the possible reconstruction 
of the (former) Yugoslavia and those, like the DSS, that strive for the establishment of a democratic 
Serbian state’ (Tanjug, 1 December 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1862/C, 3 December 
1993)
^Tanjug, 20 October 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/1826/C, 22 October 1993 The 
Associated Press, 21 October 1993. DraSkovid partly blamed the position in which the opposition found 
itself on the sanctions, stating that these: ‘firstly affected ordinary people and the democratic opposition. 
We have no money. We have no cars. We have no petrol. We have no possibility to travel around Serbia to 
have election rallies to explain our programs. The only way to campaign is TV. But the door to TV is 
closed to us. Under such conditions we have no chance (The Christian Science Monitor, 27 October 1993).
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opposition parties which accepted the unequal conditions and which rejected a unified 
electoral list o f the democratic opposition.’65
At the time of the calling of the 1993 elections, Serbia was in ‘a catastrophic 
crisis’ (Slavujevic, 1998: 100). Furthermore, in the run-up to the election, this crisis 
intensified. According to Antonie, in October 1993 the monthly inflation rate in 
Yugoslavia was approximately 1.9%. By November the figure 20.2%, while by 
December this had risen to 178.9%, or a daily inflation rate o f 28%66 (Antonie, 2002: 
165). However, in spite of this, as Goati points out, in the ‘politically “overheated” 
atmosphere before the 1993 elections ... the central axis of differentiation of the electoral 
body was not in the economic and social domain but in the sphere o f the “Serbian 
national issue’” (Goati, 2001a: 119).
The 1993 election campaign saw the democratic opposition parties competing 
against a regime that had repositioned itself as a moderate pro-national party, and also an 
advocate o f moderate rather than radical change to deal with Serbia’s severe social and 
economic problems (Slavujevic, 1998: 101-102). In relation to the national question, 
Antonie notes that the regime used its formidable propaganda resources to position the 
party between DEPOS, which was portrayed as a party o f ‘traitors’ who sought Serbia’s 
surrender, and the ‘irresponsible and war-mongering radicals’ who wanted war with the 
whole world67 (Antonie, 2002: 167).
In terms o f its election campaign, the DS used the word ‘honesty’ as its slogan,68 
accused the authorities o f corruption,69 and promised economic prosperity and stability
65 Tanjug, 16 November 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/1849/C, 18 November 1993
66 Author’s translation
67 Author’s translation
68 IPS-Intemational Press Service, 6 December 1993
180
should the DS triumph in the elections. During the election campaign however, Djindjic 
expressed a desire that all parties should be united with respect to the national question 
and not let it become a matter o f political dispute, and also called on all political parties, 
both government and opposition, to ‘tell the world clearly that, regardless o f all other 
differences, there is no difference in the view that the sanctions are bad and harmful to all 
of us. We should destroy our enemies’ illusions that they can divide us with the 
sanctions, and that they will create a rift among us.’71 This is in contrast to the previous 
time period when the party used the sanctions against the regime, blaming Milosevic for 
their imposition and clearly highlighting the costs o f the regime’s rule to Serbia. This 
change o f approach is evident in Djindjic’s statement that one o f the most important 
issues for the party in its campaign was ‘how to improve the current authorities’ 
management o f the scant national resources in the existing situation.’72 The other issues 
that Djindjic highlighted were the need to prepare for when the sanctions were lifted and 
whether or not the opposition could bring about the lifting o f sanctions more quickly than 
could the current authorities.73 Again, this shows a clear change from the previous time 
period in which the opposition argued, albeit wrongly, that with Milosevic in power, the 
sanctions would remain in place. Furthermore, while the DS criticised the government’s 
handling of the economy, Djindjic was careful not to criticise Milosevic himself, 
explaining afterwards that ‘These were not presidential elections, but elections for the
70
69 Serbian TV, 13 December 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1873/C, 16 December 1993.
70 Tanjug, 15 December 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/1847/C, 17 December 1993.
71 Serbian Radio, 25 November 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1857/C, 27 November 
1993
72 Yugoslav Telegraph Service news agency, 7 November 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
EE/1842/C, 10 November 1993.
73 Yugoslav Telegraph Service news agency, 7 November 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
EE/1842/C, 10 November 1993.
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government and delegates to the republican parliament.’74 Slavujevic argues that in this 
way the DS was hoping to attract ‘dissatisfied but non-radical voters’ and while being 
critical of the government’s incompetence the DS ‘avoided direct confrontation with S. 
Milosevic’ (Slavujevic, 1998: 103). Possibly as a result o f its non-confrontational stance 
vis-à-vis Milosevic, the DS received more favourable coverage in the state controlled 
media than did the other opposition parties.75
Draskovic and the reconstituted DEPOS coalition, which now included the GSS, 
continued to adopt a moderate position in the election campaign and did not emphasise 
the national question, choosing instead to criticise the regime for the catastrophic 
economic crisis (Slavujevic, 1998: 103). During the election campaign Draskovic 
outlined the three things that he believed were necessary for Serbia: ‘The war must stop, 
the sanctions must be lifted, and Serbia must receive international financial and other
I f shelp.’ Draskovic also claimed that DEPOS was the only organisation that could achieve 
these objectives ‘because the whole world knows only DEPOS. DEPOS has friends 
throughout the world. They are just waiting for this big change in Serbia and the 
turnabout will take place.’77 Draskovic asserted this belief in the international standing of 
DEPOS on more than one occasion, possibly reflecting a belief on his part that the high 
level of international support and attention that he received throughout his detention in 
June and July, implied international support for him and for DEPOS in the election
74 ‘Either a Joint Government or Else Romania,’ Djindjic interviewed by Branka Kaljevic, AIM, Belgrade, 
23 January 1994.
75 ‘Either a Joint Government or Else Romania,’ Djindjié interviewed by Branka Kaljevic, AIM, Belgrade, 
23 January 1994.
76 Serbian Radio, 20 November 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1853/C, 23 November 
1993. On another occasion DraSkovic stated that DEPOS’s two main aims were to get the sanctions lifted 
and obtain funds for Serbia’s recovery’ (Tanjug, 15 December 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
EE/1873/C, 16 December 1993).
77 Serbian Radio, 20 November 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1853/C, 23 November 
1993.
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campaign. He stressed that in the event o f a DEPOS victory: ‘The sanctions will be lifted 
immediately. I can tell you that the highest doors in Moscow, Paris, London, Athens, 
Washington, and everywhere are wide open to me personally. Businessmen from all over 
the world will invest enormous capital.’78
While on the whole DEPOS was considerably more moderate on the national 
question than were the DS and the DSS at this time, as the election approached, 
Draskovic displayed considerable inconsistency, making statements in support of greater 
Serbian nationalism during campaign rallies that were irreconcilable with his generally 
moderate stance. Five days before the election, he declared that he would support a 
‘United States of Serbia’ and that Serb populated areas o f the former-Yugoslavia would 
soon come under ‘one hat, one roof.’79 Furthermore, he asserted that ‘Sarajevo, Mostar 
and Pakrac will all be part of Serbia.’80 How this was to be achieved while 
simultaneously working towards ending the conflict in Bosnia and ensuring the lifting o f 
international sanctions was not made clear.
The DSS gave the national question a greater emphasis in its campaign than did 
DEPOS or the DS, with Kostunica stating that the central issues for his party were the 
national programme and socio-economic and democratic change.81 He criticised the 
undemocratic nature o f the Milosevic regime, noting that none of the important decisions 
relating to state and national interests had been discussed in the parliament and asserting 
that a ‘country in which the national and foreign policy are conducted by one man is not a
78 Serbian TV, 14 November 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1847/C, 16 November 1993
79 The Guardian (London), 16 December 1993
80 The Independent (London), 17 December 1993. DraSkovic is also reported to have stated that western 
Hercegovina should be given to the Croats as ‘it has never been ours’ (Yugoslav Telegraph Service news 
agency, 29 November 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/1860/C, 1 December 1993).
81 Serbian TV, 21 November 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1853/C, 23 November 1993.
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democratic country.’82 The DSS campaign slogan described the party as the ‘voice o f
83hope’ but Kostunica warned that, given the seriousness o f Serbia’s problems, ‘false 
promises on changing things overnight are not being offered.’84
In spite of the international support that the democratic opposition parties had 
received in securing Draskovic’s release in m id-1993, there was very little international 
attention paid to the December 1993 elections, with few international comments on the 
decision to call the election, on the election campaign or on the election results. Remarks 
attributed to an unnamed ‘European diplomat’ suggest that the IC expected Milosevic’s 
SPS to win the election,85 while an unnamed ‘Western diplomat’ is quoted as stating that 
none o f the opposition parties were offering anything significantly different from the 
SPS, ‘only a change of image without selling out on the national issue.’86
That the IC paid little attention to the 1993 election may be due to the fact that 
Milosevic had become considerably more co-operative with international efforts to 
resolve the Bosnian conflict.87 This, together with the fact that the opposition was divided 
and that some o f the democratic opposition parties were increasingly espousing positions 
that were at odds with the IC’s positions, suggests that, in terms of achieving their 
immediate goals, maintaining the status quo in Serbia at this time would have been a 
more attractive option. As such, while the IC was prepared to support the democratic
82 Serbian TV, 21 November 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1853/C, 23 November 1993.
83 Serbian Radio, 16 November 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/1849/C, 18 November 
1993.
84 Serbian TV, 21 November 1993 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/1853/C, 23 November 1993.
85 Agence France Presse, 21 October 1993.
86 The Christian Science Monitor, 17 December 1993.
87 Another factor that may account for the lack of international attention paid to the 1993 election in Serbia 
is that most international actors were preoccupied with elections in Russia that took place a week earlier 
and which were called after a major political crisis there. Indeed, some have speculated that Milosevic’s 
decision to hold the Serbian elections only a week after the Russian polls was designed to diminish the 
likelihood of international attention (The Associated Press, 21 October 1993).
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opposition in its campaign to have Draskovic released, this did not fundamentally alter 
either the relationship between the democratic opposition parties and the IC, or the basic 
approach of the IC which remained firmly focused on pressuring the Milosevic regime to 
attain concessions with respect to Bosnia.
T h e  e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s
The results o f the 1993 elections were another disappointment for the opposition, 
in that the SPS remained as the single largest party in parliament, increasing its share o f 
the vote by over five per cent from its result in the 1992 election for the Serbian 
parliament. This gave the SPS twenty-two seats more than it had won in the 1992 
elections, but left it three seats short o f the parliamentary majority that it was seeking. 
The biggest loser in the December 1993 elections was the SRS, which gained only 13.8% 
of the vote, a drop o f close to 10%, and 39 seats compared to the 73 it had won in 1992. 
This has been largely attributed to a sustained media campaign against the SRS, with 
Seselj being completely banned from appearing on state television (Matic, 1998: 119). In 
addition to regime attempts to discredit the SRS, it also attempted to promote an 
alternative extreme nationalist party, the Serbian Unity Party (SSJ-Stranka Srpskog 
Jedinstva), headed by Zeljko Raznjatovic (more commonly known as Arkan) to take its 
place. This was unsuccessful, however, as in spite o f an expensive electoral campaign 
and wide coverage in the state-controlled media, the SSJ did not gain a single seat in the 
Serbian parliament (Goati, 2001a: 118).
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PARTY PERCENTAGE OF 
VOTE
SEATS
SPS 36.7% 123 (49.2%)
DEPOS 16.6% 45(18% )
SRS 13.8% 39(15.6% )
DS 11.6% 29(11.6% )
DSS 5.1% 7 (2.8%)
Table 2: Results of the December 1993 elections for the Serbian parliament 
(Figures from Goati, 2001a: 212)
In terms of the opposition election results, the DS made significant gains winning 
11.6% of the vote, up from 4.2% in 1992, and twenty-nine seats in the parliament in 
which it had only six seats following the 1992 elections. DEPOS emerged with forty-five 
seats, five fewer than it had in 1992, with its 16.6% of the vote being less than one per 
cent below what had been achieved in 1992. This can largely be attributed to the DSS 
having left the coalition however, and on the positive side DEPOS was now the second 
largest political grouping in the Serbian parliament (Thomas, 1999: 189). The DSS 
gained only 5.1% of the vote and only seven seats, being the party that was hardest hit by 
the non-proportional nature o f the electoral system. In addition, the turn out in the 1993 
elections fell from 69.7% in 1992 to 61.6% in 1993.
While the SPS gained votes and seats in the 1993 elections, some analysts argue 
that the result was far from a success for the Milosevic regime. Antonie, for example, 
points out that the parliamentary opposition (excluding national minority parties, but 
including the SRS) won 47% of the votes while the SPS won only 37%. For this reason 
he claims, Milosevic did not win the 1993 election, rather he did not lose it88 (Antonie,
88 Author’s translation.
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2002: 165). Similarly, Gordy argues that the ‘SPS’s performance in the December 1993 
elections was its weakest ever,’ because it had lost the support o f the SRS, while its 
attempts to promote the SSJ as a substitute for the SRS had ‘failed miserably,’ forcing the 
party to search for coalition partners to form a government (Gordy, 1999: 48). As such, 
although the opposition did not succeed in ousting the regime in December 1993, the 
election results cannot be considered catastrophic from an opposition perspective; the 
opposition parties’ combined total percentage o f the vote increased by 10% from 23.1% 
in 1992 to 33.1% in 1993 (Goati, 2001a: 117).
O f the individual opposition parties, the DS made the greatest gains which Goati 
attributes to the parties addressing the ‘everyday problems of the citizens and the 
emphasised tolerance o f other political parties, including the Socialists’ (Goati, 2001a: 
116), a factor that Milosevic also considers to be significant.89 In terms of the DSS, Goati 
believes that its poor showing resulted from the hard line nationalist position that it 
emphasised in the election campaign; a space that he argues ‘was fully occupied by SRS.’ 
In addition, while DEPOS gained fewer seats than it had in 1992, this was most likely 
due to fact that the DSS contested the 1993 elections independently (Goati, 2001a: 116). 
However, Slavujevic notes that the DEPOS campaign also suffered from the lack o f a 
coherent programme for achieving its aims (Slavujevic, 1998: 103), indicating that 
DEPOS might have been able to secure more votes if it had more effectively presented 
itself as a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime.
While the opposition may have increased its level o f support, it is, nevertheless, 
notable that, in spite of the grave social and economic problems that Serbia was 
experiencing at the end o f 1993, the opposition failed to unseat the SPS, and furthermore,
89 ‘Who Stole The Tarts?’ Milan Milosevic, Vreme NDA, 7 February 1994.
the SPS was able to increase its proportion o f the vote, albeit to a lesser extent than 
Milosevic had hoped. In explaining this outcome, analysts note a number o f factors 
including opposition disunity, which saw the three most significant democratic 
opposition parties -  the DS, the DSS and the SPO -  contest the elections independently 
of each other, and which was evident not just in the inability o f the democratic opposition 
parties to form a united front against the regime but also in the divisions that were 
occurring within the parties (Antonie, 2002: 166; Slavujevic, 1998: 101). As Slavujevic 
notes ‘the failed negotiations in coalition formation, denouncements o f each other’s 
views, the questioning o f the credentials of each other’s leaders, etc. did not encourage 
the belief that, even after an election victory, the opposition parties in a coalition 
government would be able to put their managing potential to practice’ (Slavujevic, 1998: 
105). As such, opposition disunity hindered the ability o f the democratic opposition 
parties to present a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime. Furthermore, this 
division was important not just because it did not provide a clear alternative choice for 
voters, but also because the electoral system, described by one commentator as the 
‘SPS’s greatest advantage at these elections,’ was designed to favour larger parties (i.e. 
the SPS).90
For Antonie, the most important factor in explaining the SPS result was the 
regime’s propaganda and control over much of the media91 (Antonie, 2002: 166). Goati 
also considers this to be one o f the most significant factors and emphasises the success 
the regime had in terms of convincing voters that it was not to blame for the dire 
economic situation in which Serbia found itself (Goati, 2001a: 120). This interpretation
90 ‘Wisdom After The Event,’ Dragoslav Grujió, Vreme NDA No. 119, 2 January 1994.
91 Author’s translation
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was heavily promoted by the state-controlled media. According to Matic, RTS, the state 
television company, ‘pointed to the “undeserved and unjust” United Nations sanctions 
and a world conspiracy o f designers of the new world order as the causes o f all social 
evils. Thus, the ruling party was absolved o f all responsibility for the problems’ (Matic, 
1998: 120). However, while regime propaganda was the decisive factor in the 
dissemination o f this interpretation of the causes o f Serbia’s woes, Goati considers that 
the opposition also contributed. In contrast to the situation in 1992, the opposition parties 
‘did not accuse the ruling regime of causing the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
implementation of economic sanctions,’ instead criticising ‘the regime’s incompetence to 
pursue [a] more successful economic policy under the circumstances o f the international 
sanctions,’ enabling the regime to argue that no government could do better under the 
circumstances (Goati, 2001a: 121-122). Furthermore, the opposition’s acceptance of the 
regime’s interpretation o f events also undermined the credibility of the opposition. 
According to Slavujevic, ‘By changing its views on the causes o f the crisis in society the 
opposition appeared inconsistent’ (Slavujevic, 1998: 105).
A further significant contributory factor to the relative success of the SPS in these 
circumstances was the fact that, in spite of Serbia’s social and economic problems, the 
Serbian national question remained ‘the central axis o f differentiation of the electoral 
body’ (Goati, 2001a: 119); an issue on which the regime could claim some success. This 
clearly demonstrates the SPS’s ‘decisive role in determining the agenda and dynamics of 
political events in the country’ (Slavujevic, 1998: 101), and, given that neither the DS nor 
DEPOS made the national question a central element o f their campaigns, also illustrates
189
the difficulties that the opposition had in terms o f maintaining a zone o f ideological 
autonomy against the regime and influencing the political agenda.
The creation o f Serb entities in Bosnia and Croatia allowed the regime to claim that 
Serb interests had been successfully defended, and it was greatly helped in this regard by 
the change in international policy with respect to Bosnia which now accepted that a 
resolution to that conflict would involve the partition o f Bosnia’s territory along ethnic 
lines. As Slavujevic points out, within Serbia ’the belief was spreading that by military 
successes the Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been defended 
effectively, that the Serbian national and state issue was all but solved, and that the lifting 
or at least softening o f sanctions was imminent when the combat calmed down' 
(Slavujevic, 1998: 100-101). In such an atmosphere, Goati argues, the opposition parties, 
for reasons o f pragmatism, refrained from attacking the regime for instigating the conflict 
in Bosnia and for causing sanctions to be imposed, pointing out that:
Persistence in denunciation o f the ruling regime for [the] breakout of war [in 
Bosnia and Croatia] in times when Serbs have practically accomplished their 
goals in those republics -  would expose the opposition parties to the danger 
of being accused by the regime’s media for ‘national treachery’ (Goati, 
2001a: 122).
As such, while the change in the opposition’s approach o f attacking the regime for
bringing about the imposition of international sanctions, to accepting the regime’s
interpretation o f the sanctions as undeserved clearly damaged the opposition, it must be 
noted that given the conditions in which they were forced to operate, the democratic
opposition parties had little room to manoeuvre.
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Forming the government
Although the SPS emerged as the largest party following the 1993 elections, it 
was nevertheless three seats short of a parliamentary majority and so, on 21 January, 
Milosevic issued an invitation to several opposition parties to discuss the formation o f a 
government o f national unity. The invitation was accepted by Djindjic and Draskovic 
among others, but rejected by Kostunica (Milosevic, 1994: 1). Ultimately, discussions 
with Draskovic and Djindjic proved unsuccessful. Milosevic, however, was saved when 
the six ND deputies, who had fought the election as part o f the DEPOS coalition, opted to 
join the new government. The ND deputies justified their decision to participate in a 
coalition government with Milosevic on the grounds that it would be easier to change the 
situation in Serbia from the inside, though as Anastasijevic points out this claim ‘rang 
hollow since they profited disproportionately from their deal with Milosevic. This small 
party got four ministerial seats and access to material resources it could never have 
dreamt of while in opposition’ (Anastasijevic, 2000: 42). In addition to the defection o f 
the ND representatives, the new government attracted the support of two DS members, 
Radoje Djukic and Slobodan Radulovic, who left their party to participate in the 
coalition. The success o f the SPS in attracting support from some former opposition 
deputies enabled the regime to claim that the newly formed cabinet was based on 
principals of national unity (Markotich, 1994: 8).
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Conclusions
D i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  a n d  t h e  M i l o s e v i c  r e g i m e
The issue that was o f greatest importance to the IC in its dealings with Serbia 
between 1993 and 1995 was again the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The tightening 
of sanctions that occurred in April 1993 resulted from the Bosnian Serbs’ rejection o f the 
VOPP, while the suspension o f certain sanctions in 1994, the indefinite suspension of all 
sanctions in 1995, and the permanent lifting in sanctions in 1996 were effectively rewards 
to the Milosevic regime for co-operation in international efforts to bring the conflict in 
Bosnia to an end. While for a brief period in 1993, following Draskovic’s arrest, Serbia’s 
internal political order became the subject o f international attention, once the situation 
had been resolved, and Draskovic was released from prison, the undemocratic nature of 
the Milosevic regime no longer featured on the international agenda.
The democratic opposition parties began 1993 with the relatively moderate 
positions regarding the Serbian national question that they had held throughout 1992. 
However, over the course o f 1993 and 1994 this began to change as first the DSS and 
then the DS became increasingly vocal in their support for the creation o f a greater 
Serbia. While neither party openly and explicitly advocated the use of force to bring 
about a greater Serbia, from 1994 both spoke out in favour of the Bosnian Serb 
leadership’s rejection of international peace plans, and argued that Serb gains in Bosnia 
and Croatia ought to be defended. As such, both the DS and the DSS held views that 
were considerably at odds with those o f the IC.
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Both the GSS and the SPO supported all the major peace plans that were proposed 
to resolve the Bosnian conflict, and generally maintained the moderate positions that they 
had held in 1992. Draskovic, however, was somewhat inconsistent on this issue as at 
times he engaged in nationalist rhetoric, such as his claim before the 1993 elections that 
Sarajevo, Mostar and Pakrac would soon be part o f Serbia. The contradiction between his 
support of international peace plans while also making such claims can only have 
undermined his credibility in the eyes o f the IC. Nevertheless, Draskovic’s nationalist 
outbursts notwithstanding, both the GSS and the SPO, united within DEPOS, held 
positions that were broadly in line with those of the IC, and as such did present a credible 
alternative from an IC perspective.
While the SPO and the GSS did, on balance, maintain positions that were close to 
those o f the IC, in 1993 the Milosevic regime abandoned its support for the creation o f a 
greater Serbia through force, and began to support international policies that were 
designed to bring the fighting in Bosnia to an end. As such, the IC had little incentive to 
work with the democratic opposition parties against the regime, and is likely to have 
concluded that maintaining the status quo was the surest way to achieve its goal of ending 
the fighting in Bosnia. The need for democratic reform in Serbia and the possibility o f 
regime change were not on the international agenda at this time, as is clear by the lack o f 
international attention paid to the 1993 elections.
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  I C  a n d  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s
As was the case throughout 1992, this time period began with little formal contact 
between the democratic opposition parties and the IC. The exception to this was during
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m id-1993 when IC representatives met with representatives of the democratic opposition 
parties as part o f their efforts to secure the release of Draskovic. While this certainly 
raised the profile of the democratic opposition parties, and particularly that of DraSkovic 
and the SPO, it did not result in sustained or regular contact between the democratic 
opposition parties and the IC, and also did not lead to Serbia’s internal political order 
appearing regularly on the international agenda. This is clearly evident in the lack o f 
international attention that the December 1993 elections received and the total lack o f 
support, either explicit or implied, for the opposition in its attempts to challenge 
Milosevic’s SPS at this time.
While the IC paid little attention to Serbia’s democratic opposition, the opposition 
parties became increasingly critical of the IC and its policies with respect to Bosnia. All 
the parties considered here were critical o f the decision to tighten sanctions against the 
SRJ in 1993. Furthermore, while in the previous time period much o f this criticism was 
directed at Milosevic, in 1993 the IC became the main focus o f opposition criticism. 
Some democratic opposition leaders voiced concern that international policy may have a 
detrimental impact on the prospects for democratic transformation in Serbia. Both the 
GSS and the SPO were highly critical in this regard, as is evident in their reactions to the 
abandonment o f the VOPP and the acceptance o f the ethnic division o f Bosnia. The GSS 
and the SPO also argued that international sanctions were strengthening rather than 
weakening Milosevic, and expressed concern that the IC accepted Milosevic as a 
peacemaker and a guarantor o f Balkan stability; in the process reducing incentives for the 
opposition to support IC positions as a means of opposing Milosevic.
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The impact of ICpolicy on the democratic opposition parties
As has been outlined above, between 1993 and 1995 the democratic opposition 
parties challenged the Milosevic regime on only two occasions, both in 1993. In the first 
of these challenges, the campaign to secure Draskovic’s release, the opposition was 
successful. As has been noted, international support in this campaign was a crucial, and 
probably decisive factor accounting for this success. The democratic opposition parties 
appeal to the IC to intervene in support of the campaign to secure Draskovic’s release 
constituted a clear attempt to question the regime’s legitimacy in the international arena 
by highlighting its undemocratic behaviour, and to raise the costs to Milosevic o f his 
authoritarian rule by jeopardising his attempts to forge a more co-operative relationship 
with the IC in his quest to get sanctions removed. That Milosevic backed down and 
released Draskovic, citing the damage that was being done to Serbia’s international 
relations, indicates that in this regard the democratic opposition parties carried out this 
particular task successfully. In addition, as soon as the war in Bosnia ended, the 
democratic opposition parties began to raise the issue o f Serbia’s need for democratic 
reform at the international level, and appealed to the IC to focus attention on this matter. 
This contrasts somewhat with the situation in 1992 where there is little evidence that the 
democratic opposition parties sought international assistance.
The second challenge to the Milosevic regime came in the December 1993 
elections for the Serbian parliament, in which the democratic opposition parties failed to 
unseat the regime. Among the factors that contributed to this failure were the disunity of 
the opposition and its inability to present a credible alternative to the SPS, two of the
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most important weaknesses of the opposition identified in chapter one. The inability of 
the democratic opposition parties to present a credible alternative to the regime derived in 
part from its disunity. However, other factors such as its lack o f a clear programme 
indicating how it intended to fulfil its campaign promises and its change in position in 
relation to responsibility for Serbia’s economic chaos, also undermined the opposition in 
this regard. Given the IC’s almost total lack o f attention to the 1993 election, it had no 
direct impact on the democratic opposition parties’ campaigns. However, existing 
tensions between the opposition parties were exacerbated by its differences with respect 
to the efforts o f the IC to deal with the conflict in Bosnia, most notably the VOPP and the 
Contact Group peace plan, and as such, albeit unintentionally, international policy did 
contribute to undermining the efforts o f the democratic opposition parties to effectively 
challenge the regime. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the IC made any effort to 
engage with the democratic opposition in order to gain their support for its efforts to 
resolve the Bosnian conflict.
During the time period covered by this case study, Serbia’s democratic opposition 
parties were less successful in carrying out the four tasks necessary to effectively oppose 
the regime than they had been in 1992 (resisting integration; maintaining a zone of 
ideological autonomy; questioning the legitimacy o f the regime and raising the costs of 
authoritarian rule; and presenting a credible alternative both domestically and 
internationally). While all the parties considered here did resist integration into the 
regime, Milosevic was only able to form a government through co-opting the small ND 
party that had contested the elections as part of the DEPOS coalition. Furthermore, after 
the elections, both the SPO and the DS accepted negotiations with the regime with a view
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to forming a coalition government and as such considered offering support to the SPS, or 
at the very least did not rule it out. Thus, while ultimately they did successfully resist 
integration, they moved closer to failure in this regard than had been the case in 1992.
While the democratic opposition parties did achieve some success in terms o f 
questioning the legitimacy o f the Milosevic regime and raising the costs o f authoritarian 
rule at the international level, it was less successful at carrying out this task at the 
domestic level. In contrast to 1992, when the opposition criticised the regime for the 
imposition of sanctions against Serbia, thereby highlighting the costs to Serbia o f 
Milosevic’s war policies, this was not a feature of the 1993 election campaign. As 
outlined above, in 1993 the opposition parties chose to emphasise the failure o f the 
regime to adequately manage the economy rather than highlight the way in which 
Milosevic’s policies had brought about the catastrophic predicament in which Serbia 
found itself. As such, the democratic opposition parties facilitated the regime’s attempts 
to blame international policy, UN sanctions and an international conspiracy against 
Serbia for the economic chaos, and to put forward the argument that, in such conditions 
no other government could have done more. However, while the opposition parties may 
have contributed to this perception, a far more significant factor was Milosevic’s 
formidable propaganda machinery.
Milosevic’s propaganda machinery and control over much of Serbia’s media also 
hindered the opposition in terms o f maintaining a zone of ideological autonomy against 
the regime and influencing the political agenda. That the national question, on which 
Milosevic could claim some success, dominated the agenda while Serbia was 
experiencing one o f the most severe incidences o f hyperinflation ever recorded, is clear
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evidence o f the opposition’s failure in this regard. As in the previous time period, 
international policy, which also highlighted the national question in most of its dealings 
with Serbia, facilitated Milosevic in maintaining the focus of political discourse on the 
national question. Although for a brief period in 1993 the IC focused its attention on 
Serbia’s internal political order, and in so doing forced Milosevic to make concessions in 
this area, it did not take the opportunity to highlight the undemocratic nature of the 
regime in its future dealings with Serbia. Had it done so, this may have helped the 
opposition parties in terms of ensuring that issues that would be of benefit to them, and 
detrimental to the regime, featured more prominently on the political agenda. As such, at 
the very least, IC policy did nothing to help the democratic opposition parties in terms of 
influencing the agenda on which the elections were contested, and may in fact have 
undermined them in this regard.
A further impact o f international policy that was detrimental to the opposition was 
the abandonment of the IC’s previous position that a resolution to the Bosnian conflict 
must involve preserving the country as a unitary state. By accepting the future ethnic 
division o f Bosnia the IC, in essence, recognised the de facto existence o f RS, and 
enabled Milosevic to claim that Serb interests had been successfully defended, and his 
national policy had been a success, thereby increasing the regime’s credibility, while at 
the same time undermining those who had been opposed to the war from the outset.
The democratic opposition also failed in the task of presenting a credible 
alternative to the regime domestically, and, at least with respect to the DS and the DSS, 
was less successful in this regard internationally than had been the case in 1992. The 
disunity o f the opposition resulted in the three most significant opposition parties
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contesting the December 1993 elections separately, thus not providing a clear and 
credible alternative to the regime. Furthermore, DEPOS, the largest of the democratic 
opposition organisations, also failed to produce a credible alternative programme 
demonstrating how it would fulfil the promises that it was making. This, in addition to 
making clearly unrealistic promises and Draskovic’s inconsistent statements in relation to 
the national question, can only have undermined the credibility o f the coalition in the 
minds o f the electorate. In addition, the increasingly nationalist position of both the DS 
and the DSS, together with its disunity, also meant that the opposition appeared less 
credible as an alternative from an IC perspective than it had the previous year. However, 
notwithstanding Draskovic’s occasional nationalist outbursts, both the SPO and the GSS, 
united within DEPOS, held positions that were broadly in line with those of the IC, and 
as such, these parties can be considered to have been a credible alternative partner from 
an IC perspective.
In summary, while the failure o f the democratic opposition parties to mount an 
effective challenge to the regime derived to a great extent from its own weaknesses and 
also the considerable power of the Milosevic regime, international policy, 
unintentionally, acted to exacerbate the opposition’s weaknesses and also undermined the 
opposition in its attempts to carry out the tasks necessary to effectively oppose the regime 
that were identified in chapter one.
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C h a p t e r  5 :  Z a j e d n o
This case study deals with the time period following the signing o f the Dayton 
Peace Agreement until the elections that were held for the Serbian parliament and 
presidency at the end of 1997. Throughout this time period Serbia enjoyed a relatively 
high degree o f international integration following the lifting o f the UN sanctions that had 
been imposed during the Bosnian war, although an ‘outer wall’ o f sanctions remained in 
place. These sanctions were maintained primarily by the US, and blocked the SRJ from 
membership of international organisations such as the OSCE and NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace, in addition to preventing it from joining or having access to lending from 
international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD 
(International Crisis Group, 2000: 2). In addition, the EU imposed an arms embargo 
against the SRJ in March 1996.1
Following the signing o f the Dayton agreement in 1995, the democratic 
opposition parties succeeded in overcoming some of the differences that had divided 
them in the previous time period, and formed a coalition - Zajedno (Together), to contest 
federal and local elections that were held towards the end o f 1996, and this was the first 
major challenge to the Milosevic regime in the time period covered by this case study. 
While Zajedno failed to beat the SPS and its allies in the federal elections, the coalition 
was surprisingly successful at the local level, winning in most o f Serbia’s major towns 
and cities, including Belgrade. The attempts of the Milosevic regime to overturn these 
victories led to the second major opposition challenge to the Milosevic regime at this
1 European Report, 28 February 1996.
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time: over three months of anti-regime protests that received significant international 
attention, seriously undermining Milosevic’s international credibility while at the same 
time greatly increasing the international profile o f the democratic opposition parties. 
However, once the demonstrations had ended and the opposition parties took power in 
the local administrations in the spring of 1997, the internal divisions that existed within 
Zajedno became insurmountable and the coalition had ceased to exist by the time 
elections for the Serbian presidency and parliament took place at the end o f 1997. O f the 
democratic opposition parties considered here, only the SPO contested the 1997 
elections, while the others boycotted them on the grounds that the electoral conditions 
were unfair.
The key issues for the IC in its relations with Serbia in this time period were the 
implementation of the Dayton agreement; the situation in Kosovo; and, following the 
annulment of the opposition’s victories in the local elections in 1996, the need for 
democratic reform within Serbia. The time period covering this case study saw a 
significant increase in contacts between the Serbian opposition parties and the IC, and a 
considerable raising of the opposition’s profile on the international stage. As such this 
case study provides the opportunity to examine the extent to which this enhanced status 
of the opposition parties impacted on the democratic opposition parties’ effectiveness in 
their campaigns against the Milosevic regime.
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Key Issues for the International Community
In its dealings with Serbia throughout 1996 and 1997, the IC focused on three 
main issues: the implementation of the Dayton agreement, the situation in Kosovo, and, 
following the attempt o f the Milosevic regime to annul the results o f local elections that 
were held in late 1996, the need for those election results to be respected and for 
democratic reform in Serbia. While the situation in Kosovo was one of the stated reasons 
for the maintenance o f the ‘outer wall’ o f sanctions, this will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 6 and so will not be considered here. During this time period, the international 
institutions and actors that were most involved in dealing with Serbia were the US, the 
EU and its member states, and, to a lesser extent, the OSCE.
T h e  S e r b i a n  o p p o s i t i o n  a n d  t h e  D a y t o n  a g r e e m e n t
The issue that received the greatest amount o f international attention in 1996 and 
1997 was the implementation o f the Dayton agreement, with emphasis on the need to co­
operate with the ICTY, and this dominated most o f the meetings between the IC and the 
Serbian authorities. As such, at least throughout 1996, when Milosevic was subjected to 
international criticism and pressure this generally related to his failure to honour the 
commitments that he made when he signed the agreement. For example, when US State 
Department official John Komblum met with Milosevic in late May 1996 and threatened 
the Serbian president with renewed sanctions, this was intended to compel him to push 
for full implementation o f Dayton and to use his influence to force Karadzic to resign
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from political life in Bosnia.2 In addition, the EU identified implementation o f the Dayton 
agreement as the ‘overriding objective o f action of the EU’ in the SRJ and other former 
Yugoslav states when it outlined a set o f principles on which future relations between the 
EU and these states would be based.3
In relation to the differences between the democratic opposition parties and the 
Milosevic regime regarding attitudes to the Dayton agreement, the opposition parties 
involved in the Zajedno coalition made efforts to assure the IC that, should they take 
power, they would honour this agreement. While the GSS and the SPO could point to the 
fact that they had opposed the war in Bosnia from the outset and had consistently 
supported international peace plans as evidence of their willingness to ensure that the 
Dayton agreement was implemented, the situation was more difficult for the DS and the 
DSS. To a large extent, however, the DSS was marginalized throughout this time period 
as it remained outside the Zajedno coalition for most o f the time, only reluctantly 
contesting the 1996 federal elections as part of the coalition and leaving shortly 
afterwards. The DSS decision to remain independent o f the Zajedno coalition was taken 
as a result o f policy differences with the Zajedno parties, and in particular differences 
regarding national policy and relations with the West.
The nationalist position adopted by the DS during the war in Bosnia was 
interpreted by some commentators as being merely a pragmatic move, and Djindjic’s 
comments during the time period covered by this case study support this interpretation. In 
late 1996 Djindjic, argued that ‘Any politician in Serbia had to show solidarity with the
2 Agence France Presse, 1 June 1996
3 ‘Commission Defines Principles for Future Contractual Relations with Certain Countries in South Eastern 
Europe,’ IP/96/876, 2 October 1996.
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Bosnian Serbs during the war. It is not our choice who their leaders are,’4 and claimed 
that some degree of nationalism was essential in order to push through the reforms that 
the DS was committed to making. Djindjic argued that the use of nationalism was 
essential in order to build popular support, but asserted that ‘Europe and the United States 
should not make too much of this. We will honour the Dayton agreement, and we will not 
incorporate Serbian-held Bosnia into Serbia as long as this is opposed by our Western 
friends.’5 Furthermore, Djindjic summarised his and his party’s vision of a post- 
MiloSevic Serbia as: ‘No Greater Serbia; respect o f the Bosnian peace accord; a law- 
based state; a market economy; freedom of all kinds.’6 Djindjic clearly saw that 
guarantees of opposition support for the Dayton agreement were a pragmatic necessity if 
the opposition was to attract international support, noting that respect for the agreement 
was ‘the key that will open the doors of Europe to us.’7
In addition to emphasising its willingness to respect the Dayton agreement, the 
Zajedno leaders also made efforts to counter any belief that might exist within the IC that 
Milosevic represented a factor for stability within the region, or that only with Milosevic 
in power could the Dayton agreement be guaranteed. According to Draskovic, the 
‘United States is committing the gravest error in believing that Serbia and its president 
can be a stabilising factor in the Balkans. This state mafia is the biggest factor of 
instability in Serbia and the region. ... There cannot be double criteria. ... You cannot
4 The Guardian (London), 17 December 1996. Djindjiö also emphasised that he was not the only one who 
dealt with Karadzic, stating that ‘I would say at that time most Western European diplomats had the same 
contact with the same person.’ (ORF TV, Vienna, 27 January 1997 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
EE/D2829/A, 29 January 1997).
5 New York Times, 1 December 1996
6 The Associated Press, 29 November 1996
7 Rai Radio 1, Rome, 29 November 1996 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D2784/A, 2 December 
1996
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support a democratic America and a totalitarian Serbia at the same time.’8 Djindjic also 
argued that T h e  West is wrong to see Milosevic as a factor o f stability.’9 Kostunica also 
criticised the IC’s lack of concern regarding the undemocratic nature of the Milosevic 
regime, claiming that:
The position o f the West has changed since 1989. Then they insisted on 
respect for human rights, a democratic society, and the creation of equal 
conditions for the organisation of political parties. ... I think that their criteria 
have now been lowered and have contracted to just one formal position -  a 
democracy exists where there is more than one party and where elections take 
place.10
It was not only the democratic opposition parties who believed that the IC 
considered Milosevic to be an important guarantor o f the Dayton agreement. Similar 
sentiments were expressed by several prominent US observers, some with extensive 
experience in the Balkans.11 Warren Zimmermann, who was the last US ambassador to 
the SFRJ, argued that the opposition parties would be more likely to honour Dayton than 
the Milosevic regime. Claiming that the US had become ‘so transfixed with the view that 
Milosevic is the guarantor o f the Dayton Agreement that we've forgotten ... that he has 
not been very good at guaranteeing the Dayton Agreement,’ he stated that ‘we would do
8 Agence France Presse, 24 November 1996. Similarly, regarding Bosnia DraSkovic asked: ‘How can the 
butcher of the Balkans become a peacemaker? America is wrong if it thinks that the one who destroyed 
Bosnia can now be the only guarantee for its peace ... No one should trust this guy, especially not 
America’ (The Associated Press, 5 December 1996).
9 The Washington Post, 25 November 1996
10 KoStunica quoted in Thomas, 1999, pp. 260-261
11 The view that the US administration had in some sense supported Milosevic because of his role in 
Dayton was also voiced by Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch who stated that, 
‘The Clinton administration adopted a deferential approach toward MiloSevic because they saw him as the 
key player in the Dayton process’ (The Washington Post, 5 December 1996).
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much better in terms of the Bosnian peace process with either [Djindjic or Draskovic] in 
power than we will do with Milosevic’.
In summary, while the opposition parties comprising Zajedno expressed a 
willingness to implement Dayton should they come to power, Milosevic was subject to 
frequent international criticism and pressure over his failure to honour the commitments 
that he made when he signed the agreement. As such, it could be argued that the 
opposition parties that were involved in the Zajedno coalition did have a different 
position on this issue than did the Milosevic regime, which although it claimed to be 
committed to the Dayton agreement, was frequently criticised for not fully complying 
with its provisions. Furthermore, the position of the democratic opposition parties was 
closer to that of the IC than was the regime’s and as such the democratic opposition, in 
this case the Zajedno coalition, did represent a credible alternative to the Milosevic 
regime from an IC perspective.
T h e  U n d e m o c r a t i c  N a t u r e  o f  t h e  M i l o s e v i c  R e g i m e
While the undemocratic nature o f the Milosevic regime would become a key issue 
for the IC following the annulment o f local election results at the end o f 1996, prior to 
this, although the need for democratic reform was mentioned in numerous IC statements, 
it was not a priority issue in IC dealings with Serbia. In April 1996, the EU clearly
12 The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Monday Transcript # 5711, 2 December 1996. Zimmermann presented 
similar arguments a couple of days later, stating that ‘The disappearance of Milosevic and his replacement 
by someone from the opposition would be a substantial advantage for Serbia, for peace in the Balkans. It 
would be an enormously positive event’ (The Associated Press, 5 December 1996). Similar arguments were 
also made by former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski who argued that it would help the 
peace process in Bosnia if Milosevic were to fall because Serbia would be ‘ruled by people who think the 
war was a crime’. He went on to state that ‘We ought to make it as clear and as forcefully as we can that we 
support the democratic forces’ (The Washington Times, 5 December 1996).
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identified the issues that were most significant in its dealings with Serbia in a declaration 
on the possibility o f EU recognition o f the SRJ.13 The issues identified included 
implementation of the Dayton agreement, including co-operation with the ICTY; 
recognition of all other former Yugoslav republics; agreement on succession issues with 
the other former Yugoslav republics; and implementation o f the peace agreement for 
Eastern Slavonia. While the final condition specified the need for ‘full respect for human 
rights, minority rights and ... the granting o f a large degree o f autonomy for Kosovo 
within the [SRJ],’ which may imply the need for a more democratic political system, 
there was no explicit mention o f the need for democratic reform within Serbia.14
Further evidence o f the lack of priority given to this issue can also be seen in US 
and EU statements that were made shortly before elections were held in 1996. US 
ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, stated in October 1996 that the US would 
continue to be against Yugoslavia’s participation in international financial institutions 
until it co-operated with the ICTY, made ‘substantial progress’ in resolving the tensions 
in Kosovo, and tried to settle claims over assets with other former-Yugoslav states, but 
did not call for democratic reform in Serbia and did not mention the elections that were 
scheduled to take place in November.15 Similarly, the conclusion of an EU Council of 
Ministers meeting on 1 October 1996 included a section on the former Yugoslavia which 
mentioned the importance of the implementation of Dayton and the forthcoming elections 
in Bosnia, and also noted that the Council had discussed the situation in Kosovo, but
13 The SRJ had already been formally recognised by a number of European states including Germany, 
France, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy (European Report, 
European Information Service, 20 April 1996).
14 ‘Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on Recognition by EU Member States 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,’ PESC/96/30, 9 April 1996.
15 The Associated Press, 1 October 1996.
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made no mention o f the forthcoming elections in the SRJ or the undemocratic nature of 
the Milosevic regime. On the contrary, if anything, the EU press release praised the SRJ 
authorities, mentioning ‘the important role o f the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Croatia both in terms of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in 
terms of the stability in the wider region.’16
However, while the need for democratic reform in Serbia was not a regular issue 
on the international agenda in 1996, it was not entirely ignored either, and the 
undemocratic nature of the Milosevic regime was noted on occasion. One example o f this 
came in November when Assistant Secretary o f State with responsibility for human rights 
issues, John Shattuck, visited Serbia and met with Milosevic. While the negotiations 
between the two men centred on the need for Serbia to cooperate with the ICTY, 
Shattuck also alluded to the need for changes within Serbia, stating that the US was 
prepared to support the SRJ’s readmission to the international financial institutions ‘if 
there is full cooperation with the international tribunal in the Hague and progress on 
human rights in Kosovo as well as in Serbia.’17 Similarly, John Komblum, on a visit to 
Belgrade on 12 November also mentioned the need for democratic reform within Serbia, 
stating that the US believed that ‘complete freedom of the press needs to be established’ 
and that ‘economic and political liberalisation must come to this country.’
While the IC did not place significant emphasis on the need for democratic reform 
before the protests that took place at the end of 1996, one aspect o f Milosevic’s 
repressive rule did receive some degree of attention early in 1996 and that was repression 
of the independent media. One of the most significant events in this regard was the
16 RAPID, Council o f Ministers Press Release, 1 October 1996
17 Agence France Presse, 7 November 1996
18 United Press International, 12 November 1996
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takeover of the independent television station Studio B on 15 February.19 When Studio B 
was taken over, the democratic opposition parties appealed for international support, and 
Draskovic and Pesic met with US and EU officials in Belgrade, again showing its 
readiness to highlight the undemocratic nature of the regime at the international level.20
The IC reacted to the takeover o f Studio B by condemning the action, and asking 
that independent control be returned to the station. A State Department spokesperson 
described the action as a ‘transparent attempt by authorities there to limit access to 
uncensored news and information,’21 while the EU issued a statement expressing 
concern.22 However, while the West was willing to criticise the regime’s actions, no 
concrete measures were taken in order to try to force Milosevic to reverse the decision.23
Milosevic certainly seemed undeterred by internal and external protests over the 
Studio B takeover, as the following week he was subject to further criticism when, on 23 
February, the Supreme Court upheld a decision by the Serbian Ministry o f Culture 
nullifying the official registration of the Soros Foundation, thereby preventing it from 
undertaking any further work in the SRJ.24 Although the State Department’s reaction to 
the closure of the Soros Foundation offices did not go beyond condemnation, it was,
19 Serbia’s Supreme Court ruled that Studio B had been incorrectly privatised and would be returned to 
social ownership under the control o f the Belgrade city assembly ( ‘Media: The Tamed Studio B ’, Milan 
Milosevic, Vreme NDA No. 229: 26 February 1996).
20 Associated Press Worldstream, 16 February 1996
21 US Department o f State Regular Briefing, 16 February 1996
22 ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf o f the European Union on Independent Media in the Federal 
Republic o f Yugoslavia’ PESC/96/20, 6 March 1996. Further criticism came from UNESCO (United Press 
International, 16 February 1996)
23 Unwillingness on the part o f some IC actors to push the point too heavily was evident in comments by 
France’s ambassador to Yugoslavia in an interview with local media. The ambassador was asked whether 
there would be international pressure on Milosevic to preserve the freedom o f the independent media and 
replied that: ‘ I don’t like the word pressure. We want to help -  i f  that’s your aim, here is a way to 
accomplish it ’( ‘Good and Bad Signs’, Gabriel Keller interviewed by Roksanda Nincic, Vreme News Digest 
Agency No. 231, 12 March 1996).
24 The End o f the Soros Foundation, Dejan Anastasijevid, Vreme News Digest Agency No. 230, 5 March 
1996
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0nevertheless, to some extent more forcefiil than had been the case with the closure o f 
Studio B. Unlike in the case o f Studio B, the State Department linked the closure o f the 
Soros Foundation offices to the possibility of lifting the outer wall o f sanctions, with a 
spokesperson stating that Serbia would be ‘denied the full measure of membership in 
various international organizations and recognition from the United States if it does not 
reverse this disturbing trend that we've seen o f anti-democratic measures.’25 The 
somewhat stronger international reaction to this move, in particular from the US, and the 
subsequent reopening o f the Soros foundation under a different name,26 suggests that the 
IC, if it chose to exert pressure on Milosevic, could indeed influence his actions.
Following Milosevic’s attempts to deny the Zajedno coalition its victories in the 
1996 local elections, and the large anti-regime protests that followed, Serbia’s internal 
political order received an unprecedented level o f international attention, with all the key 
international actors and institutions commenting on these developments, and condemning 
the regime for its undemocratic behaviour, and this will be discussed in detail later in this 
chapter. While initially the response of the IC to the electoral fraud was rather mild, as 
the protests continued the IC became increasingly critical of the Milosevic regime, and 
threatened to increase the level of Serbia’s international isolation if the situation were not 
resolved. While this issue was clearly o f importance to the IC, the differences between 
the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime in relation to the annulment 
of the election results and the undemocratic nature o f the Milosevic regime are self- 
evident.
25 US Department o f State Daily Press Briefing, 4 March 1996
26 In June 1996 the Soros Foundation was allowed to reregister in the SRJ as the Foundation for Open 
Society (Associated Press Worldstream, 11 June 1996).
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In summary, in spite of the fact that the war in Bosnia had ended in 1995, Bosnia 
remained the most significant issue for the IC in its dealings with Serbia and the need for 
Serbia to fulfil its obligations under the Dayton agreement was the single most important 
issue for the IC during this time period. However, while democratic reform was not 
identified as a high priority in the immediate post-Dayton period, there was, nevertheless, 
some degree of international recognition that this was an area in which the Milosevic 
regime was clearly deficient. As such, although not emphasised as a key issue, IC 
representatives mentioned the need for democratic reform on occasion, and the IC 
condemned explicitly repressive measures such as the take over o f Studio B, although no 
punitive action was taken.
Challenges to the Milosevic regime
The 1996federal and local elections
Serbia’s democratic opposition parties entered the post-Dayton period in some 
disarray. The differences that had plagued them between 1993 and 1995 left the 
democratic opposition disunited with tensions not just between the parties but also within 
them. While splits occurred within the DS and the GSS, in spite o f their differences, and 
with federal and local elections due to take place in 1996, there was a feeling among the 
democratic opposition parties that defeating the Milosevic regime would require a degree
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While from early 1996 the SPO, the DS and the GSS had been co-operating in 
organising joint activities in preparation for the federal elections,28 the announcement, on 
14 August, that federal elections would take place on 3 November, provided an added 
impetus to formalise this co-operation in order to create an opposition electoral coalition 
to challenge the SPS, and on 2 September the Zajedno coalition formally came into 
existence. While Kostunica had spoken in favour o f opposition unity to fight the regime, 
arguing that this was made all the more important by the fact that the ‘regime is still 
operating and needed by external forces in the implementation of the Dayton accords,’29 
the DSS decided not to join the opposition alliance, voting on 8 September to contest the 
federal elections alone.30 Kostunica was opposed to his party joining the coalition on the 
grounds o f political differences between the DSS and the SPO.31
Having reached an agreement regarding participation in the forthcoming 
elections, the Zajedno leaders then approached Dragoslav Avramovic, to head the
of opposition co-operation.27
27 Attempts at opposition co-operation had begun in December 1995 when the DS, DSS, and two smaller 
parties formed a coalition known as the Democratic Alternative (Thomas, 1999: 255). In addition, all o f the 
opposition parties represented in the Serbian parliament had cooperated in protesting against a ban on live 
TV coverage o f the parliament (Tanjug, 13 December 1995 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts 
EE/D2487/A, 14 December 1995; The Associated Press, 26 December 1995).
28 The first demonstration organised by the parties took place in Belgrade in March to mark the fifth 
anniversary o f the March 1991 anti-regime protests. ( ‘Who’s Lying?’ Milan Milo§evi6, Vreme News Digest 
Agency No. 232, 19 March 1996; United Press International, 9 March 1996). Further jo in t demonstrations 
were held throughout Serbia in the following weeks and months.
29 Nasa Borba, 5 March 1996 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts EE/D2554/A, 6 March 1996. 
KoStunica’s statement that MiloSevid ‘was needed by external forces’ for the implementation o f the Dayton 
agreement was an expression o f an underlying feeling among much o f the opposition that Milosevic was in 
some sense supported by the IC. Although at this point this was not a major theme in opposition rhetoric it 
would become so in the following months.
30 The decision was taken with 91 members voting against joining Zajedno, 32 voting in favour, and 15 
abstaining (Tanjug, 8 September 1996 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D2713/A, 10 September 
1996).
31 ‘KoStunica Out o f the Game?’, Milan MiloSevid, Vreme News Digest Agency No. 258, 15 September
1996. The issue o f whether or not the DSS should contest the elections as part o f Zajedno was the source o f 
some conflict within the party, with some senior party members supporting participation.
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coalition. Avramovic, however, insisted that if he were to lead Zajedno in the federal 
elections, the DSS must be part o f the coalition, and threatened to withdraw and publicly 
blame the DSS if it did not participate. This pressure paid off, and on 1 October it was 
announced that the DSS would contest the federal elections as a member of the Zajedno 
coalition.33 Zajedno’s leaders hoped that their chances of success in the elections would 
be considerably boosted by Avramovic’s participation, and in October, opinion polls 
indicated that Avramovic was the most popular political figure in the country for 43% of 
the population, while Milosevic was favoured by only 29% (Thomas, 1999: 279). 
Zajedno was dealt a severe blow, however, when, on 9 October. Avramovic announced 
that he would be withdrawing from the coalition, citing ill health as the reason for his 
decision. Although the claims that he was withdrawing for health reasons were widely 
disbelieved, Avramovic never revealed any further reasons for his withdrawal, and even 
Pe§ic states that she never discovered why he had decided to do so (Pe§ic, 2000 173). 
However, in spite o f Avramovic’s departure the Zajedno coalition survived and managed 
to remain intact to contest the federal elections. The DSS contested the federal elections 
as part o f the Zajedno coalition, but participated independently at the local level.
In contrast to earlier elections where the national question had predominated, the 
central themes in the 1996 election campaigns were Serbia’s economic and social 
problems. As Sekelj notes, this shift was brought about by the SPS itself (Sekelj, 2000: 
67). The election campaign o f the SPS was centred on economic recovery and social
32 FoNet news agency, 24 September 1996 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D2727/A, 26 
September 1996. Avramovic was a highly popular and well-respected figure within Serbia at the time. As 
former governor o f the Yugoslav national bank he had introduced a stabilisation programme that brought 
the country’s hyperinflation under control.
33 Kostunica cited the changes to the federal electoral law and Avramovic’s threat to withdraw from the 
political scene as key factors influencing the DSS to alter its position with regard to participation in 
Zajedno. See ‘Opposition and the Elections,’ UroS Komlenovic, Vreme News Digest Agency No. 261, 6 
October 1996.
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development, with the campaign slogan ‘Serbia 2000: a Step into the New Century’ 
(Slavujevic, 1998: 105). The democratic opposition parties followed suit and also did not 
focus on the national question. Indeed, as Slavujevic notes, these parties ‘did not even 
call the regime to account’ for the loss o f Serb held territories in Croatia and Bosnia or 
the mass exodus of Serbs from Krajina (Slavujevic, 1998: 106).34
During the election campaign the democratic opposition parties became 
increasingly frustrated and angry at what they considered to be international support for 
Milosevic’s SPS party in the elections, reflecting a general belief that the West 
considered Milosevic to be a guarantor o f the Dayton agreement and therefore did not 
want to see him removed from power. Among their complaints, the opposition parties 
criticised western diplomats’ apparent willingness to be present on official visits with 
leading members of the ruling parties during the election campaign. According to a 
report in the Washington Post: ‘Throughout the Yugoslav electoral campaign, U.S. 
envoys visited state-run factories and met with high-ranking officials from Milosevic’s 
[SPS], leaving a strong impression that Washington backed the Socialists.’35
Aware that they were facing elections in grossly unfair conditions, the leaders of 
the Zajedno coalition wanted international supervision o f the November elections, and in 
early October they travelled to Brussels and appealed to Europe and the US to put 
pressure on Milosevic to accept international monitors, again bringing the regime’s 
legitimacy into question at the international level. During a press conference the coalition 
leaders stated that the west had to choose between supporting Milosevic to gain short­
34 Slavujevic goes on to point out that following the signing o f the Dayton agreement the DS softened its 
national posture, thereby enabling it to enter the Zajedno coalition, and the DSS, while never renouncing its 
national policy, could not express its ‘national hard line’ once it had entered Zajedno (Slavujevic, 1998: 
106-107).
35 The Washington Post, 4 November 1996. See also Thomas, 1999, pp. 281-282.
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term stability and supporting the opposition to guarantee long-term peace in the Balkans, 
and stressed that only with a democratically elected government would it be possible to 
resolve the conflict in Kosovo.36
Towards the end of October, with no arrangement in place for international 
monitors, the democratic opposition parties threatened to boycott the elections if they 
were not given a role in supervising the polls, and accused Milosevic of trying to prevent
77them from playing such a role. Furthermore, the democratic opposition parties clearly 
felt that the IC was not exerting sufficient pressure on Milosevic in this regard, going so 
far as to suggest that the IC, and in particular the US, was plotting with Milosevic to 
ensure that he retained power following the 1996 elections. Draskovic accused Milosevic 
of ‘arranging with the American government and the European Union to steal the 
forthcoming elections,’38 while Kostunica declared that ‘At this moment and for some 
reason there is no interest in the West to send observers to Serbia.’39 Senior DS member 
Slobodan Vuksanovic stated that ‘We all think Western countries support Milosevic and 
the socialist regime, and now we can freely say the Western world is on their side.’40 The 
Zajedno leaders were so incensed that they sent a letter to the US Embassy in Belgrade in 
which they asked for ‘an immediate, official and public explanation by the American 
government.’41
36 Associated Press Worldstream, 8 October 1996
37 Agence France Presse, 25 October 1996. DraSkovic claimed that Milosevic had ordered that Zajedno 
representatives ‘should be thrown out o f election committees en masse throughout Serbia’ and also alleged 
that a NiS SPS official, M ile Ilic, had claimed that he received an order from Milosevic to 'steal votes', and 
that this had been agreed with the US (Beta news agency, 25 October 1996 in BBC Summary o f World 
Broadcasts EE/D2754/A, 28 October 1996).
38 Agence France Presse, 25 October 1996.
39 Associated Press Worldstream, 25 October 1996
40 The Christian Science Monitor, 1 November 1996
41 Associated Press Worldstream, 25 October 1996
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The US embassy vigorously denied the charges, and US diplomat Jack Zetkulic 
stated that the US had recommended that the OSCE send observers.42 The OSCE 
however, stated that it would only be sending two election experts who would submit a 
report. The OSCE confirmed that the SRJ authorities had invited observers, but that the 
invitation had arrived too late to organise ‘a meaningful election observation.’43 In the 
end seventy-six international observers did turn up to monitor the 3 November elections 
with only days to prepare.44
The results o f the federal elections were a huge disappointment for the opposition. 
The SPS-JUL-ND45 coalition won 45.41% of the votes and sixty-four seats in the Federal 
Parliament a significant increase on the 31.5% secured by the SPS when it contested the 
1992 federal elections alone. Zajedno gained only 23.81% o f the vote and twenty-two 
parliamentary places which represented the opposition’s ‘greatest election defeat since 
1990,’ receiving almost 400,000 fewer votes than the four parties had won in the 1993 
Serbian elections (Milosevic, 2000: 178). However, compared to the 1992 federal 
elections, Zajedno received less than 1% fewer votes and three seats less than had 
DEPOS and the DS in 1992. Goati attributes the success o f the SPS-JUL-ND coalition to 
the ability of the SPS to portray the end o f the war in the former Yugoslavia and the 
lifting o f UN sanctions to the ‘peace-making policy’ of the SPS (Goati, 2001a: 84). 
Slavujevic also highlights this point, noting out that with the ‘triumphalist atmosphere 
that was created following the signing o f the Dayton agreement, Serbia’s population was
‘assured that stopping the war in [Bosnia] would lead to the elimination of sanctions
42 Associated Press Worldstream, 25 October 1996.
43 Associated Press Worldstream, 25 October 1996.
44 United Press International, 1 November 1996.
45 The SPS contested the election as part o f the ‘ left coalition’ which included the ND party and JUL, the 
party o f M ilosevic’s wife Miijana Markovid.
since the international community acknowledged the “consequent peace-making policy 
of the [SRJ], and particularly o f the President of Serbia, S. Milosevic”’ (Slavujevic, 1998: 
105).
Party PERCENTAGE OF 
VOTE
Seats
SPS-JUL-ND 45.41% 64 (59.26%)
Zajedno 23.81% 22 (20.37)
SRS 18.78% 16(14.81)
T ab le 3: E lection  results for the Y u goslav  C h am ber o f C itizens election  held  in Serbia in 1996
While Zajedno was disappointed with the results o f the federal election, at the 
municipal level the coalition did surprisingly well. Following the first round of voting on 
3 November, Zajedno was already in the lead in 14 o f Serbia’s major cities, including 
Belgrade, Novi Sad and Nis. After the second round of voting in the local elections held 
on 17 November this success was confirmed as Zajedno won a majority in 40 of Serbia’s 
189 municipalities (Anastasijevic, 2000: 46). On 18 November Slobodan Vuksanovic 
announced that Zajedno had won 70 o f the 110 seats in the Belgrade city assembly, and 
called on the SPS to accept the results.46 A victory rally was held in Belgrade on 18 
November at which Djindjic was introduced as the ‘new mayor of Belgrade’ (Thomas, 
1999: 285).
Accounting for the discrepancy between the failure o f the democratic opposition 
at the federal level and their success at the local level, Lazic argues that the regime
46 Beta news agency, 18 November 1996 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D2774/A, 20 
November 1996
enjoyed a number o f advantages at the federal level that did not apply in the case o f the 
local elections. He points out that, at the federal level, both the number of electoral units 
and their boundaries had been specifically designed to favour the SPS; that the opposition 
had no control over the electoral process at the federal level; and also that the abstention 
of Albanian voters in Kosovo, where the regime’s electoral manipulations were always 
high, resulted in the regime being able to take all the parliamentary seats for the province 
(Lazic, 1999: 13). He also notes that in Serbia’s urban centres, where Zajedno was most 
successful, support for the regime was much less than in its strongholds in villages and 
suburbs. As such, he claims that the Zajedno victories demonstrated the narrow support 
base of the regime (Lazic, 1999: 13).
While at first it seemed that the SPS was prepared to accept defeat in the local 
elections, with SPS spokesperson Ivica Dacic going so far as to publicly acknowledge 
that Zajedno had triumphed in Belgrade, it soon became clear that Milosevic and his 
associates were embarking on what Antonie describes as ‘the most unbelievable electoral 
theft in the political history of Serbia’47 (Antonie, 2002: 189). According to Goati, ‘the 
ruling regime in Serbia ... managed through the electoral commissions and courts, to 
either alter the results o f the local elections or cancel them and call ... new elections 
(Goati, 2001a: 89).48
47 Author’s translation.
48 The regime carried out this electoral theft in two ways. Wherever possible they simply changed the 
results o f the voting to the benefit o f the SPS, as happened in Ni§, or they annulled the elections in those 
municipalities where the opposition had won and called for a repeat o f the voting, as was the case in 
Belgrade. For a detailed description o f the procedures the regime used to overturn the results o f the local 
elections see Rakic-Vodinelic et al, 1997, Izborna kradja: Pravni aspekt, Belgrade: Medija Centar. In 
addition to accusations o f electoral fraud on the part o f the opposition parties, legal experts and even 
members o f the judiciary were also a source o f pressure on Milosevic at this time, as they questioned the 
legality o f the regime’s actions and complained about its manipulation o f the courts. See IPS-Inter Press 
Service, 25 November 1996 and Nasa Borba, 3 December 1996, in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts 
EE/D2787/A, 5 December 1996.
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The Winter Protests
The attempts on the part of the authorities to overturn the victories o f the Zajedno 
coalition in the local elections resulted in the largest and most prolonged anti-government 
protests that had taken place in Serbia since Milosevic came to power.49 The 
demonstrations consisted of two separate but parallel protests. The first was that led by 
the Zajedno coalition, while the second was a protest organised by students, who from the 
outset emphasised the ‘non-party nature of their movement.’50 While the students 
emphasised that they were not affiliated with any political party or coalition, it is also 
clear that not all the protestors who took part in the Zajedno-led demonstrations 
considered themselves to be supporters o f the coalition.51
As the DSS had not participated as part o f Zajedno in the local elections, the party 
was somewhat marginalized at this time, but it condemned the actions of the Milosevic 
regime in its attempts to overturn the election result and expressed support for opposition 
aims to prevent this. A DSS statement issued on 26 November argued that the ‘main goal 
of the opposition should be to have general elections held under regular conditions’, and
49 Anastasijevic summarises the extent o f the protests: ‘ the Zajedno-led protests lasted 88 days, until mid- 
February 1997, while the parallel student protests lasted for 117 days. Thousands o f citizens turned out for 
the rallies, which were held in some 50 Serbian towns; on some occasions, as many as 300,000 people took 
to the streets o f Belgrade’ (Anastasijevid, 2000: 47).
50 Throughout the duration o f the protests the students maintained that they were not affiliated with any 
political party or coalition, and that their demonstrations were independent o f those o f the Zajedno rallies, 
although they did share the same aims in regard to the electoral fraud perpetrated by the regime. The 
students’ demands were widened to include the resignation o f Dragan VeliCkovic, the rector o f Belgrade 
University, and Vojin Djurdjevic, the student president, following Velidkovic's claim that there were no 
student protests but a small group o f 'misguided youths' had been gathering in the streets (Beta news 
agency, 5 December 1996 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts EE/D2788/A, 6 December 1996).
51 Research undertaken to determine the political orientation o f the protestors indicated that Zajedno 
supporters accounted for just over half o f those who took part (51.5%), and that 30.3% claimed that they 
were neither members nor sympathisers o f any political party. Furthermore, 18% were supporters o f 
opposition parties that were not members o f the Zajedno coalition (Babovitf, 1999: 42).
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to this end urged the opposition parties not to accept the seats won in either the federal or 
local elections, and to return the seats they held in the Serbian parliament.52 In mid- 
January 1997, the DSS decided to formally leave the Zajedno coalition, with Kostunica 
citing irreconcilable differences in relation to ‘solving the state and national issues, the 
implementation of the Dayton agreement, and the Serbs outside the [SRJ].53 Kostunica 
did say, however, that the DSS and Zajedno would continue to cooperate, though as two 
separate political organisations, and asserted that the DSS ‘must maintain its individuality 
and it cannot be part o f any political organisation,’ not even Zajedno.54
The reaction o f the IC to the protests
From the outset, the democratic opposition parties had sought the assistance o f the 
IC in defending its election victories against Milosevic’s attempts to overturn them, with 
Draskovic first appealing to the US and the EU to help ensure that Milosevic respect the 
election results as early as 18 November. EU countries and the US, he stated, ‘must force 
Milosevic to respect the election results.’55 Furthermore, on 20 November Draskovic, 
Djindjic and Pesic met with representatives of the US and European governments in
52 Beta news agency, 26 November 1996 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE//A, 28 November
1996.
53 Blic, 13 January 1997, in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D2817/A, 15 January 1997. Speaking 
in December 1996 KoStunica outlined the differences between his party and that parties that were at the 
core o f the Zajedno coalition, demonstrating the more nationalist orientation o f the DSS: ‘We agree with 
the Zajedno coalition that the most important aim is democracy. We, however, place priority on solving the 
questions o f the federal state, Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak, the Republika Srpska, the issue o f national 
identity, while Djindjic, DraSkovic and Pe§ic place priority on social and economic questions’ (Thomas, 
1999:324).
54 Blic, 13 January 1997, in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D2817/A, 15 January 1997
55 Agence France Presse, 18 November 1996
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Belgrade to discuss the situation.56 In a meeting with Richard Miles, Draskovic requested 
that a team of legal experts be sent from the US to Belgrade to help resolve the 
situation.57 The US did not accede to this request.
Calls for international support on the part o f Zajedno’s leaders reflected the belief 
within the Serbian opposition that IC support would be very important in terms o f getting 
the elections results recognised. Ilija Djukic, a Zajedno spokesperson on foreign affairs, 
emphasised that while ultimately the onus lay with the opposition, ‘the help and 
understanding of the international community ... is very important.’58 The opposition 
leaders clearly believed that Milosevic would be amenable to international pressure. 
According to Djindjic: ‘Milosevic is a typical Balkans dictator and despises his own 
people. He doesn’t care if a million people protest against him, but if President Clinton 
gives him a call, he will care.’59 In a similar vein DraSkovic stated: ‘The American 
administration knows quite well how to deal with Milosevic. If they made him sign peace 
for Bosnia, they certainly can make him return our election victory.’60
While the Zajedno leaders believed that IC support would be an important factor 
in their campaign to have their electoral victories recognised, it was also the case that 
they believed that the IC was supporting Milosevic because o f his role as a signatory of 
the Dayton peace agreement. This is clear in Djukic’s comments on a meeting with IC 
representatives at the beginning of the protests. Djukic stated that the IC had a ‘collision
56 Beta news agency, 20 November 1996 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D2776/A, 22 
November 1996. At this meeting the democratic opposition parties provided the IC representatives with 
evidence o f the electoral manipulation in Ni§.
57 United Press International, 20 November 1996. DraSkovic reiterated this request at a rally in Belgrade a 
week into to the protests, stating that ‘We invite international experts o f the European Union and the 
American government to come here immediately to see the evidence (o f electoral fraud) which we have 
obtained’ (Agence France Presse, 24 November 1996)
58 ‘A ll Things Considered’, National Public Radio, Transcript # 96112713-212, 27 November 1996
59 The Associated Press, 29 November 1996
60 The Associated Press, 5 December 1996
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of priorities’ and was ‘squeezed’ between a wish to maintain good relations with 
Milosevic because o f Dayton, and the recognition that Serbia must democratise.61 
Commenting on the reaction o f the IC representatives at the meeting, Djukic stated that: 
‘They said very little. They need Milosevic. He is guaranteeing the Dayton agreement for 
them.’ Draskovic was also critical o f the IC at this time, stating that ‘They refuse to see 
the worst sort o f crime is being perpetrated here: a crime committed by the state.’63 
Similarly, Srdja Popovic, who was one of the Zajedno candidates to have his seat 
overturned by the Belgrade courts, seemed let down by the lack of concrete action on the 
part of the IC and asked: ‘Where are the Western powers? A lot o f people were looking 
to the West, but they are now disappointed. Where are the election observers now?’64 
One of the leaders o f the student protests, Zarko Mihailovic, also expressed 
disappointment with the response o f the US, stating that ‘As a country that says it 
supports democratic values we expected more from America.’65 There was also some 
frustration among the protestors themselves with regard to the perception that the West 
was supporting Milosevic. On 27 November an American flag was set alight outside the 
US embassy in Belgrade, while some protestors carried banners stating that ‘US serves 
communists.’66
The initial response o f the IC to events in Serbia following the elections of 17 
November was muted. As Antonie notes, for the first few days following the elections, 
the only comments from any IC representatives came in response to direct questions from
61 The Washington Post, 26 November 1996
62 The Guardian (London), 26 November 1996
63 The Independent (London), 26 November 1996
64 The Guardian (London), 26 November 1996
65 The New York Times, 28 November 1996
66 Associated Press Worldstream, 27 November 1996
222
f i ljournalists (Antonie, 2002: 194). As events developed, however, the IC became more 
critical in its response to events in Serbia. The US government was probably the most 
vocal international critic of the Milosevic regime throughout the duration of the protests, 
and the first international comments on the events in Serbia came from a US State 
Department spokesperson. Expressing US concern over reports that Milosevic had tried 
to ‘affect the process o f vote counting,’ the spokesperson called for more openness in the 
process, urging the authorities ‘to resolve this issue in a democratic fashion o f precisely 
who won in these various municipalities around Serbia.’68 On 27 November the State 
Department, for the first time, called for Milosevic to reverse the decision to annul the 
elections.69
While the US was critical of the Milosevic regime’s decision to annul the election 
results, and repeatedly called for this decision to be reversed, initially the US did little 
other than emphasise that the ‘outer wall’ o f sanctions that the US maintained against the
7 0SRJ, would not be removed. The State Department did emphasise that it also retained 
the option of trying to have UN sanctions reimposed on the SRJ; though at no point did it 
take steps in this direction. Furthermore, given Russia’s and China’s insistence that the 
local elections were an internal matter for Serbia, the agreement o f the Security Council 
to such a move was unlikely.71 In addition, the réintroduction of multilateral sanctions 
would not have been welcomed by the opposition parties, with Pesic noting that Serbia’s
67 Author’s translation
68 US Department o f State, Daily Press Briefing, 21 November 1996.
69 US Department o f State, Daily Press Briefing, 27 November 1996.
70 US Department o f State, Daily Press Briefing, 26 November 1996.
71 Illustrative o f the difficulties that the US would have faced i f  it had tried to take this course o f action, is 
its failure to persuade the participants at a Peace Implementation Conference in London on 4 and 5 
December to issue a statement condemning Serbia (Associated Press Worldstream, 4 December 1996). At 
this meeting Strobe Talbott met with Milutinovié to discuss the situation in Serbia, in what was described 
as ‘a very tough meeting’ (US Department o f State Daily Press Briefing, 4 December 1996).
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renewed isolation would suit Milosevic, while Djindjic pointed out that sanctions had
n'xdone little to weaken the regime in the past. Both leaders argued that any international 
measures taken should directly target the Milosevic regime.74
Criticism of the Serbian authorities’ actions also came from the White House. On 
10 December Clinton stated that the election results should be respected and noted while 
neither the US ‘nor anyone else, would seek to interfere in the internal events in Serbia 
... our sympathies are always with free people who are struggling to express their 
freedom and want to have the integrity o f their elections respected.’75 Clinton’s statement 
that the US did not want to interfere in Serbia’s internal affairs reflected the lack of desire 
on the part o f the US, or any other international actor, to use the issue of Milosevic’s 
abuse of the elections to help bring about a change o f government in the SRJ.76 This was 
also evident in Christopher’s comments when he stated that reform with Milosevic in 
power was not impossible.77 Thus, while the US was supportive o f the demands that the 
opposition’s election victories should be respected, there was no support for the demands 
made by some opposition leaders that Milosevic should resign.
79
72 ‘M i necemo sankcije’ , PeSic interviewed in NIN, No. 2389, 13 December 1996. Author’s translation.
73 Deutschlandfunk radio, Cologne, 3 January 1997, in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D2808/A, 4 
January 1997.
74 ‘M i necemo sankcije’ , Pe§ic interviewed in NIN, No. 2389, 13 December 1996 (Author’s translation); 
Deutschlandfunk radio, Cologne, 3 January 1997, in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D2808/A, 4 
January 1997. On a visit to the US in December, Perisid and Labus o f the DS also spoke in favour o f 
sanctions targeted against the MiloSevid regime, with Labus arguing that sanctions could be imposed 
against the ’20 families which own most o f Serbia’s assets’ (Associated Press Worldstream, 11 December 
1996). The US rejected these suggestions, with an unnamed US State Department official claiming that this 
would take too much time, and that ‘By the time we identified these assets, they would certainly have 
melted away’ . (Associated Press Worldstream, 11 December 1996).
75 Associated Press Worldstream, 10 December 1996.
76 A  lack o f w ill to interfere in Serbia’s internal affairs in this way was also implicit in the remarks made by 
an unnamed ‘UK Foreign Office o ffic ia l’ who explained that the issue o f the Serbian local elections would 
not be raised at the PIC in London in early December because Serbia’s future must be decided by its own 
people and not the IC (AFX News, 3 December 1996).
77 US Department o f State, Press Briefing by Secretary o f State Warren Christopher, 9 December 1996.
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The US was also quite explicit in stating that it did not support the Serbian 
opposition per se, but only its demands that the electoral will o f Serbia’s citizens should 
be respected. According to State Department spokesperson, Nicholas Bums, ‘We have 
not become here the political backers or supporters of a particular political party in 
Serbia. We are trying to uphold, along with all our allies in Europe, democratic principles 
that we think a modem European state should adhere to.’78 In this regard it is worth 
noting that the US continued to call for dialogue between the Serbian government and the 
opposition in an attempt to resolve the crisis, and did not insist that the election results 
need to be recognised before this took place.79 This was at odds with the position o f the 
Zajedno leaders that dialogue would not be possible until the regime reversed the 
annulment o f the 17 November elections and recognised its victories. Pesic made this 
clear at the protest meeting on 15 December: ‘We cannot haggle with anyone over 17th 
November. We want to discuss everything, but first of all we want the truth about 17th 
November. This is a condition above all conditions.’80
As the crisis progressed, the US did, to some extent, increase the level o f Serbia’s
Ojdiplomatic isolation. A meeting between Komblum and Milosevic, due to take place in 
December in Belgrade, was cancelled, with the State Department explaining that ‘given 
the current situation ... [Komblum] decided it would not be appropriate to go to Belgrade
78 US Department o f State, Daily Press Briefing, 12 December 1996.
79 US Department o f State, Daily Press Briefing, 12 December 1996.
80 Beta news agency, 15 December 1996 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts EE/D2797/A, 17
December 1996. The same point was also made by DraSkovic following his meeting with Komblum in
Geneva, when he stated that ‘ there w ill be no dialogue with MiloSevid until he recognises all our election 
victories’ (Associated Press Worldstream, 16 December 1996). Similarly, Djindjid, responding to an 
initiative from the SPS to hold panel discussion in the Serbian parliament, stated that: ‘There is no 
compromise with them. We have nothing to discuss with the regime which has brought Serbia to the brink 
o f disaster, except the way in which they ought to leave’ (Beta news agency, 14 December 1996 in BBC 
Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D2796/A, 16 December 1996).
81 In addition, on 6 December President Clinton extended for a further year the sanctions that the US had in 
place against the SRJ (Agence France Presse, 6 December 1996). However, US dissatisfaction with Serbia 
over co-operation with the ICTY suggests that this decision would have been taken in any case.
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at this time.’ In a show of support for the opposition, Komblum did, however, meet 
with Draskovic and other Zajedno representatives on 15 December in Geneva, following 
which he praised the Zajedno leaders, stating that ‘These three leaders are impressive in 
their discipline, in their goals and in their desire to work with all parts o f Yugoslav 
society to establish a true democracy there.’ 83
The EU’s response to Milosevic’s attempts at electoral fraud was weaker than that 
of the US, and its first statement addressing the elections angered the Zajedno coalition. 
The statement, issued on 22 November, ‘noted opposition allegations of irregularities’ 
and urged that ‘the re-run of the elections in the areas identified by the electoral 
commission is conducted in full accordance with international democratic norms.’84 The 
Zajedno coalition leaders interpreted the EU’s call that democratic norms be adhered to 
in the third round of elections as an endorsement of the third round of voting, which the 
coalition regarded as illegitimate as they had already won the elections. In response to the 
EU statement, Zajedno sent a strongly worded letter to EU ministers, accusing them of 
giving a free hand to thieves to steal the elections again. The letter went on to point out 
that the EU governments knew that voting had been annulled only in towns in which the 
democratic opposition had won and stated that EU support for the annulling of the 
elections was ‘strange and incomprehensible’85 (Antonie, 2002: 195). A further statement
R9
82 US Department o f State Daily Press Briefing, 10 December 1996.
83 Associated Press Worldstream, 15 December 1996.
84 ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf o f the European Union on the local elections in the Federal 
Republic o f Yugoslavia,’22 November 1996.
85 Author’s translation. In contrast, the US State Department’s position regarding the third round o f voting 
was closer to that o f Zajedno. At its Daily Press Briefing on 27 November, Bums stated that Milosevic had 
‘manufactured’ the elections and that ‘holding run-off elections is not acceptable’ (US Department o f State, 
Daily Press Briefing, 27 November 1996). The OSCE also questioned the holding o f a third round, stating 
that ‘ it is puzzling to see that the third round o f the elections took place especially in those constituencies 
where the political opposition had won strong positions’ (Statement o f the Chairman-in -O ffice o f the 
OSCE on the situation in the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia, 29 November 1996).
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was issued by the EU on 2 December, expressing concern at events in Serbia,86 but it did 
not, in contrast to the demands from the US State Department, call on Milosevic to 
reverse the decision to annul the elections.
While the EU was less forthright in its demands that the Milosevic regime reverse 
the annulment o f the elections, it did, with US encouragement, delay extending trade 
privileges to the SRJ while the situation with the elections remained unresolved.87 The 
EU had agreed in principle to offer preferential import arrangements to the SRJ, as it had 
done to other former Yugoslav republics. However, at a meeting of the EU’s Council of 
Foreign Affairs Ministers on 25 November, a statement was issued in which the EU said 
that it was postponing the decision on the matter until 6 December, pending an 
explanation of the decision to annul the election results and hold a third round of voting.88 
At the 6 December meeting the EU again refused to extend trade privileges to the SRJ.89 
In its statement the EU expressed a willingness to co-operate with the SRJ, ‘as long as the 
country respects human rights, complies with the Dayton Peace Agreements and settles 
the controversy over the recent elections.’90
In spite of these expressions o f international support, in mid-December, the 
Zajedno leaders were angered by comments made by Italian foreign minister, Lamberto 
Dini following a visit to Belgrade. Dini arrived in Belgrade on 12 December and met 
with both Milosevic and the opposition leaders, who informed him that they would stick
86 ‘D eclaration  by the P residency  on b eh a lf o f  the E uropean U nion on the local elections in the Federal 
R epublic o f  Y u g o s lav ia ’, 2 D ecem ber 1996.
87 T he US State D epartm en t had appealed  to the EU  not to g ran t trade p riv ileges to the SRJ at this tim e. A 
spokesperson  stated  that the U S ‘has m ade it c lear to ou r E uropean  partners that we oppose that. T his is not 
the tim e for business as norm al w ith Serbia. T his is the tim e to stand up toge ther and confron t the Serbian 
G o vernm ent ab ou t its frankly  ou trageous behav io ur tow ards its ow n p e o p le ’ (U S D epartm en t o f  State D aily  
Press B riefing , 3 D ecem ber 1996).
88 European Report, E uropean  Inform ation  Service, 27 N o vem b er 1996.
89 A ssocia ted  Press W orldstream , 6 D ecem ber 1996.
90 European Report, E uropean  In form ation  Service, 11 D ecem ber 1996.
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to their demands for recognition o f the results of the 17 November elections. Speaking at 
a press conference after his meetings Dini emphasised the need to resolve the situation 
but described demands for a reversal of the election results as ‘unrealistic’ and the results 
of the elections as ‘something irreversible, something that cannot be changed as the 
opposition would like’.91 The Zajedno leaders expressed surprise at Dini’s statement, 
with Vuksanovic stating that the DS would be sending a letter to the Italian government 
expressing its disagreement with what Dini had said,92 while Draskovic claimed that 
Dini’s statement showed support for ‘legal terrorism committed against the electoral will 
of the Serbian people.’93
Other international institutions with a direct interest in the former Yugoslavia that 
commented on the situation in Serbia included the OSCE and NATO. On November 29 
the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Flavio Cotti, issued a statement which stated that he was 
‘extremely concerned about the shortcomings, irregularities and violations o f law which 
occurred during the vote verification process’ and offered OSCE assistance to resolve the 
matter.94 In December, NATO also addressed the annulment o f the elections, condemning 
the decision to annul the election results and calling on the Serbian government to 
‘respect the democratic will o f the people by reversing that decision,’ while commending 
the ‘opposition for its adherence to non-violence.’95
91 R adio B 92, 12 D ecem ber 1996 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2795/A , 14 D ecem ber 1996.
92 T anjug , 13 D ecem ber 1996 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2796/A , 16 D ecem ber 1996.
93 A gence F rance P resse, 13 D ecem ber 1996. DraSkovic also  cla im ed that D ini had em phasised  that 
M ilosevic w as needed to im plem ent D ayton, and that D ini had said that ‘the patrio tic  duty o f  [Zajedno] is 
to recognise the reality  in Serbia and to open dialogue w ith the S erbian  p res id en t.’
94 S tatem ent o f  the C hairm an-in -O ffice  o f  the O S C E  on the situation  in the Federal R epublic o f  Y ugoslavia , 
29 N o vem ber 1996.
95 ‘S tatem en t on B osn ian  and H erzeg ov ina’, P ress C om m unique M -N A C -2 (96)166 . Issued at the 
M inisterial M eeting  o f  the N o rth  A tlantic C ouncil, 10 D ecem ber 1996.
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Throughout the protests two issues drew particularly strong international 
condemnations: regime attempts to stifle the independent media, and the use o f force 
against demonstrators. The regime attempted to halt reports o f the protests that were 
taking place by jamming the broadcasts o f independent radio station B92,96 and then, on 
3 December ordering that the station be closed down on the grounds that it was operating 
without a legal permit. On the same day another independent radio station, the student- 
run Radio Indeks, claimed that its transmissions were being disrupted.97 Condemnation of 
Milosevic’s actions against the independent media came from a wide variety o f 
international actors, including the US State Department,98 the White House,99 and the 
EU,100 and appears to have had some success in forcing him to reconsider. Two days 
later, on December 5, B92 was allowed to resume broadcasting; an outcome that the 
Zajedno leaders believed had a lot to do with international pressure. Commenting on the 
decision to allow B92 back on air, Djindjic stated that ‘If it wasn’t for us there would be 
no Western pressure. But without the United States [Milosevic] would not have given us 
anything. He doesn’t care what we do or think. He only cares about Clinton or Kohl’.101
While initially the response o f the authorities to the demonstrations was simply to 
ignore them, as they continued the regime did resort to force to deal with the protestors
96 T he A ssociated  P ress, 29 N o vem b er 1996.
97 T he A ssociated  Press, 3 D ecem ber 1996.
98 US D epartm en t o f  State D aily  Press B riefing , 3 D ecem ber 1996.
99 T he A ssocia ted  Press, 4 D ecem ber 1996. In addition  to co ndem ning  the reg im e’s actions, the US also
took concrete steps to underm ine M ilo sev ic ’s ab ility  to restric t the flow  o f  in form ation  w ith in Serbia by 
announcing  that the V oice o f  A m erica radio  service w ould carry  b roadcasts from  B 92 w hile the station  w as 
o f f  the air. See US D epartm en t o f  S tate D aily  Press B riefing, 4 D ecem ber 1996.
100 D eclaration  by the P residency  on b eh a lf  o f  the E uropean  U n ion  on developm ents in the Federal
R epublic o f  Y u g o slav ia ’, 4 D ecem ber 1996; R A PID , C om m ission  o f  the E uropean  C om m unities, 4 
D ecem ber 1996.
101 The Washington Post, 6 D ecem ber 1996. It is w orth  noting  that w hile the IC w as vocal in its 
condem nation  o f  the closure o f  B 92, its ed itor, V eran  M atic, po in ted  ou t tha t the independent m edia in 
Serbia had had no in ternational assistance in 1996. Speaking in the U S, M atic stated: ‘T he U nited States 
have no program s to help the free m edia in Serbia; in 1996, we received no suppo rt at all from  the 
E uropean U nion e ith e r’ (T he A ssocia ted  Press, 12 D ecem ber 1996).
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on a number of occasions, most notably on 24 December 1996. In mid-December, 
Milosevic had begun to organise pro-government demonstrations to rival the Zajedno 
rallies which were intended to culminate in a meeting in Belgrade on 24 December. 
Thomas suggests that this move was intended to ‘demonstrate to the international 
community that a ‘silent majority’ o f Serbs remained loyal to Milosevic’ (Thomas, 1999: 
302). However, some figures close to Milosevic at the time claim that the purpose o f the 
meeting to be held in Belgrade on 24 December was to give Milosevic the opportunity to 
declare a state o f emergency, call in the army and ban the demonstrations.102 When 
Milosevic’s supporters arrived, fighting broke out between them and the opposition 
supporters and at one point an opposition supporter was shot in the head.103
Reacting to these events, Strobe Talbott noted that the US held ‘the Serbian 
government and its president, Slobodan Milosevic, responsible for the violent actions of 
the demonstrators,’ and warned that ‘violence against the protestors will have serious 
consequences and will inevitably lead to Serbia’s further isolation from the international 
community.’104 The EU also condemned Milosevic for the violence that occurred on 24 
December, asserting that ‘Any action by the Serbian authorities to repress the rights of
102 B oth  SRJ p residen t Z oran  Lili<5 and NebojSa C ovie cla im  that this w as the case. A ccord ing  to Li lie: 
‘Som e people w anted a rio t tha t day. T hey  could  declare a state o f  em ergency  and use it to put an end to the 
c ris is ’ ( ‘T he Fall o f  M iloSeviC’, ep isode 1 B BC  docum entary  series b road cast on 5 January  2003).
103 A ccord ing  to the then M ayor o f  B elgrade, NebojSa C ovic, there w ere no po lice on the streets at this tim e 
to try and p revent the v iolence. CoviC claim s that he called P ublic Security  M in ister R adovan Stojidid to 
ask w here the po lice  w ere, and Stojidic inform ed him  that M ilosevic had forb idden  him  to deploy any 
police. O n ly  w hen C ovic th rea tened  to jo in  the dem onstrators i f  the po lice w ere not ca lled  in w ith in  20 
m inutes, did M ilosev ic  order them  to stop the fighting . Covid m akes these claim s in ‘The Fall o f  
M iloSevid’, ep isode 1 B B C  docum entary  series b roadcast on 5 January  2003.
104 Federal N ew s Service, S tate D epartm en t B riefing , S tatem en t by  A cting  S ecretary  o f  State S trobe 
T albott, 24 D ecem ber 1996.
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the Serbian people can only lead to the further diplomatic, political and economic 
isolation of Serbia. ’105
Following the violence that occurred on 24 December, Milosevic’s regime began 
to take a harder line against the demonstrators and on 25 December Belgrade police 
issued a statement saying that demonstrations that block the flow of traffic would no 
longer be tolerated, and that the police would take action to prevent any further 
disturbance of public order.106 This prompted German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel to 
state that ‘If President Milosevic thinks, as would seem to be the case, that he can ban 
demonstrations by arguing they cause traffic problems, he would be well advised to think 
again in the light of the return to Europe which Belgrade itself desires.’107 Although the 
demonstrators continued to assemble in Belgrade’s Republic Square, the police prevented 
them from walking through the city, as they had been doing since the protests began.
In summary, while the IC was initially slow to react to the attempts by the 
Milosevic regime to annul the local election results, all international actors that were 
involved in dealing with Serbia at this time condemned the regime’s actions, with the US 
and the EU making moves to increase the isolation of the regime in response to these 
actions. The events that led to the harshest international criticism of the regime were the 
attempts to stifle the independent media that were reporting the protests and the use of 
violence against the protestors. In contrast to the international condemnation of the 
regime, the opposition was praised for its efforts to ensure that the demonstrations 
remained peaceful. The decision of the regime to allow B92 to continue to operate 
following international protests indicates that international pressure could be effective.
105 T he Press A ssocia tion , 27 D ecem ber 1996.
106 IP S -In ter Press Service, 26 D ecem ber 1996.
107 A gence F rance P resse, 26 D ecem ber 1996.
231
The OSCE Mission
In the second week o f December Warren Christopher wrote to Milosevic 
reiterating the US position that he ought to respect the results o f 17 November elections. 
Milosevic’s response was to issue an open letter to Christopher, denying accusations that
there had been any electoral fraud, and inviting an OSCE delegation to Belgrade to be
108informed of the facts. This was followed by a letter to the OSCE from Milan 
Milutinovic, inviting a delegation to Belgrade ‘because o f the dissatisfaction with the 
election results and objections formulated by the opposition party.’109
On 20 December, the OSCE mission, headed by former Spanish prime minister 
Felipe Gonzalez, left for Belgrade, with a mandate to ‘seek information from all political 
forces, institutions, and from the judiciary about facts and events relating to the municipal 
elections in the [SRJ], including the annulment of their results’ and to make ‘any 
recommendations that he deems appropriate.’ In addition, Gonzalez was also to ‘discuss 
the situation of democratic rights, media and national minorities’ and to ‘explore ways 
and means in which the OSCE can provide assistance in ensuring that his 
recommendations are implemented.110
International pressure on Milosevic increased considerably when Gonzalez 
released his report on 27 December, upholding the opposition’s claims that they had won 
in the local elections in fourteen of Serbia’s major towns and cities, including Belgrade.
108 T anjug , 13 D ecem ber 1996 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 2795/A , 14 D ecem ber 1996. 
T hom as suggests that M ilosev ic w as encouraged  to m ake this m ove because he in terpre ted  D in i’s rem arks, 
m ade the previous day, as ‘m ark ing  the lim its o f  W estern  w illingness to suppo rt Z ajedno  and the street 
p ro tes to rs’ (T hom as, 1999: 301).
109 A gence F rance Presse, 14 D ecem ber 1996.
110 O SC E Press R elease, P ersonal R epresen ta tive o f  the O S C E  C hairm an -in -O ffice leaves for B elgrade 
today, 20 D ecem ber 1996.
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Declaring that the election results had been annulled on the basis o f arguments ‘that no
democratic country could have accepted,’ Gonzalez recommended that the OSCE issue
an urgent call on the Serbian government ‘to implement the will of the citizens as
expressed in the polls.’111 Gonzalez also noted that there were ‘deficiencies (of a
structural nature) in the electoral system’ and ‘obstacles confronting the independent
information media and serious difficulties standing in the way to free and fair access to 
112the public media.’ The OSCE subsequently endorsed Gonzalez’ report, and called for 
its ‘swift and full’ implementation.113
While the Serbian authorities initially appeared to welcome the report, which it 
described as ‘constructive’ and ‘balanced,’114 it soon became clear that they did not 
intend to implement Gonzalez’ recommendations and recognise the Zajedno victories. In 
its official response to the OSCE the regime did concede that the Zajedno coalition had 
won in three o f the contested towns and in a number o f contested municipalities in 
Belgrade, but denied that they had won in the other contested towns, and did not mention 
the elections for the Belgrade city assembly.115
Given that an international organisation now supported the claims of the Zajedno 
leaders that their votes had been stolen, and given the fact that the Serbian authorities had 
been held responsible for the violence that occurred on 24 December, the Milosevic 
regime now came under increased international pressure. The US State Department was 
critical o f the Serbian response to the OSCE, asserting that it ‘does not go nearly far
1,1 The Guardian (London), 28 D ecem ber 1996.
112 P relim inary  R eport o f  the O SC E  E lectio n  O bservation  M ission , Presiden tial and Parliam entary  E lection, 
R epublic o f  Serbia, S ep tem ber 21, 1997.
113 A gence F rance Presse, 3 January  1997.
114 T anjug , 27 D ecem ber 1996 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2804/A , 30 D ecem ber 1996.
1,5 T anjug , 3 January  1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2808/A , 6 January  1997.
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enough in acknowledging the obligations of the Serbian Government to make sure that it 
respects the voice of the people.’116 In addition to the US, many other foreign ministries 
called for Milosevic to accept the Gonzalez report in full, including the UK,117 France,118 
Germany and the Netherlands.119 Furthermore, the EU released a statement on 9 January 
which called on the Serbian authorities to recognise the results of the 17 November 
elections. The statement pointed out that ‘only reform directed towards full 
démocratisation and the liberalisation of the political and economic system, in dialogue 
with the opposition, as well as respect for human rights and for the rights of minorities 
will bring a solution to the present problems and allow the full integration of the [SRJ] 
into the international community.’120
With Milosevic showing no sign o f backing down, on 11 January Komblum 
announced a series of measures, the intention o f which, according to the State 
Department, was to ‘tighten the pressure on Mr. Milosevic and to demonstrate to him that 
there is a penalty to the type o f behaviour that he has shown.’121 The US plan included 
the minimising of political and economic relations with Belgrade, and ensuring that 
international attention continued to be focused on events in Serbia. In addition, the State 
Department also said that the US ‘was seriously considering increasing, in the short term, 
our assistance to those groups in Serbia that stand for democracy,’ and that the US
116 US D epartm en t o f  State, D aily  Press B riefing, 3 January  1997.
117 A gence F rance P resse, 3 January  1997.
118 A gence F rance Presse, 4 January  1997.
119 A gence F rance P resse, 8 January  1997.
120 ‘D eclaration  by the Presidency  on B eh a lf o f  the E uropean  U nion  on the S ituation  in the F R Y ,’ 
PE SC /97/1 , 9 January  1997.
121 US D epartm en t o f  State, D aily  Press B riefing, 13 January  1997.
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‘would like to help non-profit organisations, non-governmental organisations to try to 
identify the obstacles to démocratisation’ in Serbia.122
Faced with this mounting internal and international pressure, Milosevic finally 
accepted defeat and, on 4 February, asked Marjanovic that the Serbian parliament pass a 
special law allowing for the recognition o f the Zajedno victories in the local elections.123 
Outlining his reasons for taking this step, Milosevic claimed that the disputes over the 
elections had ‘caused great damage to our country both domestically and internationally’ 
and that ‘the state interest of improving relations o f our country with the international 
community by far exceeds the significance o f any number o f seats in a handful of 
cities.’124
The opposition leaders reacted cautiously to this move,125 and initially it was 
unclear whether the Zajedno leaders would call off their protests even if the elections 
results were finally recognised. All pointed to the fact that there were a considerable 
number of other conditions to satisfy before Serbia could be fully democratised. Djindjic 
articulated this in an interview on 4 February, stating that: ‘This is the first step, but it is 
not enough. It should be followed by establishing the responsibility o f those who violated 
and overstepped their powers. I would also like to remind the citizens that the state media 
must open up. Only then can we start to talk and only then will our peaceful protest
122 US D epartm en t o f  State, D aily  Press B riefing , 13 January  1997. Fo llow ing  the events o f  1996/1997 the 
N ational D em ocratic  Institu te and the In ternational R epub lican  Institu te began  to provide a relatively  sm all 
am ount o f  dém ocratisation  assistance to Serbia (See G agnon, 1998). T h a t U S dém ocratisation  assistance 
w as at a low  level was acknow ledged  by the S tate D epartm en t in D ecem ber 1998 w hen a spokesperson  
stated  that ‘we do not go around prom oting  dem ocratic  change in Serbia as we do in o ther p la ce s’ (U S 
D epartm en t o f  State D aily  B riefing , 1 D ecem ber 1998).
123 T his m ove cam e tw o days after the m ost v io lent n ight the pro tests had seen, during  w hich police 
attacked dem onstrators, m any o f  w hom , inc lud ing  PeSic, w ere badly  beaten  by the police, and w hich led to 
further in ternational critic ism  o f  the regim e.
124 T he A ssociated  Press, 4 F ebruary  1997.
125 B eta news agency , 5 February  1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2837/A , 7 F ebruary
1997.
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stop.’126 However, this changed on 6 February when, following a meeting with France’s 
foreign minister in Paris, Draskovic announced that the protests would be halted once the 
decision to restore its victories in the 17 November was implemented.127 On 11 February 
the Serbian parliament passed the law, known as the Lex Specialis, allowing for the 
recognition o f the Zajedno election victories. Following this, on 15 February the Zajedno 
leadership announced that the protests would be suspended.
The IC and Serbia after the protests
Milosevic’s annulment of the local election results, and the ensuing protests, did 
much to increase the international profile of the democratic opposition parties in Serbia, 
and also to undermine the credibility o f the Milosevic regime. The Zajedno parties clearly 
believed that they had destroyed Milosevic’s international legitimacy and that they had 
succeeded in demonstrating that he could not be considered to be a factor for stability in 
the region. This view was clearly articulated by Djindjic who stated that ‘With our 
marches, we have broken the illusion in the West that Milosevic is a statesman.’128 
Similarly, while in London in February 1997, Djindjic asserted that ‘The opposition is 
now being treated as the voice of a European Serbia. Milosevic is history. ... It is a fact 
that all international players are talking to us and have no need to talk to Milosevic, 
irrespective o f the fact that he is in power. No one is looking to him for reforms in the
126 R adio  B 92, 4 February  1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2836/A , 6 F ebruary  1997.
127 A gence F rance Presse, 7 F ebruary  1997.
128 The Washington Post, 2 D ecem ber 1996.
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country.’129 Pesic also seemed to believe that events had damaged Milosevié’s 
international reputation: ‘Our dictator had a stable position in the world, but on 18th 
November he stole the elections and the world said that he was no longer a factor for 
stability, but rather a factor for instability and concluded that it was better if he went.’130 
While Draskovic believed that: ‘Until now, [Milosevic] has been able to deceive the West 
that he was a factor o f peace and stability. However, the United States and the EU are 
now seeing that the man who kindled the war in Yugoslavia is prepared to begin a civil 
war in Serbia.’131
However, following the recognition o f the election results, Serbia’s relations with 
the IC essentially reverted to the situation that had existed before the protests began. 
Thus, senior US diplomats again held meetings with Milosevic, while at the end of April, 
the EU finally decided to grant the autonomous trade preferences to the SRJ that had 
been postponed in December 1996. In its statement announcing its decision, the EU 
acknowledged that the Gonzalez report’s recommendations had not been fully 
implemented and that the measure had been taken ‘against the background of the need to 
promote economic revival and to reinforce a trend towards démocratisation,’ as well as 
pointing out that the measure was supported by Zajedno.132 In addition, Milosevic was 
provided with some much needed cash by the Italian-Greek purchase o f forty-nine
129 B eta new s agency , 27 F ebruary  1997 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 2856/A , 1 M arch
1997.
130 B eta new s agency, 1 F ebruary  1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2833/A , 3 February
1997.
131 K apital, Sofia, 2-8 D ecem ber 1996, p .23 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 2785/A , 3 
D ecem ber 1996.
132 ‘D eclaratio n  o f  the E uropean  U nion on the occasion  o f  the gran ting  o f  au tonom ous trade preferences to 
the F R Y ,’ 30 A pril 1997. C om m enting  on the ex tension o f  trade priv ileges to the SRJ, and the subsequent 
decision  o f  the EU  to approve a $112 m illion  aid package to the SRJ in M ay, H um an R ights W atch poin t 
out that ‘In this w ay, the EU  had rew arded P residen t M iloSevid for doing  w hat he w as legally ob ligated  to 
do in the first p lace -  recognise the elections -  w ithout regard  for o ther hum an rights vio lations tha t persist 
to d ay ’ ( ‘Serbian E lections N o t F ree and F a ir’, H um an R ights W atch, 18 Sep tem ber 1997).
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percent o f Serbia’s Telekom company for DM1.5 billion, ‘a sum that was essential to 
Milosevic in order to avoid social upheavals’ (Stojanovic, 2003: 205).
However, some things did change in the aftermath of the Zajedno protests, and 
what is most significant in the context of this research was the increased international 
profile of the democratic opposition parties and also the fact that while Milosevic was 
still subjected to international pressure in relation to the situation in Kosovo and the 
implementation of the Dayton agreement, the need for democratic change within Serbia, 
and in particular the implementation o f Gonzalez’ recommendations, figured more 
prominently in international criticism of the Belgrade authorities. An EU statement 
pointed out that the OSCE mission had also called for dialogue between the government 
and the opposition on further measures that needed to be taken in order to ensure Serbia’s 
démocratisation, including the liberalisation o f the media and changes to the electoral 
system.133 Furthermore, the EU also declared that it while continuing to pressurise 
Milosevic with respect to Gonzalez report, it would ‘simultaneously keep up contacts 
with the opposition, and consider other measures to further the process o f 
democratization.’134 Similarly, a State Department spokesperson noted that, although the 
US welcomed the recognition of Zajedno’s victories, ‘we are distressed by the lack of 
implementation o f the remaining recommendations made by the OSCE Mission of former 
Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, including media reforms, media freedoms, and 
electoral reforms.’135
133 T he A ssocia ted  Press, 5 F eb ruary  1997. T he opposition  parties seem ed to have been assured  by the IC 
that it w ould m ain tain  pressure on M ilosevic to im plem en t all o f  the p rov isions o f  G onzalez report, w ith 
D jindjic stating at a Z ajedno  rally that ‘W e have received  assurances that the in ternational com m unity  will 
see that the G onzalez report is fully applied , and ex ert p ressure if  n ecessa ry ’ (A gence France Presse, 6 
February  1997).
134 1984th C ouncil m eeting , G eneral A ffairs, B russels, 20 January  1997.
135 US D epartm en t o f  State D aily  Press B riefing , 4 A pril 1997.
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Following the end o f the protests, the democratic opposition parties continued to 
meet with IC officials and the representatives o f national governments, thus retaining 
some of the international profile that had been achieved during the protests.136 Djindjic 
acknowledged this point in October 1997 when he stated that:
All senior officials used to hold talks only with state representatives, as if the 
opposition did not exist. There is more equality now. I believe that there has 
been a great step forward as far as our position and status are concerned. The 
world is aware that there is a democratic opposition in Serbia.137
In the course of these meetings the Zajedno leaders continued to receive verbal support 
for their efforts to ensure the démocratisation o f Serbia. US support was clear when the 
Zajedno leaders travelled to Washington in April 1997 and met with Albright. According 
to a State Department spokesperson, the meeting between the Zajedno leaders and 
Albright was intended ‘to underscore the very strong support that the United States gives 
to democratic change in Serbia,’ and also expressed support for the ‘efforts of the 
Zajedno coalition and the other democratic forces in Serbia to lead Serbia out of the dead 
end it currently finds itself in and to begin the process o f developing a modem European 
country.’138 However, the democratic opposition parties still appeared to believe that the
136 T he Z ajedno  leaders v isited Paris, L ondon  and M adrid  in February  1997, and G erm any  and D enm ark  in 
M arch 1997, w here they m et O SC E  represen ta tives. In A pril 1997 they m et A lb rig h t in W ash ing ton  and 
H olbrooke and G elbard  in B elgrade, and in M ay they m et A lb righ t again  w h en  she v isited  B elgrade.
137 R adio  B 92, 6 O ctober 1997 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3044/A , 8 O ctober 1997.
138 S im ilar suppo rt w as also ev iden t w hen Z ajedno  represen ta tives m et O S C E  chairm an N iels H elveg 
P etersen  in C openhagen  in M arch. DraSkovic had urged bo th  P etersen  and G e rm an y ’s K inkel to press 
M iloSevid to accep t round table talks w ith the opposition  to determ ine the election  conditions for the 
elections due later in 1997 (B eta new s agency , 19 M arch 1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts 
E E /D 2873/A , 21 M arch  1997). Fo llow ing  talks w ith DraSkoviC and PeSiC, H elveg Petersen  urged the 
S erbian  au thorities to beg in  a d ialogue w ith the opposition  and to allow  them  full access to the m edia 
(A ssociated  Press W orldstream , 17 M arch 1997).
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IC could do more to help them, with Pesic stating that so far the Serbian opposition had 
‘received only moral support and a lot o f admiration’ from the west.139
While the Zajedno leaders’ meetings with IC representatives did give them an 
opportunity to press for international support to compel Milosevic to accept democratic 
reforms, this was undermined domestically by Milosevic’s renewed contacts with the IC. 
Commenting on Albright’s two day visit to Belgrade beginning on 31 May, in which she 
met with representatives o f the opposition and with Milosevic, Smajlovic, notes that 
while the opposition 'had nothing to thank Mrs. Albright for last Saturday in Belgrade', 
she ‘had made it possible for [Milosevic] to emerge from the total diplomatic isolation in 
which he had found himself as o f last November, at the same time publicly maintaining 
the pose o f a champion o f national interests who protects the constitution and dignity o f a 
country against outside attacks.’140
Furthermore, some commentators also note that the Zajedno protests had an 
additional impact in that they marked a turning point in the way in which Milosevic ruled 
Serbia. Cohen argues that after the Zajedno protests Milosevic began ‘tightening the 
authoritarian facets o f his control system, and abandoning practices that had been typical 
of his earlier “soft dictatorship’” (Cohen, 2001: 324), while an ICG report states that the 
1996-1997 demonstrations ‘provoked profound changes in the character o f the regime,’ 
noting in particular that the passing of the University and Public Information laws in 
1998 ‘marked the end of democratic despotism and the beginning of despotism without 
democracy’ (ICG, 2000: 3).
139 A ssocia ted  Press W orldstream , 4 A pril 1997.
140 ‘S trict but Ju s t’, L jiljana Sm ajlovic, Vreme News Digest Agency N o. 296, 7 June 1997.
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In summary, while initially weak, the IC’s response to the Milosevic regime’s 
actions strengthened following the OSCE report which supported the opposition’s claims 
that they had won key victories in local elections in 1996. Although the regime initially 
appeared unwilling to heed the recommendations o f the Gonzalez report, mounting 
international pressure eventually led Milosevic to reconsider. While the democratic 
opposition parties appeared to want to continue the protests in order to secure further 
reform in line with Gonzalez’ recommendations, there was no international support for 
such action. The Gonzalez report provided the democratic opposition parties with an 
internationally sanctioned critique o f Serbia’s undemocratic electoral system, and as such 
provided a useful reference point in terms of their appeals for international assistance in 
their campaigns to bring about democratic reform within Serbia. In addition, democratic 
reform became a far more prominent feature on the international agenda following the 
events of 1996-1997. This, in combination with the raised international profile of the 
democratic opposition parties, can be considered as significant achievements on the part 
of the democratic opposition. However, once the crisis over the local election results was 
resolved, the IC essentially reverted to the same pattern o f interaction with the Milosevic 
regime that had prevailed before 1996 elections took place.
The 1997 republican and presidential elections
Almost as soon as the Milosevic regime agreed to accept the opposition’s 
victories in the 1996 local elections, the divisions that had existed within Zajedno from 
its inception became more prominent. A major disagreement over who should be the
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coalition’s presidential candidate in the forthcoming elections (Anastasijevic, 2000: 50- 
51), the personal animosity that existed between Djindjic and Draskovic, and also some 
significant differences between the SPO and the DS in relation to their political 
orientation (Goati, 2001a: 123) proved insurmountable, and by mid 1997 the coalition 
had effectively ceased to exist. The break up of the Zajedno coalition, in addition to 
weakening the opposition in the forthcoming elections, also, to some extent, undermined 
some of the gains that the opposition parties had achieved internationally. In its meetings 
with Zajedno representatives, US officials made it clear that they wanted the coalition to 
continue. Miodrag Perisic, a senior DS member, acknowledged this following a meeting 
with Komblum in April, stating that Komblum had said that ‘a coordinated activity on 
the part o f the [Zajedno] coalition was expected.’141
In protest at the unfair electoral conditions under which the 1997 Serbian 
parliamentary and presidential elections were to be held, the parties that had been 
signatories to a June agreement on the minimum election conditions that would ensure 
their participation,142 including the DS, the DSS and the GSS, announced that they would 
not participate, but would instead organise an ‘anti-election campaign.’143 The SPO,
141 R adio B 92, 11 April 1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2892/A , 14 A pril 1997.
142 T he 4 June ag reem ent w as signed by tw elve opposition  parties, w hich did not include the SPO , and set 
out the o p p osition ’s m in im um  conditions for the hold ing o f  fair elections. A ccord ing  to the agreem ent, if  
these conditions w ere not m et, the parties to the ag reem en t w ould  not partic ipate  in the elections. T he 
conditions as ou tlined  by the agreem ent w ere as follow s: ‘that the num ber o f  co nstituencies should  not be 
increased, that the co nstitu tion  and law  on  nom inating  and electing  [the] S erbian  presiden t be stric tly  
observed  and that full contro l o f  all stages o f  the election  process be assured. T he o ther tw o conditions are 
objectiv ity  o f  the m edia, p rim arily  television , during the election  cam paign, and the ad op tion  o f  p roper 
regula tions on the financing o f  the po litical parties and the election  cam p aig n ’ (T anjug, 29 M ay 1997 in 
BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2933/A , 31 M ay 1997). T he SPO  did not sign the ag reem ent 
because they cla im ed  it v io lated  an early  Z ajedno  ag reem en t (B eta new s agency , 4 June 1997 in BBC 
Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2938/A , 6 June 1997).
143 R adio  B 92, 19 July  1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2976/A , 21 July 1997. T he m ove 
cam e as a d irec t response to a new  electoral law  that was passed  on 18 July, and w hich increased the 
num ber o f  electoral units in Serbia from  nine to tw enty-n ine , m aking the electoral conditions for the 
opposition  parties w orse than they had been in 1993 (G oati, 2001a: 125).
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however, had not signed the June agreement, and, following negotiations with Milosevic, 
it was announced that the SPO would participate in the elections that had been scheduled 
for 21 September, though the party reserved the right to reverse this decision if the 
authorities did not invite the OSCE to monitor the elections.144 Commenting on the 
decision, Draskovic stated that although the election conditions were ‘not brilliant’, they 
were better than they had been in previous elections.145
The DS, DSS and GSS all decided to boycott the elections, as they considered that 
the conditions under which they were being held were not in keeping with the 
recommendations made in the Gonzalez report. According to Kostunica, the opposition 
was hoping for one of two outcomes: either the elections would be called off, following 
which fair electoral conditions could be negotiated, and the elections rescheduled, or the 
boycott would highlight the lack of legitimacy of the elections, which would compel the 
regime to call new elections, as had happened with respect to the federal elections o f May 
1 9 9 2  l4 6  Djin(jjj£ clearly believed that opposition participation in the elections was 
essential if they were to be considered legitimate, and declared that the opposition was 
‘so strong now that if we were to tell the world that we were boycotting the next 
elections, then these elections would not be considered legitimate.’147
However, if the democratic opposition parties that were boycotting the elections 
were hoping for international support for their ‘anti-election’ campaign, they were to be 
disappointed. The first indication o f this came in August, from Richard Holbrooke, who,
144 R adio B 92, 10 A ugust 1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2995/A , 12 A ugust 1997.
145 R adio  B 92, 10 A u gust 1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2995/A , 12 A ugust 1997.
146 R adio B 92, 3 A ugust 1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2989/A , 5 A ugust 1997.
147 R adio  B 92, 9 D ecem ber 1996 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2792/A , 11 D ecem ber 1996.
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in an interview given to B92, stated that an election boycott ‘would be stupid.’148 Both 
the DSS149 and the DS were critical o f Holbrooke’s remarks, with Djindjic claiming that 
Holbrooke was not competent to judge on the issue and that his remarks should be 
disregarded.150 A lack o f support for the opposition’s position was also evident in the 
comments o f a State Department spokesperson who, while acknowledging that the 
decision regarding whether or not to participate in the elections ‘under grossly unfair 
conditions’ was a difficult one, stated that: ‘In general ... the United States favours the 
broadest participation in the political process. Boycotts are not particularly effective tools 
for bringing about political change. ... So we are not advocating a boycott.151 Similarly, 
in a statement issued at the end of July 1997, the EU, while noting that ‘Recent 
legislation in Serbia is leading the country away from true democratization,’ implied that 
the EU was also not in favour o f a boycott. While not explicitly denouncing a boycott, the 
EU statement asserts that ‘the European Union exhorts all opposition political groupings 
to engage themselves fully during the period of the electoral campaign and to assume 
their political responsibilities.’152
As the elections approached there was little international comment, a point that 
was noted by a journalist during a State Department Press Briefing in September. The 
State Department’s spokesperson responded by noting that:
148 ‘S queaking B u lld o zer’, D ejan  A nastasijevic, Vreme News Digest Agency N o. 306, 16 A ugust 1997. 
A nastasijevid  also  m entions an o ther gaffe by H olbrooke during his visit, in w hich in response to a question  
on w hat type o f  a nego tia to r M ilosevic w as, he stated  that M ilosevic ‘very skilfu lly  protec ts the interests o f  
his co u n try ’. T he fo llow ing  day in response to the sam e question  he reform ulated  his an sw er and stated that 
‘M ilosevic sk ilfu lly  protects his ow n in te re sts’.
149 B eta  new s agency , 9 A ugust 1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 2994/A , 11 A ugust 1997
150 D jindjic also noted  tha t in a m eeting  w ith the opposition  H o lbrooke was m ainly  concerned  w ith the 
situation  in B osn ia and relations betw een  Serbia and M ontenegro , and w as not particu larly  in terested  in the 
forthcom ing  elections in Serbia (B eta new s agency , 9 A ugust 1997 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts 
E E /D 2995/A , 12 A ugust 1997).
151 U S D epartm en t o f  State D aily  Press B riefing , 12 A u gust 1997.
152 ‘D eclaration  by the P residency  on b eh a lf o f  the E uropean  U n ion  on the F R Y ,’ 31 July  1997.
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obviously our focus until yesterday -  and I would say it’s a continuing one -  
has to do with events in Bosnia, particularly the municipal elections, which 
were so critical to the future o f Bosnia. So we focused on that. Secondly, we 
obviously have had real concerns about the prospects for truly democratic 
elections in the [SRJ]. So we don’t have high hopes for those elections, 
clearly. I think the low-key approach that you refer to reflects, to a large 
degree, the low-key expectations we have in regard to those elections.153
As such, in spite o f the raised international profile o f the democratic opposition parties 
following the 1996/1997 protests, and the international attention that the undemocratic 
nature o f the Milosevic regime had received, once the Zajedno electoral victories had 
been recognised, the IC’s focus again reverted to Bosnia, with little, if any, international 
support offered to the democratic opposition parties either in their efforts to ensure fair 
electoral conditions for the 1997 polls, or their attempts to undermine the legitimacy of 
those elections when this was not forthcoming.
The parliamentary elections and the first round of the presidential elections were 
held on 21 September 1997. The turnout o f 57.4% was disappointing to those who had 
boycotted the election as it represented a drop of just over 4% from the 61.6% turnout in 
the 1993 republican election and an even smaller drop from the 60.3% turnout in the 
1996 federal elections. In the parliamentary elections the SPS-JUL-ND coalition gained 
34.2% o f the votes, a slight drop on the SPS’s result in the 1993 elections, and lost its 
parliamentary majority, winning only 110 of the 250 seats available. Furthermore, in the 
presidential election, the SPS candidate Zoran Lilic, although topping the poll, did not get 
more than 50% o f the votes cast, and so a second round was held on 5 October. In the 
second round Lilic was narrowly defeated by Seselj, though the election was
153 US D epartm en t o f  State D aily  Press B riefing , 16 S ep tem ber 1997
subsequently declared invalid as the turnout was less than the required 50%.154 In 
addition to Seselj’s success in the presidential elections, the SRS also performed 
unexpectedly well in the parliamentary elections, coming in second to the SPS-JUL-ND 
coalition with 28.1% of the vote and 82 seats in the parliament, more than doubling the 
percentage of the vote and seats it had received in the 1993 election.
Party PERCENTAGE OF 
VOTE
Seats
SPS-JUL-ND 34.2% 110 (44%)
SRS 28.1% 82 (32.8%)
SPO 19.1% 45(18%)
T ab le 4: R esults o f  the 1997 elections for the Serbian p arliam en t (F igures from  G oati, 2001a: 213)
The SPO finished the election in third place, winning 19.1% of the vote and 45
parliamentary seats. While this represented a slight increase from the 16.6% that DEPOS
had won in 1993, Goati argues that it nevertheless represented ‘stagnation’ rather than
success, as the SPO did not gain votes from the absence o f the other democratic
opposition parties (Goati, 2001a: 131). The SPO result was well below what Draskovic
had predicted and his disappointment was compounded by his performance in the
presidential elections. In spite of his confident predictions that he would win the
presidency, with only 20.6% of the vote, Draskovic came in third place, and so did not
even secure a place in the second round (Goati, 2001a: 132). Draskovic also contested the
second presidential election, held in December after the September presidential election
154 A  rescheduled  presiden tial e lection  w as held in D ecem ber and §e§elj w as beaten  by the SPS-JU L -N D  
candidate M ilan  M ilutinovic.
was declared invalid, but in December his performance was even worse, winning only 
15.4% of the vote in the first round, and again failing to secure a place in the second 
round (Anastasijevic, 2000: 55).
The poor performance o f the SPO heralded another round of acrimony between 
the parties of the opposition. Draskovic blamed his and the SPO’s poor performance in 
the presidential and parliamentary elections on those parties that had advocated a boycott 
of the elections. On 30 September Draskovic took his revenge when the SPO, acting with 
the support o f the SPS and the SRS, voted to have Djindjic removed as Belgrade’s mayor 
(Anastasijevic, 2000: 55). In addition to ousting Djindjic, Draskovic also sacked key 
figures within Studio B, which the opposition had gained control of when they took 
power in Belgrade’s city council, claiming that the station had been biased in favour of 
the parties that were boycotting the elections during the election campaign period155 
(Anastasijevic, 2000: 56). Subsequent demonstrations to protest against these actions 
were suppressed by riot police, and although Draskovic tried to distance himself from 
this, it nevertheless damaged his credibility.
Following the parliamentary elections there was no party or electoral coalition 
that had a sufficient number o f seats to form a government. Draskovic considered himself 
to be in a relatively strong position to negotiate with the regime on forming a coalition 
government, apparently believing that there was no chance of the SPS inviting the 
Radicals into government. As such, in negotiations with the SPS, Draskovic demanded
,5S A nastasijev ic  poin ts ou t tha t fo llow ing these events S tud io  B becam e b iased  in favou r o f  the SPO  
(A nastasijevic, 2000: 57).
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quite a high price for his co-operation.156 Negotiations between the SPO and SPS 
continued throughout the first few months of 1997, but on 24 March 1998 a government 
was formed comprising the SPS, JUL and the SRS (often referred to as the ‘red-black 
coalition), leaving Draskovic and the SPO out o f government and considerably 
compromised by its willingness to negotiate with the authorities.
In spite of the raised international profile o f Serbia’s democratic opposition and 
also the increased prominence o f Serbia’s internal political order on the international 
agenda, the IC paid little attention to the 1997 elections. While it was noted that the 
conditions were unfair, there will no sustained international pressure on Milosevic to 
reform the electoral system and fully implement the provisions o f the Gonzalez report.
Conclusions
Differences between the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime
The issues that were o f primary importance for the IC in its dealings with Serbia
during the time period covered by this case study were the implementation of the Dayton
agreement, the situation in Kosovo, and the need for democratic reform in Serbia - in
particular the need for the Milosevic regime to recognise the victories o f the Zajedno
coalition in the 1996 local elections. Prior to the regime’s annulment o f these election
victories, Serbia’s internal political order had not been the central concern of the IC in its
dealings with Serbia, though there was a general recognition on the part o f the IC that this
156 In January  1998 he reported ly  dem anded  ‘that the SPO  should  be g iven  the positions o f  P rim e M inister 
and P residen t o f  the G overnm ent, ten m inisterial p laces, and a p roportion  o f  the am bassadorial p osition s’ 
(Thom as, 1999: 393).
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was an issue that would need to be addressed at some point. IC actors did condemn some 
flagrant violations o f democratic norms, especially in relation to attempts on the part o f 
the regime to repress the independent media. However, following the Zajedno protests o f 
1996-1997, the undemocratic nature o f the Milosevic regime was a more prominent item 
on the international agenda, being noted alongside implementing the Dayton peace 
agreement and granting some degree of autonomy to Kosovo as a key issue in terms of 
Serbia’s relations with the IC. In relation to this issue of democratic reform in Serbia, the 
differences between the Milosevic regime and the democratic opposition parties are self- 
evident.
The most significant issue for the IC during this time period was again centred on 
Bosnia, with IC representatives consistently stressing the need for Serbia to comply with 
all obligations outlined in the Dayton agreement, including full co-operation with the 
ICTY. As has been shown above, the democratic opposition parties that made up the 
Zajedno coalition went to great lengths to convince the IC that they would honour this 
agreement should they take power. In addition, they also sought to counter any belief 
within the IC that Milosevic, as a signatory of the Dayton agreement, represented a factor 
for regional stability, arguing that conflict was more likely to recur if Serbia remained 
undemocratic. Given that the Milosevic regime was subject to international criticism and 
pressure in relation to the failure to fully honour obligations under the Dayton agreement, 
the democratic opposition parties held positions on the issues that were o f central 
importance to the IC that were different to those of the Milosevic regime. As these 
positions were in line with those o f the IC, the democratic opposition parties within 
Zajedno can be seen as presenting a credible alternative partner to the IC.
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The relationship between the IC and the Serbian democratic opposition parties
At the beginning o f the time period covered by this case study, Serbia’s 
democratic opposition parties received little international support, and the federal and 
local elections that were held in November 1996 did not receive any significant 
international attention until after Milosevic’s attempt to deprive the Zajedno coalition of 
its victories in the 1996 local elections. However, the mass protests that followed these 
events greatly increased the international profile o f Serbia’s democratic opposition parties 
and put the issue o f Serbia’s internal political order at the centre o f the international 
agenda. As a result of their efforts to secure international support for their campaign to 
gain recognition for their victories in the local elections, the democratic opposition 
parties frequently met with high-ranking representatives o f international organisations 
and national governments. Furthermore, the Zajedno coalition received explicit 
international support in their campaign to have their election victories restored. When 
Milosevic refused to concede defeat and recognise the opposition’s victories both the US 
and the EU took steps to increase Serbia’s level o f international isolation.
At the beginning of this time period, Serbia’s democratic opposition parties believed 
that Milosevic, as a signatory of the Dayton agreement, was, to some degree, supported 
by the IC and perceived internationally as a factor for regional stability. As has been 
seen, the opposition consistently challenged this notion, arguing that, on the contrary, 
regional stability would not be possible with Milosevic in power and an undemocratic 
Serbia, with some opposition leaders warning that as a result o f Milosevic’s continuance 
in power, serious conflict in Kosovo was more likely. Given this belief, the democratic
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opposition parties were critical o f what they saw as tacit international support for 
Milosevic in the 1996 election campaign, and also criticised the weak international 
response at the beginning of the stand off over the annulment o f the local election results. 
However, in spite o f their disappointment, the democratic opposition parties assessed that 
international support was an important component in their battle against the Milosevic 
regime. As such, although often critical of the IC, the opposition parties did not engage in 
any sort o f virulent anti-Western rhetoric. On the contrary, the parties within the Zajedno 
coalition made efforts to convince the IC of its pro-Western orientation.
The impact o f international policy in the democratic opposition parties
The democratic opposition parties launched three major campaigns against the 
Milosevic regime between the beginning of 1996 and the end of 1997: the two election 
campaigns in 1996 and 1997 and the protests that aimed at forcing the Milosevic regime 
to recognise Zajedno’s victories in the 1996 local elections. In terms o f the outcome of 
these campaigns the results are mixed. While the campaign to ensure that the regime 
recognised Zajedno’s victories in the 1996 local elections was a major success for the 
democratic opposition, it was followed by Serbian legislative elections that were an 
abysmal failure, while the 1996 local and federal elections saw the opposition poll badly 
at the federal level but secure important victories at the local level.
Looking first at the opposition’s failures, it is immediately clear that different 
factors account for failure in the 1996 federal elections and the 1997 republican elections. 
In 1997, the inability o f the democratic opposition parties to agree on a strategy, with the 
SPO contesting the election while the other parties staged a boycott, handed Milosevic an
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easy victory. While in previous time periods, most notably in 1993 and 1994, differences 
with respect to international policy can be considered to have exacerbated the already 
existing divisions within the opposition; in 1997 the parties were divided over the issue of 
whether or not to contest the elections in the grossly unfair conditions that prevailed at 
this time. The SPO’s willingness to contest elections that its former coalition partners had 
chosen to boycott, its months o f negotiations with the regime aimed at the formation of a 
coalition government, and its co-operation with the regime in ousting the DS city 
government in Belgrade, did much to undermine the SPO’s status as an opposition 
partner, and indicates, at least to a certain extent, the party’s failure to resist integration 
into the regime, one o f the tasks necessary to effectively oppose the regime (resisting 
integration; maintaining a zone of ideological autonomy; questioning the legitimacy of 
the regime and raising the costs o f authoritarian rule; and presenting a credible alternative 
both domestically and internationally). That the SPO did not join the Serbian government 
was more Milosevic’s choice than Draskovic’s. Whether this was because Draskovic was 
demanding too high a price for his participation, or a strategic move by Milosevic to 
discredit the SPO in the eyes of the other opposition parties, the effect was the same: the 
credibility o f the SPO as an opposition party was seriously undermined.
While clearly the democratic opposition parties themselves bear a large degree of 
responsibility for their failure in 1997, it must also be noted that, in spite o f the success 
that the Zajedno parties had in highlighting the undemocratic nature o f the Milosevic 
regime, there was very little international pressure on Milosevic to ensure that the 1997 
elections could take place in free and fair conditions, as demanded by most of the 
opposition parties. While US and EU representatives disapproved of the opposition
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parties’ decision not to contest the election, they did little to address the issue that 
provided the rationale for that boycott. Although the IC regularly stated that the 
Milosevic regime must implement the Gonzalez report’s recommendations in full, no 
international actors exerted any real pressure on the Milosevic regime to do so. As such, 
while the IC may not have actively exacerbated the conflict between the opposition 
parties at this time, its passivity in relation to the issue that was dividing the democratic 
opposition did nothing to help the parties overcome their differences.
While the disunity o f the opposition and the inability of the SPO to resist 
integration into the regime may help to account for the opposition’s failures in the 1997 
elections, this cannot be said of the 1996 federal elections. In 1996, all four o f the 
democratic opposition parties considered in this study contested the federal elections as 
part of the Zajedno coalition. However, Milosevic’s ability to portray the ending of the 
conflict in Bosnia, and the lifting o f international sanctions as the results o f his 
peacemaking policy, did much to boost his credibility and image as a statesman. As such, 
even if unintentionally, by providing Milosevic with a certain degree o f external 
legitimacy, international policy contributed to undermining the democratic opposition 
parties in the 1996 federal elections, diminishing their ability to present a credible 
alternative to the Milosevic regime at the domestic level. It is also clear that the 
democratic opposition parties considered that the IC was continuing to offer tacit support 
to Milosevic throughout the campaign, in particular by the participation of international 
officials in meetings with regime figures during the election campaign. The opposition’s 
attempts to pressurise Milosevic in relation to the conditions under which the elections
253
would be held, and the need for independent international observers to oversee the 
elections, received little international support.
When considering the success o f the democratic opposition in its campaign to 
ensure that the Milosevic regime recognised its victories in the 1996 local elections a 
number of factors are particularly significant. Firstly, in spite o f the strains between the 
opposition parties, and in particular between the SPO and the DS, throughout the duration 
of the protests in 1996 and 1997 the Zajedno parties maintained a united front. 
Furthermore, they enjoyed considerable success in carrying out the tasks necessary to 
effectively oppose the regime (resisting integration; maintaining a zone of ideological 
autonomy; questioning the legitimacy o f the regime and raising the costs o f authoritarian 
rule; and presenting a credible alternative both domestically and internationally). Zajedno 
successfully brought the legitimacy of the regime into question by highlighting the 
regime’s attempts to steal the elections, both domestically and internationally, and also 
raised the costs to the regime o f its undemocratic behaviour. In addition, they ensured 
that the regime’s undemocratic actions remained at the centre o f political discourse in 
Serbia throughout the duration of the protests, and as such maintained a zone of 
ideological autonomy against the regime even if only briefly. Furthermore, the 
democratic opposition parties also ensured that the need for democratic reform became a 
more prominent feature on the international agenda. As such, while international support 
may have been a crucial factor in pushing Milosevic to concede defeat on this issue, 
without the determination o f the democratic opposition parties to both highlight the 
regime’s abuses and to ensure that their victories were recognised, there would have been 
no international pressure for Milosevic to concede.
254
In terms o f its performance in carrying out the tasks necessary to effectively 
oppose the regime over this time period, as has been noted, while all four parties were 
successful in resisting integration into the regime throughout 1996, the SPO was 
seriously deficient in this regard in 1997 and early 1998. The opposition also did much to 
bring the legitimacy of the regime into question, both domestically and internationally, 
and raised the costs o f authoritarian rule. Furthermore, the opposition had some impact 
on the political agenda in Serbia during the winter protests. The moderate stance o f the 
Zajedno coalition in relation to national issues, and its publicly stated willingness to 
respect the Dayton agreement meant that, from an IC perspective, Zajedno did indeed 
represent a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime. Furthermore, the Zajedno 
protests following the annulment of its election victories, and the success o f its campaign 
to have those victories reinstated, did much to enhance the credibility of the democratic 
opposition domestically and demonstrated that the Milosevic regime was not entirely 
invincible. However, the breakdown of the Zajedno coalition in 1997 and the inability of 
the parties to agree a common strategy for the Serbian elections did much to diminish the 
credibility that had been gained in late 1996 and early 1997. While the opposition parties 
themselves must take much of the blame for this, the lack o f international support that 
they received in their efforts to ensure that the elections would take place under equitable 
conditions, did not help. As such, the impact o f IC policies and actions was positive in 
relation to the winter protests, and constituted a direct intervention on the part o f the IC in 
support of the opposition parties’ campaign. However, in relation to the 1996 and 1997 
elections, while there was no direct international involvement, the indirect effect of
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international policy undermined the effectiveness of the democratic opposition parties in 
their campaigns against the Milosevic regime.
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Chapter 6:Kosovo
This case study begins in the spring o f 1998 when the IC first responded to the 
increasing violence in Kosovo and continues until June 1999 at the end of the NATO 
bombing of the SRJ that occurred in response to this violence. While at the end of 1997 
Serbia was enjoying a relatively high degree o f international integration, this began to 
change in 1998 as the IC responded to events in Kosovo, beginning with relatively minor 
sanctions and culminating in the NATO bombing campaign that began on 24 March 1999 
and the almost total diplomatic isolation o f Milosevic and his associates following the 
ICTY indictment o f Milosevic and other key regime figures for war crimes.
During this time period the most important issue for the IC in its dealings with 
Serbia was the situation in Kosovo and the increasing levels o f violence in the province, 
and this was the stated reason for all the coercive measures imposed during this time 
period. Following the demonstrations of 1996/7, the parties involved in the Zajedno 
coalition had successfully cultivated good relations with the IC, and believed that the 
successes o f its campaign included demonstrating that a credible alternative to the 
Milosevic regime did exist within Serbia, and exposing internationally the true nature of 
Milosevic’s rule. As such, this case study will also allow for an examination of the 
impact on IC-opposition relations once the focus o f international attention reverted to 
Milosevic and Kosovo, while issues such as democratic reform and media liberalisation, 
which the Zajedno partners had fought hard to place on the international agenda, were 
once again sidelined. Furthermore, given the harsh international reaction to events in 
Kosovo this case study provides the opportunity to examine how such policies impacted
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on the relationship between the IC and the democratic opposition parties and to assess 
whether this international approach to dealing with Serbia had a significant impact on the 
effectiveness o f the democratic opposition parties.
Evaluating the impact o f IC policies on the effectiveness o f the democratic 
opposition parties in opposing the Milosevic regime during this time period is made 
somewhat difficult by the absence of any major opposition challenges to the regime. As 
there were no elections scheduled at this time the opportunity for directly challenging the 
Milosevic regime for power did not arise. In addition, although a new opposition alliance 
was formed, The Alliance for Change (SZP -  Savez za Promene), and also planned to 
organise anti-regime demonstrations, the deteriorating situation in Serbia and the threat o f  
military action, precluded the opposition parties from engaging in such activity at this 
time. However, in spite o f the lack of major challenges to the regime, the democratic 
opposition parties did make efforts to oppose the regime. Firstly, while the SZP did not 
manage to carry out its planned anti-regime demonstrations, its efforts to forge a new 
coalition and plan a campaign, did, nevertheless, represent an attempt to challenge the 
regime. Secondly, during the time period considered here, the Milosevic regime became 
increasingly repressive, passing two key pieces o f legislation in 1998 that aimed to 
undermine any resistance to its rule: the Law on Universities in May 1998 and the Law 
on Public Information in October 1998. While the democratic opposition parties did not 
manage to mount the type o f large-scale protests such as those in 1992 and 1996/1997, 
they were, nevertheless, strongly opposed to these measures, and challenged the regime 
on these issues. While clearly less significant that the campaigns undertaken in earlier 
time periods, these efforts did represent challenges to the Milosevic regime.
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Key Issues for the International Community
As was noted in chapter 5, the situation in Kosovo was one o f the stated reasons 
for the maintenance of the outer wall of sanctions against the SRJ in the post-Dayton 
period. However, it was not until the level of violence in the province began to increase 
in late 1997 that Kosovo came to dominate the international agenda. Throughout the time 
period covered by this case study, the situation in Kosovo was the overriding priority for 
the IC in its dealings with Serbia. International policy focused on coercing Milosevic to 
comply with international demands designed to resolve the conflict, first through the use 
of sanctions and later through the use o f military force. The Contact Group took the lead 
in the international response to the Kosovo crisis and over time it was joined by the UN 
Security Council, the OSCE and NATO. In addition to this multilateral response, 
individual states also acted to defuse the crisis, with the US playing a major role.
The Contact Group set out the IC’s demands early in the crisis and these were 
reiterated by all international actors dealing with the crisis. In a statement issued on 9 
March 1998, the Contact Group made clear that any resolution to the Kosovo crisis 
should be based on Kosovo being granted a substantial degree o f autonomy, while the 
territorial integrity o f the SRJ must be preserved. As such, throughout this time period, 
there was no international support for Kosovo to become independent. In its 9 March 
statement, the Contact Group demanded that special police units stationed in Kosovo 
must be withdrawn and actions by the security forces affecting the civilian population 
must be halted. The Contact Group also insisted that humanitarian organisations and 
representatives of the Contact Group must be allowed access to Kosovo and expressed 
support for the proposal for a new OSCE mission headed by Felipe Gonzales, the
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personal representative o f the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, and for the return of the long­
term OSCE missions to Sandzak and Kosovo.1 Finally, the Contact Group insisted that 
Milosevic must publicly commit himself to a process of dialogue with the leadership o f 
the Kosovo Albanian community with a view to finding a political solution to the 
conflict.2 On 25 March a further demand was added when the Contact Group stipulated 
that there must be international participation in any negotiations between the two sides, as 
this was ‘essential to the achievement o f a political solution.3
When the sanctions imposed on Serbia failed to yield results, the IC increased 
pressure by demonstrating its willingness to use military force in pursuit of its objectives 
and on 11 June NATO’s military planners were instructed to prepare a range o f military 
options should the use of force ever become necessary.4 On 12 October, NATO 
significantly increased international pressure when it issued an Activation Order for both 
limited air strikes and a phased air campaign to begin within four days. This period was 
intended to enable a deal that was being negotiated by Richard Holbrooke to be 
consolidated (Weller, 1999: 272).
1 These missions, which had been approved by Milan Panic while he was SRJ Prime Minister, had come to 
an end when the Yugoslav authorities refused to reissue visas for their members in response to the OSCE 
decision to suspend Serbian membership o f the organisation on the grounds o f its abuse o f human rights in 
Kosovo.
2 Contact Group Statement on Kosovo, 9 March 1998.
3 Contact Group Statement on Kosovo, 25 March 1998. These demands were supported by the UN Security 
Council in Resolution 1160 passed on 31 March 1998 and NATO (Statement o f Ministerial Meeting, North 
Atlantic Council, Luxembourg, 28 May 1998).
4 According to a NATO statement the military planners were ordered to: ‘assess and develop for further 
Council consideration and decisions as appropriate a full range o f options with the mission, based on the 
relevant legal basis, o f halting or disrupting a systematic campaign o f violent repression and expulsion in 
Kosovo; supporting international efforts to secure the agreement o f the parties to a cessation o f violence 
and disengagement; and helping to create the conditions for serious negotiations toward a political 
settlement’ (Statement issued at the Meeting o f North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, 11 
June 1998).
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The IC’s coercive approach appeared to pay off in October 1998 when Holbrooke 
concluded agreements with Milosevic including a set of eleven principles that were 
intended to lead to a political solution to the conflict and an agreement on the deployment 
of an international observer mission, the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). 
However, it soon became clear that the Holbrooke agreements were not going to achieve 
a peaceful resolution to the conflict and, in spite o f the presence o f international 
observers, fighting in Kosovo continued and intensified. The KLA was chastised for 
carrying out provocative attacks against the Serbs, while for their part the Serbs were 
accused o f engaging in disproportionate responses to the KLA actions. Against this 
background, the apparent massacre o f 45 Kosovo Albanian civilians at Racak on 15 
January proved to be a turning point in terms of the international response to events in 
Kosovo.
On 29 January 1999, the Contact Group issued a statement in which it ordered 
both sides to begin negotiations on a settlement at Rambouillet in France. When the Serbs 
refused to sign the agreement that was drawn up at Rambouillet, NATO began an air 
campaign against the SRJ on 24 March. NATO’s air campaign continued until 10 June 
when it was officially suspended following Milosevic’s acceptance o f the IC’s terms for 
ending the bombing campaign and the conclusion of an agreement between NATO and 
Yugoslavia detailing the withdrawal of all Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo.5 This
5 The terms that were presented to Milosevic had been worked out by Victor Chernomyrdin, Martti 
Ahtisaari and Strobe Talbott and were based on a set o f principles for a settlement that had been agreed by 
the G8 meeting in Germany on 6 May. The most contentious issues were the composition o f an 
international force that would be deployed to Kosovo to assist in implementing a political settlement for the 
province, and whether or not all Yugoslav forces would have to leave the province. Once it had been 
agreed that the international force would be under UN auspices, but with substantial NATO participation, 
and that all Yugoslav forces should leave Kosovo, Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari presented the terms to 
Milosevic. The Yugoslav parliament accepted the proposal and talks began between NATO and the 
Yugoslav m ilitary to reach a military-technical agreement detailing the withdrawal o f the Yugoslav forces.
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agreement was concluded on 9 June and the following day the bombing was halted and 
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244.
Before considering the differences between the Milosevic regime and the 
democratic opposition parties with regard to the conflict in Kosovo, the regime’s position 
needs to be noted. The Milosevic regime considered Serbian actions in Kosovo to be a 
legitimate response to the threats posed by the terrorist actions o f the KLA, which, from 
the standpoint o f the Serbian authorities, was an armed group that was attempting to 
bring about the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. As such, the regime’s perspective was 
that events in Kosovo were an internal Serbian affair in which the IC had no right to 
interfere. This position was succinctly outlined by SPS spokesperson Ivica Dacic who 
rejected the possibility o f international mediation on the grounds that ‘internal issues of 
Serbia cannot be internationalised.’6 The regime also denied that Kosovo’s Albanian 
population was deprived of basic human rights, arguing that they enjoyed minority rights 
at an acceptable international standard.
As such, when considering the extent to which the democratic opposition parties 
differed from the Milosevic regime in terms of its positions in relation to the Kosovo 
conflict, and the extent to which the democratic opposition parties represented a credible 
alternative partner to the IC at this time, the attitudes o f the parties to the conflict in 
general, to the role that the IC should play in attempting to resolve the conflict, and to the 
key developments o f the international reaction to conflict will be considered.
6 RFE/RL Newsline, 13 March 1998. Not only did the administration reject suggestions that IC 
representatives should mediate in the dispute, but openly blamed elements o f the IC for the violence in the 
province. Speaking at the beginning o f March 1998 the Yugoslav Defence Minister Pavle Bulatovic stated 
that ‘ there would be no terrorism [in Kosovo] and the Kosovo problem would not be what it is today i f  the 
separatists did not enjoy the support o f a certain section o f the international community’ (RFE/RL Newsline 
4 March 1998.)
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The democratic opposition parties' interpretations o f the Kosovo conflict
All the parties considered in this study were in agreement with the stance of the 
Milosevic regime that Kosovo’s independence was unacceptable, but as this was also the 
position of the IC, it cannot be considered controversial. However, examining the 
opposition parties’ beliefs regarding who bore responsibility for the conflict and their 
proposed solutions, reveals differences between the opposition parties themselves, and 
also between some o f the opposition parties and the Milosevic regime.
Draskovic and the SPO opposed independence for Kosovo, arguing that the 
province should get wide autonomy within Serbia, in line with the highest European 
democratic standards, though these were left largely undefined.7 Draskovic urged the 
Serbian parliament to invite representatives o f Kosovo’s political parties to negotiate and
suggested that there should be a greater degree o f local self-government throughout
8 •Serbia. Draskovic was highly critical o f the KLA, which he clearly identified as a 
terrorist organisation, and claimed that there was an element o f bias or unequal treatment 
in the IC’s reaction to events in Kosovo, arguing that Kosovo’s political representatives 
and the KLA should have been subject to the same type o f ultimatums and warnings as 
the Serbian authorities and security forces.9
7 ‘Kosovo’, Vuk DraSkovic, MTV2466, 2 April 1998 (author’s translation)
8 Radio B92, 3 March 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D3167/A, 5 March 1998
9 Radio B92, 9 March 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D3172/A, 11 March 1998. Speaking 
in June, DraSkovid also rejected the Contact Group’s demands that Serbian and Yugoslav forces should 
withdraw from Kosovo, stating that this demand was unacceptable (Tanjug, 16 June 1998 in BBC Summary 
o f World Broadcasts EE/D3256/A, 18 June 1998).
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Draskovic was also critical o f Kosovo’s political representatives,10 rejecting the 
suggestion that the Kosovo Albanian political leadership was merely engaged in a 
struggle for rights, and alleging that Rugova’s programme was ‘looking for an 
independent Kosovo and greater Albania’ and as such was ‘not a democratic but a 
terrorist programme.’11 As such, Draskovic’s position in this regard was closer to that of 
the Milosevic regime than the IC which, while initially somewhat critical o f the KLA, 
was supportive o f Rugova and the Kosovo Albanian political leadership.
A further issue on which Draskovic’s position was at odds with that o f the IC was 
in relation to assigning responsibility for the conflict in Kosovo. While the IC clearly saw 
Milosevic and the Serbian authorities as bearing most o f the responsibility in this regard, 
Draskovic was considerably more critical o f the Kosovo Albanians, claiming that 
‘Milosevic is guilty o f 1,000 things, but he is not guilty for Kosovo, because under Tito’s 
1974 constitution even then [the Kosovo Albanians] were unhappy. They had the right to 
veto Serb law but they still wanted independence.’12 In this early phase o f the conflict, 
Draskovic’s criticism of the Serbian authorities was restricted to condemning the lack o f 
internal political and economic reform in Serbia, and the weakness of Serbia 
internationally, which he believed was encouraging the KLA. According to an SPO 
statement issued in early March 1998, Albanian ‘extremists’ assessed that, as a result of 
the lack of political and economic reform in Serbia, the country would continue to grow 
weaker, and would be ‘constantly labelled as the main culprit in the Balkans.’13 The
l0In March 1998, DraSkovic alleged that Kosovo’s citizens were ‘being exposed to terrorism and the 
intolerance o f almost all the Albanian parties’ (Beta news agency, 5 March 1998 in BBC Monitoring 
Europe -  Political, 6 March 1998).
11 ‘M iloSevii nije jedini problem’ interview with Vuk DraSkovic, MW  2505, 29 December 1998 (author’s 
translation).
12 The Scotsman, 5 May 1998.
13 Beta news agency, 8 March 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D3171/A, 10 March 1998.
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statement went on to argue that only with a democratic Serbia could the Kosovo crisis be 
resolved and terrorism and ‘Albanian separatism’ ended.14 However, this implicit 
criticism of the regime was not matched by condemnation of the actions of Serbia’s 
security forces in Kosovo, which were explicitly endorsed when Draskovic described 
them as ‘Our state’s actions against Albanian terrorism, for which nobody in the world 
can reproach us.’15
Draskovic also played down the extent to which the human rights of the Kosovo 
Albanians were being abused, arguing that such abuse existed throughout Serbia,16 and 
that the Kosovo Albanians themselves, and not the Serbian authorities, were responsible 
for their lack of political rights. Draskovic argued that had they not boycotted elections, 
the Kosovo Albanian population could have had ‘significant representation’ in the 
Serbian and Yugoslav governments and parliaments, alleging that ‘Serbia didn’t deprive 
the Albanians o f these rights, rather Rugova boycotted them.’17 As such, on this issue, 
the position of the SPO and Draskovic was, again, broadly in line with that o f the 
Milosevic regime.
Kostunica envisaged that a solution to the Kosovo problem lay in the 
régionalisation o f Serbia, which he envisaged as being along the lines o f Spain.18 
Although he argued that Serbia’s external borders could not be changed he advocated 
changing those within the country, ‘in order to create compact Serb municipalities in
14 Beta news agency, 8 March 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D3171/A, 10 March 1998.
15 Radio B92, 3 March 1998 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts EE/D3167/A, 5 March 1998.
16 ‘Kosovo’, Vuk DraSkovic, M W 2466, 2 April 1998 (author’s translation).
17 ‘Kosovo’, Vuk DraSkovic, NIN  2466, 2 April 1998. In the same article, DraSkovié also claimed that 
Rugova was partly responsible for the maintenance o f the MiloSevié regime in power, stating that by 
boycotting elections Rugova had ‘propped up the regime in Serbia. Now he complains that that regime is 
not democratic. I t ’s not, thanks to him too’ (Author’s translation).
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Kosovo.’19 This, he argued, would also facilitate the process o f démocratisation in 
Serbia.20 Alongside this régionalisation, Kostunica proposed passing laws at the federal 
level that would guarantee the rights o f all national minorities without singling out the 
Kosovo Albanians in particular.21 Also, like Draskovic, and in contrast to the IC, 
Kostunica was critical o f the Kosovo Albanian political leadership, which he
99characterised as being less willing to compromise than the Serbian authorities.
Throughout the entire time period covered by this case study, Kostunica believed 
that there was an anti-Serb bias in the IC’s approach to events in Kosovo, and that the IC, 
and in particular the US, was supporting the KLA and was willing to accept an 
independent Kosovo. This, he believed, had been the case from the earliest days o f the 
break-up o f the SFRJ.23 In addition, Kostunica accused the IC o f acting undemocratically 
and also o f undermining democratic forces in Serbia. When asked about the impact o f the 
IC’s position that the Kosovo Albanians must have that which was denied to Serbs in
18 ‘Kosovo u region’ interview with Vojislav KoStunica in N IN 2465, 26 March 1998 (author’s translation). 
KoStunica’s notion o f regionalising Serbia dated back to 1993. See UroS Komlenovid, ‘Ethnic Soccer’ , 
Vreme News Digest Agency No. 111,8 November 1993.
19 Kostunica quoted in Cigar, 2001, p. 44.
20 ‘Kosovo u region’ interview with Vojislav KoStunica in NIN  2465, 26 March 1998 (author’s translation).
21 ‘ Izgubljena decenija’ , interview with Vojislav KoStunica in NIN  2485, 13 August 1998 (author’s 
translation).
22 Kostunica made this claim in August 1998, stating that: ‘When things, observed from the Serbian point 
o f view, get to this situation, when they are practically destroyed, the regime in Belgrade, Milosevic’s 
regime, has demonstrated a willingness to make certain concessions...Until now that has absolutely not 
been demonstrated on the Albanian side and it is that which is worrying’ ( ‘ Izgubljena decenija’, interview 
with Vojislav KoStunica in NIN  2485, 13 August 1998).
23 ‘Kosovo u region’ interview with Vojislav KoStunica in NIN 2465, 26 March 1998 (author’s translation).
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Bosnia and Croatia he stated that ‘these kinds o f policies o f the international community 
and the leading countries, and above all the USA, not only weaken democratic potential 
and democratic forces in Serbia, but cause serious damage to the idea of democracy 
itself.24
In terms of his vision for a resolution of the Kosovo conflict, Djindjic claimed that 
he was ‘pleading for a status of autonomy for Kosovo,’25 and argued that a resolution to 
the conflict should rest on rights as opposed to territory, declaring that: ‘By this concept, 
Serbian Albanians could have collective personal, instead of territorial rights. And that 
means that national minorities could have representation in the federal state, with
substantial rights in all questions relating to national identity (language, culture,
26 ,religion).’ Pesic also argued against a solution based on territory, stating that although 
‘ethnic realities and claims must be taken into account, hence the importance of 
guaranteed rights of autonomy at the local level, but this does not mean giving each 
ethnic group a state.’27 She also suggested that a ‘new concept o f citizenship not based 
primarily on ethnic origin’ needed to be introduced in the Balkans.28
While the attitudes of those parties involved in the SZP were generally closer to the 
IC position than those of the other opposition parties, there were, nevertheless, some 
differences. Like Draskovic and Kostunica, Djindjic was critical of the Kosovo Albanian
24 ‘ Izgubljena decenija’, interview with Vojislav KoStunica in NIN  2485, 13 August 1998. In the same 
interview KoStunica further criticised the IC for acting undemocratically when he stated: ‘ I would mention 
another way in which the international community, really the western countries that have a decisive role in 
the Contact Group, literally walk over the very idea o f democracy. That is the practice o f representatives o f 
the Contact Group and Slobodan Milosevic determining the future legal status o f Kosovo in dialogue ... In 
talks which are absolutely far from the eyes and ears o f the public in Serbia there is nothing that would in 
the least resemble a democratic solution’(author’s translation).
25 Frankfurter Rundschau’ 16 March 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, EE/D3178/A, 18 March 
1998.
26 ‘Prava umesto teritorije’, Zoran Djindjic in N IN 2467, 9 April 1998 (author’s translation).
27 Liberation, 15 May 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, EE/D3538/A, 19 May 1999.
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political leadership, and questioned its true aims, stating that: ‘There exists a well- 
founded doubt that the Albanian leaders in Kosovo and Metohija are not concerned with 
democratic rights, but with an independent state, even if that is undemocratic.’29
However, in spite o f his suspicions, Djindjic and other SZP leaders travelled to 
Kosovo in July 1998 to meet with Kosovo Albanian political representatives and to 
discuss the situation in the province. While the two groups could not reach an agreement 
on how the conflict might be resolved, they did agree that the violence that was being 
perpetrated was unacceptable. Furthermore, the visit o f Serbia’s opposition leaders was 
welcomed by Fehmi Agani, a leader o f one o f the most significant Kosovo Albanian 
political parties.30 In addition, Djindjic attended a conference in Paris on Serbian- 
Albanian relations organised by the International Human Rights Federation in late 
September 1998.31 While these moves clearly could not have contributed much to 
resolving the conflict in Kosovo, they do demonstrate a willingness on the part of the 
SZP leaders to engage with representatives o f the Kosovo Albanian leadership, and may 
have constituted an attempt to convince the IC that their position in relation to the 
Kosovo dispute was fundamentally different to that o f the regime.
In contrast to Draskovic, Djindjic was also critical of the Milosevic regime and its 
Kosovo policies, though much of his concern seems to have been primarily for the impact 
that these policies would have on Serbia itself, rather than on the Kosovo Albanians. In 
his reaction to the Contact Group’s 9 March 1998 statement, Djindjic doubted whether 
Milosevic would meet the demands contained in the statement and expressed concern
28 Liberation, 15 May 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, EE/D3538/A, 19 May 1999.
29 ‘Prava umesto teritorije’ , Zoran D jindjic in M A r2467, 9 April 1998 (author’s translation).
30 The Financial Times (London), 15 July 1998.
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about the impact of further sanctions on Serbia’s fragile economy. He also was doubtful 
as to whether the IC’s approach could yield results stating that ‘this [solution] is 
dependent on a tolerant and normal policy. You must forgive me, but I doubt that such a 
thing exists in the ruling regime.’
A consistent theme in DS and SZP comments on the situation in Kosovo 
throughout this time period was the insistence that attaining a long-term political solution 
in Kosovo would not be possible without the removal o f the Milosevic regime and the 
introduction of democratic reforms throughout Serbia. From the outset, Djindjic argued 
that ‘only a truly democratic Serbia would be in a position to truly calm tensions in 
Kosovo.’33 In keeping with this, he also believed that the issue o f Kosovo’s status should 
be addressed only after the issue of human rights (throughout Serbia, and not just in 
Kosovo) had been dealt with, arguing that ‘If you start with the question o f status you 
will never achieve your objective. It is necessary to force Milosevic and his regime to 
guarantee basic rights and liberties.’34 Djindjic’s argued that all o f Serbia’s citizens 
needed to be guaranteed human and civil rights and asserted that ‘It is difficult for the 
opposition, which is unable to be granted the rights it wants, to stand up and demand 
these very rights for other groupings in the same country.’35
31 Radio B92, 19 September 1998 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, EE/D3338/A, 22 September
1998.
32 Radio B92, 9 March 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts EE/D3172/A, 11 March 1998.
33 Agence France Presse, 10 March 1998.
34 Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 March 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, EE/D3538/A, 18 March
1998. Djindjic also appeared to believe that with the right economic incentives the Kosovo Albanians 
might be induced to remain within Yugoslavia: ‘We must make Yugoslavia economically attractive to the 
Albanians. It w ill never be politically, so we must show them with one elected voice in Serbia it w ill be far 
easier to become part o f the EU than i f  they were in Albania, and eventually the need to leave us w ill 
subside’ (The Scotsman, 5 May 1998).
35 Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 March 1998 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, EE/D3538/A, 18 March
1998.
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The overall position of the democratic opposition parties in relation to Kosovo’s 
status was broadly in line with that of the Milosevic regime and the IC: Kosovo’s ethnic 
Albanian population should be granted some degree of autonomy (though not necessarily 
territorially based), but should remain within the SRJ. However, it is clear that while all 
the democratic opposition parties advocated the granting of autonomy to Kosovo’s 
Albanians, all were vague as to what this might mean in practice and as such did not 
present a well-worked out, detailed and viable alternative to the policies being pursued by 
the regime. Furthermore, there are clear differences, both between the democratic 
opposition parties themselves and also between the IC and the opposition, regarding 
responsibility for the conflict. While the IC believed that primary responsibility for the 
conflict lay with the Serbian authorities, the democratic opposition parties were far more 
critical of the Kosovo Albanians, and expressed doubts about motives of Kosovo’s 
political leadership. However, the SZP parties were far more critical of Milosevic’s role 
in the conflict than were the other parties, and in particular the SPO, and consistently 
emphasised that the removal of Milosevic from power and the introduction of political 
reform in Serbia were essential prerequisites for any long term solution to the Kosovo 
conflict.
Attitudes o f the democratic opposition parties to international intervention
One of the IC’s demands in relation to Kosovo was that there should be 
negotiations between the Serbian and Albanian sides of the dispute, and it supported 
Kosovo Albanians demands that there should be foreign mediation in these talks. The
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Serbian authorities, however, resisted the notion that international involvement in 
negotiations was necessary,36 and Milosevic tried to evade responsibility regarding this 
key question by putting the matter to the Serbian people in a referendum on the question 
‘Do you accept the participation of foreign representatives in the resolution of the 
problems in Kosovo?’37
The Kosovo referendum and the issue of whether the IC should be involved in 
attempts to resolve the Kosovo conflict, revealed a significant difference between some 
of the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime regarding the role that the 
IC should play in resolving the Kosovo conflict. Of the parties considered here, the DS, 
the DSS and the GSS were all opposed to the Kosovo referendum, and some of the party 
leaders argued in favour of a role for the IC in dealing with the Kosovo crisis. In addition, 
there was also a feeling within the democratic opposition that the Kosovo conflict had 
already been internationalised and that the referendum was therefore meaningless.
Calling for a boycott of the planned referendum, Djindjic argued that the IC did 
have a role to play, declaring that ‘We need observers from the [OSCE] in both Kosovo 
and the rest of Serbia, and we need them fast.’38 He was also prepared to accept the 
presence of foreign troops in Kosovo, preferably from the UN, if internal forces proved 
unable to ensure security in the province.39 However, although not opposed to 
international mediation Djindjic remained sceptical as to what could be gained from 
negotiations given the conditions that existed within Serbia at the time: ‘I think that the
36 A n M P from  the SRS, co m m enting  on in ternational dem ands for m ediation  in the d ispu te  stated tha t the 
US has alw ays ‘supported  our enem ies, and now  it w ants to destroy  the Serbs. I f  w e accep t m ediation , we 
will be sign ing  [our ow n] su rrend er’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 8  A pril 1998).
37 T he referendum  took place on 23 A pril and 94 .73%  o f  those w ho voted  opp osed  foreign partic ipation  in 
reso lv ing  the K osovo  d ispu te (Judah, 2000: 152).
38 Christian Science Monitor, 17 July 1998.
39 R adio  B 92, 15 July  1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, E E /D 3281/A , 17 July 1998.
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West is creating an illusion in this regard. Competent negotiations require a lot, for 
example a system of guarantees and institutions within which such talks can be 
conducted. You need institutions that guarantee the implementation of the results.’40 
Pesic also supported international intervention to deal with the crisis in Kosovo and 
argued that the referendum - which she considered to be a means by which Milosevic 
could shift ‘the burden of responsibility over to the people, who will thus vote for 
sanctions and even harder life’41 - was pointless as the Kosovo question had already been 
internationalised.42 In addition, Kostunica, although generally highly critical of the IC 
throughout this time period, also opposed the referendum and argued that Kosovo 
conflict had been ‘internationalised in the 1980s through the worry of the West, above all 
the USA, for the situation of the human rights of the Kosovo Albanians.’43
The position of the SPO and Draskovic on the role of the IC is less clear, and 
shows a degree of inconsistency that may reflect the position of the party at that time.44 
Draskovic was not opposed to internationalising the Kosovo conflict, rather he saw it as 
essential if war was to be avoided in Kosovo, and appears to have considered that the IC 
could be an ally in defending Kosovo: ‘I believe that we will only defend Kosovo without 
war in full co-operation with the Contact Group and the European Union.’45 Furthermore, 
when outlining what he would do were he in power, Draskovic made clear that he did not
40 F rankfu rter R undschau , 16 M arch 1998 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /D 3538/A , 18 M arch
1998.
41 A ssocia ted  P ress W orldstream , 2 A pril 1998.
42 A A P N ew sfeed , 22 A pril 1998.
43 ‘K osovo  u reg io n ’ in terv iew  w ith  V o jislav  K oStunica in A W  2465, 26 M arch  1998 (au th o r’s translation). 
W hile frequently  critical o f  the IC ’s handling  o f  the K osovo  situation , K oStunica did, how ever, seem  to 
believe that it could  w ork  to the benefit o f  opp osition  forces w ith in  Serbia, s ta ting  that: ‘T he international 
co m m unity  is m ore in terested  in K osovo  than in dem ocratic  elections in Serbia. B ut they m ight press for 
early  e lections in o rder to give the A lbanians rep resen ta tion ’ (The Toronto Star, 3 A pril 1998).
272
object to an international presence in negotiations with the Kosovo Albanian leadership. 
He stated if he were in such a position, he would form a negotiating team at the highest 
level and invite Rugova to talks, with Gonzales and American witnesses present if 
Rugova so desired, and with representatives of the federal state, as the Kosovo Albanians 
wanted.46 However, in spite of this apparent acceptance of an IC role in resolving the 
conflict, Draskovic supported the referendum and urged voters to reject international 
mediation.47 While this call to reject foreign intervention in resolving the dispute in 
Kosovo may seem to be at odds with Draskovic’s apparent willingness to allow foreign 
participation in any talks between the Serbian authorities and Kosovo’s political 
representatives, a closer look at the role Draskovic envisioned for the IC in any such talks 
is revealing. Although Draskovic expressed a desire for foreign representatives to be 
present at negotiations, on several occasions he made clear that their role should be 
limited to observation rather than mediation.48 Speaking in May he stated that he thought 
the OSCE mission headed by Felipe Gonzales should be accepted, ‘but not as a mediator 
in the dialogue but as a special OSCE envoy.’49 In June, he further noted that any 
international presence at the negotiations should be limited when he pointed out that the
44 A lthough form ally  part o f  the opposition , the SPO  had been negotiating  w ith the SPS on the possib le 
form ation o f  a coalition  governm ent. W hile the SPS decided  to opt fo r the R adica ls as a coalition  partner in 
the Serbian governm ent, DraSkovic took the SPO  into the federal governm ent in January  1999.
45 ‘K o so v o ’, V uk DraSkovic, NIN 2466, 2 A pril 1998 (au th o r’s translation).
46 ‘K o so v o ’, V uk DraSkovic, N IN 2466, 2 A pril 1998 (au tho r’s translation).
47 DraSkovic m ay not have had the full suppo rt o f  all SPO  m em bers on this issue, at least initially. 
C om m enting  on the decision  to hold the referendum , SPO  spokesperson  Ivan K ovacevic stated  tha t it 
represented  a call for confron tation  betw een [the SRJ] and the in ternational co m m u n ity ’ (A gence F rance 
Presse, 3 A pril 1998).
48 In M arch 1998, D raskovic expressed the b e lie f  tha t the K osovo  A lbanians w ere insisting  on an 
in ternational p resence in the talks because ‘they are convinced  tha t they w ould thus be sitting at the 
negotiating  table as represen ta tives o f  an independent s ta te ’. H e w ent on to state that ‘international
peacen iks should  be p resent at the talks to ease the d ia logue, but not to g ive anyone the leg itim acy o f  an
independent s ta te ’ (B eta new s agency, 18 M arch  1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3180/A , 
20 M arch  1998).
49 B eta new s agency, 14 M ay 1998 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 14 M ay 1998.
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no vote in the referendum did not reject an international role that ‘does not influence the 
talks and impose solutions.’50
While the DS, DSS and GSS were prepared to accept an international intervention 
in the Kosovo dispute, they were critical of the IC ’s decision to impose sanctions against 
Serbia. Djindjic objected to the Contact Group’s move, arguing that the sanctions would 
‘punish people, not the regime,’51 and would ‘help Milosevic’s propaganda that the West 
is biased, unjust and enemy of Serbs.’ Djindjic stated that sanctions would strengthen 
the Milosevic regime ‘because they provide it with an excellent excuse for not 
implementing fundamental political and economic reforms which are the prerequisite for 
Serbia’s survival.’53 Although Djindjic clearly objected to the sanctions that had been 
imposed, as was the case in earlier time periods, he believed that international isolation of 
the Milosevic regime could be useful and suggested that international representatives 
should meet with representatives of the democratic opposition and not Milosevic and his 
associates.54 Draskovic also objected to the imposition of sanctions at this time, stating 
that the Contact Group was ‘punishing a country which is protecting its borders and 
preventing the creation of an ethnic Albanian state on its territory.’55
In summary, in contrast to the Milosevic regime both the DS and the GSS were in 
agreement with the IC regarding the need for foreign mediation in the Kosovo dispute, 
with Djindjic going so far as to state that the deployment of foreign troops to Kosovo, 
under UN auspices, would be acceptable. However, both leaders stressed that without
50 T anjug , 9 June 1998, in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3250/A , 11 June 1998.
51A A P N ew sfeed , 2 M ay 1998.
52 A ssocia ted  Press W orldstream , 10 M ay 1998.
53 B eta  new s agency , 9 S ep tem ber 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, E E /D 3329/A , 11 
S ep tem ber 1998.
54 F rank fu rte r R undschau, 16 M arch  1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, E E /D 3538/A , 18 M arch
1998.
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democratic reform in Serbia and the removal of Milosevic from power, long-term 
stability in Kosovo and the wider region was unlikely. While the DSS was opposed to the 
Kosovo referendum and argued that the situation in Kosovo had long been 
internationalised, the party remained extremely critical of the IC and its intervention in 
Kosovo throughout this time period and as such, Kostunica’s argument that Kosovo had 
been the subject of international concern for many years cannot be seen as an 
endorsement of international policy. While Draskovic’s position in relation to the need 
for international intervention was somewhat contradictory, his and his party’s position 
was considerably closer to that of the Milosevic regime than the DS, DSS or GSS.
The NA TO Ultimatum and the Holbrooke Agreements
A clear division between the opposition parties is also evident in their reactions to 
the Holbrooke agreement and the threat of NATO bombing that was used to compel 
Milosevic to accept the agreement. While the SZP parties welcomed the Holbrooke 
agreements they were concerned that the continued IC practice of negotiating with the 
regime and also the threat of NATO bombing could undermine democratic forces within 
Serbia and also expressed concern about the potential of such moves to radicalise and 
encourage Kosovo Albanian extremists. While the SPO also welcomed the agreement, 
this can be seen as further evidence of the party’s growing closeness to the regime. The 
DSS was the only party to reject the Holbrooke agreements, and its criticism 
demonstrates its nationalist orientation at this time.
55 A A P N ew sfeed, 2 M ay 1998.
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While the SZP welcomed the Holbrooke agreements, opposition leaders again 
attempted to widen the agenda by reiterating the necessity of democratic reform in Serbia 
to bring about a long-term solution to the Kosovo problem, and called for support for the 
democratic opposition.56 The GSS emphasised the potential negative impact on Serbia’s 
democratic opposition that could arise from the continued practice of the IC to negotiate 
with Milosevic in its efforts to resolve the Kosovo dispute. Commenting on one of 
Holbrooke and Gelbard’s visits to Milosevic, Pesic argued that by considering Milosevic 
as being indispensable to the resolution of the Kosovo conflict they were undermining the 
prospects for democratic reform in Serbia.57 Djindjic was also critical of the IC for 
negotiating only with Milosevic, arguing that Milosevic was ‘the obstacle to a rational 
solution to the problem of Kosovo’ and was ‘not qualified for the negotiations on Kosovo 
that are currently under way.’58
56 A ssocia ted  P ress W orldstream , 13 O ctober 1998. W hile D jindjic w as no t overly  critical o f  the agreem ent 
reached by M ilosevic and H olbrooke in O ctober, he w as critical o f  its im plem entation . In a m eeting  w ith 
O SC E chairm an  K nut V ollebaek, he com plained  that the presence o f  the O S C E  h ad n ’t brought about a 
reduction  in tension in K osovo , o r an end to violence. D jindjic also com m ented  on the p ligh t o f  the Serb 
population  in K osovo, w ho he claim ed w ere ‘feeling  increasing ly  insecure because, hav ing  been abandoned 
by the ir state, they have becom e the target o f  increasingly  unprovoked  attacks by K osovo A lbanian  
te rro rists’ (B osnian  Serb new s agency SR N A , 10 January  1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts 
E E /D 3430/A , 12 January  1999). D jindjic also urged the IC  to increase its pressure on M ilosevic to respect 
the H olbrooke agreem ents, ra ther than launch a N A T O  bom bing  cam paign  against the SRJ, arguing that 
m ilitary  in terven tion  w ould  not bring  peace to K osovo. H e po in ted  ou t tha t under the ag reem en t there was a 
prov ision  fo r 2 ,000 m onitors bu t tha t there w ere only  750 in p lace (A gence F rance Presse, 20 January  
1999).
57 B eta new s agency, 14 M ay 1998 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /D 3228/A , 16 M ay 1998.
58 B eta new s agency, 30 N o vem b er 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3399/A , 2 D ecem ber
1998. In add ition  to his objections to M ilosev ic as a negotiato r, D jind jic  also vehem ently  ob jected  to 
H olbrooke, stating  tha t ‘H o lbrooke has assum ed the role o f  m ed ia to r w ith  a special status. H e is not 
behaving as a d ip lom at and a politic ian. Instead, he is like a bu lldozer that destroys every th ing  in its w ay to 
achieve the aim  set by  the U S ad m in istra tion ’. C ritical o f  H o lb ro o k e’s m eetings w ith  the K L A  he w ent on 
to say: ‘Instead o f  the negotiations being  conducted  by O S C E  represen ta tive Felipe G onzales, w ho has 
grea t experience in the figh t against terrorism  and separatism , w e get H olbrooke, w ho acts like a 
co m m ission er w ith a special s ta tu s’ (B eta  N ew s A gency , 26 June in B B C  M onito ring  E urope - P o litical, 26 
June 1998). D jindjic called  for an exp lanation  from  both  H o lbrooke and the U S State D epartm ent: ‘M rs. 
M adeleine A lb rig h t’s office should  issue an official s ta tem en t ex p lain in g  w hy she th inks it is ju s tified  and 
appropriate  fo r M r. H olbrooke in this w ay to m eet represen ta tives o f  a terrorist organ isa tion  w hich is 
engaged in v io lence on a daily  b a s is ’ (R adio  B 92, 26 June in BBC Monitoring Europe - Political, 26 June
1998).
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Djindjic also objected to the threat of NATO bombing on the grounds that this too 
could undermine democratic forces in Serbia, and strengthen the regime and could even 
endanger the lives of the opposition: ‘We’re marked as traitors in a time of war, Every 
day we are getting threats.’59 Djindjic consistently argued that NATO bombs would serve 
only to strengthen Milosevic stating that a bombing campaign would ‘facilitate the 
imposition of dictatorship in Serbia and turn Serbia into Europe’s Iraq, which in the long 
term will jeopardize the stability of the entire Balkans.’60
Djindjic and Pesic also believed that the threat of military intervention in Kosovo 
would as serve as encouragement to Kosovo Albanian extremists. Djindjic argued that 
Security Council Resolution 1199, which he believed increased the likelihood of NATO 
intervention, would serve as encouragement to radical Albanians who would now ‘do 
everything to make a military intervention in Kosovo happen.’61 Pesic expressed similar 
concerns and criticised the Contact Group on the grounds that it was too tolerant of KLA 
violence, arguing that this lessened the possibility of their being a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict. She called on the Contact Group to ‘consider, with utmost seriousness, the 
armed activities of the so-called [KLA] and its open support for the creation of a greater 
Albania’, arguing that unless the Contact Group used its influence to ensure an end to
59 T he P h iladelph ia  Inquirer, 7 O ctober 1998.
60 R adio  B 92, 12 O ctober 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3357/A , 14 O c tob er 1998.
61 B eta  new s agency , 25 Sep tem ber 1998 in B B C  M onito ring  E urope - P o litical, 25 Sep tem ber 1998. In the 
sam e article , D jind jic  is also quo ted  as say ing  that the IC  had ‘d em onstrated  an inability  o r lack o f  in terest 
in finding a lasting  solu tion  to the K osovo  p ro b lem ’ and singled  ou t R ussia  fo r particu lar critic ism  stating  
that by  not veto ing the reso lu tion  it had ‘practically  g iven the green ligh t to N A T O  to in tervene in K o so v o ’. 
A t this tim e, D jind jic  also argued that there was an alternative to m ilita ry  action, though  he d id n ’t specify  
w hat th is m igh t be, s ta ting  that ‘T here are tw o ex trem es: O ne is to do  noth ing, w hich is w hat the 
in ternational co m m unity  has been  doing. T he o ther is bom bs. B oth  o f  them  are w rong. ... I c a n ’t believe 
th e re ’s noth ing in b e tw een ’ (The Philadelphia Inquirer, 7 O ctober 1998).
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armed hostilities by all parties to the conflict, political dialogue to resolve the crisis
f \  9would not succeed.
The DSS was critical of the Holbrooke agreements, which Kostunica described as 
‘yet another capitulation by Milosevic.’ He accused Milosevic of failing to preserve 
Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of failing to secure a ‘favourable 
status for Kosovo.’63 A DSS spokesperson argued that the plans for Kosovo’s future 
removed the province ‘from the legal structure of Serbia and the [SRJ],’ alleging that the 
OSCE monitors ‘serve as a force to separate the Serbian and Albanian side, so Kosovo 
will end up under some sort of international protectorate. There is less and less of Serbia 
in Kosovo.’64 As such, the DSS critique of the Holbrooke agreements was clearly based 
on nationalist arguments.
In line with its increasing closeness to the regime at this time, Draskovic and the 
SPO welcomed the Holbrooke agreements and the deployment of OSCE observers. The 
SPO leader stated that the agreement did not ‘contain anything detrimental to the interests 
of our country.’65 He also claimed that accepting the proposals to resolve the crisis would 
‘soon lead to the lifting of all existing economic sanctions against our country, and the
62 B eta new s agency , 23 June 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, E E /D 3262/A , 25 June 1998. 
PeSic retu rned  to the issue o f  the K L A  in her reaction  to the H olb rooke ag reem ents, sta ting  that she did not 
see how  the prob lem  o f  the return  o f  the K L A  to positions abandoned  by  S erbian  forces had been  solved 
w ith in  the ag reem ents (R adio  B 92, 29 O ctober 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, E E /D 3372/A , 
31 O ctober 1998).
63 B eta  new s agency , 13 O ctober 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3358/A , 15 O ctober
1998. B eta  new s agency , 23 N o vem b er 1998 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 23 N ovem b er 1998.
64 B eta new s agency, 4 January  1999 in B B C  Monitoring Europe -  Political, 4 January  1999.
65 D raskovic argued tha t ‘It is in ou r in terest tha t m any observers from  the O S C E  and o ther im portant 
in ternational o rgan isa tions com e to K osovo  to investigate the crim es against the S erbian  p op u la tio n ’ (B eta 
new s agency, 13 O c tob er 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3357/A , 14 O ctober 1998).
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door would be opened for significant economic assistance.’66
In summary, all of the democratic opposition parties considered here were critical 
of the IC’s actions with respect to the Kosovo conflict at this time. However, while the 
DS and the GSS emphasised that international efforts to resolve the conflict that did not 
address the need for democratic reform in Serbia were unlikely to be successful and were 
undermining the prospects for democracy, the DSS rejected the Holbrooke agreements on 
the grounds that they represented a capitulation, and Kostunica and the DSS were critical 
of Milosevic for failing to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the SRJ. The 
SPO accepted the Holbrooke agreements, arguing that they represented a means by which 
Serbia could be reintegrated into the IC. In this respect, the SPO again held positions that 
were closer to those of the Milosevic regime than the other democratic opposition parties.
Rambouillet and the NATO bombing
By the time the Rambouillet negotiations began in February 1999 a significant 
change had occurred on the political scene in Serbia, with Draskovic and the SPO 
deciding to enter the federal government on 18 January.67 Draskovic’s stated reason for
66 B eta new s agency , 9 O ctober 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3355/A , 12 O ctober
1998. D raSkovic’s b e lie f  tha t through  accep ting  the H ill p roposals S erb ia ’s in ternational iso lation  could 
soon com e to an end, w ould  seem  to be indicative o f  a serious m isread ing  o f  the in ternational m ood at this 
tim e. Speaking in early  N o vem ber DraSkovic expressed  the b e lie f tha t in ternational op in ion  was turning in 
favour o f  the Serbs, and that there w ould be in ternational support fo r any provocations on the part o f  the 
K LA: ‘I f  they  do not ge t ou t o f  the w ay and continue w ith their p rovocations, w ith k idnapping  and 
pretending  to patro l the roads, the in ternational co m m unity  w ill certa in ly  g ive the green light to our 
an titerro rist units to hit the terro rists  w ith all ou r m ight. I believe that the in ternational com m unity  will, 
perhaps, also offer to help ou t an titerro rist units in rooting  out the g rea test evil w h ich  is today th rea ten ing  
no t only Serbia but also the region and the B alk an s’ (T anjug, 8  N ovem ber 1998 in BBC Summary o f World 
Broadcasts E E /D 3380/A , 10 N ovem ber 1998).
67 T anjug , 18 January  1999, in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3437/A , 20 January  1999. 
DraSkovic was appoin ted  deputy  prim e m in ister w ith  special responsib ility  fo r in ternational affairs, w hile 
four o ther SPO  m em bers w ere appointed  to the federal cabinet.
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joining the federal government was to assist ‘in the defence of Kosmet and in the struggle
/ o
for truth about Kosmet.’ He also expressed the hope that, through the participation of 
the SPO in government, Yugoslavia’s international relations could be improved.69 
Emphasising the need for political and economic reform, which he identified as his most 
important task,70 Draskovic maintained that, in spite of the SPO’s participation in the 
federal government, it remained an opposition party.71 Draskovic’s decision to enter the 
federal government strengthened Milosevic’s position, giving him effective control of 
two thirds of both the republican and federal parliaments.72
The democratic opposition parties continued to be critical of the actions of the IC 
in its efforts to deal with the Kosovo crisis during this phase of the conflict, with 
objections being raised to both the Rambouillet process and then the NATO bombing 
campaign. Again, however, significant differences between the parties are evident, 
although all parties opposed the NATO bombing campaign. However, while the initial 
reaction of the democratic opposition to NATO’s military intervention was to present 
itself ‘primarily as a patriotic force helping the defence of the nation’ this changed around 
the beginning of May as the opposition became more critical of the regime (Ilic, 2000: 4).
68 B eta new s agency , 19 January  1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3437/A , 20 January  
1999.
69 B eta new s agency , 19 January  1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3437/A , 20 January  
1999.
70 B eta new s agency , 19 January  1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3437/A , 20 January  
1999.
71 A ccord ing  to DraSkovic the SPO  w ould  oppose ‘every th ing  that ham pers p rogress, everything that is 
undem ocratic  and against the reconcilia tion  w ith the in ternational com m unity . H ow ever, we will never 
oppose the defence o f  ou r country  and K osovo, as the essence o f  ev ery th ing  that m akes us S erb s’. B eta 
new s agency , 19 January  1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3438/A , 21 January  1999.
72 T he Scotsm an, 20 January  1999. PeSic com m ented  on D raS kovic’s decision , cla im ing  that as a result 
Serbia had en tered  a phase o f  w hat she referred  to as ‘to ta litarian  p lu ra lism ’, because it effectively  m eant 
an end to any form  o f  parliam entary  opposition  tha t could  contro l the governm ent: ‘I f  there is no contro l 
over the governm ent, then it cannot w ork for the good o f  the state o r the p e o p le ’ (B eta  new s agency, 21 
January  1999 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 22 January  1999).
280
Ilic cites an interview given by Draskovic in late April, in which he condemned the 
Serbian authorities handling of the crisis, as a key turning point (Ilic, 2000: 5). While 
critical of the Rambouillet process, the GSS believed that the authorities should have 
accepted a settlement at this time. The DS clearly believed that Milosevic would accept a 
settlement at Rambouillet, but did not believe that this would lead to a long-term solution 
to the conflict. The DSS continued to be the most critical of the parties in relation to 
international efforts to resolve the Kosovo dispute, raising objections to both the 
Rambouillet process and also the provisions of the draft agreement for a settlement, and 
continued to accuse of the IC, and in particular the US, of being biased in favour of the 
Kosovo Albanians. The DSS also criticised the IC for its role in maintaining Milosevic in 
power, as did the SZP parties. All of the opposition parties advocated the acceptance of 
the G8 proposals for bringing the conflict to an end, though Kostunica and Djindjic 
expressed reservations about the content of the proposed settlement.
While Pesic was critical of the Rambouillet negotiations on the grounds that the 
peace conference would result in a solution being imposed and that it would not ‘remove 
the causes of instability in the region -  an undemocratic state -  because the solution will 
not demand elections in Serbia,’73 she nevertheless was adamant that the Serbian 
authorities should have tried to obtain a settlement at Rambouillet.74 That the Serbian 
government didn’t do so, she argued, meant that it bore a great deal of responsibility for 
the NATO bombing campaign.75 Pesic objected to the threat to use military force, 
however, which would, she claimed, help Milosevic to retain power as it would
73 B eta new s agency , 28 January  1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /D 3446/A , 30 January
1999.
74 Liberation, 15 M ay 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, E E /D 3538/A , 19 M ay 1999.
75 Liberation, 15 M ay 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, E E /D 3538/A , 19 M ay 1999.
281
‘contribute to further homogenisation of the people and to Serbia’s isolation, which 
would create circumstances in which Milosevic would be justified in ‘agreeing to any 
kind of agreement in order to save the people and the state.’76
While Djindjic had reservations about the Rambouillet agreement, which he 
claimed would give Kosovo more independence within Yugoslavia than either Serbia or 
Montenegro, he nevertheless believed that Milosevic would accept it ‘if his favourite 
negotiator Richard Holbrooke promises him that he will stay in power in return,’77 and 
his concern in this regard was echoed by Pesic who accused the West of putting 
Milosevic in a position of guaranteeing a solution in exchange for a promise that ‘his 
regime would not be touched.’78 Djindjic clearly believed that an agreement would be 
reached at Rambouillet but he was sceptical regarding its ability to provide a long-term 
solution to the Kosovo conflict, returning again to the need for democratic reform in 
Serbia. Djindjic claimed that the implementation of any agreement reached in 
Rambouillet would be problematic because the institutions and political system that 
would be necessary to grant meaningful autonomy to the Kosovo Albanians did not exist 
in Milosevic’s Serbia, and also because, he claimed, neither side involved in the conflict 
was interested in a compromise.79
Kostunica continued to believe that the IC, and in particular the US, was biased in 
relation to the Kosovo conflict and was highly critical of Rambouillet which he described 
as ‘a US-Albanian coordinated action plan to the detriment of the Serbs,’ in which there
76 B eta new s agency , 28 January  1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /D 3446/A , 30 January  
1999.
77 B eta new s agency, 4 M arch 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3476/A , 6  M arch  1999.
78 B eta new s agency , 28 January  1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, E E /D 3446/A , 30 January 
1999.
79 D eutsch landfunk  radio, 4 February  1999 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 4 February  1999.
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would be ‘much more diktat than negotiations on the military part of the agreement.’80 
KoStunica also argued that at the Rambouillet conference, the US made every effort to 
convince the Albanians to sign in order to allow NATO’s military action against
O 1 9
Serbia.’ In his criticism of the US, Kostunica on several occasions, compared the US 
administration to the Nazis, and even made a comparison between Clinton and Hitler.82
Kostunica also objected to elements of the proposed settlement at Rambouillet, 
which he believed represented an infringement of Serbia’s and Yugoslavia’s sovereignty. 
He argued that the talks would fail ‘unless the very assumptions on which the 
negotiations are based are changed and unless the idea that Kosovo’s statehood is 
presented as “a wide degree of autonomy” and the occupation of Kosovo as a peaceful 
solution is abandoned.’83
The SZP parties advocated that the conditions set by the IC for ending the NATO 
bombing should be accepted, and welcomed the decision of the Serbian authorities to do 
so. However, Djindjic’s call for an acceptance of the proposals seems to have been a 
pragmatic assessment of the situation in which Serbia found itself. Commenting on the 
G8 proposal Djindjic stated that: ‘In principle I am against everything this proposal 
contains, but I am in favour of accepting it because we are in no position to set conditions
80 B eta new s agency, 21 F ebruary  1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3466/A , 23 F ebruary  
1999.
81 K oStunica stated  that: ‘T he negotiations at R am bouille t w ere doom ed the m om ent A m erican  d ip lom acy  
stepped through  the front doo r o f  the castle , exp lain ing  w hat w ould have to be done i f  one  o f  the tw o sides 
d id n ’t sign the agreem ent. T he Serbs w ould  in that case have to be bom bed and the A lbanians, w ith  a heavy 
heart, w ould  be denied h e lp ’ ( ‘A m ericka v eza ’ in terv iew  w ith V o jislav  K oStunica in NIN  2513, 25 
February  1999). A t a la te r stage, w hen  the N A T O  bom bing cam paign  w as underw ay, KoStunica also 
accused the U S o f  hav ing  as its m ain  ob jective ‘the ethnic c leansing  o f  Serbs from  K osovo  and placing the 
province und er its co n tro l’ (T anjug, 5 A pril 1999 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 6  April 1999).
82 T anjug , 5 A pril 1999 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 6  A pril 1999. K oStunica also co m pared 
N A T O  to the N azis in M ay (T anjug, 24 M ay 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3544/A , 26 
M ay 1999).
83 ‘A m ericka v e z a ’ in terview  w ith V ojislav  KoStunica in NIN  2513, 25 F ebruary  1999 (au th o r’s 
translation).
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or make demands. When we ask ourselves what the alternative to this proposal is, the 
answer is: more air strikes, which is much worse.’84 Djindjic went on to assert that the 
position of the DS was ‘that Milosevic ought to accept this accord and try to salvage in 
this peace what was lost in Rambouillet. If Milosevic had accepted the Rambouillet 
agreement we would have had the opportunity in the next two or three years to recover 
what was lost in Rambouillet. By entering the war we are losing more and more by the
o r
day.’ Pesic also argued that the conditions put forward by the IC to end the NATO 
bombing campaign should also be accepted, stating that ‘I fail to see why establishing an 
international protectorate over Kosovo poses a problem,’ and claiming that on this issue 
the GSS, the DS and Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic were unanimous.86
While Kostunica did not advocate rejecting the G8 proposals for an end to the 
conflict, which, he stated, contained some positive elements, he was more cautious in his 
acceptance than the other democratic opposition parties. Kostunica noted that there were 
dangers inherent in the G8 plan as a result of the ambiguity contained in the document 
regarding the nature of the international force that would be stationed in Kosovo. Arguing 
that there should be greater clarity in relation to the mandate and duration of such a
84 SR N A  B osn ian  Serb new s agency, 13 M ay 1999 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 25 M ay 1999.
85 SR N A  B osn ian  Serb new s agency, 13 M ay 1999 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 25 M ay 1999. 
T he sim ilarity  be tw een  the G 8  proposal and the R am bouille t ag reem en t w as also  noted  in an official DS 
sta tem ent w hich  w elcom ed the decision  to accep t the peace p lan  bu t noted  tha t this ‘decision  should have 
been m ade before  the start o f  w ar, because the G 8  p lan accep ted  today does not d iffer from  the one rejected  
ea rlie r’ (A gence France P resse, 3 June 1999). DS deputy  leader Z oran  Z ivkovid m ade the sam e poin t on  4 
June (A ssociated  Press W orldstream , 4 June 1999).
86 Liberation, 15 M ay 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /D 3538/A , 19 M ay 1999.
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force.87 Kostunica also expressed concern that the proposed resolution would result in
oo
Kosovo losing all links with the Republic of Serbia.
Draskovic and the SPO began this period as participants in the federal government, 
and as such cannot be considered to have been part of the democratic opposition at that 
time. However, while Draskovic was critical of NATO for attacking the SRJ, he also 
became increasingly critical of the regime as the NATO campaign continued, and as Ilic 
points out, Draskovic ‘began perceptibly distancing himself from the war policy’ (Ilic, 
2000: 5). On 26 April, in an interview given to Studio B, Draskovic accused the regime 
of lying to the people of Serbia. He claimed that the IC had dropped the problematic 
aspects of the Rambouillet proposals and as such the authorities should accept the IC’s 
conditions for bringing a halt to the bombing campaign. He argued that Yugoslavia had 
achieved all that it could at this time, that acceptance of the IC’s demands did not 
constitute a threat to Serbia’s national or state interests, and that a UN force would be
89acceptable in Kosovo. Two days later Draskovic was sacked as deputy prime minister 
because of his ‘public statements against government positions, and for damaging the 
government’s prestige.’90 Throughout the remainder of the NATO campaign Draskovic 
urged the Serbian authorities to accept the G8 conditions for ending the bombing, and 
welcomed Milosevic’s decision to do so in late May.
87 T anjug , 11 M ay 1999 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 11 M ay 1999. KoStunica w as also critical 
o f  the draft U N  Security  C ouncil resolu tion  that w as based on the G 8  proposal, again noting that it 
contained m any am biguities and em phasising  in p articu lar that: ‘It is not good that the m ain bone o f  
con ten tion  be tw een  R ussia and N A T O , i.e. the issue o f  com m and over w hat is know n as the in ternational 
security  presence, is not m entioned in the d raft reso lu tion  and that it be resolved through som e separate, 
bila teral ag reem en ts.’ (B osnian  Serb new s agency  SR N A , 9 June 1999 in BBC Summary o f World 
Broadcasts E E /D 3558/A , 11 June 1999).
88 B osn ian  Serb new s agency SR N A , 9 June 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3558/A , 11 
June 1999.
89 S tudio B T V  w eb site, 26 A pril 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3520/A , 28 April 
1999.
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As in earlier phases of the Kosovo crisis, the SZP parties expressed concern at the 
impact that international policy might have on the democratic opposition, and also 
expressed concern that the IC would be willing to accept Milosevic’s continuance in 
power if he accepted international proposals for resolving the Kosovo conflict. Speaking 
during the NATO bombing campaign, Pesic complained that the West ‘strikes deals with 
[Milosevic] and continues regarding him as a partner with whom it can negotiate peace. It 
is leaving us with him in a country reduced to a heap of rubble.’91 Suggesting that an 
alternative approach from the IC might be more useful, she called on the West to stop 
‘taking nothing but ethnic rights into account’ and support ‘the citizens of Yugoslavia 
and Serbia who want to create a real democracy, the sole key to lasting peace.’92
Djindjic also suggested that an alternative approach on the part of the IC would 
have been far more successful against the regime, arguing that ‘Milosevic could be far 
more easily eliminated through the development of democracy here than through air 
strikes,’ and noting that the US had spent more money on one day’s bombs than it ever 
spent helping the democratic opposition in Serbia.93 Djindjic also expressed concern 
regarding the increase in anti-Western feeling that would result from the bombing, stating 
that ‘The people here now identify Western democracy with bombs.’ 94 Like Djindjic and 
Pesic, Kostunica criticised the IC, and in particular the US, for its role in maintaining 
Milosevic in power, stating that: ‘We can wonder to what extent the democratic world
90 A gence France Presse, 28 A pril 1999.
91 Liberation, 15 M ay 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /D 3538/A , 19 M ay 1999.
92 Liberation, 15 M ay 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, E E /D 3538/A , 19 M ay 1999.
93 New York Times, 29 M arch  1999.
94 F rank fu rte r R undschau, 9 A pril 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3506/A , 12 A pril 
1999. D jindjic also noted  the im pact that this an ti-W estern  feeling m ight have on the D S, as the p a rty ’s 
‘en tire  political identity  is closely  tied to E urope and A m erica. F o r m ost people  here, E urope has becom e 
identical w ith N A TO , w hich is identical w ith  b o m b s’. F or this reason, accord ing  to D jind jic , the DS was 
‘the b iggest loser in this w a r’ (The Washington Post, 12 A pril 1999).
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has conserved an authoritarian regime in Serbia, to what extent Washington has the credit 
for maintaining Slobodan Milosevic in power and that which his power represents in 
Serbia. That credit is very great.’95
In summary, during this phase of the conflict, the positions of the democratic 
opposition parties in relation to the conflict in Kosovo and the international response to it 
conform to the same pattern as during earlier phases of the conflict. While all were 
critical of the IC, the DS and the GSS emphasised the negative impact that IC policy 
would have on the prospects for democratic reform in Serbia, and continued to be critical 
of international engagement with Milosevic. However, both of these parties argued that 
Milosevic should have accepted a settlement in Rambouillet. The DSS and the SPO 
rejected the Rambouillet proposals, though given that the SPO had joined the federal 
government by this stage it had lost its status as an opposition party. All parties argued 
that the G8 proposals for ending the conflict should be accepted, though the DSS 
expressed reservations, while the DS’s acceptance of the proposals seems to have been a 
pragmatic assessment based on the situation in which Serbia found itself.
In considering the attitudes of the democratic opposition to the Kosovo conflict as 
a whole, it is clear that, while all parties became increasingly critical of international 
policy as the international reaction to the conflict became more severe, there were clear 
differences between the position’s of the SZP parties and the DSS, and those of the 
Milosevic regime. The SPO held positions that were generally in line with those of the 
Milosevic regime, going so far as to join the federal government in January 1999. As 
such, the SPO cannot be considered to have been a credible alternative to the Milosevic
95 ‘A m eriSka v e za ’ in terv iew  w ith V ojislav  KoStunica in NIN  2513, 25 February  1999 (au th o r’s 
translation).
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regime from an IC perspective at this time. Similarly, while the DSS was far more critical 
of regime than was the DS, its criticism was based on a strong nationalist perspective and 
therefore put its position at odds with that of the IC. The SZP parties, however, while 
critical of international policy, generally maintained positions that were broadly in line 
with those of the IC, supported international intervention in the conflict and were even 
willing to accept an international military presence in Kosovo. Furthermore, much of 
their criticism of international policy related to their belief that, in the absence of 
democratic reform, there could be no long-term solution to the Kosovo conflict. As such, 
the SZP held positions that were closer to those of the IC than were those of the 
Milosevic regime and as such can be considered as a credible alternative partner from an 
IC perspective.
Challenges to the Milosevic regime
As noted above, there were no major opposition challenges to the Milosevic 
regime during this time period. However, in spite of the clearly unfavourable 
environment, the democratic opposition parties, and particularly the DS and the GSS 
were not entirely inactive. In 1998 both of these parties were central to the formation of 
an opposition alliance, the SZP, and began plans to stage anti-regime demonstrations. 
However, these plans were ultimately put on hold as a result of the NATO bombing 
campaign.
While Milosevic had been employing steadily more repressive tactics in his 
efforts to retain power in Serbia throughout the 1990s, in 1998 and 1999 this tendency
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continued at an accelerated pace, with moves against the autonomy of Serbia’s 
universities and also against the independent media drawing particular criticism from the 
opposition. While large scale, sustained demonstrations of the kind seen in earlier time 
period did not result from these moves, the democratic opposition parties did, 
nonetheless, strenuously object to these measures.
The Alliance for Change (SZP)
The Alliance for Change was founded in June 1998 and initially included the DS, 
the GSS and four other opposition parties, though a number of other opposition parties 
and organisations would join over the course of the following year. In addition to these 
parties, the SZP also included a number of high profile public figures as members, 
including Milan Panic, who was a key figure in the establishment of the SZP, and 
Dragoslav Avramovic (Milosevic, 2000: 129). The Alliance declared that its goal was the 
‘establishment of [a] modem democratic state, re-construction of the economy and return 
to the world community’ (CeSID, 2000: 79), and planned to challenge Milosevic through 
anti-regime demonstrations with the aim of forcing early elections in Serbia.
From the outset the SZP made efforts to secure international support for its 
planned efforts to oust Milosevic. Apparently convinced that they could defeat Milosevic 
in any fair electoral contest, the main request that the Alliance members made from the 
IC was that it use its influence to ensure that free and fair elections could be held in 
Serbia. To this end they emphasised the need for international support for the
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increasingly beleaguered independent media.96 Furthermore, clearly intending to 
demonstrate that it represented a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime, the SZP 
also expressed support for international efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Kosovo, and at a 
meeting with Gelbard in July 1998, requested that the IC continue these efforts.97 
Speaking in advance of the meeting, Panic also stated that he intended to ask Gelbard to 
push the IC to send observers to Kosovo in an effort to bring the fighting to an end.98
During this time period the SZP had frequent meetings with IC representatives 
both in Serbia when those representatives visited, and also outside Serbia, and used every 
opportunity to undermine Milosevic’s legitimacy by raising the issue of the undemocratic 
character of the regime. As such, the democratic opposition clearly enjoyed a higher 
international profile than it had prior to the Zajedno demonstrations in 1996 and 1997. 
The increased international profile of the democratic opposition parties coincided with an 
increased level of international criticism of Milosevic, not only in relation to Kosovo, but 
also in relation to the lack of democracy in Serbia, which, while significantly less 
important to the IC than was the Kosovo crisis, nevertheless was a regular feature in 
international criticism of the Serbian authorities. Continuing a trend that began in the 
previous time period, the need for democratic reform in Serbia in order to secure the 
lifting of the outer wall of sanctions was repeatedly stressed by US officials.
Furthermore, during the time period considered in this case study, IC 
representatives began to publicly identify Milosevic as being a significant source of all 
problems in the former Yugoslavia, as the democratic opposition parties had long argued.
96 P eace W atch  O nline, D ecem ber 1998, U n ited  States Institu te o f  Peace. A vailab le  at: 
h ttp ://w w w .usip .o rg /peacew atch /!9 98 /1298 /p w l 2 9 8 .htm l: N ational P ublic R adio, N P R  M orn ing  Edition,
10 D ecem ber 1998, T ranscrip t # 9 8 1 2 1 0 1 5 -2 1 0 .
97 P R  N ew sw ire, 27 July  1998.
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According the US State Department’s James Rubin at a press briefing on 1 December: 
‘Milosevic has been at the center of every crisis in the former Yugoslavia over the last 
decade. He is not simply part of the problem: Milosevic is the problem," while Austrian 
foreign minister Wolfgang Scheussel, following a meeting with Djindjic and speaking on 
behalf of the EU, noted that Milosevic ‘was part of the problem, not the solution.’100
In spite of increasing international criticism of Milosevic, IC representatives also 
made clear that they would continue to negotiate with the regime to try and resolve the 
Kosovo crisis.101 This continued international engagement with Milosevic in order to 
reach an agreement that would bring the fighting in Kosovo to an end was criticised by 
the democratic opposition parties, who considered that this was helping to sustain 
Milosevic and in so doing was causing damage to the prospects of democratic reform in 
Serbia. Nebojsa Covic, in his capacity as SZP co-ordinator, addressed a hearing of the 
American Helsinki Commission in late 1998 and noted that one of the sources of 
Milosevic’s power was ‘the legitimacy, given de facto to him by the international 
community.’102 At the same hearing Milan Panic urged the IC to stop meeting with 
Milosevic because:
If international leaders no longer parade to Belgrade to meet with him, his 
public image will quickly fade, and it will become apparent to an 
overwhelming majority of Serbs that his regime no longer enjoys 
international legitimacy. Those international leaders who want to encourage
98 A ssocia ted  P ress W orldstream , 20 July 1998.
99 US D epartm en t o f  State, D aily  Press B riefing, 1 D ecem ber 1998.
100 A ssocia ted  Press W orldstream , 4 D ecem ber 1998.
101 A m bassador C hristop her H ill, US Special E nvoy for K osovo. ‘R em arks at m eeting  w ith m em bers o f  the 
independent m ed ia ’, B elgrade , 3 D ecem ber 1998.
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democracy in Serbia should meet with the leaders of the Serbian opposition 
on every possible occasion, not with those who repress democracy.103
In January 1999, Djindjic outlined the SZP’s strategy for the coming year, stating that 
there would be an initial phase of protest rallies throughout Serbia’s major towns and 
cities, this followed by demands for elections in the autumn with a final phase that would 
be devoted to ensuring that the elections would be free and fair. In this regard he noted 
the need for international support, claiming that the support of the OSCE and other IC 
institutions ‘could be enough to guarantee the right conditions in Serbia for honest 
elections.’104 However, Djindjic also noted that the primary condition for the 
demonstrations to go ahead was ‘that there should be no war or air strikes in Kosovo. 
Otherwise we would have to call the whole thing off.’105 NATO’s air attacks against the 
SRJ effectively brought to an end any possibility of the SZP going ahead with it plans. In 
early April, Djindjic commented on the impact of the bombing on the democratic 
opposition:
At present we are not active politically, not only because of martial law but 
also because the populace does not want that at all. The priorities are different 
now. Everyone has friends or children who may be sent to Kosovo for 
military duty. Everyone is fearful and the people are not interested in politics 
when they are fearful. As long as war prevails we cannot talk about
102 ‘T he M ilosevic R egim e V ersus Serbian  D em ocracy  and B alkan  S tab ility ’, H earing  before the 
C om m ission  on  Security  and C oopera tion  in E urope, 10 D ecem ber 1998. A vailab le  a t h ttp ://w w w .csce .g ov . 
19 Sep tem ber 2006.
103 ‘T he M ilosevic R egim e V ersus S erbian  D em ocracy  and B alkan  S tab ility ’, H earing  before the 
C om m ission  on  Security  and C oopera tion  in E urope, 10 D ecem ber 1998. A vailab le  a t h ttp ://w w w .csce .g ov , 
19 S ep tem ber 2006.
104 Glas Javnosti, 12 January  1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3432/A , 14 January 1999.
105 Glas Javnosti, 12 January  1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3432/A , 14 January  1999.
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unemployment and wages. We have now been practically wiped out. If 
elections were held today, we would get zero per cent.’106
Pesic also noted the detrimental impact of the NATO campaign on those working against 
the regime inside Serbia, pointing out that the bombing was:
not making the job of the democratic opposition in Serbia any easier ... it is 
difficult to persuade people of the validity of Western democratic ideas used 
to justify the strikes. ... It is pointless, indeed irritating, to hear the West say 
it is against the regime but not against the Serbian people. People do not draw 
the distinction when the bombs are falling on them.107
In addition to forcing the SZP to cancel its campaign against the Milosevic regime 
Djindjic also feared for his personal safety during the bombing, and claims to have been
shown a ‘hit list’ with his and independent journalist Slavko Curuvija’s names at the
108 vtop. When Curuvija was assassinated, Djindjic relocated to Montenegro, where he 
spent his time working closely with Milo Djukanovic to prepare an opposition strategy 
for the post war period. To this end, Djukanovic and Djindjic wrote an article that was 
published in the New York Times, entitled ‘After The War In Serbia Is Over’, in which 
they outlined their vision for post-war Yugoslavia and also what they believed was
106 F rankfu rter R undschau, 9 A pril 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3506/A , 12 A pril 
1999. In a s im ilar com m ent on the m arg inalisation  o f  the opp osition  w ith in Serbia, D jindjid also noted that 
the bom bing  w as having a sim ilar effect on  ‘those m oderates and dem ocrats am ong the ethnic A lb an ian s’
(New York Times, 29 M arch  1999).
107 Liberation, 15 M ay 1999 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, E E /D 353 8/A , 19 M ay 1999. D jindjic 
also m ade the poin t that the ‘people do not see the in terven tion  as be ing  against the presiden t but against 
their co u n try ’ and w ent on  to state that he regretted  ‘very m uch that W este rn  policy  and E uropean  values 
are now  equated  w ith  N A T O  and b o m b s’ (F rankfu rter R undschau, 9 A pril 1999 in BBC Summary o f World 
Broadcasts E E /D 3506/A , 12 A pril 1999).
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necessary from the IC to make this a reality, pointing out that ‘outside world needs to do 
more than solve the Kosovo crisis.’109
In summary, while the SZP was unable to go ahead with its planned anti-regime 
demonstrations, and thus lost an opportunity to draw attention to the lack of legitimacy of 
the regime in the domestic arena, the SZP used the higher international profile of the 
democratic opposition to continuously highlight the undemocratic nature of the regime at 
the international level in an effort to undermine Milosevic’s external legitimacy. 
However, while the IC became increasingly critical of the Milosevic regime throughout 
this time period, it continued to negotiate with the regime in an effort to resolve the 
Kosovo conflict, in spite of the objections of the SZP whose leaders argued that this was 
doing much to strengthen the regime within Serbia. Furthermore, the SZP also noted the 
extent to which its efforts to oppose the regime were being undermined by international 
policy, an effect that was most noticeable in the SZP’s abandonment of its planned anti­
regime demonstrations as a result of the NATO bombing campaign.
Increasing repression
While to a greater or lesser extent repression had been a tool of the Milosevic 
regime throughout the 1990s, his need to resort to such tactics increased in the late 1990s. 
According to a report by Human Rights Watch, while the IC focused on the developing 
crisis in Kosovo, Milosevic used his ‘control of the Serbian parliament to enact and 
implement draconian new laws severely restricting independent media and freedom of
108 D jindjic m akes these claim s in the B B C  series ‘T he Fall o f  M ilo sev ic ’, E p isode 2, b roadcast on  B B C  
television , 12 January  2003 and in an in terv iew  given to the B osnian  Serb new s agency  SR N A  on 13 M ay 
1999 reproduced  in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 15 M ay 1999.
109 New York Times, 8  M ay 1999.
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expression.’110 Of particular note during this time period were a law that effectively 
abolished the autonomy of Serbia’s universities, and a public information law that 
imposed severe restrictions on the independent media.
At the end of May 1998, in a move that was perceived as revenge for the student 
protests in 1996 and 1997, the Serbian government passed a new law on universities that 
gave the government control over state universities, effectively abolishing their 
autonomy.111 The law gave the Serbian authorities the power to appoint presidents and 
deans of state universities, in addition to other staff, and required that all staff, regardless 
of their previous terms of employment, sign new contracts that were seen by many as 
being in effect an oath of loyalty to the regime.112 In protest at the move, the president of 
Belgrade University resigned on 27 May while students announced that they would strike 
and organise protest rallies in towns throughout Serbia.113
Protests began even before the law was passed, beginning on 25 May and 
included a demonstration organised by the SZP. Over the coming days the police acted 
with force to break up the ongoing student demonstrations and also prevented protestors 
from marching through Belgrade.114 The democratic opposition parties supported the 
students in their protests, condemning the new law and the violence that had been used 
against the demonstrators.115
110 ‘D eepen ing  A u thoritarian ism  in Serbia: T he P urge o f  the U n ivers ities ,’ H u m an  R ights W atch, January  
1999. A vailab le  at: h ttp ://w w w .hrw .O rg/reports/1999/serb ia/index .h tm #T opO fP age.
111 B eta new s agency , 28 M ay 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3240/A , 30 M ay 1998.
112 ‘D eepen ing  A u thoritarian ism  in Serbia: T he Purge o f  the U n iv ers ities ,’ H um an  R ights W atch, January 
1999. A vailab le  at: h ttp ://w w w .hrw .O rg /reports/1999/serb ia/index .h tm #T opO fP age.
113 B eta new s agency, 28 M ay 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3240/A , 30 M ay 1998
114 B eta new s agency, 26 M ay 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3238/A , 28 M ay 1998; 
B eta  new s agency, 2 June 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts E E /D 3244/A , 4 June 1998; 
Financial Times, 28 M ay 1998.
1,5 B eta new s agency , 26 M ay 1998 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3238/A , 28 M ay 1998.
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The law on universities and the use of violence to deal with the demonstrators 
received little, if any, international attention. There were no statements of support for the 
students or condemnations of the Milosevic regime’s use of violence to deal with the 
protestors by any significant international actors. On the contrary, the IC decided at this 
time to suspend the implementation of sanctions against Serbia that had been proposed by 
the Contact Group on 8 May because Milosevic had agreed to hold talks with Rugova.116 
In addition, following the suspension of negotiations between the Serbs and Albanians 
and an increase in the level of violence in Kosovo, the statements that accompanied the 
decisions to implement those sanctions that had been suspended mentioned only the 
situation in Kosovo, and made no reference to the increasing level of repression inside 
Serbia.
Demands for media liberalisation in Serbia were a constant theme in opposition 
rhetoric throughout the duration of Milosevic’s rule and had been the rationale for 
numerous anti-regime campaigns and protests throughout the 1990s as the regime grew 
ever more repressive. The level of repression of the independent media in Serbia 
increased significantly in the time period considered here. Regime efforts to stifle the 
independent media in 1998 began in May, around the same time as the law on 
universities was passed, when federal government refused to grant permits to all but three 
of thirty independent television and radio stations that had applied for licenses earlier that 
year. Of those that were granted licences, the government demanded exceptionally high
116 Secre tary  o f  State M adeleine A lbright, P ress C onference, L uxem bourg , 28 M ay 1998; C ouncil o f  
M in isters Press R elease, PRES: 98/162, 2097th C ouncil m eeting  -  G eneral A ffairs -B ru sse ls , 25 M ay 1998.
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payments for the use of the allotted frequencies.117 While the International Association of 
Free Press (IFEX) condemned the Yugoslav authorities, describing the decision to set the 
fees at such a high rate as ‘deliberate attempt to silence independent media and voices,’118 
there was little other international reaction to media repression at this time. As noted 
above in relation to the university law, the IC was preoccupied with events in Kosovo in 
late May 1998 and as such matters relating to the undemocratic nature and actions of the 
Milosevic regime did not feature prominently on the international agenda.
In October 1998, the Milosevic regime used the threat of NATO air strikes to 
further undermine the independent media. On 8 October the Serbian government issued a 
‘Decree on Special Measures in Conditions of Threats of NATO Attacks’ which included 
measures aimed at the media, including a ban on re-broadcasting foreign media 
programmes which ‘damage the interests of our country, which spread fear, panic or 
defeatism, or which negatively affect citizens’ willingness to preserve the integrity of 
Serbia and Yugoslavia.’119 The decree stipulated that ‘Media outlets ... must not spread 
defeatism and act contrary to national unity and to our state interests.’120 According to 
Human Rights Watch, within a few days of the decree, Serbian police closed down three 
newspapers and two radio stations.121
Within weeks of passing the Decree the situation for the independent media 
deteriorated even further. While the Decree was suspended and those publications that
117 T he fees for a te lev ision  station  covering  an area o f  a city  w ith  a population  o f  1.5 m illion  w ould be 
obliged to pay 40 ,000 D M  per m onth, w hile a station  covering  m ore than one city  w ould  have to pay 60,000 
DM  per m onth (B eta new s agency, 21 M ay 1998 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, World Broadcast 
Information, W B I/0022/W B , 29 M ay 1998).
118 B eta new s agency, 21 M ay 1998 in BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, World Broadcast Information, 
W B I/0022/W B , 29 M ay 1998.
119 A gence F rance P resse, 9 O ctober 1998.
120 A ssocia ted  Press W orldstream , 9 O c tob er 1998.
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had been banned were again free to publish, the Serbian parliament passed a Law on 
Public Information on 20 October that incorporated many of the Decree’s provisions. The 
new law included a prohibition against re-broadcasting of foreign radio and television 
programmes and high fines for those who breached its provisions, and granted significant 
powers to the authorities to determine which reports were unlawful.122 According to a 
report by the Beta news agency which considered the implications of the new law: ‘Legal 
experts and owners of private and independent media are unanimous in assessing that the 
new law enables the authorities - by arbitrarily interpreting the law’s rather vague 
provisions and prescribing high fines - to practically ban any media not to their liking.’123 
In line with the more critical stance that the IC was taking with respect to 
Milosevic at this time, the IC condemned regime attempts to repress the independent 
media through both the Decree and the information law. On 9 October, the day after the 
Special Decree was announced, the US State Department issued a statement condemning 
the Serbian authorities ‘actions against Serbian civil society.’ The statement noted not 
only the actions against the independent media but also the ‘politically-motivated 
dismissals at Belgrade University’s law faculty,’ and called on the Serbian government to 
‘reinstate dismissed professors, ensure that no further dismissals take place, and repeal 
legislation mandating these dismissals.’124 Furthermore, less than a week later, the US 
State Department issued a statement condemning the closure of independent media
121 H um an R ights W atch  W orld  R eport 1999. A vailable at 
h ttp ://w w w .hrw .o rg /w orld report99 /eu rope /vugoslav ia .h tm l. 1 Sep tem ber 2006.
122 A ssocia ted  Press W orldstream , 20 O c tob er 1998.
123 B eta new s agency , 22 O c to ber 1998 in BBC Monitoring World Media, 23 O ctober 1998.
124 ‘U nited  States C ondem ns B e lg rad e ’s A ctions A gainst S erbian  C ivil S o c ie ty ,’ US D epartm en t o f  State 
O ffice o f  the Spokesm an, P ress S tatem ent, 9 O ctober 1998.
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outlets under the provisions of the Decree. The EU response’s was harsher still, 
imposing a visa ban against nineteen named Serbian and Yugoslav officials that it 
considered were responsible for the repressive measures taken against the independent 
media.126
In summary, in May 1998 the IC, preoccupied with Kosovo, did not take the 
opportunity to condemn Milosevic’s attempts to undermine dissenting voices within 
Serbia, choosing instead to ease sanctions against Serbia in recognition of Milosevic 
agreement to hold talks with Rugova. As such, this action would appear to confirm the 
fears of the democratic opposition parties that the IC would not object to Milosevic’s 
undemocratic practices if he conceded to international demands with respect to Kosovo. 
However, by October 1998, the IC was becoming increasingly critical of Milosevic, 
identifying his regime as a significant source of the problems that beset the former 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s, and not part of their solution. As such, the international 
reaction to the regime’s efforts to silence the independent media at the end of 1998 was 
considerably more critical than had been the case in May, and saw sanctions imposed as a 
result of Serbia’s undemocratic internal order.
1 o  c
125 ‘U n ited  States D enounces B e lg rad e ’s O ffensive A gainst S erbian  M ed ia ,’ US D epartm en t o f  State O ffice 
o f  the Spokesm an, Press S tatem ent, 15 O ctober 1998.
126 R adio  B 92, 16 D ecem ber 1998 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3413/A , 18 D ecem ber 1998.
C o n c l u s i o n s
Differences between the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime
While the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime were united in 
opposing independence for Kosovo, this was also the position of all international actors 
who responded to events in Kosovo and as such cannot be considered controversial. 
However, notwithstanding this broad similarity, there were some significant differences 
between the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime in relation to the 
Kosovo dispute. Throughout this time period there were essentially three opposition 
perspectives coming from the four parties considered here. Firstly, the DS and the GSS, 
at this time united within the SZP, held positions that were closer to those of the IC than 
were those of the other two parties. The DSS remained extremely critical of international 
policy and actions in the IC’s dealings with Serbia, and also of the Milosevic regime, and 
maintained its position as the most nationalist of the four parties. The SPO’s positions 
were often inconsistent but were generally closer to those of the Milosevic regime than 
were those of the other parties considered here.
Regarding the role of the IC in resolving the Kosovo conflict, both the DS or the 
GSS considered quite extensive international involvement in Kosovo to be acceptable. 
Both parties consistently argued that international involvement was necessary to resolve 
the conflict, and from the early stages of the crisis Djindjic went so far as to state that the 
presence of UN troops in Kosovo as a last resort would be acceptable. In contrast, the 
DSS objected strenuously to the idea that an international military force would be 
stationed in Kosovo, and as such the DSS position was closer to that of the regime than
either the DS and the GSS on this issue. For its part, the SPO supported the regime’s 
referendum and called for a rejection of international involvement in the resolution of the 
conflict, making it the party that held a position closest to that of the regime on this issue. 
As such, on this issue, only the SZP can be considered to have been a credible alternative 
to the Milosevic regime from an IC perspective.
Similarly there were also differences between some of the opposition parties and 
the regime in terms of their attitudes to international actions aimed at resolving the 
Kosovo conflict. Both the DS and GSS consistently urged the regime to accept 
international demands to resolve the conflict. In this however, there is noticeable degree 
of pragmatism from Djindjic who appears to have seen acceptance of some international 
terms as the lesser of two evils, being preferable to international military intervention, but 
with provisions that the DS leader viewed as unfavourable. This is clear in the DS’s 
acceptance of both the Holbrooke agreements and the G8 conditions for bringing an end 
to the NATO bombing. However, although the DS did view some of the international 
conditions as being less than ideal, the party and its leader, nevertheless, advocated their 
acceptance, and the DS was critical of the regime for not doing so in the early stages of 
the crisis. The GSS also urged acceptance of the IC ’s demands, including arguing that the 
regime should have signed the Rambouillet agreement and thus avoided the NATO 
bombing campaign. In contrast, the DSS was opposed to both the Holbrooke agreements 
and the Rambouillet proposals. Although Kostunica did advocate accepting the G8 
proposals, he did so with little enthusiasm, and like Djindjic, seems to have considered 
this to be the lesser of two evils. However, in contrast to the DS whose criticism of the 
Milosevic regime focused on its failure to prevent the NATO bombing, the DSS
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emphasised the effective loss of Serbian control of Kosovo in its critique of Milosevic’s 
policies.
The position of the SPO reflected, to a large extent, that of the regime throughout this 
phase of the crisis, with the party supporting the Holbrooke agreements while objecting 
strenuously to the Rambouillet proposals. However, from late April, the SPO became 
increasingly critical of the regime’s refusal to accept international demands for an end to 
the bombing campaign, and advocated acceptance of the G8 plan to end the conflict 
arguing that it did not represent any danger to Serbia’s state and national interests. For 
Draskovic, the Serbian authorities had gained all that it could from its war policy, and as 
such should now pursue an end to the bombing campaign.
Given these positions, again it is clear that only the DS and the GSS held positions 
that were closer to those of the IC than those of the Milosevic regime, and only these 
parties can be considered to have represented a credible alternative to the Milosevic 
regime.
The relationship between the IC and democratic opposition parties
The democratic opposition parties, and in particular the SZP, continued to enjoy 
the higher international profile that had resulted from the Zajedno protests in 1996/1997 
and regularly met with international representatives to discuss the situation in Serbia. In 
spite of this, however, throughout this time period all of the democratic opposition parties 
were critical of the IC and the way in which it dealt with the Kosovo conflict, with the 
central criticisms being the negative impact that such actions would have on the
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democratic opposition within Serbia, the continuing international practice of negotiating 
with Milosevic, and a perception of bias on the part of the democratic opposition parties. 
However, while all of the parties commented on these issues, there was a difference in 
emphasis between the critique of the DS and GSS, and that of the SPO and DSS.
From the beginning of the crisis in Kosovo the DS consistently emphasised the 
need for democratic reform in Serbia and the removal of Milosevic from power in order 
to resolve the conflict in Kosovo, and as such much of the party’s criticism of the IC 
focused on this issue. Thus, while welcoming any initiatives that might have brought an 
end to the conflict, the DS expressed doubt regarding their ability to bring long-term 
peace and stability to Kosovo. In a similar vein, the DS and GSS were highly critical of 
IC actions with respect to Kosovo because of the potentially negative impact on 
democratic forces in Serbia. Both parties argued that the IC’s approach of using sanctions 
and bombing would greatly undermine the democratic opposition and strengthen the 
regime, and were highly critical of the IC for continuing to negotiate with Milosevic, 
arguing that an end to the Kosovo conflict and regional stability in general would be 
more easily achieved through removing Milosevic rather than through the renewed 
isolation of Serbia.
In spite of its criticism of the IC, both the DS and the GSS continued to maintain 
good relations with the IC, even at the height of the NATO campaign when Djindjic and 
PeSic travelled to Europe with Milo Djukanovic to meet European leaders. With the 
opposition completely marginalized as a result of the bombing, and Djindjic in virtual 
exile in Montenegro, the DS leader chose to focus his attention on the post-war period. 
Djindjic clearly believed that international support would be crucial if the democratic
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opposition in Serbia was to have any success in ousting Milosevic. Realising that, 
following the NATO bombing campaign, Milosevic was highly unlikely ever to be 
considered as a partner of the West again, Djindjic sought international support for his 
and Djukanovic’s campaign to remove the regime from power once the bombing ceased. 
Thus, while Djindjic may have been critical of the IC’s efforts to bring the war in Kosovo 
to an end, and in particular the NATO campaign, his criticism was measured and there 
was no significant degree of anti-Westernism from him or his party. On the contrary, both 
Djindjic and Pesic clearly saw anti-Westernism as an obstacle to their political activities 
against the regime and lamented the increasing anti-Western feeling that had developed 
in Serbia as a result of the IC’s actions.
While the DSS was also critical of the IC’s actions and their negative impact on 
the development of democracy in Serbia, this was a less prominent element in the party’s 
criticism of international action in Kosovo than was the case with DS and GSS. In 
addition, at times the DSS’s criticism of the IC during this time period was considerably 
more vitriolic that was that of the DS and GSS, which sometimes gave it a strong anti- 
Western tone. A persistent theme in DSS comments on the international involvement in 
the Kosovo crisis was that of the existence of an anti-Serb bias in the international 
approach. While there appears to have been a similar perception within the DS and GSS, 
in particular in relation to their comments on IC attitudes to Kosovo Albanian violence, 
this was a relatively minor element in those parties comments on the Kosovo crisis. In 
contrast, the DSS and also the SPO, were more critical in this regard. The primary target 
of allegations of bias on the part of the DSS was the US, though European states and 
NATO were also criticised. Kostunica frequently expressed the belief that the US was
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colluding with the KLA against Serbia, and alleged that the Rambouillet negotiations 
were deliberately set up in order to provide a pretext for bombing Yugoslavia. Similar 
sentiments were expressed by the SPO.
The impact o f international policy on the democratic opposition parties
International policy with respect to the Kosovo conflict had a profound impact on 
the democratic opposition parties and their effectiveness in opposing the Milosevic 
regime at this time, making any sustained anti-regime campaigns practically impossible. 
Furthermore, international policy greatly undermined the ability of the democratic 
opposition parties to carry out any of the tasks necessary to effectively oppose the regime 
(resisting integration; maintaining a zone of ideological autonomy; questioning the 
legitimacy of the regime and raising the costs of authoritarian rule; and presenting a 
credible alternative domestically and internationally).
The DS, GSS and DSS successfully resisted integration into the regime, but the 
SPO, which had been drawing closer to the regime since 1997, was fully co-opted in 
January 1999 when it joined the federal government. Although it was expelled shortly 
afterwards, the decision of the SPO to join the government, and the extreme closeness of 
its positions to those of the regime prior to January 1999, mean that the SPO effectively 
abandoned its status as an opposition party at this time.
While the democratic opposition parties were successful in terms of highlighting 
the undemocratic nature of the Milosevic regime and thus undermining the regime’s 
legitimacy at the international level, there was little opportunity to carry out this task at
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the domestic level. In addition, while the SZP can certainly have been considered to have 
successfully presented a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime from an IC 
perspective, the lack of any sustained or significant campaigns against the regime gave it 
no real opportunity to do so within Serbia. Furthermore, with the threat of NATO 
bombing hanging over Serbia for much of the time period, and the eventual use of 
military force against the SRJ in 1999, the Milosevic regime introduced severely 
repressive legislation designed to undermine and eliminate regime opponents. As such, 
with the possibility of a NATO attack dominating the domestic agenda, and the increased 
repression of opposition forces, the political space in which the opposition could operate 
was all but eliminated. Similarly, in such circumstances the Kosovo conflict and the 
international reaction to it dominated political discourse in Serbia, undermining the 
ability of the opposition to maintain a zone of ideological autonomy.
While the Zajedno coalition had had considerable success in highlighting the 
undemocratic nature of the Milosevic regime, the events of this case study demonstrate 
that the need for democratic reform in Serbia had still not become an IC priority. While 
the opposition certainly enjoyed a higher international profile, and received considerably 
more expressions of international support than it had in the past, it is clear that, up until 
the NATO bombing, the IC was making no significant effort to strengthen the opposition. 
Its efforts to resolve the Kosovo conflict involved the same approach as had its earlier 
efforts to resolve the Bosnian conflict: applying pressure on Milosevic in the hope that 
this would lead to the concessions necessary to achieve its objectives, and in the process 
undermining the effectiveness of the opposition.
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This case study covers the time period from June 1999 when the NATO 
bombing came to an end and October 2000 when Milosevic conceded defeat in the 
federal presidential election that had been held in September. The main distinguishing 
feature of this time period is that, for the first time, the IC and the democratic 
opposition parties were prioritising the same objective: the removal of the Milosevic 
regime from power. As a result of events in Kosovo and the ICTY indictments of 
Milosevic and his associates, the IC made it clear that it could no longer do business 
with Milosevic and his regime, called for his removal, and openly supported efforts 
by the opposition to bring an end to his rule. The IC aimed to achieve its goal of 
removing Milosevic through a combination of sanctions - increasingly making efforts 
to target these directly at the regime - and assistance to democratic forces within 
Serbia. However, while the overriding objective of both the democratic opposition 
parties and the IC was undoubtedly Milosevic’s removal from power, there were 
disagreements between the two as to the best means to achieve this goal, with the 
opposition parties remaining critical of some elements of international policy. 
Furthermore, other issues, most notably the plight of Kosovo’s Serb minority and 
future co-operation with the ICTY, also strained relations between the democratic 
opposition and the IC.
In the time period covered by this case study, there was one significant 
challenge to the Milosevic regime and that was the September 2000 election for the 
Yugoslav parliament and presidency (Serbian local elections were also held on the 
same day) in which an opposition coalition, DOS (Demokratska Opozicija Srbije -  
Democratic Opposition of Serbia), defeated Milosevic’s SPS in the parliamentary
C h a p t e r  7 :  T h e  F a l l  o f  M i l o s e v i c
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elections, while DOS’s presidential candidate defeated Milosevic in the presidential 
elections.1 Although Milosevic was initially slow to acknowledge the opposition’s 
victory, faced with a mass uprising, and with his regime crumbling, Milosevic 
conceded defeat on 6 October 2000.
Given the changed priorities of international policy at this time and the explicit 
international support for the democratic opposition, this case study provides the 
opportunity to examine the extent to which the relationship between the democratic 
opposition parties and the IC changed in this significantly altered context, and also to 
consider whether this new situation enhanced or undermined the effectiveness of the 
democratic opposition parties’ campaigns against the Milosevic regime.
Key Issues for the International Community
The NATO bombing of Kosovo and the ICTY indictments against Milosevic 
and four other key regime figures made Milosevic an international outcast, and 
ensured that there could be no return to previous patterns of international engagement 
with him or his regime. As such, IC policy with respect to Serbia came to focus on the 
removal of Milosevic. At this time the most significant international actors that were 
involved in dealing with Serbia were the EU and the US, and both openly expressed 
their desire to see Milosevic ousted, making this an explicit condition for the 
normalisation of Serbia’s international relations. In order to achieve its objectives, the 
IC adopted an approach of maintaining sanctions against Serbia, (though increasingly 
these came to be targeted at the regime directly, often in response to requests from the
1 W h ile  in the im m ed ia te  a fte rm a th  o f  the N A T O  bo m b in g  the S Z P  a ttem p ted  to cap ita lise  on  a rise  in 
p o p u la r d isco n ten t th ro u g h  o rg an isin g  m ass dem o n stra tio n s  d em an d ing  M ilo§ev i6 ’s res ig na tio n , these  
w ere  u ltim a te ly  u n successfu l. O p po sitio n  d isun ity , w ith  the S P O  re fu sing  to  pa rtic ip a te  in the 
d em o n stra tio n s  o r to su p p o rt the d em an d s fo r M ilo se v ic ’s res ig n a tio n , co n trib u ted  to th is failure.
opposition), and at the same time offering assistance to democratic forces within 
Serbia. The extent of international support for the democratic opposition parties 
during this time period distinguishes it from previous time periods in which, although 
the IC may have expressed disapproval with Milosevic and condemned his actions, no 
sustained or serious attempts were made to assist the opposition to bring an end to his 
rule.
The IC and the democratic opposition parties were essentially now prioritising 
the same ultimate objective -  the removal of Milosevic. However, this is not to imply 
that there was agreement between the democratic opposition parties and the IC in 
relation to how this objective should be achieved. On the contrary, the democratic 
opposition parties remained highly critical of elements of IC policy - most notably in 
relation to the maintenance of sanctions - and in spite of clear and unequivocal 
statements on the part of IC representatives that they wanted to see the end of 
Milosevic, the democratic opposition parties, at times, continued to accuse the IC of 
strengthening rather than undermining the regime. Furthermore, issues that were not 
directly related to the opposition’s efforts to remove Milosevic, most notably the 
plight of Kosovo’s Serb minority following the withdrawal of Serbian and Yugoslav 
security forces from the province, and the issue of Serbia’s future relations with the 
ICTY, led to some tension between the democratic opposition parties and the IC. 
While these issues may not have been directly related to efforts aimed at 
overthrowing Milosevic, many within the democratic opposition nevertheless viewed 
international policy and actions in these areas as potentially damaging to their efforts 
against the regime.
2 A  repo rt b y  the  In te rn a tio n a l C ris is  G ro u p  from  M ay  20 0 0  su gg ests  th a t th e re  m ay  also  have b een  
‘residual an x ie ties  am o n g  the  o p p o s itio n  tha t the W est co u ld  rev e rt to  e a rlie r  M ilo§ev ic-cen tred  
p o lic ie s ’ (IC G , 2000: 2).
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In spite of these tensions however, the IC continued to support the democratic 
opposition parties throughout the time period covered by this case study, and the level 
of international assistance increased dramatically following the announcement in July 
2000 that Yugoslav elections were to be held in September. Evidence of IC support is 
clear not only in the statements of IC representatives and the provision of direct 
financial assistance, but also in the apparent willingness of the IC to listen to the 
views and suggestions of Serbia’s opposition leaders, and also to act on those 
suggestions, in some cases altering policy to accommodate the opposition’s requests. 
Clearly identifying the disunity of the opposition as a key stumbling block in earlier 
attempts to unseat the Milosevic regime, the IC exerted significant pressure on the 
democratic opposition parties to unite and form a common front against the regime. 
By considering the two central elements of international policy at this time -  the 
maintenance of sanctions and assistance to Serbia’s democratic opposition forces -  
together with the tension between the democratic opposition and the IC in relation to 
Kosovo and the ICTY, it is possible to illustrate the extent to which the relationship 
between Serbia’s democratic opposition parties and the IC had changed at this time.
Sanctions
A central element of IC policy with respect to Serbia throughout the entire 
time period covered by this study was the imposition of international sanctions, and 
this continued during the time period covered by this case study. Initially, the US took 
a far firmer line in relation to the maintenance of sanctions than did the EU, with 
Gelbard declaring that, as long as Milosevic remained in power, Serbia would remain
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isolated and not even reconstruction aid would be provided.3 While there were some 
differences of opinion regarding reconstruction aid to Serbia within the EU,4 in 
general EU leaders took a more flexible approach to the issue of sanctions, as 
illustrated by its decision in principle to recommend the partial lifting of certain 
sanctions, including the flight ban, and its emphasis on the need to support democratic 
forces in the SRJ, and in particular those municipalities that were under the control of 
the democratic opposition.5
The democratic opposition parties considered here all opposed the 
continuation of international sanctions against Serbia. Kostunica, maintaining his 
more anti-Western stance, was critical of the rationale for imposing sanctions, and 
also accused the US of being selective in its targets for sanctions, stating that the US 
attitude to Croatia illustrated that ‘dictatorial regimes and authorities that have 
committed ethnic cleansing are not in any way distasteful to NATO’.6
The SPO and the SZP were also opposed to sanctions, emphasising, as in 
previous time periods, the damage that they were causing to Serbia’s population and
3 T estim on y  o f  R o b ert G e lb ard  a t the, H earing  o f  the E u rop ean  A ffa irs  S ub co m m ittee  o f  the Senate  
F o reig n  R ela tio n s  C om m ittee  on  ‘P rosp ec ts  fo r D em o cracy  in Y u g o s la v ia ’, 29  Ju ly  1999. A v ailab le  at: 
h ttp ://w w w .g lo b a lre s is tan ce .co m /an a lv s is /h ea rin .h tm . G e lb a rd  d escrib ed  U S sanctio ns p o licy  as 
co n ta in in g  ‘th ree  lev els o f  san ctio n s, s tarting  w ith  the ou te r w all, the K o so v o -re la ted  sanc tio ns  s tarted  a 
y ear an d  a h a lf  ago, and  then  the w artim e sanctions, inc lud ing  the fuel em b arg o , b u t a lso  the v isa  ban , 
w h ich  has had  a d e m o n strab ly  negative  e ffec t o n  the m em b ers  o f  the  M ilo sev ic  reg im e p sy ch o lo g ica lly  
and in rea l te rm s, and, o f  co urse , T he  H agu e T rib un al in d ic tm en ts .’
4 The New  York Times , 21 June  1999.
5 European R eport, 21 Ju ly  1999. C om m en ts b y  M ich ae l S teiner, an ad v iso r to G erh ard  S ch ro ed er 
d em o n stra te  the ra tion a le  for co n sid erin g  such  m oves. W hile  ack n o w led g in g  tha t there  w as a ‘d an g er 
tha t som e o f  th is m ay  seep  to B e lg rad e ,’ S te in er a rg ued  tha t th is ‘sh ou ld  no t stop  us ta rge tin g  the areas 
w e w an t to help , an d  so illu s tra tin g  tha t dem o cracy  p a y s ’ (The New York Times, 21 June  1999). S im ila r 
a rgu m en ts  w ere  m ade b y  EU  fo re ign  affa irs  co m m issio n e r H ans van  den  B ro ek  w ho sug gested  tha t 
som e E U  aid  m ay  be  ta rg e ted  a t o p p o s itio n  co n tro lled  areas  in Serbia: ‘W e shall n o t b e  ab le  to 
co n c lud e  ag reem en ts  w ith  M ilo sev ic  o r h is g o v ern m en t b u t tha t does no t m ean  w e can  d o  n o th ing  for 
the S erb ian  po p u la tio n . T h e  q u estio n  is w h at you  can  do u n d e r the M ilo sev ic  reg im e. I d o n ’t see w hy 
on  an ad  hoc b asis  one  co u ld  no t ca rry  o u t specific  p ro jec ts  w ith  local o r reg ion al o rg an isa tio n s  w h ich  
have  p ro v ed  to be  p ro -d em o crac y .’ (The Guardian, 24 June 1999). T h is  idea  had  b een  p ro p o sed  by  
D jin d jic  in 1999, and  is set ou t in the N ew  York Times a rtic le  w ritten  jo in tly  b y  D jin d jid  and 
D ju k an o v ic , ‘A fte r T he  W ar In S erb ia  is O v e r’.
6 B e ta  new s ag ency , 18 June 1999 in BBC M onitoring Europe -  Political, 19 June 1999.
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also to the democratic opposition itself.7 Djindjic emphasised the suffering of Serbia’s 
population and the dire need for an end to the sanctions.8 He also argued that 
continued international isolation would result in all Serbs seeing Europe as an 
enemy,9 and pointed out that if the opposition could have the sanctions lifted it would 
do much to increase their credibility in Serbia. Speaking at an OSCE summit in 
Istanbul in late 1999, Djindjic noted that: ‘We must do our best to have sanctions 
lifted, so that people in Serbia can see that the international community accepts us as 
partners. This is the way of boosting the stature and credibility of the Serbian 
opposition in Serbia.’10
Djindjic proposed that if the IC was not prepared to lift the sanctions entirely, 
that it should provide targeted assistance to those towns in Serbia that were under 
opposition control.11 To this end Djindjic proposed that while no money should reach 
Milosevic, the IC should start ‘immediately financing individual projects instead, 
namely projects where the opposition is in power: in Nis, in Cacak, in Novi Sad. 
There one can build bridges, for instance, so that people see that Serbia gets support 
only if it is governed democratically.’
In line with its more flexible approach to the maintenance of sanctions against 
Serbia, the EU responded to Djindjic’s proposals in late 1999 and began a programme
7 La Repubblica  w eb site, 4 A u g u st 1999 in BBC  Sum mary o f  World Broadcasts  E E /D 3 6 0 7 /A , 7 
A u gu st 1999; A g ence  F ran ce  P resse , 16 O c to b er 1999.
8 A g en ce  F rance  P resse , 31 O c to b er 1999. D jin d jié  co n sid ered  in te rna tio na l eco no m ic  ass istan ce  to 
S erb ia  to b e  o f  p a ram o u n t im p o rtan ce , d ec la rin g  tha t a ‘c h ang e  o f  reg im e w ith o u t in te rn a tion a l 
ass is tance  m ean s no th ing . O u r econom ic co llap se  co u ld  n o t be ha lted  ev en  w ith  the ch ang e  o f  the 
reg im e, b u t o n ly  w ith  2 o r 3 b illio n  d o lla rs ’ in  ass is tance  (A g en ce  F rance  P resse , 16 O c to b er 1999).
9 F ran k fu rte r A llg em ein e , 22 June 1999 in BBC  Sum mary o f  World Broadcasts  E E /D 35 6 9 /A , 24 June  
1999. F o llo w ing  a m eeting  w ith  the B ritish  fo re ig n  m in is te r, D jin d jic  c la im s to  have  to ld  C o ok  ‘th a t h is 
idea o f  co n tin u in g  to iso la te  S erb ia  as long  as M ilo sev ic  rem a in s  in p o w er is bad , b ecau se  it is an  idea 
w h ich , tak en  to its log ica l co nc lu sion , leads to c iv il w ar. In s tead  o f  tha t, I ad v ised  the B ritish  
g o v ern m en t to help  the o p p o sitio n  m u n ic ip a lities , as w ell as the in d ep en d en t m ed ia , in  o rd e r to o pen  up 
the co u n try  ra th e r than  tu rn  it in on  i t s e l f  {Le F igaro , 6  Ju ly  1999 in BBC  Sum mary o f  World 
Broadcasts  E E /D 3 58 1 /A , 8  Ju ly  1999).
10 B e ta  new s ag en cy , 18 N o v em b er 1999 in B BC  Sum m ary o f  World Broadcasts  E E /D 3 69 7 /B , 20 
N o v em b er 1999.
11 The New York Times, 20  Ju ne  1999.
12 ‘P ro fil\  V ienn a , 14 June  1999.
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of providing heating oil to opposition controlled towns in Serbia know as Energy for 
Democracy. Opposition leaders were invited to attend a meeting of EU foreign 
ministers in Luxembourg on 11 October 1999 at which the EU intended to announce 
that fuel would be provided to two Serbian towns, Nis and Pirot, with the possibility 
of extending the scheme to other towns in the future.13 However, while opposition 
leaders initially accepted the EU’s invitation, most, including Draskovic and Djindjic 
(Kostunica had not been invited), decided to boycott the meeting at the last minute 
when they realised that the EU wanted them to sign a declaration that included a 
promise to extradite Milosevic and other indictees to the ICTY should they come to 
power.14 In spite of the boycott, the EU went ahead with its plans to provide heating 
oil to the towns of Nis and Pirot.
The US was initially sceptical of the EU’s Energy for Democracy initiative, 
with the State Department’s James Rubin stating that while the US supported ‘the 
principle of giving aid to the opposition,’ there was concern ‘about doing anything 
that would weaken the overall sanctions regime.’15 However, the US changed its 
position following talks between Albright and a group of SZP leaders in late 1999, 
when Albright announced that the US had agreed to evaluate the Energy for 
Democracy pilot programme to make sure that any assistance provided arrived at its 
intended target. Emphasising that US support for the project ‘comes at the specific 
request of Serbia’s democratic leaders,’ Albright noted that it was the democratic 
opposition and not the regime ‘who will deserve credit for each and every energy
13 T he  list o f  m un ic ip a lities  tha t w o u ld  ben efit from  the E n erg y  fo r D em o cracy  p ro g ram m e w as 
ex p an d ed  to  inc lude N o v i Sad , K rag u jevac , K ra ljev o , S o m b o r an d  S ub o tica  in  F eb ru a ry  200 0  (A gence  
F rance  P resse , 15 F eb ru ary  2000).
14 A sso c ia ted  P ress W o rld stream , 10 O c to b er 1999
15 The Washington Post, 12 O c to b er 1999
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delivery that is made.’16 Further concessions to the opposition were also made 
following this meeting when it was announced that the US would lift the fuel embargo 
and flight ban following the holding of free and fair elections in Serbia, a change from 
the previous position that the sanctions would remain in place until Milosevic was 
removed from power. The willingness of the IC to alter its policies after consultations 
with the democratic opposition parties is in marked contrast to their actions in 
previous time periods when requests for concessions generally went unheeded. 
Further support for the opposition also included an explicit endorsement of its 
position that elections should be held in Serbia as soon as possible, under the 
conditions specified by the opposition, and Albright also stated that the US 
‘enthusiastically endorses the call of Serbia’s democratic leaders for a Trilateral 
Working Group to promote change and to plan now for the reform and economic 
recovery of a democratic Yugoslavia.’17
The opposition also scored further success in its campaign to have the 
sanctions lifted when, in February 2000, the EU and the US announced that they 
would suspend the flight ban for six months. The move was accompanied by a 
decision to examine how sanctions targeted at the Milosevic regime could be 
strengthened.18 While the EU had been more prepared to consider this type of move 
for some time, it marked a major shift in policy on the part of the US which had 
previously unequivocally rejected taking such a step. In October 1999, James Rubin 
had stated that the US ‘would strongly oppose measures to allow ... airline flights to
16 S tate  D epartm en t B rie fin g , 3 N o v em b er 1999. T ha t c red it fo r the E n erg y  fo r D em o cracy  p rog ram m e 
w as due to  the S erb ian  o p p osition  w as a lso  ack n o w led g ed  b y  the E U ’s C o m m iss io n e r fo r E xternal 
R e la tio ns, C hris  P a tten , w ho p o in ted  ou t that: ‘O n e reason  w h y  w e ’ve g on e ah ead  w ith  the E n erg y  for 
D em o cracy  p ro g ram  is b ecau se  [the o pp osition ] ad v ised  us to  do  so, an d  o u r ex ce llen t o ffic ia ls  . . .  have 
b een  resp o n d in g  to those  req uests  from  the  d em ocra ts  in  S e rb ia .’ (C N N  In te rna tio na l Insigh t, 
T ran sc rip t # 120700cb .k01 , 7 D ecem b er 1999). In  ad d itio n  to its p ro m o tio n  b y  the SZ P , G 1 7  w as 
h eav ily  in v o lv ed  in the E n erg y  for D em o cracy  p rog ram m e.
17 S tate D ep artm en t B rie fin g , 3 N o v em b er 1999.
18 A g en ce  F rance  P resse , 10 F eb ru ary  2000 ; The Financial Times (L o n do n ), 15 F eb ru ary  2000.
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resume between Belgrade and the Western world’ as this would ‘line the regime’s 
pockets, that would only be for the rich who can afford aircraft and airline tickets.’19 
The State Department credited the democratic opposition parties for the change of 
policy: ‘in recognition of the steps that the opposition has taken to unify, to develop a 
joint program, to work on common lists for elections, ... we responded to their calls 
to have a suspension for several months of the ban on flights in and out of Yugoslavia 
to Europe.’20
The decision to suspend the flight ban was welcomed by most of the 
democratic opposition parties, including the SPO and the DS, with Djindjic stating 
that the decision was ‘a very important signal that shows that the democratic 
opposition in Serbia has obtained major international respect.’21 Again, however, 
Kostunica was more critical, stressing the damage that could be done from the 
tightening of other sanctions against certain Serbian companies, and also highlighting 
the potential damage to the oppositon. According to Kostunica:
This will not only affect the directors of these companies, but also a great 
number of employees and a large part of society. The greatest problem 
lies in the fact that the Portuguese foreign minister, who is the EU Council 
of Ministers’ chairman, literally said that ‘the measures agreed upon will 
be discussed and arranged in agreement with the Serbian democratic 
opposition.’22
Kostunica went on to allege that this was ‘a disservice to the Serbian opposition’ and 
stated that ‘the Serbian opposition -  without being asked -  has been made to look like
19 U S D ep artm en t o f  S tate , D a ily  P ress  B rie fin g , 12 O c to b er 1999.
20 U S D ep artm en t o f  S tate , D a ily  P ress  B rie fin g , 15 F eb ru a ry  2000 .
21 A g en ce  F rance  P resse , 10 F eb ru a ry  2000 .
22 B e ta  new s ag ency , 14 F eb ru ary  200 0  in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 37 6 6 /C , 17 
F eb ru ary  2000.
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a prison warden. This is not what the Serbian opposition wants, but the EU Council of 
Ministers has given it this role. This is something that should not be accepted at any 
price.’23
In summary, the democratic opposition parties continued to object to the 
maintenance of sanctions against Serbia, again arguing, as in earlier time periods, that 
they were harming the Serbian population and the opposition itself. While the IC 
would not accede to the opposition’s request that sanctions be lifted in their entirety, 
IC actors were, nevertheless, prepared to lift some sanctions and also to provide 
assistance to those parts of Serbia that were under opposition control. This willingness 
on the part of the IC to respond positively to opposition suggestions in relation to the 
sanctions contrasts sharply with earlier unwillingness to make concessions to the 
opposition on this issue, and demonstrates clearly the extent to which the relationship 
between the democratic opposition parties and the IC had changed.
International support for the Serbian opposition
Following the end of the Kosovo bombing campaign, the IC made support for 
the democratic opposition and its efforts to bring about an end to Milosevic’s rule a 
central element of its policy with respect to Serbia. In testimony to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Gelbard described support to ‘the forces of democratic change 
that exist within Serbian society’ as a ‘key aspect’ of US policy on Serbia,’ and went 
on the outline five categories in which the US government was assisting 
démocratisation in Serbia: ensuring that the Milosevic regime remains isolated; 
assistance to a wide variety of opposition groups including political parties,
23 B e ta  new s ag ency , 14 F eb ru ary  20 0 0  in  BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 37 6 6 /C , 17 
F eb ru ary  2000.
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independent media, student groups and labour unions; consultation with European 
allies to ensure co-ordination of efforts; encouraging the engagement of other 
countries in the region; and support for Djukanovic’s government in Montenegro.24 
Democratic forces in Serbia also received support from the US Congress, which 
passed the Serbian Démocratisation Act in July 1999 pledging $100 million for 
démocratisation, including the provision of training, equipment and technical 
assistance to the opposition parties, as well as the independent media.25 Additionally, 
Clinton pledged a further $10 million at the Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo in July
1999 26
While the democratic opposition clearly sought international assistance at this 
time, events that followed a meeting between Gelbard and SZP leaders in June 1999 
highlighted the potential damage that could stem from too close a relationship 
between the opposition and the West, when Serbia’s state-controlled media used the 
meeting in its attempts to discredit the democratic opposition. A Radio Belgrade 
report, which described the opposition as ‘the Serbian fifth column,’ claimed that the 
purpose of Gelbard’s meeting was to ‘prepare for the violent overthrow of the 
authorities in Yugoslavia’ and that to this end, the US would provide the opposition 
with $9 million.27 Djindjic clearly saw this type of anti-opposition propaganda as 
effective, stating that ‘if the elections were to take place in an environment where a 
government news agency publishes that we got $9 million from the Americans to 
topple Milosevic ... you could imagine who would win.’28
24 T e s tim o n y  o f  R o b ert G e lb ard  at the, H earing  o f  the  E u ro p ean  A ffa irs  S u b co m m ittee  o f  the S enate  
F o re ig n  R ela tio n s  C om m ittee  on  ‘P ro sp ec ts  fo r D em o cracy  in Y u g o s la v ia ’, 29 Ju ly  1999. A v ailab le  at: 
h ttp ://w w w .g lo b a lre s is tan ce .co m /an a ly s is /h ea rin .h tm .
25 Christian Science Monitor, 23 A u gust 1999.
26 U n ited  P ress In te rn a tion a l, 30 Ju ly  1999.
27 R ad io  B e lg rad e  w ebsite , 16 June 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3 5 6 4 /A , 18 June
1999. T h ese  c la im s w ere  d en ied  b y  the U S  S tate  D ep artm en t (U S D ep artm en t o f  S tate , D aily  P ress 
B rie fin g , 23 June 1999).
28 The Scotsman, 18 June  1999.
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While aware that a close relationship with the IC could be damaging to the 
democratic opposition parties, Djindjic, nevertheless, clearly saw the need for 
international assistance, commenting in July 1999 that Milosevic was most likely to 
be toppled by a combination of internal and external pressures.29 He also indicated 
that potential damage could be offset by the IC, claiming that ‘of course we have 
damage as pro-European, pro-Western politicians. ... And what we try is not only to 
have damage from our position ... but to have benefits from other support, economic 
support, and other support for the future of the country.’30
In addition to US and EU support a further manifestation of international 
support for the democratic opposition was clear from the invitations that were issued 
to opposition leaders to attend international conferences and meetings, such as those 
of the Stability Pact and OSCE, as Serbia’s informal representatives. Speaking at an 
OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999, which marked the first time that 
representatives from the SRJ had attended an OSCE summit since the country’s 
expulsion in 1992,31 Djindjic remarked that:
We are aware of the fact that we are not an official delegation, that it is a 
huge success that we have been able to attend the summit at all, because 
this is a precedent that has not been made so far. Our task is to present our 
views and to hope that some of them will be accepted. My impression is 
that there is a disposition among European countries to accommodate our 
desires.32
29 Sme, B ra tislav a , 30  June 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3 5 7 6 /A , 2 Ju ly  1999
30 T h e  N e w sH o u r w ith  J im  L ehrer, T ran sc rip t # 65 81 , 4 N o v em b er 1999.
31 B 92 new s arch iv e , 18 N o v em b er 1999. A v ailab le  at:
h ttp ://w w w .b 9 2 . n e t/en g lish /n ew s/in d ex .p h p ?o rd e r= p rio rity & d d =  18& m m =  11 & yy yy =  1999.
32 B eta  new s ag en cy , 18 N o v em b er 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 36 9 7 /A , 20  
N o v em b er 1999.
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At the OSCE summit agreement was reached on setting up a trilateral commission 
involving the US, the EU and the Serbian democratic opposition and which would 
formalise relations between the Serbian opposition and the IC.33
The first meeting of the Trilateral Commission took place in Berlin in mid- 
December 1999, and was attended by Albright, Javier Solana, Chris Patten, some EU 
foreign ministers and President Djukanovic. In her address to the meeting on 17 
December, Albright described the purpose of the meeting as being to discuss what 
could be done to help create a democratic future for Yugoslavia, and outlined what 
steps could be taken. Included in the list were the continuance of humanitarian aid to 
the most vulnerable sections of Serbia’s population; the doubling of US 
démocratisation assistance to Serbia; support for participation of opposition 
representatives in international events; and opposition unity.34 Although the 
opposition did not succeed in persuading the EU and US to lift the sanctions, there 
was, nevertheless, general satisfaction with the meeting. Djindjic clearly considered 
that the meeting represented a new phase in the Serbian opposition’s relationship with 
the IC, stating that: ‘For the first time, their strategy has been one of support and 
development, rather than sanctions and threats.’35
Not all democratic opposition parties were in favour of the Trilateral 
Commission. Kostunica, claimed that the meeting had not been useful for the Serbian 
opposition, pointing out that the opposition parties had been travelling to meetings 
with IC representatives with requests to have the sanctions lifted, but to date had had 
no success in this regard. Referring to relations with the IC in general, Kostunica
33 B e ta  new s ag ency , 18 N o v em b er 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 36 9 7 /A , 20 
N o v em b er 1999.
R em arks  b y  A lb rig h t a t U S -E U -S e rb ian  O p p o sitio n  M eetin g , B erlin , 17 D ecem b er 1999, D epartm en t 
o f  S tate  D ispa tch , D ecem b er 1999.
35 R ad io  B 2-92 , 17 D ecem b er 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3 72 2 /A , 20  D ecem b er
1999.
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advocated some sort of middle ground between the approach of the regime, which he 
considered to be too uncooperative, and the approach of the opposition parties, which 
he considered to be too cooperative.36
While the IC was clearly more willing to assist the opposition than had been 
the case in earlier time periods, there was also more international pressure exerted on 
the democratic opposition parties than had been the case in the past, particularly in 
relation to the need for the main parties and their leaders to unite. Both the US and the 
EU considered that opposition unity would be an important factor in the ability of the 
opposition to effectively oppose the Milosevic’s regime, and the US in particular 
applied pressure on the opposition parties to achieve this. The importance of 
opposition unity to the US was regularly noted by American officials, with Gelbard 
claiming that disunity was the biggest obstacle to opposition success and urging 
opposition leaders ‘to overcome the politics of ego and to work together instead for 
the common good of Serbia and their people.’37 At a US-EU-Serbian opposition 
meeting in Berlin in December 1999, Albright called for opposition unity in the 
strongest terms, stating that ‘the international community is not interested in 
supporting one of you in preference to another; we want to help all of you against the 
forces of repression that have been dragging Serbia down and holding it back.’38 
Similar messages came from the EU with Patten advising the opposition to ‘act and
36 B e ta  new s ag ency , 20 D ecem b er 1999 in B BC  Sum mary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 37 2 4 /A , 22 
D ecem b er 1999.
37 T e s tim o n y  o f  R o b ert G e lb ard  a t the, H earin g  o f  the E u ro p ean  A ffa irs  S ub com m ittee  o f  the S enate  
F o re ig n  R ela tio ns C o m m ittee  on  ‘P rosp ec ts  fo r D em o cracy  in Y u g o s la v ia ’, 29 Ju ly  1999. A v ailab le  at: 
h ttp ://w w w .g lo b a lres is tan ce .co m /an a ly s is /h ea rin .h tm .
38 R em arks  b y  A lb rig h t at U S -E U -S e rb ian  O p p o sitio n  m eeting , B erlin , 17 D ecem b er 1999 in 
D ep artm en t o f  S tate  D ispa tch , D ecem b er 1999. A v ram ovid  c la im ed  th a t the op p o sitio n  h ad  been  g iven  
a tw o  m o n th  d ead lin e  to  ach ieve  a p la tfo rm  for jo in t ac tion  at the B erlin  m eeting  (B e ta  new s agency , 
119 D ecem b er 1999 in B BC  Sum mary o f  World Broadcasts  E E /D 3 7 2 3 /A , 21 D ecem b er 1999). T h is  
w as den ied  b y  the S P O  (B e ta  new s ag ency , 20 D ecem b er 1999 in B BC  Sum mary o f  World Broadcasts 
E E /D 3 72 4 /A , 22 D ecem b er 1999).
320
work as one’.39 The extent of international pressure, and in particular US pressure, on 
the opposition parties in relation to this issue is clear in Djindjic’s comment: ‘The 
Americans kept on insisting that the opposition unite. It was virtually an ultimatum.’40
Support for Serbia’s democratic opposition parties was clearly a much higher 
international priority in this time period than it had been at any time in the past and 
this is clear not only from the increased financial assistance but also from the regular 
high level meetings between opposition leaders and IC representatives which were 
formalised in the Trilateral Commission. In the absence of formal contact with the 
Milosevic regime, this also illustrates that, to a large extent, the democratic opposition 
was now coming to be regarded as Serbia’s legitimate international representative, as 
Djindjic noted at the OSCE meeting in November 1999. While there was clearly 
danger for the opposition parties being seen to be too close to the Western powers that 
had recently bombed Yugoslavia, the SPO and the SZP calculated that this was a risk 
worth taking. Kostunica and the DSS, however, remained far more critical of the 
West, while its lack of involvement in any coalition with the larger opposition parties 
left the party somewhat marginalized internationally.
Kosovo
One issue that caused tension between the democratic opposition parties and 
the IC at this time was the plight of Kosovo’s Serb minority following the withdrawal 
of Yugoslav troops from the province, and this was regularly on the agenda of the 
opposition parties in their meetings with IC representatives. All opposition parties 
were critical of the IC for not doing enough to protect the Kosovo Serbs, with some of
39 C N N  In tern a tion al Insigh t, T ran sc rip t #  12 0700cb .k 01 , 7 D ecem b er 1999.
40 T h e  Fall o f  M ilo sev ic , ep iso d e  3. B B C  d ocu m en tary  series  b ro ad cas t 19 Jan u a ry  2003.
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the most strident criticism coming from the DSS and the SPO. In addition, both the 
SZP and the SPO also raised the issue of the potential gains to Milosevic if  the IC did 
not do more to protect the Kosovo Serbs.
Draskovic and Kostunica were highly critical of the IC ’s inability or 
unwillingness to prevent violent attacks against members of Kosovo’s Serb 
population, with both leaders accusing the IC of being indifferent to what they 
described as genocide against the Kosovo Serbs.41 The GSS was also critical of the 
lack of protection afforded to Kosovo’s Serb minority, with a party spokesperson 
alleging that the IC was ‘soft on crimes committed against Serbs,’ and that KFOR was 
not fulfilling its obligations under the Geneva conventions.42
The DS and the SPO linked the situation in Kosovo to the efforts of the 
democratic opposition parties, pointing out that the situation in Kosovo could work to 
undermine their position in Serbia. Vuksanovic argued that ‘The crimes against Serbs 
actually help Milosevic because he is using them to put all the blame on the 
international community and on the opposition parties ... He diverts public attention 
to Kosovo from problems at home.’43 Similarly, Draskovic commented that although 
Milosevic was ‘very weak’ if NATO did not ‘stop the murder of Serbs, the burnings, 
the sieges, the ethnic cleansing, it will guarantee his recovery.’44 Draskovic accused 
the EU and the US of being the ‘most stubborn supporters of the present anti-
41 A g en ce  F rance  P resse , 20  Ju ly  1999; B osn ian  S erb  new s ag ency , S R N A , 23 Ju ly  1999 in BBC  
M onitoring Europe -  P olitical, 24 Ju ly  1999.
42 A sso c ia ted  P ress  W o rld stream , 30 A u g ust 1999.
43 A sso c ia ted  P ress W o rld stream , 31 A u gu st 1999. V u k san ov ic  a lso  co m m en ted  on  the dam ag e  tha t 
ev en ts  in K o so v o  w ere  h av in g  on  the p ro sp ec ts  fo r dém o cra tisa tio n  in Serbia: ‘I t ’s a na tu ra l hu m an  
reac tio n  to w o rry  ab ou t sa fe ty  first and fo rem ost. . . .  T h is  w ill b e  the m a in  them e in the new s un til the 
s itu a tio n  is so lved . T he  s itu a tio n  in  K o so v o  is p rev en tin g  the dém o cra tisa tio n  o f  S e rb ia .’ ( Christian 
Science M onitor , 15 S ep tem b er 1999). T h is  p o in t w as also  m ade  b y  N ebojS a C ov ic  an d  the D em o cratic  
A lte rn a tiv e  party . A cco rd in g  to C ov ic , IC  ac tio ns in  K o so v o  w ere  co u n te rp ro d u c tiv e  fo r bo th  the 
d em o cra tic  p ro ce ss  and  for the S erb ian  op p o sitio n  (S R N A  new s ag ency , 22 S ep tem b er 1999 in  BBC  
Sum mary o f  World Broadcasts  E E /D 3 64 8 /A , 24  S ep tem b er 1999).
44 La Repubblica  w eb site, 4 A u g u st 1999 in BBC  Sum mary o f  World Broadcasts  E E /D 3 60 7 /A , 7 
A u g ust 1999.
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European regime in Serbia,’ going on to state that ‘Only the idiotic politicians from 
the EU and the United States could expect an explosion of pro-Western feelings in 
Serbia as long as such shameful atrocities and crimes against the Serbs in Kosovo are 
taking place.’45 As such, the positions of the democratic opposition parties with 
respect to the situation in Kosovo reflect concern not just for plight of the Kosovo 
Serbs, but also for the ability of Milosevic to use such a situation to undermine the 
opposition.
Co-operation with the ICTY
As noted above, most of Serbia’s democratic opposition leaders decided to 
boycott a key meeting with the EU when it emerged that they would be asked to sign 
a declaration promising future co-operation with the ICTY if they were to come to 
power. EU leaders were quick to blame Milosevic for the decision of the opposition 
leaders not to attend the meeting, with Robin Cook claiming that the decision was 
‘imposed on them by Milosevic who told them they would be guilty of treason to 
come here.’46 Djindjic, however, refuted this, asserting that Cook ‘obviously does not 
know the situation in Serbia.’47
In explaining why they refused to attend the Luxembourg meeting, the 
democratic opposition parties emphasised two main points: the first was that their 
priorities did not include future relations with the ICTY, while the second was to 
emphasise the potential damage that could be done to the opposition if it was to be 
seen as being too accommodating in relation to the Hague tribunal. Draskovic’s
45 M ed iafax  new s ag ency , 22 Ju ly  1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3 5 9 6 /A , 26 Ju ly
1999. D raSkovic m ade s im ila r c la im s at an  S PO  o rg an ised  ra lly  in N i§ o n  24 Ju ly  (The New York 
Times, 24 Ju ly  1999).
46 A sso c ia ted  P ress W o rld stream , 11 O c to b er  1999.
47 A g ence F rance P resse , 11 O c to b er 1999.
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advisor noted that the objective of the opposition parties in terms of their planned trip 
to Luxembourg was to discuss ‘the lifting of international sanctions, humanitarian aid 
and the EU’s support to opposition forces in Serbia, but not to be someone who would 
confirm something that had been agreed upon without our knowledge.’48 Djindjic 
emphasised that the problem was not that the democratic opposition would not co­
operate with the ICTY, declaring that:
of course we are prepared to cooperate fully with the Hague Tribunal, 
because we want to be a UN member, and the Security Council is a UN 
body. ... But in our view, this is not the topic for talks with the EU. ... 
What we want to discuss is, naturally, money, economy and problems of 
the people of Serbia who are fighting for their rights in the streets. ... If the 
EU helps us to solve economic problems, we shall be in a much better 
position to give our people hope and strengthen their desire for change.49
In addition to the fact that the ICTY was not a priority issue for the democratic 
opposition parties at this time, Vuksanovic noted the potential damage to the 
opposition from signing such a declaration, and highlighted the EU’s lack of 
understanding of the situation inside Serbia. Vuksanovic declared that ‘This is a very 
sensitive subject. If we are involved with the Hague tribunal, we will be destroyed by 
Milosevic propaganda.’50 He went on to state that:
48 U n ited  P ress  In te rn a tio na l, 11 O c to b er 1999. S im ió a lso  de sc rib ed  the L u x em b o u rg  m eetin g  as ‘a 
w o n d erfu l o p p o rtu n ity  fo r the E U  to sho w  its su pp o rt fo r the d em ocra tic  o p p o sitio n , bu t it w as w a s te d ’ 
{The Scotsman, 12 O c to b er 1999).
49 R ad io  B 2 -92 , 11 O c to b er 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3 66 4 /A , 13 O c tob er
1999. F u rth e r co m m en ts  from  the D S inc lu ded  Z iv k o v ié ’s rem ark s  that: ‘I t is un accep tab le  tha t in this 
d ocu m en t w e are  o b lig ed  to sign , the E U  do es no t p ro m ise  an y th in g  bu t d em and s fro m  us tha t w e m ake 
p ro m ises  once  w e co m e to p o w e r’, w h ile  D jin d jic  n o ted  tha t ‘T h ere  is no th ing  w rong  w ith  the 
p rin c ip le s  b u t co -o p era tio n  w ith  the W ar C rim es T rib u n al is no t a p r io rity  at the m om ent. O u r m ain  
p rio rity  is the co m ing  w in te r and  the p o ss ib le  hu m an ita rian  ca ta s tro p h e ’. B atió  also  em p hasised  the fact 
tha t the o p p o s itio n ’s p r io rity  at th is tim e w as the n eed  for a id  fo r S e rb ia ’s p o p u la tio n  an d  n o t the IC T Y  
(B 92 new s arch iv e , O c to b er 11 1999. A v ailab le  at:
h ttp ://w w w .b 9 2 . n e t/en g lish /n ew s/in d ex .p h p ?d d =  11 & m m =  10 & w v v =  1999).
50 The Scotsman, 12 O c to b er 1999.
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Milosevic deserves everything he gets, and we have respect for the UN 
and the institutions of the UN -  the tribunal included. But the first thing is 
to stay alive politically. We can only win if we can get enough people out 
on to the streets every night, and the EU gave us no choice: we cannot 
have anything to do with this.51
That the refusal of the democratic opposition parties to sign the EU declaration did 
not lead to a serious breach in relations between them and the IC is significant. 
Cooperation with the ICTY was an obligation for Serbia according to the terms of the 
Dayton agreement and, as such, had been a source of tension between the IC and 
Milosevic for much of the late 1990s. While the opposition parties attempted to 
reassure the IC that they would cooperate with the Hague tribunal if they came to 
power, their refusal to sign the EU declaration suggests a degree of ambivalence in 
their attitudes to the court, even if only through fear of the impact this might have 
domestically. That this did not become a sticking point in relations between the 
democratic opposition parties and the IC illustrates the extent to which IC priorities 
had changed, with the desire to assist opposition parties in their efforts to oust 
Milosevic now clearly the overriding objective of IC policy.
Ilic notes that, while there is a relative scarcity of material relating to the 
opposition’s attitudes to co-operation with the ICTY, in the period before the 2000 
elections, on the whole, the DS, the SPO and the GSS accepted that co-operation 
would be necessary if they gained power (Ilic, 2001: 8-12). However, Kostunica was 
a consistent critic of the ICTY describing the tribunal as ‘unjust,’52 its indictment of 
Milosevic as an ‘unnecessary decision’53 and claiming that the tribunal had ‘pressed
51 The Scotsman, 12 O c to b er 1999.
52 B e ta  new s agency , 15 M ay  20 0 0 , in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 38 4 2 /C , 17 M ay  2000
53 F oN et new s ag ency , 23 A u gu st 2 00 0 , in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 39 2 8 /C , 25 
A u g ust 2000.
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unreasonable charges against [Milosevic].’54 Kostunica’s disdain for the ICTY is clear 
in the remarks that he made following the arrest of former speaker of the Republika 
Srpska parliament Momcilo Krajisnik in April 2000: ‘It is clear that the Hague 
tribunal is not a legal, judiciary or international institution. It is a NATO, that is, a US 
weapon of pressure and imposition of its own will in the world in accordance with its 
own current interests.’55 Furthermore, when questioned directly about whether 
Milosevic would be handed over the Hague when the new government took power, 
Kostunica stated that ‘The first government will have no time to concern itself with 
the Hague tribunal. This is not our priority.’56
The IC was directly confronted with Kostunica’s negative opinion of the 
ICTY in the period between his winning the presidential election and his taking 
power. Speaking at the beginning of October, Kostunica chastised the US for ‘missing 
no opportunity to mention the Hague indictment as if that was more important than 
the fate of a nation.’57 Kostunica explained that he was criticising US statements 
because:
as a rule these statements mention the Hague Tribunal’s accusations 
against Slobodan Milosevic. I am one of those who thinks the accusation 
is unjust in legal terms. I think it is foolish and legally incorrect. It helps 
maintain tension and to a certain extent had made us hostage to 
Milosevic’s authoritarian regime. I am opposed to this accusation and 
when the Americans mention i t ... it makes our position more difficult.58
54 S R N A  new s ag ency , B ije ljina , 9 A u gust 200 0 , in B BC  Sum mary o f  World Broadcasts  E E /D 3 91 6 /C , 
11 A u g ust 2000 .
55 B e ta  new s agency , 3 A p ril 2000  in BBC  Sum mary o f  World Broadcasts  E E /D 3 8 0 7 /C , 5 A p ril 2000
56 Focus, M un ich , 21 A u g ust 200 0  in BBC  Summary o f  World Broadcasts  E E /D 3 9 2 8 /C , 25 A u gust 
2000.
57 F o N et N ew s A g en cy , 2 O c to b er 2000 , B BC  M onitoring Europe -  Political, 2 O c to b er 2000.
58 R ussian  P ub lic  T V , 4 O c to b er 20 0 0  in BBC M onitoring Form er Soviet Union -  Political, 4 O c to ber 
2000.
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When questioned about Kostunica’s comments, US officials refrained from 
any criticism of Kostunica, and reiterated their support for efforts to ensure that his 
electoral victory was respected.59 When asked whether she believed Kostunica would 
be co-operative with the West if he were Yugoslav president, Albright responded:
I think that the issue here is that Mr. Kostunica is very clearly a Serb 
nationalist. One can recognise that one can be a nationalist and not be an 
ethnic cleanser. I think that he is obviously entitled to believe in a strong 
Yugoslavia. He has never been a communist. He’s someone who has 
made very clear that he believes in the rule of law. Those are values that 
are important to the US and to the European community.60
At this time, it is clear that IC representatives were being careful not to make threats 
or statements that might undermine the opposition, a point that was made explicitly by 
French foreign minister Vedrine who stated that it was ‘very important that we do not 
strike a tone of threats but rather encouragement, saying that if democracy wins the 
elections, then the Yugoslav democrats will be able to move closer to Europe and so 
on.’61
In considering international policy with respect to Serbia at this time it is clear 
that the extent and nature of international support for Serbia’s democratic opposition 
parties was significantly different from any support that had been offered to the 
opposition in previous time periods. Unlike before, the IC openly called for 
Milosevic’s removal from power and assistance to the democratic opposition in an
59 U S D ep artm en t o f  S tate , D a ily  P ress B rie fin g , 3 O c to b er 200 0 ; T he  W hite  H o use , P ress  B rie fin g , 3 
O c to b er 2000.
60 F D C H  P o litica l T ranscrip ts , M ade le in e  K. A lb rig h t ho ld s jo in t new s co n fe ren ce  w ith  F ren ch  fo re ign  
m in is te r H u b ert V ed rin e , P aris , 2 O c to b er 2000.
61 F D C H  P o litic a l T ran scrip ts , M ad e le in e  K. A lb rig h t ho ld s jo in t  new s co n fe ren ce  w ith  F ren ch  fo re ign  
m in is te r H u b ert V edrine , P aris , 2 O c to b er 2000. Jav ie r S o lana  m ade a s im ila r  p o in t a t the  sam e p ress 
co n fe ren ce , s ta ting  that ‘it is im p o rtan t to re fra in  from  do in g  an y th ing  n ow  th a t w o u ld  p rov id e  
a rg um en ts  tha t M r. M ilo sev ic  co u ld  use to s tren g th en  his re a r  gu a rd  m an o eu v rin g s  w h ich  he m ay  b e  
indu lg ing  in. ’
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effort to secure regime change became the central element of international policy with 
respect to Serbia. Support to the democratic opposition went beyond merely 
increasing financial support and issuing statements in support of its campaigns, 
however. The IC also showed its support for democratic forces by regularly meeting 
with opposition leaders, listening to their suggestions and, on occasion, changing 
policy in line with these suggestions. That sensitive and contentious issues such as the 
plight of Kosovo’s Serb minority and, in particular, future co-operation with the 
Hague tribunal did not become major issues in the relationship between the 
democratic opposition parties and the IC is significant; opposition positions that may 
have undermined their credibility as an alternative to the Milosevic regime 
internationally in earlier time periods did not have any significant negative impact on 
IC support for the opposition. This demonstrates that whether or not the democratic 
opposition parties held views that were at odds with those of the IC was less 
important to the IC than whether or not they could effectively oppose the regime 
domestically, and also suggests that international actors may have been more aware of 
the potential damage that some of their policies could do to the democratic opposition 
parties. The IC also sought to actively build opposition unity through exerting 
pressure on the democratic opposition parties, something that was not done 
previously.
Challenges to the Milosevic regime
The S ep tem ber 2000 E lections
In the immediate aftermath of the NATO bombing, the democratic opposition 
in Serbia was again in disarray. The SZP had been unable to operate as a result of the
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bombing and Djindjic had relocated to Montenegro fearing for his personal safety. 
The SPO had been discredited as an opposition party as a result of its decision to enter 
the federal government in January 1999, and, although Draskovic was expelled a few 
months later, other opposition actors now viewed him with some suspicion. Kostunica 
and the DSS had remained aloof from opposition coalitions since its short-lived co­
operation with Zajedno, and as such was somewhat marginalized at this time as the 
opposition scene was dominated by the larger SPO and SZP. The SZP had organised 
protests in an effort to capitalise on the rise in popular discontent in the aftermath of 
the NATO bombing, but, while initially well attended, the demonstrations were called 
off in December as attendance declined.
Divisions between the SPO and the SZP at this time regarding the appropriate 
strategy and tactics to unseat the regime precluded the creation of a united opposition 
front for much of the second half of 1999. While the SZP was demanding Milosevic’s 
resignation, the SPO argued that change would be best effected through negotiations 
with the regime. Furthermore, while the SZP believed that Milosevic could be toppled 
through street demonstrations, this was not a tactic favoured by Draskovic at this 
time.
However, by the end of 1999, with neither strategy showing any signs that it 
might succeed, changes in the positions of the SPO and the SZP appeared to bring the 
two parties closer together. In mid-October Djindjic had announced that the SZP’s 
protests would now be ‘focused on demanding early elections.’62 This brought his 
position closer to that of Draskovic who had begun to argue that the time had passed 
when it would be possible to negotiate with the authorities for a transitional 
government. Instead, the SPO’s position was now that public ‘attention and pressure
62 A g ence  F rance  P resse , 15 O c to b er 1999.
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should be focused on early elections and getting the best conditions for these 
elections.’63 While there was considerable division within the democratic opposition 
during much of 1999, there were also signs towards the end of the year that the 
opposition parties may be drawing closer together, when as the result of an initiative 
by former DS leader Dragoljub Micunovic, two opposition agreements were signed, 
both of which related to opposition strategy for future elections.64
Draskovic was behind the next initiative to unite the opposition parties and in 
late December the SPO issued an invitation to the leaders of the main opposition 
parties to talks. Those invited included Djindjic, Svilanovic, Kostunica, Vladan Batic, 
and Micunovic, and the leaders of regionally based parties and coalitions from 
Vojvodina, Sandzak, and Kosovo.65 Of the 16 party leaders that were invited to the 
meeting, only Djindjic and Svilanovic did not attend, on the grounds that an 
agreement had been reached within the SZP that it would be represented by its 
coordinator, Batic.66
The 10 January meeting resulted in the opposition parties signing two 
documents. The first was an agreement on a joint opposition strategy to secure
63 A g ence F rance  P resse , 19 A u g u st 1999. A t the tim e SZ P m em b ers  had  o b jec ted  to D ra§ k ov ic’s ca ll 
to  fo rce ea rly  e lec tions, w ith  D jin d jic  a rgu in g  that an y  e lec tio ns  w ith  M ilo sev ic  rem ain in g  in p o w er 
w o u ld  b e  m an ip u la ted  (A g en ce  F rance P resse , 26 A u gu st 1999). T h e  G S S and M lad jan  D ink ic  a lso  
ra ised  o b jec tion s  (B eta  new s agency , 26  A u gu st 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts 
E E /D 3 62 5 /A , 28 A u g ust 1999; B e ta  new s ag ency , 24  A u gu st 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World 
Broadcasts E E /D /3 62 3 /A , 26 A u gu st 1999).
64 T he  first w as s ign ed  on  14 O c tob er, b y  all o f  the m a jo r op p o sitio n  p a rtie s  w ho ag reed  to  a se t o f  
co nd itio ns  fo r fa ir e lec tio ns  w h ich  they  in tended  to p resen t a t a ro u n d tab le  o f  the o p p o sitio n  an d  the 
au th o rities  (B e ta  new s ag ency , 14 O c to b er 1999 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 15 O c to b er
1999). T he  seco n d  w as s ign ed  o n  28 O c to b er an d  w as ‘P rin c ip les  o f  co o p era tio n  be tw een  the 
dem ocra tic  o p p o s itio n ,’ an d  spec ified  tha t the p a rtie s  w ou ld  co n tinu e  to  co o p era te  in neg o tia tio n s  
reg a rd in g  e lec tio n  co nd itio ns , as w ell as th ro u g h o u t the e lec tio n  cam p a ig n  and  in  the  po st-e lec tio n  
pe rio d , an d  in c lud ed  a p ro v is io n  th a t the s ign a to rie s  w o u ld  n o t co o p era te  w ith , su pp o rt o r  en te r in to  a 
co a litio n  w ith  an y  o f  the p a rtie s  then  in pow er. T he  S P O  d id  no t s ig n  th is  ag reem en t (B eta  new s 
ag ency , 28 O c to b er 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3 6 7 9 /A , 30 O c to b er 1999).
65 B eta  new s ag ency , 28 D ecem b er 1999 in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 37 2 7 /A , 30 
D ecem b er 1999.
66 R ad io  B 2-9 2 , 10 Jan u a ry  2 0 0 0  in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3 73 4 /C , 11 Janu ary
2000.
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democratic conditions for the holding of early elections.67 The parties also signed a 
second document which called on the EU and the US to lift or suspend all sanctions as 
soon as the opposition and the authorities signed an agreement on early elections, to 
renew Yugoslavia’s membership of the OSCE, and to allow for the Yugoslav army 
and Serbian police to return to Kosovo, in line with existing agreements.68
The opposition agreement was welcomed by the IC, with a spokesperson for 
the EU’s foreign affairs commissioner stating that ‘It is a priority for the European 
Union that the Serbian opposition forces unite in their struggle for democracy and 
freedom. These developments are to be welcomed.’69 In addition, a meeting of the 
EU’s General Affairs Council on 24 January also welcomed the agreement, and 
endorsed the opposition’s call for elections in early 2000.70 Similarly, the US State 
Department issued a press statement welcoming both the agreement and the parties’ 
‘united call for early elections, an end to state terror, and the abolition of repressive 
legislation.’71
The democratic opposition parties believed that the 10 January agreement 
would strengthen their position with the IC. Following a Trilateral Commission 
meeting in Budva on 19 January, Djindjic expressed a certain degree of optimism on 
the issue of sanctions, noting that the 10 January agreement was having a positive 
impact on the opposition’s relations with the IC: ‘I think the situation in Serbia is seen
67 S tud io  B T V , 10 Jan u a ry  200 0  in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 37 3 5 /C , 12 Jan u a ry
2000. T he p a rtie s ’ d em and s inc lu ded  tha t d em o cra tic  e lec tio ns  b e  he ld  be fo re  the  en d  o f  A p ril, an d  that 
an ti-d em o cra tic  law s su ch  as the law  on  in fo rm atio n  and  the law  o n  u n iv ersitie s  b e  abo lish ed . In 
ad d itio n , the pa rtie s  p led g ed  to  do  ev ery th in g  p o ss ib le  to p resen t the s tra teg y  o f  the jo in t  op p o sitio n , 
an d  to  increase  the hop e o f  v ic to ry  to the p eo p le  o f  Serbia . T h e  p a rtie s  also  ag reed  to  ho ld  a ra lly  o f  
su p p o rt fo r th e ir  d em and s in  M arch , and  to ab id e  b y  all p a s t ag reem en ts  o n  n o n -co o p e ra tio n  w ith  the 
reg im e, an d  the m in im um  accep tab le  e lec tio n  co nd itions.
68 S tud io  B T V , 10 Jan u a ry  20 0 0  in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts E E /D 3 7 3 5 /C , 12 Janu ary
2000.
69 A g ence  F rance  P resse , 11 Jan u a ry  2000.
70 2 2 3 9 th C ouncil M eetin g  -  G en era l A ffa irs  -  B ru sse ls  -  24 Jan u a ry  2000 .
71 U S D epartm en t o f  S tate , P ress  S ta tem en t, ‘S erb ian  O p p o sitio n  C alls fo r E arly  E le c tio n s ,’ Janu ary  11
2000.
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much more optimistically today than before our meeting, and they have said that the 
holding o f that meeting and the behaviour o f the opposition since then is one o f the 
reasons which could change their stance. ’72 Portuguese diplomat Antonio Tanger 
Correa, who chaired the meeting o f the Trilateral Commission, confirmed the more 
favourable disposition o f the IC towards the Serbian opposition following the 10 
January agreement, declaring that: ‘It is much easier for us to help a united opposition 
than a fractured opposition. ... The fact that the opposition is united ... in relation to 
the lifting o f the sanctions confronts us with a different situation.’73 Furthermore, in 
their stated reasons for supporting a suspension o f the flight ban, both Albright and 
Cook noted that the efforts o f the democratic opposition parties to unite had been a 
factor in their decision.74 As such, the democratic opposition parties were, to a certain 
extent, now being ‘rewarded’ by the IC for making efforts to unify.
In the months following the 10 January agreement the main democratic 
opposition parties held regular meetings to discuss cooperation and strategy, and in 
early March agreed a joint political platform, known as ‘Platform o f the Democratic 
Opposition o f Serbia.’75 On 22 March the parties, after a series o f delays and 
disagreements, agreed the date for their planned joint rally in Belgrade, which took 
place on 14 April (the original intention had been to hold the rally in March), under 
the title ‘Stop the Terror For Free Elections.’76 Between 100,000 and 200,000 turned
72 Radio M ontenegro, 19 January 2000 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D3743/C, 21 
January 2000.
73 Agence France Presse, 20 January 2000. An EU foreign m inisters meeting held the following week 
did not agree to any sanctions relief for Serbia, with UK and the Netherlands arguing against such a 
move. It was decided, however, to hold further discussions on the issue at future m eetings (Beta news 
agency, 25 January 2000 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D3748/C, 27 January 2000). The 
SZP decided to send an expert team, headed by Avram ovic, to Britain and the Netherlands to make 
their case for lifting the flight ban and oil embargo (Agence France Presse, 28 January 2000).
74 Federal News Service, Press Availability with Secretary o f  State M adeleine Albright and British 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, The State Department, W ashington, 9 February 2000.
75 Radio B2-92, 3 M arch 2000 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D3780/C, 4 M arch 2000. The 
DOS Platform is reprinted in MiloSevid, 2000: 99. 190-192.
76 Assocaited Press W orldstream , 22 M arch 2000.
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up for the demonstration, which included representatives from the main democratic 
opposition parties and coalitions, together with representatives from Otpor77 and the 
Association o f Independent Journalists.78
As has already been noted, the democratic opposition parties came under a 
significant degree o f international pressure to unite and form a common front against 
the Milosevic regime. However, demands for unity also came from domestic actors, 
in particular from highly popular NGOs such as G17 plus79 and Otpor.80 At the 14 
April rally Otpor warned the opposition parties that it would launch demonstrations 
against any party that breached opposition unity or co-operated with the Milosevic 
regime (Anastasijevic, 2000: 157). The influence o f Otpor on the democratic 
opposition parties should not be underestimated. As Bieber points out, ‘The 
unification o f the opposition, first in January 2000 and later in the form o f [DOS], was 
largely the result o f intensive pressure by Otpor’81 (Bieber, 2003: 86). While it is 
difficult to assess the relative influence o f external and internal sources o f pressure on 
the democratic opposition parties to unite at this time, it seems clear that both were 
influential.
While internal and external pressure may have played a role in forcing the 
democratic opposition parties to work more closely together, even this was not 
sufficient to overcome divisions between the parties, as became clear in the run up to
77 Otpor (Resistance) was a student organisation that was founded in Belgrade in 1998 and which 
would play a significant role in the overthrow o f  the M ilosevic regime in 2000.
78 Radio B2-92, 4 April 2000 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D3808/C, 6 April 2000.
79 G17/G17 plus was a highly respected group o f  independent econom ists who did much to highlight 
the catastrophic economic consequences o f  MiloSevtf policies and played an important role in drawing 
up the DOS platform  for the Septem ber 2000 elections.
80 It was not only non-party groups that were growing im patient with the party leaders, as key figures 
within the democratic opposition parties also criticised the leadership on these grounds. This was 
particularly the case with respect to those local party leaders who had been in pow er since the Zajedno 
local election victories in 1996/1997 (Beta news agency, 28 O ctober 1999 in BBC Monitoring Europe 
-  Political, 29 October 1999; ‘Serbia’s Brave N ew  Protesters’, Balkan Crisis Report, Institute for W ar 
and Peace Reporting, 11 July 1999).
81 Bieber also claims that O tpor ‘put an end to most instances o f  cooperation with the regime and 
refocused the opposition on toppling Slobodan M iloSevic’ (Bieber, 2003: 81).
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the September elections. Cohen claims that the appearance o f the united opposition 
parties at 14 April rally was a ‘show o f solidarity’ that was ‘maintained mainly for the 
crowds and opposition supporters abroad’ (Cohen, 2001: 359), while Bieber asserts 
that even DOS ‘divided by many programmatic issues and personal animosities -  was 
united solely by its rejection o f any cooperation with the regime’ (Bieber, 2003: 79).
In summary, under pressure from both domestic and international actors, 
Serbia’s democratic opposition parties made efforts to overcome their differences and 
act together against the regime. Considerable progress in this direction was made in 
late 1999 and early 2000, culminating in the 10 January agreement which was 
welcomed by the IC as a positive step. However, differences between the parties 
persisted and maintaining a united front was clearly difficult, particularly for the SPO. 
The fragility o f the unity between the SPO and the other democratic opposition parties 
was evident even in early 2000, foreshadowing the breakdown o f this wide opposition 
unity in advance o f the September elections.
The September 2000federal elections
By law, elections for the federal parliament’s Chamber o f Citizens and Serbian 
local elections were scheduled to take place in 2000, though M ilosevic’s term as 
Yugoslav president was not due to expire until July 2001. Against a background o f  
increasing repression, further groundwork for the election was laid when Milosevic 
introduced changes to the electoral laws, and amended the Yugoslav constitution in 
moves designed to ensure that he would remain in power. In July, Milosevic 
succeeded in getting constitutional amendments passed in the Federal parliament that
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clearly indicated his intention to maintain power in the SRJ.82 The constitutional 
changes introduced direct elections for the Yugoslav president, who could now stay in 
office for two terms, and also for the Chamber o f Republics. Until this time the 
representatives in the Chamber o f Republics had been appointed by the republican 
parliaments. These changes clearly weakened Montenegro’s position in the Yugoslav 
federation, and Montenegro’s ruling parties decided to boycott the subsequent 
elections (Goati, 2001: 233-235).
Until the constitutional changes were introduced, the SRJ president was 
elected by the Yugoslav parliament and could stand for only one four year term and as 
such, M ilosevic’s term in office was due to expire in July 2001. Clearly Milosevic 
intended to maintain power by running in direct elections under the new 
arrangements. In addition to changes to the Yugoslav constitution, Milosevic also 
prepared for the forthcoming elections by passing new electoral laws in the federal 
parliament. The changes included a redrawing o f electoral boundaries to favour the 
ruling parties and changes to the composition o f the Federal Electoral Commission 
such that the majority o f its members were elected by the Federal parliament (in effect 
the Milosevic regime) (Goati, 2001: 235-237). On 27 July, Milosevic announced that 
there would be Yugoslav legislative and presidential elections held on 24 September 
2000, with Serbian local elections also taking place on the same day.
Draskovic’s immediate reaction to the announcement that the elections would 
be held in September was to declare that the SPO would boycott them.83 However, the
82 In April M ilosevic had prepared the ground for this move to change the Federal Constitution when 
the Serbian parliam ent approved changes to the law regarding how representatives were to be chosen 
for the Federal Cham ber o f  the Republics, ensuring that M ilosevic would have the two thirds m ajority 
in the federal parliam ent needed to amend the constitution. The move was described by an opposition 
politician as ‘an internal coup in the Serbian A ssem bly’ (Ramet, 2002: 355).
United Press International, 28 July 2000. DraSkovic stated that: ‘As ours is a two-m em ber federation, 
if  one m em ber is not participating in such elections they cease to be federal polls and become a 
dangerous provocation for breaking up the federal state and the SPO will not be a party to it.’
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other main opposition parties, who had signed an agreement on 2 June that they 
would participate in forthcoming elections, and would present a joint list o f  
candidates,84 announced that they would be taking part and that they would put 
forward a joint DOS candidate to oppose Milosevic in the elections for the SRJ 
presidency.85
The IC reaction to the announcement o f the elections was to support the 
opposition’s decision to contest the elections, and the US called on the SPO and 
Montenegro to participate.86 While the Montenegrin government refused to end its 
boycott, the SPO decided that it would participate, though not as part o f DOS, and in 
early August the party announced that Belgrade mayor, Vojislav Mihailovic, grandson 
o f wartime nationalist leader Draza Mihailovic, would be the SPO’s candidate for the 
federal presidency.87 On 7 August, DOS announced that Kostunica would be its
o  opresidential candidate.
Following the announcement that elections were to be held in September 
2000, the IC greatly increased the level o f support it was providing to Serbia’s 
democratic opposition parties. In mid-August, the US decided to open an office in its 
Budapest embassy to support democratic forces in Serbia. The US and the EU 
provided considerable financial support to the DOS coalition and also to non-party 
groups, most notably Otpor. According to Carothers, the international support for 
Serbia’s democrats was intended to achieve four objectives: to increase the credibility 
o f the elections through providing a parallel vote count and domestic election 
observers; to strengthen the democratic opposition parties; to increase the belief in 
Serbia’s population that political change was both desirable and possible; and to
84 Agence France Presse, 2 June 1999.
85 Agence France Presse, 29 July 2000.
86 The New York Times, 31 July 2000.
87 Radio B2-92, 6 August 2000.
88 United Press International, 7 August 2000.
support a massive campaign to increase voter turnout (Carothers, 2001: 2). In terms o f  
the scale o f the financial assistance that was offered to the democratic opposition, 
Carothers estimates that approximately $40 million was provided by US government 
and private sources, and close to the same amount from Europe (Carothers, 2001: 3). 
International financial assistance paid for polls o f Serbian public opinion to help the 
opposition formulate an effective strategy; 2.5 million stickers for Otpor which was at 
the forefront o f the get-out-the vote campaign; 20,000 elections monitors; and
OQcommunications and other equipment for the DOS campaign headquarters. 
According to Djindjic, ‘Satellite phones and computers were vital to us. We were 
given our entire communication network.’90
In addition to providing financial and technical assistance to the democratic 
opposition, in mid-September the EU promised that sanctions against Serbia would be 
lifted if  the opposition won the elections. In an appeal to Serbian voters, EU foreign 
ministers issued a statement in which it promised that ‘A choice, leading to 
democratic change, would lead to a radical modification o f the European Union’s 
policy towards Serbia: we will lift the sanctions against the Federal Republic o f  
Yugoslavia.’91 This move was welcomed by Kostunica, who stated that ‘This is a 
telling proof that European policy towards Yugoslavia has changed for the better. It 
would be even more useful for democracy in Serbia if  the lifting o f sanctions were
0 9unconditional, but this gesture o f goodwill means a lot to the Serbs.’
While the IC supported the democratic opposition in the September elections 
-  in effect Kostunica and the DOS coalition - Kostunica stated that he wanted neither 
verbal nor financial support from the US, which he believed was jointly responsible,
89 The Fall O f M ilosevic, episode 3, BBC docum entary series broadcast on 19 January 2003.
90 The Fall O f MiloSevid, episode 3, BBC docum entary series broadcast on 19 January 2003.
91 The Scotsman, 19 Septem ber 2000.
92 SRNA news agency, 18 Septem ber 2000 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D3950/C, 20 
Septem ber 2000.
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with Milosevic, for the hardships that the Serbian population had suffered.93 He 
reacted angrily to the decision o f the US to open the Budapest office, describing it as 
the ‘crudest interference in the internal affairs’ o f Serbia and Yugoslavia, and an 
example o f the ‘hegemonistic and colonial pretensions o f the current US 
administration.’94 Expressing great concern regarding the potential negative impact 
such assistance might have, Kostunica declared that ‘The American decision is a true 
kiss o f death to all truly democratic and patriotic forces in our country and an 
encouragement to the non-national, corrupt and irresponsible policies’ o f the 
Milosevic regime.95 Kostunica also stated that ‘You have to have a huge dose o f  
arrogance, but hypocrisy as well, in order to claim that a long-term US goal is the 
improvement o f democracy in Serbia. Democracy in Serbia is exclusively a Serbian 
goal and nobody else can claim it.’96
The State Department reacted with considerable tolerance to Kostunica’s anti- 
American views, with a spokesperson stating that:
I think that it’s obvious we don’t share Mr. Kostunica’s views regarding 
US interest in a democratic Serbia, nor do those democratic forces who do 
want to talk to us. It’s not ... our position to endorse one particular 
candidate. We believe that Mr. Kostunica is indeed a genuine democratic
q  nleader, and he is entitled to his opinions.
Kostunica reacted more favourably to a statement by Albright which urged 
Serbia’s citizens to vote in the forthcoming elections. Although he did question the 
right o f the US administration to call on Serbs to vote in their own elections,
93 Radio B2-92, 13 August 2000 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D3919/C, 15 August 2000.
94 Radio B2-92 web site, 16 August 2000 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 16 August 2000.
95 Associated Press W orldstream , 16 August 2000.
96 Radio B2-92 web site, 16 August 2000 in BBC Monitoring Europe -  Political, 16 August 2000.
97 US Department o f State, Daily Press Briefing, 18 August 2000.
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Kostunica nevertheless stated that Albright’s statement ‘represents in a way a positive 
shift in the hitherto US policy towards events’ in the SRJ and should therefore ‘be 
taken as a good sign.’98 What made this statement more acceptable from Kostunica’s 
point o f view was that: ‘There are no threats in this statement, there are no promises 
or anything else that might offend the dignity o f our people and be misused by 
Slobodan M ilosevic’s regime against his opponents.’99 Kostunica expressed the hope 
that ‘all pre-election comments and statements from Washington will remain within 
this framework.’ 100
The DOS coalition topped the polls in the September 2000 federal elections 
for both houses o f the federal parliament and also in the crucial presidential election 
(see Table 4). DOS won approximately 44% in the elections for both houses o f the 
federal parliament, an increase o f more than 20% on Zajedno’s total in the 1996 
federal elections. While the SPS-JUL vote was more than 20% less than the SPS-JUL- 
ND coalition had obtained in the 1996 elections, it was not significantly smaller than 
the percentage o f 34.2% won in the 1997 Serbian elections. A far more significant 
loss was that experienced by the SPO which, although it had for most o f the 1990s 
been Serbia’s largest individual opposition party, received only around 5% in both 
parliamentary elections, a massive drop from the 19.1% that it had won when it 
contested the Serbian elections in 1997, which secured the party only one seat in the 
Chamber o f Republics and none in the Chamber o f Citizens. As such, Goati has noted 
that the party’s decision to remain independent o f DOS was a major mistake on the 
part o f the SPO, which, as a consequence, ‘was “self-eliminated” ... from the main
98 Beta news agency, 24 August 2000 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D3929/C, 26 August 
2000.
99 Beta news agency, 24 A ugust 2000 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D3929/C, 26 August 
2000.
100 Beta news agency, 24 A ugust 2000 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts EE/D3929/C, 26 August 
2000.
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party scene’(Goati, 2001a: 233). In addition, the turnout for the election was 74.4%, a 
huge increase on the 57.4% that had voted in the 1997 election, and the highest 
turnout in any elections that had been held in Serbia since the introduction o f  
multiparty elections in 1990 (Goati, 2001b: 54).
Presidency Chamber of Citizens Chamber of Republics
Votes (%) Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats
DOS 50.24% 44.6% 59 (54.6%) 43.9% 10(50%)
SPS-JUL 37.15% 33.5% 44 (40.7%) 31% 7 (35%)
SRS 5.88% 8.8% 4 (3.7%) 9.9% 2 ( 10%)
SPO 2.95% 5% 0 5.9% 1 (5%)
T ab le  4: R esu lts o f the 2000 Y ugoslav elections. (F igures from  G oati, 2001a, p.247)
The presidential election was even more successful for DOS, with Kostunica 
obtaining more than 50% o f the first round votes, meaning that he had won the 
election outright. However, Milosevic was not prepared to recognise the result o f the 
presidential election, and, on 28 September, four days after the vote had taken place, 
the Federal Electoral Commission (SIK) announced that while Kostunica had received 
the largest amount o f votes o f all the candidates in the election, he had secured only 
48.96% o f the total votes and as such a second round o f voting would be held on 8 
October.101 This left Kostunica and DOS with the option o f disputing the SIK’s
101 Agence France Presse, 28 Septem ber 2000.
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Iresults, or accepting them and taking part in a second round o f voting. Kostunica 
chose the latter.
DOS’s claim that Kostunica had beaten Milosevic in the first round o f  the 
presidential elections was endorsed by most IC actors, including the US, the EU and 
the OSCE.102 In addition, the EU announced that it was preparing to lift its sanctions 
against Serbia as soon as Milosevic was removed from office, 103 while Clinton 
declared that ‘If the will o f the people is respected’ that the US would ‘take steps with 
our allies to lift economic sanctions.’ 104 However, Milosevic refused to concede 
defeat and on 4 October Yugoslavia’s Constitutional Court issued a rather vague 
ruling that part o f the 24 September presidential election had been annulled. The 
following morning the court announced that the results o f the presidential elections 
were invalid, and a re-run o f the election was unnecessary until M ilosevic’s term o f  
office expired in July 2001 (de Kmjevic-Miskovic, 2001: 105).
The Constitutional Court’s announcement came the morning o f a planned 
opposition demonstration in Belgrade which was to be attended by opposition 
supporters and activists from all over Serbia. Approximately 700,000 demonstrators 
converged on Belgrade on 5 October and, in operations planned by opposition leaders, 
anti-Milosevic activists took control o f key regime institutions such as the Federal 
parliament building, police stations and the state-controlled media.105 According to 
Djindjic, the seizure o f key regime buildings had been planned by the DOS leaders
102 Agence France Presse, 27 Septem ber 2000. de Krnjevic-M i§kovic states that the decision not to 
participate in the second round was taken against western advice (de Krnjevid-MiSkovic, 2001: 104). 
However, once this decision was taken the IC stood behind DOS and called for K ostunica’s victory to 
be recognised.
103 Agence France Presse, 28 Septem ber 2000. France had argued that the sanctions should have been 
lifted im m ediately as the opposition had already won the election.
104 Christian Science Monitor, 28 Septem ber 2000.
105 A full account o f  the events o f 5 October can be found in The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th 
Revolution by Dragan BujoSevic and Ivan Radovanovic.
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because they knew that a ‘mass demonstration alone would not get him out. We had 
to seize his institutions.’ 106
With the opposition having taken over the federal parliament building and 
other regime buildings and institutions, including the state-controlled media, the 
following day the Constitutional Court reversed its earlier ruling and declared that 
Kostunica had won the presidential election in the first round, and as such was 
rightfully Yugoslavia’s president. Following a meeting with Kostunica on 6 October 
Milosevic conceded defeat, stating that he accepted the court’s ruling, bringing his 
thirteen-year reign to an end.
Explaining the DOS victory
A variety o f factors, internal and external, contributed to the fall o f the 
Milosevic regime, and as Cevallos rightly points out ‘it is in the end impossible to 
credit any single individual or organization with the downfall o f M ilosevic’ (Cevallos, 
2001: 10). It is not the purpose o f this research to determine the relative contribution 
o f various groups and factors to the events that culminated in the end o f M ilosevic’s 
rule in October 2000. Rather, what is being considered here is the manner in which 
international policy either enhanced or undermined the effectiveness o f the 
democratic opposition parties in their campaigns against the Milosevic regime.
In analyses o f the reasons for DOS’s victory in the September 2000 elections, 
and the subsequent collapse o f the Milosevic regime, commentators note the 
importance o f a variety o f internal and external factors. The role o f  international 
support for the opposition is noted by Goati (2001b), Cevallos (2001) and Carothers
106 The Fall o f  M ilosevic, episode 3, BBC docum entary series broadcast on 19 January 2003.
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(20 0 1), though none o f these authors consider that this alone can explain the events o f  
September and October 2000. Among the internal factors considered to be important 
are the decline in the importance o f national issues relative to concerns about 
economic and social problems (Gordy, 2000: 79; Pavlovic, 2001: 2); changes in the 
strategy and behaviour o f the democratic opposition parties and its ability to present a 
credible alternative (Pavlovic, 2001: 2-3; Goati, 2001b); and miscalculations on the 
part o f Milosevic, in particular his decision to call and contest direct elections for the 
Yugoslav presidency and his miscalculations regarding the relative strength o f his 
regime (Goati, 2001b: 54; Pavlovic, 2001: 6; Bujosevic and Radovanovic, 2003: 2).
While all o f these factors are undoubtedly important, what is o f greatest 
significance within the context o f this research is the impact that international policy 
had on the democratic opposition parties and the effectiveness o f DOS’s electoral 
challenge to Milosevic. As such, while clearly acknowledging that non-party groups 
such as Otpor, and longer term factors such as changes in the priorities o f the Serbian 
electorate, the declining popularity o f the Milosevic regime and also its weakness, 
made substantial contributions to M ilosevic’s downfall, the focus here is on the 
activities o f the democratic opposition parties and the contribution that they made to 
the collapse o f the regime. However, this is not meant to imply that these factors 
alone can account for the ending o f the Milosevic regime.
Throughout 1998 and 1999 the democratic opposition parties were under 
considerable internal and external pressure to unite against the Milosevic regime. 
However, in spite o f efforts to present a united front it was clear that the key divisions 
could not be overcome, and as such, the unity envisaged by those who were putting 
pressure on the parties, failed to materialise. While the inability o f  the major 
opposition parties to present a united front undermined the prospects o f an opposition
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victory in the forthcoming elections, Pavlovic argues that a significant change in 
opposition strategy occurred in August 2000 and that this was a key reason for DOS’s 
success. Pavlovic, who is highly critical o f both Draskovic and Djindjic, argues that 
until this point Serbia’s main opposition leaders were motivated more by their wish to 
establish themselves as leader o f the opposition than they were by the desire to 
destroy the Milosevic regime, but notes that T h e principles o f the unification o f the 
opposition were radically changed when Djindjic announced at the beginning o f  
August that Kostunica was an acceptable presidential candidate behind who the whole 
opposition could stand’ 107 (Pavlovic, 2001: 3). Pavlovic argues that without this 
change Milosevic would have won once again and the whole o f the opposition would 
have met the same fate as that o f the SPO after the 2000 elections108 (Pavlovic, 2001:
That DOS’s choice o f candidate to oppose Milosevic was Kostunica is also an 
important factor in explaining the coalition’s success. As a presidential candidate 
Kostunica had several advantages over either Draskovic or Djindjic, not least o f 
which was his lack o f involvement in most o f the opposition feuding that had taken 
place over the preceding years. Furthermore, while both Draskovic and Djindjic had 
been undermined by their willingness to negotiate with Milosevic, Kostunica had 
been a fierce critic o f the regime throughout his political career. Summarising 
Kostunica’s attributes, de Kmjevic-MiSkovic notes that his ‘political career was 
untainted by any past associations with Milosevic, communism, the West, or 
Draskovic, and he had a reputation for humility, honesty, principle, and moderate 
nationalism. He was, in other words, untouchable’ (de Kmjevic-Miskovic, 2001: 
102). A further attribute in Kostunica’s favour, was his reputation as a moderate
107 A uthor’s translation.
108 A uthor’s translation.
nationalist which made it ‘very difficult for the regime to smear Kostunica as a traitor 
or NATO sycophant who was serving the “colonial” interests o f the United States and 
its allies’ 109 (Cohen, 2001: 410).
Goati identifies a further characteristic that sets the DOS campaign apart from 
earlier election confrontations, noting that in 2000 DOS represented a credible 
alternative to the Milosevic regime at the domestic level. That the 2000 elections were 
the first in which Serbia’s population became ‘polarized in relation to the regime’ 
(Gordy, 2001: 79) is, perhaps, at least in part, testament to the credibility o f DOS as 
an alternative. While the unity o f the DOS coalition and its support for Kostunica 
contributed to DOS appearing as a credible alternative to the regime, other factors are 
also important in this regard. In contrast to previous election campaigns, DOS put 
forward a coherent programme, drawn up by the G17 group, setting out clearly the 
measures it intended to implement during its first year in power.110 According to 
Goati, the coalition ‘thoroughly described the devastating effects o f the ruling 
regime’s policy in the past decade,’ (Goati, 2001a: 244), while ‘offering them a 
convincing alternative project o f democratic and market transformations’ (Goati, 
2001b: 53).
Another factor that probably contributed to DOS’s credibility was the clear 
position o f the IC that once Milosevic was removed from power, the sanctions against 
Serbia would be lifted automatically and the country would receive international aid 
(Antonie, 2002: 323). As such, campaign promises that, following a DOS victory, 
Serbia’s economic situation and its international position would improve significantly,
109A further advantage o f K ostunica’s reputation as a nationalist was evident when polls indicated that 
he could secure the votes o f  19% o f voters who regularly supported the SRS (Cohen, 2001: 362).
110 ‘Dem okratska opozicija Srbije: Program  za demokratsku Srbiju’, printed in Vreme 502, 19 August 
2000.
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an issue that a substantial portion o f the electorate considered important, 111 were 
entirely credible. Furthermore, through its concessions to the opposition in relation to 
the sanctions, the IC had demonstrated its willingness to work with the opposition and 
to demonstrate to the Serbian electorate that, with Milosevic removed from power, 
Serbia could expect international assistance. While this offered tangible benefits to the 
electorate should Milosevic be rejected, it also undermined the ability o f the regime to 
portray the sanctions as part o f an international conspiracy against Serbia, as it linked 
them directly to Milosevic himself. The willingness o f the IC to make concessions 
with regard to the sanctions is in marked contrast to earlier election campaigns, and in 
particular Panic’s 1992 challenge to Milosevic, when, as Panic was promising the 
removal o f sanctions if  he won the election, the UN was simultaneously tightening its 
sanctions against the SRJ.
Another aspect o f international policy that may, ultimately have had an impact 
on the eventual victory o f DOS, is its use o f sanctions targeted directly at the regime 
and its close associates in the late 1990s. While this will not have had a substantial 
impact on the level o f support for DOS, it is likely to have contributed to the 
weakness o f the Milosevic regime, and as such, indirectly assisted DOS in defending 
its victory at the polls. Stojanovic considers this to have been a significant factor, and 
asks, with a degree o f bitterness, how it can be explained that ‘only after several years 
o f collective sanctions against Serbia did the West “remember” to direct them 
selectively against Milosevic, his family, and his top-ranking officials?’ Once this had 
occurred, he claims, ‘M ilosevic’s elite now understood definitively that they had to 
abandon him if  they wished to save their own skins. Their main concern became to
111 According to an opinion survey carried out at the Decem ber 1999 57% o f SPS supporters, 85% o f 
SRS supporters and 96-100%  o f the supporters o f various opposition parties were ‘dissatisfied with 
Y ugoslavia’s international standing (Cohen, 2001: 357).
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ensure that they do not get on the West’s black list, or for those already on it, to 
ensure that they got o ff it’ (Stojanovic, 2003: 205).
A number o f analysts also note the importance o f that fact that, since 1997, the 
opposition had been governing in a significant number o f towns and cities throughout 
Serbia (Bieber, 2003: 81; Gordy, 2000: 80; ICG, 2000: 17). While the personal rivalry 
between Djindjic and Draskovic led to the collapse o f Zajedno at the national level, in 
many o f those towns where Zajedno took power in 1997, the coalition persisted, and 
in others the DS and the SPO continued to co-operate and governed together (ICG, 
2000: 17). This development had several consequences that were o f benefit to DOS in 
September 2000. The ICG emphasises that this demonstrated the ability o f the 
opposition to govern effectively, even in the less than favourable environment created 
by the Milosevic regime, which had a positive impact on the credibility and image o f  
the democratic opposition (ICG, 2000: 2), while Gordy and Bieber note the 
opposition’s control o f local media outlets which extended the reach o f non-state 
controlled media beyond Belgrade, and which helped to offset, to some extent, the 
regime’s dominance in the media sphere (Gordy, 2000: 80; Bieber, 2003: 80). Thus, 
as a result o f their successes in 1996/1997, the opposition was able to reach a 
considerably larger number o f Serbia’s citizens than had been the case in many other 
electoral campaigns which contributed to significantly broadening the support base o f  
the democratic opposition (Gordy, 2000: 80). The increased support for the 
democratic opposition, combined with its success in convincing a substantial number 
o f Serbia’s undecided voters, (more than half the electorate) to support the opposition 
in 2000, resulted in a victory for DOS, the scale o f which made it impossible for 
Milosevic to manipulate the results in the way in which he had in earlier elections 
(Goati, 2001b: 53).
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While the above factors go someway towards explaining the success o f DOS 
in the September election campaign, further action was needed to defend that victory 
and to force the regime to concede defeat. Knowing that Milosevic was unlikely to 
accept an opposition victory, a group o f DOS leaders, excluding Kostunica, met the 
week before the election to formulate plans for the post-election period. According to 
Covic, the DOS leaders ‘agreed we would do whatever it took. W e’d even use guns if  
we had to. There was no turning back now .’ 112 As such, included among the ranks o f  
the democratic opposition on 5 October were armed groups, including ‘disaffected 
members o f the police and military who had fought in Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia’ 
(Cevallos, 2001: 2). While ultimately, M ilosevic’s fall was peaceful, the potential for 
violence clearly existed (Antonie, 2001: 37-38; Goati, 2001b: 56). Goati considers 
that the willingness o f the opposition to resort to force if  necessary was a significant 
factor in their ultimate victory over Milosevic. He argues that, what he refers to as 
‘latent force,’ played an ‘essential role’ and ‘should not be underestimated when 
discussing the deep-seated political turnabout achieved on 5 October’ (Goati, 2001b: 
56). Antonie also agrees that this is a significant factor accounting for DOS’s 
successful defence o f its electoral victories, pointing out that while the majority o f  
previous anti-regime demonstrations had been peaceful and non-violent, on this 
occasion, some opposition leaders and participants in the demonstration were 
prepared to use force if  necessary113 (Antonie, 2002: 337). That force was not used 
resulted from the weakness o f the regime confronted with significant numbers o f  
potentially violent demonstrators, such that, when Milosevic issued orders to crush 
the demonstrators with force, they were not obeyed (Antonie, 2001: 37; Goati, 2001:
112 The Fall o f  MiloSevid, episode 3, BBC docum entary series broadcast on 19 January 2003.
113 A uthor’s translation.
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While DOS and the democratic opposition parties were not solely responsible 
for the downfall o f Milosevic in 2000, they nevertheless made a significant 
contribution in terms o f both successfully challenging the regime in the 2000 elections 
and also in defending their subsequent victory when Milosevic refused to concede 
defeat. The success o f the DOS campaign can be attributed to the opposition 
overcoming some, though not all, o f the divisions that had characterised their previous 
campaigns, formulating a clear alternative to the regime, and building on the success 
that they had enjoyed in the 1996 local elections.
Conclusions
The differences between the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime
The overriding priority o f the IC in this time period was the removal o f the 
Milosevic regime from power in Serbia, and so, for the first time, the IC and Serbia’s 
democratic opposition parties were prioritising the same goal. As such, the differences 
between the Milosevic regime and the democratic opposition on this key issue are 
self-evident and require no further discussion. However, the purpose o f considering 
the differences between the Milosevic regime and the opposition is to examine 
whether or not the opposition can be considered to have been a credible alternative to 
the regime from an IC perspective. While clearly the extent o f IC support for the 
opposition, and in particular for DOS in its 2000 electoral campaign, provides a clear 
answer to this question, examining the relationship between the democratic opposition 
parties and the IC reveals that, in spite o f their common goal, there was tension
349
between the two in relation to how this was to be achieved, and also in relation to 
other issues such as the plight o f Kosovo’s Serb minority and the need for Serbia’s 
future leaders to cooperate with the ICTY.
Particularly noteworthy is the difference between the stance o f the IC and that 
o f Kostunica on the issue o f future cooperation with the ICTY, an issue that had been 
o f considerable importance to the IC for some time, and had been a source o f tension 
between the IC and the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities in the past. Kostunica had 
consistently questioned the legitimacy o f the tribunal, and stated that it would not be a 
priority for Serbia’s new leaders should they come to power. That this issue did not 
lead to any reduction in IC support for the democratic opposition, or even to any 
significant criticism o f its position, demonstrates the extent to which M ilosevic’s 
removal eclipsed all other international objectives by highlighting that, to a large 
extent, the credibility o f the democratic opposition from the IC’s perspective related 
overwhelmingly to whether it could present a credible alternative domestically, and as 
such effectively challenge the regime and hopefully oust Milosevic.
The relationship between the IC and the democratic opposition parties
The democratic opposition parties, and in particular the SZP, worked closely 
with the IC throughout this time period and received considerable international 
support for their campaigns against the regime. Opposition leaders met regularly with 
IC representatives at a high level, and this cooperation was formalised in the Trilateral 
Commission established in late 1999. Furthermore, the democratic opposition’s 
leaders increasingly came to be considered as Serbia’s legitimate international 
representatives and were invited to informally represent Serbia at meetings o f the
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OSCE and the Stability Pact. As such, while the Serbian authorities remained 
significantly isolated, there was a high level o f international engagement with the 
democratic opposition.
The IC provided extensive support to the democratic opposition throughout 
this time period with international actors regularly expressing the desire to see 
Milosevic ousted. In addition to expressions o f support, the IC also provided financial 
and technical assistance to the opposition, and particularly to DOS once the elections 
had been announced in 2000. Furthermore, the IC also demonstrated a willingness to 
support the opposition through the suspension o f sanctions, such as the flight ban, and 
also through providing assistance to opposition controlled municipalities with the 
Energy for Democracy programme, providing tangible evidence o f the benefits that 
could accrue to Serbia if  Milosevic were removed from power. While the democratic 
opposition parties were critical o f some elements o f IC policy, such as the sanctions, 
the situation o f Kosovo’s Serb minority, and the international emphasis on the need to 
co-operate with the ICTY, this did not lead to a major rift between the two.
The impact o f international policy on the democratic opposition parties
The DOS campaign was a great success for the democratic opposition which 
saw it overcome some o f the weaknesses that had undermined it in the past - namely 
opposition disunity and the inability to present a credible alternative to the regime - in 
addition to also successfully carrying out the tasks necessary to effectively oppose the 
regime (resisting integration; maintaining a zone o f ideological autonomy; 
questioning the legitimacy o f the regime and raising the costs o f authoritarian rule; 
and presenting a credible alternative domestically and internationally).
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In terms o f overcoming opposition weaknesses, DOS’s greatest success was 
its ability to present itself as a credible alternative to the regime which was facilitated 
by the unity o f the DOS coalition and its acceptance o f a joint programme that clearly 
set out the political, legal and economic reforms that the coalition intended to 
introduce within its first year in power.
In addition to overcoming these weaknesses, DOS also successfully carried 
out all o f the tasks necessary to effectively oppose the regime. All o f the parties 
considered in this study successfully resisted integration into the regime in this time 
period. While initially the SPO maintained a somewhat more accommodating stance 
vis-à-vis the regime than did the other democratic opposition parties, this changed in 
2000 and while the party was not willing to join the DOS coalition it was also 
unprepared to offer support to the ruling regime.
The opposition also had considerably greater success in maintaining a zone o f  
ideological autonomy in this time period than was the case in previous time periods, 
enabling it to fight the election campaign on an agenda that suited the opposition and 
which was highly detrimental to the regime. To a very large extent, they were aided 
by groups such as Otpor in achieving this, though the democratic opposition parties 
themselves also contributed. That the central question in the 2000 election campaign 
was the rejection or continued acceptance o f the regime demonstrates the extent to 
which M ilosevic’s previous strength in setting the political agenda was severely 
eroded by 2000. The regime’s attempts to portray the opposition as agents o f the west 
attempting to undermine Serbia ultimately failed, and the choice o f Kostunica as 
DOS’s candidate contributed to this failure. While the ability o f the democratic 
opposition parties to influence the agenda o f political competition in previous 
elections was significantly undermined by international policy in previous time
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periods, this was not the case at this time. Furthermore, international actors seemed 
well aware o f the potential damage they could cause the opposition and exhibited a 
degree o f sensitivity in relation to contentious issues such as future cooperation with 
the ICTY.
Another area in which the opposition performed well was in questioning the 
legitimacy o f the regime and demonstrating the costs o f M ilosevic’s rule. Again, 
while much credit belongs to non-party groups such as Otpor and G17, the democratic 
opposition parties also played as role. As noted above, through their election 
campaign and programme, DOS did much to outline the damage that the Milosevic 
regime had caused to Serbia over the course o f the previous decade and also to 
highlight the undemocratic nature o f M ilosevic’s rule. That the IC finally rejected any 
possibility that Milosevic could become a legitimate leader again enhanced the ability 
o f the democratic opposition in this regard.
International policy undoubtedly had a more positive impact on the 
effectiveness o f the democratic opposition parties at this time than it had in other time 
period considered in this research. On a practical level, the provision o f financial and 
technical assistance to the opposition, and in particular to the DOS election campaign, 
will certainly have helped the democratic opposition parties to overcome some o f the 
many disadvantages that it faced from competing in the unequal conditions that 
prevailed in all elections in Serbia during the Milosevic era.
In relation to helping the opposition parties to overcome the weaknesses that 
undermined them for much o f the 1990s, the IC contributed to the unity o f the 
opposition coalition that was an important element in DOS’s victory through applying 
pressure on the opposition parties to work together. In addition to the external 
pressure, the democratic opposition parties also faced considerable internal pressure.
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It is not possible to determine the relative contribution o f internal and external 
pressure for opposition unity, and as such, it cannot be claimed that IC pressure was 
decisive in this regard. However, the IC’s contribution was certainly significant.
Internal and external influences also played a role in enhancing the ability o f  
the democratic opposition to maintain a zone o f ideological autonomy against the 
regime and to present a credible alternative to the regime. Again, it is difficult to 
assess the relative contributions o f domestic and international actors. In terms o f  
presenting a credible alternative to the regime, the DOS coalition itself and also the 
G17 plus group that played a significant role in drafting DOS’s electoral platform, 
clearly made major contributions. However, international financial and technical 
assistance also made a significant contribution to the DOS campaign. Similarly, while 
non-party actors such as Otpor contributed to the ability o f the opposition to 
maintaining a zone o f ideological autonomy at this time, international financial 
assistance to Otpor will certainly have enhanced its ability to do so. As such, while 
the IC’s contribution to the success o f the opposition in maintaining a zone o f 
ideological autonomy and presenting a credible alternative was essentially that o f a 
facilitator, it nevertheless enhanced the ability o f the democratic opposition parties to 
carry out these tasks.
In summary, international policy enhanced the effectiveness o f the democratic 
opposition parties at this time. Its financial and technical assistance strengthened the 
ability o f the opposition to present a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime and 
also to maintain a zone o f ideological autonomy. International pressure contributed to 
helping the opposition to overcome its disunity, one o f the key weaknesses that 
undermined it in previous time periods. Furthermore, international actors were careful 
to ensure that they did not exert a negative influence in relation to issues such as
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Kostunica’s rejection o f the ICTY, which might have undermined the opposition had 
they done so. While on the whole the IC’s role was essentially that o f facilitating 
those within Serbia who were attempting to bring about change rather that acting as a 
decisive factor, its positive contribution is nonetheless significant.
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C h a p t e r  8 :  C o n c l u s i o n
The post-Cold War era has seen the increasing use o f international coercion 
against ‘rogue states’ in an effort to compel the target state to alter behaviour 
considered objectionable by other states and international actors. The use o f sanctions 
to achieve such ends increased significantly in the immediate post-Cold War period, 
while recent years have seen the IC resort to the use o f military force to achieve its 
objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq and Yugoslavia. However, while this increase in the 
use o f coercion has sparked debates among both academics and policymakers 
regarding the effectiveness o f such policies in achieving the aims o f the coercer states, 
little attention has been paid to how these policies have impacted on democratic 
opposition parties operating in the target states. It has been the purpose o f this 
research to examine this issue in detail, using M ilosevic’s Serbia as a case study.
In spite o f the lack o f attention that it has received, the impact o f coercive 
policies on democratic opposition parties operating in target states is potentially 
highly significant. When a state is subjected to coercive policies such as the 
imposition o f sanctions or the threat or use o f military force, the intention o f the 
coercer states is to compel the ruling regime to alter the behaviour that they consider 
objectionable. As such, the goals are political and the aim is to alter the internal 
political dynamics o f the target state in such as way as the target regime complies 
with international demands and alters it policies and/or actions. This can be achieved 
either directly by convincing the target government that the costs o f continued 
defiance are greater than the costs o f compliance, and thus compelling it to modify its 
behaviour, or indirectly, by inducing the population o f the target state to pressurise the 
government to concede to international demands or even to overthrow the government
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in a popular uprising. Domestic opposition forces are key players in either scenario. 
However, in spite o f the potential significance o f such actors, the impact o f sanctions 
on domestic opposition forces has received little attention within the academic 
literature, both in relation to the use o f wide-ranging comprehensive sanctions and 
also in relation to the impact o f sanctions targeted directly at the regime that the 
coercer states consider objectionable.
Two attributes o f Serbia’s experience o f coercion during the 1990s make it 
particularly well suited as a case study for examining the impact o f international 
coercion on democratic opposition parties operating in target states. Firstly, 
throughout the 1990s democratic opposition parties were active in Serbia and 
mounted a series o f challenges to the Milosevic regime both in the electoral arena and 
also through organising mass demonstrations against the regime. Secondly, 
throughout the 1990s Serbia was subjected to a wide range o f coercive policies 
including comprehensive UN sanctions in the early 1990s, sanctions targeted directly 
at the Milosevic regime in the late 1990s, and a NATO bombing campaign in 1999. 
This allows for consideration o f the impact o f a range o f coercive policies on the 
Serbian democratic opposition parties.
As outlined in chapter two, in order to examine the impact o f international 
coercion on the democratic opposition parties operating in M ilosevic’s Serbia this 
research has addressed three central themes. The first o f these dealt with whether or 
not Serbia’s democratic opposition parties could have been considered as a credible 
alternative to the Milosevic regime from an IC perspective. The relevance o f this lies 
in the fact that had the opposition parties represented a credible alternative partner for 
the IC, an alternative approach was available to the IC in its dealings with Serbia; 
namely to assist the democratic opposition in its campaigns against the regime in the
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hope that they could defeat Milosevic, take power, and implement policies that would 
be broadly in line with those o f the IC. The second theme was to examine the 
relationship between the democratic opposition and the IC throughout the time period 
covered by this research in an effort to determine the extent and nature o f the links 
between international actors and the democratic opposition parties and to assess the 
level o f international support for the opposition’s campaigns against the regime. 
Finally, the third question addressed the issue that is at the heart o f this research and 
this is the impact o f international policy on the effectiveness o f the democratic 
opposition parties’ campaigns against the Milosevic regime.
A variety o f  factors contributed to the inability o f Serbia’s democratic 
opposition parties to defeat the Milosevic regime throughout the 1990s, in spite o f its 
declining popularity and the disastrous consequences o f its policies for Serbia itself, 
and for other former Yugoslav republics. Undoubtedly, the most significant 
contribution to the opposition’s failure was the regime itself and the undemocratic 
nature o f its rule. However, while the undemocratic nature o f the Milosevic regime is 
certainly a key element o f any explanation for the failure o f the democratic opposition 
parties to defeat it, other factors also contributed. In particular Serbia’s democratic 
opposition, which often appeared weak and divided, on occasion offering support to 
the regime, and rarely offering much in the way o f a credible alternative to the 
Serbian electorate, certainly made its own contribution to the duration o f M ilosevic’s 
rule. The purpose o f this research has been to consider the relationship between 
Serbia’s democratic opposition parties and the IC in order to examine the impact o f  
international policy on the ability o f the democratic opposition’s effectiveness in its 
campaigns against the Milosevic regime. In order to address this issue the overall time 
period considered in this research was broken down into five sub-periods in each o f
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which Serbia’s experience o f international coercion differed in its nature and/or 
extent, with these sub-periods constituting the five case studies that have formed the 
basis o f this research. Using Alexander George’s methodology o f structured, focused 
comparison three central questions, based on the above-mentioned themes, were 
asked in relation to each o f the case studies: to what extent did the positions o f the 
democratic opposition parties’ positions on issues that were o f key importance to the 
IC differ from those o f the Milosevic regime? What was the nature and extent o f the 
relationship between the democratic opposition parties and the IC? And what, if  any, 
impact did international policy have on the effectiveness o f the democratic opposition 
parties in their campaigns against the Milosevic regime? As noted in chapter two, the 
great advantage o f using George’s methodology is that it allows for comparison o f the 
impact o f the different approaches that the IC used in coercing Serbia over the course 
o f the time period from 1992 to 2000.
While the third research question constitutes the core focus o f this study, the 
inclusion o f the first and second questions provides for a more complete picture o f the 
relationship between the democratic opposition parties and the IC throughout the 
entire time period considered here. As noted above, the first question allows for 
consideration o f the whether, at least in principle, an alternative approach o f 
strengthening the opposition in order to promote regime change in Serbia was 
available to the IC, an important issue given the widespread argument in some 
international commentary that the opposition was as unacceptable as Milosevic, as 
was discussed in chapter one. With respect to the second question, through 
considering the relationship between the IC and the democratic opposition parties in 
each case study it is possible to outline the extent and nature o f international support 
for the opposition throughout the time period from 1992 to 2000.
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In order to evaluate the impact o f international policy on Serbia’s democratic 
opposition this research has examined the major challenges to the Milosevic regime 
that were undertaken in each time period and considered the extent to which the IC 
either undermined or enhanced the ability o f the democratic opposition parties to 
perform the tasks necessary to effectively oppose a regime such as M ilosevic’s. Based 
on a modified list o f tasks o f a democratic opposition in an authoritarian regime as 
described by Stepan, and discussed in chapter one, these are: resisting integration into 
the regime; guarding zones o f ideological autonomy against the regime; questioning 
the legitimacy o f the regime and raising the costs o f authoritarian rule; and presenting 
a credible alternative to the regime both internationally and domestically. In addition, 
several weaknesses are considered to have characterised Serbia’s democratic 
opposition parities during the Milosevic era: the disunity o f the opposition, the 
opposition’s nationalism, and the inability o f the opposition to present a credible 
alternative to the regime. Using these tasks necessary to effectively oppose the 
regime, the impact o f international policy on the democratic opposition parties and the 
extent to which the IC may have exacerbated the opposition’s weaknesses or helped 
the opposition to overcome them, is evaluated.
Differences between the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime
Until mid-1999 the IC’s priorities in its dealings with Serbia for the most part 
related to issues o f Serbian nationalism and the national question, while, as noted in 
chapter one, Serbia’s democratic opposition parties have often been criticised for 
supporting nationalist policies as extreme as those o f the Milosevic regime if  not more 
so. However, an examination o f the positions o f the democratic opposition parties
360
over the course o f the eight years considered in this study reveals a far more complex 
picture. As was demonstrated in the first case study, throughout 1992 there were clear 
differences between the democratic opposition parties and the Milosevic regime with 
all parties rejecting the regime’s war policies and supporting Milan Panic’s attempts 
to co-operate with international efforts to resolve the conflicts in the former- 
Yugoslavia. This was evident in the opposition’s support for Panic at the London 
Conference, in its support for his presidential election campaign and also in its 
support for his intention to apply for UN membership for the SRJ. Furthermore, while 
there is evidence that the democratic opposition parties were broadly in favour o f  
nationalist goals, they were openly opposed to the use o f force to achieve these goals. 
Thus, at this time, the democratic opposition parties can be considered to have held 
positions on the issues that were o f key importance for the IC that were different to 
those o f the Milosevic regime, and closer to those o f the IC itself. As such, in 
principle, at this time the Serbian democratic opposition can be considered to have 
been a credible alternative partner from an IC perspective.
Following the defeat o f the opposition parties, and also o f Panic, in the 
December 1992 elections, this consensus gradually broke down between 1993 and 
1994, with the DS and the DSS taking on more nationalist positions with respect to 
the conflict in Bosnia, although even at this time there is no evidence that either o f 
these parties supported the use o f force to achieve nationalist goals. Evidence o f the 
increasing nationalism o f the DSS was clear in its rejection o f the VOPP and also the 
Contact Group peace plan. In addition, while the party welcomed the Dayton 
agreement in the sense that it brought the conflict in Bosnia to an end, it was, 
nevertheless, dissatisfied with many o f its provisions. The DS initially maintained its 
more moderate position, supporting the VOPP, but later followed the DSS in rejecting
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the Contact Group peace plan and expressing support for the Bosnian Serb leadership 
in Pale. Following the end o f the Bosnian war however, the DS soon abandoned its 
more nationalist orientation, making significant efforts to distance itself from its 
previous positions indicating the extent to which this was a pragmatic move, based on 
the party’s calculations o f how best to challenge Milosevic who had abandoned the 
nationalist cause, choosing instead to co-operate with international efforts to resolve 
the Bosnian conflict.
The SPO and the GSS remained committed to their anti-war policies 
throughout the Bosnian conflict, supporting international efforts to resolve the 
conflict, and refusing to use M ilosevic’s co-operation with the IC against him. They 
supported all international peace plans proposed by the IC, and were also highly 
critical o f the IC’s acceptance o f a territorial division o f Bosnia. Both parties argued 
that this not only strengthened the hand o f nationalists in Serbia, but also undermined 
those who had opposed the war, and increased the likelihood o f further ethnic 
conflict. As such, in the time period covered by the second case study, the democratic 
opposition parties were divided in relation to the Serbian national question. However, 
while the DS and the DSS held positions that were at odds with those o f the IC, the 
GSS and the SPO retained the more moderate stance that they had held in 1992 and as 
such could be considered to have been credible alternative partners for the IC.
As was outlined in the third case study, following the end o f the Bosnian war, 
the importance o f the national question in Serbian politics declined somewhat, with 
attention focusing more on domestic concerns. However, for the IC national questions 
remained predominant, as compliance with the Dayton agreement and, to a lesser 
extent, the situation in Kosovo, became the most important issues for the IC at this 
time. As such, the opposition parties, three o f which were now united in the Zajedno
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coalition, made efforts to demonstrate its support for Dayton, arguing repeatedly that, 
should it come to power, it would honour the Dayton commitments. As was seen in 
chapter five, Milosevic was subject to international criticism and pressure in relation 
to his failure to fully implement Dayton, and in this respect it could be argued that the 
democratic opposition, in the form o f the Zajedno coalition, held positions that were 
different to those o f the regime and closer to those o f the IC, and as such can be 
considered to have been a credible alternative partner to the Milosevic regime.
In relation to the national question a key theme in opposition discourse at this 
time was the futility o f attempting to address these issues and resolve conflicts in the 
absence o f democratic reform in Serbia. Clearly identifying Milosevic as the primary 
source o f regional instability and as the instigator o f the conflicts that occurred during 
the first half o f the 1990s, the democratic opposition parties consistently argued that 
he should not be considered as a factor for regional stability. Furthermore, the 
opposition had warned the IC that while Milosevic remained in power, there was a 
very real danger that Kosovo would become his next battlefield. However, although 
the need for democratic reform in Serbia did become a key issue on the international 
agenda during the course o f the winter protests o f 1996/1997, once the local election 
victories o f the Zajedno coalition were recognised, and the protests came to an end, 
international pressure on Milosevic to enact electoral reform along the lines suggested 
in the Gonzalez report diminished significantly.
In line with its position that ethnic conflict in the region could not be 
eradicated while Milosevic remained in power, the democratic opposition parties 
became increasingly frustrated with the IC and its focus on the Milosevic regime in its 
efforts to deal with the Kosovo conflict, which became the central focus o f  
international attention in its dealings with Serbia from 1998 onwards. The democratic
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opposition parties, arguing that Kosovo was part o f  Serbia and should remain so, were 
all opposed to granting independence to Kosovo. However, given that this was also 
the stated position o f the IC, it cannot be considered either controversial or to have 
prevented the democratic opposition from being considered as a credible alternative to 
the Milosevic regime from an IC perspective. Furthermore, while it is the case that in 
opposing independence for Kosovo the democratic opposition parties held essentially 
the same position as that o f the Milosevic regime, it is also clear that there were 
important differences between the DS and the GSS, at this time united within the SZP, 
and the Milosevic regime. The SZP supported the involvement o f the IC in the 
Kosovo conflict, including accepting the need for an international military presence 
there, though there was a clear preference that this should be a UN force. As such, the 
SZP can be considered to have been a credible alterative partner for the IC at this 
time.
In contrast, while the DSS also accepted international involvement in 
resolving the Kosovo dispute, its criticism o f the IC at this time shows that this cannot 
be seen as an endorsement o f international policy. Throughout 1998 and 1999 the 
SPO’s position was considerably closer to that o f the Milosevic regime than were 
those o f the other democratic opposition parties, as is evident in its decision to join the 
federal government in 1999. However, there was considerable inconsistency in the 
position o f the SPO, with Draskovic espousing increasingly erratic and contradictory 
positions, considerably undermining his and his party’s credibility both internationally 
and domestically.
As was seen in the final case study, in the aftermath o f the Kosovo conflict the 
IC radically altered its approach to Serbia, with the removal o f Milosevic becoming 
the main IC priority and international assistance to the democratic opposition was
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identified as the most promising way to achieve the new IC goal o f regime change. 
Given the fact that the IC and the democratic opposition parties were now pursuing 
the same goal -  the removal o f Milosevic -  differences between the democratic 
opposition and the Milosevic regime on the issues that were o f central importance to 
the IC are self-evident. The extent o f international support clearly shows that the IC 
considered the democratic opposition parties to be a credible alternative partner to the 
Milosevic regime. Furthermore, differences between some members o f the democratic 
opposition and the IC in relation to issues that the IC considered to be important, such 
as the co-operation with the ICTY and the situation in Kosovo, did not have any 
negative impact on the level o f support that the IC was willing to provide to the 
democratic opposition.
In summary, while at times most o f Serbia’s democratic opposition parties did 
adopt nationalist positions at odds with those o f the IC, it is nevertheless clear that, on 
the whole, throughout the time period between 1992 and 2000, the democratic 
opposition held positions that were different to those o f the Milosevic regime and 
closer to those o f the IC on the issues that were o f central importance internationally. 
In 1992 this was the case for all four parties considered here, while in later periods at 
times the DS, the DSS and the SPO held positions that were at odds with those o f the 
IC. However, in all five o f the case studies it is clear that there were opposition parties 
within Serbia that held positions that were broadly in line with those o f the IC, and as 
such, represented a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime from an international 
perspective.
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The relationship between the IC and the democratic opposition parties
In considering the relationship between the democratic opposition parties and 
the Milosevic regime throughout the entire time period from 1992 to 2000, it is clear 
that, at least until 1997, there was little regular contact between the democratic 
opposition parties and IC representatives. Throughout this time period, the IC focused 
almost exclusively on coercing Milosevic in the hope that this would compel him to 
alter the policies that the IC considered objectionable, and there is no evidence that a 
policy o f promoting the opposition to effect regime change in Serbia was even 
considered as an alternative approach by international actors. While the relationship 
between the democratic opposition parties and the IC changed over time, with greater 
interaction between the two following the 1996/1997 protests in Serbia, it was not 
until after the 1999 NATO bombing o f Kosovo that the IC actively sought to assist 
the democratic opposition parties in their campaigns against the regime.
In the first half o f the 1990s, the international focus on issues relating to 
Serbian nationalism worked to the advantage o f the Milosevic regime in terms o f  
ensuring that the Serbian national question remained at the centre o f political 
discourse in Serbia. Furthermore, the imposition o f sanctions against the SRJ at this 
time allowed Milosevic to deny all responsibility for the disastrous economic policies 
o f his government, portraying Serbia as the victim o f an international anti-Serb 
conspiracy.
While these circumstances greatly undermined the ability o f the democratic 
opposition parties to oppose the regime, it was, nevertheless, in this environment that 
one o f the most significant challenges to Milosevic was mounted, when the 
democratic opposition parties united in support o f Milan Panic’s electoral challenge to
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Milosevic in December 1992. In spite o f the fact that, at this time, the democratic 
opposition was openly blaming Milosevic for the imposition o f sanctions and 
opposing his war policies, as was seen in chapter three, the IC did little to help the 
opposition in this campaign. The failure o f the IC to support the democratic 
opposition at this time or to develop any relationship with those inside Serbia who 
were opposing M ilosevic’s war policies, represents a lost opportunity for the IC as by 
the end o f 1993 the opposition was already showing signs o f division with respect to 
the national question. Furthermore, by the time o f the 1993 election campaign, unable 
to compete with the regime’s propaganda, the opposition began to blame the IC, 
rather than the Milosevic regime, for the imposition o f the sanctions, effectively 
adopting the stance o f the regime.
As was noted in chapter four, to a certain extent the change in the opposition’s 
stance with respect to the Milosevic regime resulted from the ability o f the regime to 
portray its war policies as having been largely successful in terms o f defending Serb 
interests in other former Yugoslav republics. To a very great extent this was 
facilitated by a change in international policy with respect to the Bosnian conflict. The 
abandonment o f the previous IC position that any resolution o f the Bosnian conflict 
must involve a unitary Bosnian state, and the acceptance o f an ethnically based 
division o f Bosnia’s territory, was a considerable concession to Serbian nationalists 
and enabled Milosevic to claim some success in terms o f achieving nationalist goals, 
enhancing his self-perpetuated image as the true defender o f Serb interests. While the 
decision o f the opposition parties to direct its criticism at international policy and UN 
sanctions in the 1993 election campaign may have resulted from poor judgement on 
their part, M ilosevic’s control o f the Serbian media made it exceptionally difficult for 
any party that was trying to promote alternative interpretations o f  Serbia’s
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predicament. Furthermore, the lack o f international support for the opposition during 
1992 when it was openly critical o f M ilosevic’s war policies, for which the opposition 
were labelled as traitors in the state controlled media, meant that there was no 
incentive for the democratic opposition to continue promoting a generally pro- 
Western course in 1993.
Following the arrest o f Draskovic in 1993, the IC openly sided with the 
democratic opposition against the regime, and this led to increased interaction 
between the democratic opposition and international actors at this time. However, this 
did not lead to any significant long-term changes in IC-opposition relations. 
Following Draskovic's release the IC returned to its previous pattern o f engagement 
with Serbia, focusing exclusively on trying to gain concessions through maintaining 
pressure on Milosevic. As such, the opportunity to develop closer relations with the 
democratic opposition following Draskovic’s release was not taken. Furthermore, 
while Draskovic’s detention had focused international attention on the undemocratic 
nature o f the Milosevic regime, once the situation was resolved, the IC did not apply 
pressure for wider democratic reform, as was evident in the lack o f international 
attention to the December 1993 elections.
Throughout 1994 and 1995 the opposition became bitterly divided with 
respect to the national question, with both the DS and the DSS choosing a more 
nationalist orientation, while the GSS and the SPO remained committed to supporting 
international peace plans designed to bring the conflict to an end. Throughout these 
years the opposition mounted no major challenges to the regime. Milosevic, hailed 
now as a peacemaker, played a key role in the negotiations that led to the Dayton 
agreement - being the internationally favoured representative o f the Bosnian Serbs - 
and was rewarded with the lifting o f UN sanctions.
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In the post-Dayton period, M ilosevic’s status as a signatory o f the Dayton 
agreement and the IC’s perception that his co-operation was essential for regional 
stability, ensured that Milosevic was not subjected to any significant international 
pressure to introduce democratic reforms in Serbia, demonstrating that the IC still did 
not consider Serbia’s internal political order to be a priority. As such, the IC made no 
efforts to assist the democratic opposition parties in opposing Milosevic or to develop 
links between the democratic opposition and international actors. However, through 
their protests o f 1996/1997 the democratic opposition parties forced the issue o f the 
undemocratic nature o f M ilosevic’s rule onto the international agenda.
The events o f 1996/1997 altered the relationship between the democratic 
opposition parties and the IC by greatly increasing the opposition’s international 
profile. Throughout this time democratic opposition leaders regularly met with IC 
representatives to appeal for support and discuss the situation in Serbia, and this 
increased level o f contact between the democratic opposition and IC representatives 
continued following the recognition o f the opposition’s electoral victories. 
Furthermore, in the aftermath o f the protests the IC commented more frequently on 
the need for democratic reform in Serbia. However, any hopes on the part o f the 
democratic opposition that the events o f 1996/1997 would fundamentally alter the 
relationship between the IC and the Milosevic regime were ultimately disappointed. 
Once Milosevic had backed down with respect to the local election results and 
recognised the Zajedno victories, Serbia’s internal order was again relegated to the 
background and the democratic opposition continued to receive little international 
support in its efforts to force Milosevic to accept democratic reform. The 
unwillingness o f the IC to exert sufficient pressure on Milosevic to fully implement 
the recommendations o f the Gonzales report represented a further missed opportunity
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for the IC to give much-needed assistance to the democratic opposition and adds 
credence to the claims o f the opposition parties that the IC was prepared to tolerate 
M ilosevic’s autocratic rule because it perceived that, as a signatory o f  the Dayton 
agreement, Milosevic was essential to regional stability. Thus, in spite o f the fact that 
Milosevic was under considerable international and internal pressure at this time, 
international support to the democratic opposition extended only so far as ensuring its 
electoral victories were recognised, with no real support for the opposition’s demands 
for further democratic reform. The arguments o f the democratic opposition parties 
that Milosevic was the cause o f much o f the regional instability, and so could not be 
considered as a factor for stability, received little international attention, in spite o f  the 
warnings o f the opposition parties regarding the likelihood o f future conflict in 
Kosovo.
As was seen in the fourth case study, when conflict in Kosovo did intensify 
throughout 1998 and 1999 the initial international response remained essentially the 
same as it had been during the Bosnian conflict, with international actors attempting 
to pressurise the regime through the use o f sanctions in the hope that this would lead 
to a change in policy on the part o f the Serbian authorities. When this failed, the IC, 
claiming to have learnt from the Bosnian conflict that only a credible threat o f force 
was likely to influence Milosevic, threatened NATO air strikes if  Milosevic did not 
comply with its demands. The lesson that the IC appeared not to have learnt from 
earlier experience with Milosevic, was that the regime had always used conflict in 
order to maintain power within Serbia, in spite o f  the fact that the democratic 
opposition parties had been repeating this assertion over the preceding years.
As outlined in chapter seven, the end o f the Kosovo conflict saw a significant 
change in relations between the IC and the democratic opposition parties. Following
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the end o f the NATO bombing, and with no feasible alternative, the IC completely 
changed its approach to dealing with Serbia and began to advocate regime change, 
seeing the strengthening o f the democratic opposition as the best way to achieve this 
goal. Offering financial and technical assistance to a wide range o f pro-democracy 
forces inside Serbia, IC assistance did much, in practical terms, to help domestic 
actors mount an effective challenge to the regime. Finally listening to the opinions o f 
the democratic opposition parties that sanctions were counter-productive, the IC 
began to make efforts to target its punitive measures directly at the regime and its 
close associates while offering assistance to towns under opposition control. 
However, while international assistance may have given much-needed financial and 
technical assistance to the democratic opposition, the role o f the IC in the eventual 
overthrow o f the Milosevic regime was essentially that o f a facilitator. While it is 
clear that through its support to the democratic opposition parties in the run up to the 
September 2000 elections, the IC did contribute somewhat to the effectiveness o f the 
opposition challenge to the regime, this is in marked contrast to its negative impact 
throughout much o f the 1990s.
In summary, until mid-1999 the IC’s approach to Serbia was focused on 
attempting to coerce Milosevic in order to achieve its objectives in relation to Serbia 
and there were no serious efforts made to cultivate relations with the democratic 
opposition parties or to assist them in their campaigns against the regime. While the 
relationship between the IC and the democratic opposition parties changed over time, 
with increased contact between the two occurring briefly in mid-1993 as a result o f  
Draskovic’s arrest, following his release there were no efforts made to build a closer 
relationship with Serbia’s democratic opposition. The events o f 1996/1997 had a 
greater impact on IC-opposition relations in that they led to more regular contact
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between the two, and also resulted in more frequent international calls for democratic 
reform in Serbia. However, the basic pattern o f  international engagement did not 
change even at this stage, and as the conflict in Kosovo developed the IC continued to 
pursue its goals by pressuring Milosevic for concessions while making little effort to 
assist the opposition. In addition, in spite o f the more frequent appearance o f the need 
for democratic reform in Serbia on the international agenda, the IC exerted little real 
pressure on Milosevic in this regard. This situation changed dramatically in the 
aftermath o f the NATO bombing when the IC became fully engaged with the 
democratic opposition, meeting opposition representatives on a regular basis, and 
providing considerable support for the DOS coalition in the 2000 elections.
The impact of international policy on the democratic opposition parties
As was discussed in chapter one, through considering the tasks o f a 
democratic opposition in an authoritarian regime as outlined by Stepan, it was 
possible to identify a series o f tasks that democratic opposition parties operating in a 
competitive authoritarian regime need to fulfil in order to effectively oppose that 
regime: resisting integration into the regime; maintaining a zone o f ideological 
autonomy against the regime; questioning the legitimacy o f the regime, and raising 
the costs o f authoritarian rule; and presenting a credible alternative both domestically 
and internationally. In addition to carrying out these tasks, the democratic opposition 
also needed to overcome certain weaknesses that characterised it throughout the 
1990s, namely the extent o f opposition disunity, the opposition’s nationalism, and its 
inability to present a credible alternative to the Milosevic regime. One o f the central 
aims o f this research has been to examine the impact o f international policy on the
372
ability o f the Serbian democratic opposition parties to overcome its weaknesses and to 
carry out these tasks.
The opposition mounted two major campaigns against the regime between 
May 1992 and December 1992: anti-regime demonstrations in June, and an electoral 
challenge in December. Considering the impact o f international policy at this time it 
was shown that this had a generally negative impact. While the democratic opposition 
parties scored some success in terms o f questioning the legitimacy o f the regime 
internally and raising the costs to Milosevic o f his authoritarian rule, and also 
successfully resisted integration into the regime, it was less successful in maintaining 
a zone o f ideological autonomy and in presenting a credible alternative at the 
domestic level. In terms o f  overcoming the weaknesses that characterised the 
democratic opposition -  its disunity and its inability to present a credible alternative -  
the opposition was generally successful in maintaining unity; but there was less 
success in terms o f presenting a credible alternative.
The lack o f interaction between the IC and the Serbian opposition at this time 
means that credit for the successes that were achieved in terms o f maintaining unity, 
resisting integration, questioning the legitimacy o f the regime and raising the costs o f 
authoritarian rule belongs to the democratic opposition parties themselves and not to 
the IC as there is no evidence o f an indirect impact o f international policy in this 
regard. Evidence o f the opposition’s success in this regard lies in the concessions that 
the regime made in relation to the electoral conditions, which while insufficient to 
ensure that the elections would be free and fair, were, nonetheless, significant.
The democratic opposition was less successful in the December 1992 election 
campaign. Wliile the inability o f the democratic opposition to maintain a zone o f 
ideological autonomy was due in large part to M ilosevic’s control o f much o f Serbia’s
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media, international policy did facilitate Milosevic in this regard, albeit indirectly. 
While the democratic opposition parties attempted to fight an election campaign 
based on the need for political and economic reforms, M ilosevic’s ability to control 
the agenda ensured that issues o f  nationalism dominated Serbia’s political discourse, 
while the IC, through its exclusive focus on national issues, to some extent enhanced 
M ilosevic’s ability to do this.
A further impact o f international policy at this time was that it also 
undermined the ability o f the democratic opposition parties to present a credible 
alternative to the regime. Panic’s presidential campaign in December 1992 
emphasised that should he win, Serbia’s international position would be greatly 
improved. As such, the IC’s refusal to grant his request for a temporary suspension o f 
sanctions, and the decision to tighten sanctions in advance o f the elections did much 
to undermine him. While the impact o f IC policy on the ability o f the democratic 
opposition parties was indirect, it is nevertheless clear that to some extent at least, the 
IC undermined the ability o f the democratic opposition parties to maintain a zone o f  
ideological autonomy against the Milosevic regime and to present a credible 
alternative to the regime in the December 1992 elections.
In the second case study, which covers the period between 1993 and 1996, the 
democratic opposition parties mounted two significant challenges against the 
Milosevic regime: the campaign to secure Draskovic’s release and the December 
1993 elections for the Serbian parliament. While the opposition was generally 
successful in terms o f resisting integration into the regime, it was less successful than 
it had been in 1992 in questioning the legitimacy o f the regime and raising the costs o f  
authoritarian rule. In common with its shortcomings in 1992, the opposition also 
failed to maintain a zone o f ideological autonomy against the regime and to present a
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credible alternative. It is also clear that the democratic opposition was less successful 
in terms o f maintaining unity than had been the case in 1992, while the adoption o f  
more nationalist positions on the part o f the DSS meant that, in contrast to 1992, the 
party was undermined by its attempts to compete with Milosevic from a nationalist 
position.
The opposition’s campaign to secure Draskovic’s release following his arrest 
and detention in June 1993 resulted in a rare success against the regime, with 
international support being highly significant if  not decisive. By appealing to the IC 
for assistance following Draskovic’s arrest, the opposition brought the legitimacy o f  
the regime into question at both the domestic and international levels. IC support for 
the campaign to have Draskovic released and international criticism o f M ilosevic’s 
undemocratic practices reinforced the opposition in these efforts. As such, in relation 
to this campaign against the regime, the IC enhanced the ability o f the democratic 
opposition to effectively oppose the regime.
The opposition was considerably less successful in the December 1993 
elections for the Serbian parliament. As was noted in chapter four, the disunity o f the 
opposition, its inability to maintain a zone o f ideological autonomy against the 
regime, and its inability to present a credible alternative to the regime all played a role 
in the opposition’s failure. While to a large extent these deficiencies were due largely 
to the failings o f the democratic opposition parties themselves and to the ability o f the 
Milosevic regime to control the political agenda, it is also clear that international 
policy again indirectly undermined the democratic opposition in its efforts to 
overcome its weaknesses and carry out the tasks necessary to effectively oppose the 
regime. As in 1992, the continued focus o f the IC on national issues facilitated the 
regime in this regard. While responsibility for opposition disunity cannot be wholly
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attributed to the IC, differences between the parties with respect to international 
efforts to resolve the Bosnian conflict exacerbated the already existing divisions 
within the opposition. Furthermore, the change in international policy in favour o f a 
territorial division o f Bosnia enabled Milosevic to present his national policies as 
having successfully defended Serb interests, greatly boosting his internal credibility. 
As such, international policy indirectly undermined the ability o f the democratic 
opposition parties to effectively oppose the Milosevic regime.
In the period from 1996 to 1998, there is evidence o f both positive and 
negative impacts o f  international policy on the effectiveness o f Serbia’s democratic 
opposition. At this time, the democratic opposition parties mounted three challenges 
to the regime: the local and federal election campaigns o f  November 1996; the winter 
protests in defence o f Zajedno’s election victories o f 1996/1997; and the Republican 
elections o f 1997.
The greatest success o f the opposition in this time period is clearly its 
successful defence o f its victories in the 1996 local elections. Throughout this 
campaign the Zajedno parties managed to maintain a relatively united front against 
the regime. In terms o f carrying out the tasks necessary to effectively oppose the 
regime it successfully resisted integration; seriously challenged the regime’s 
legitimacy both domestically and internationally while significantly increasing the 
costs to the regime o f its authoritarian rule; maintained a zone o f ideological 
autonomy against the regime, at least for the duration o f the protests; and greatly 
increased its credibility as an alternative to the Milosevic regime domestically while 
significantly increasing its profile internationally.
From the outset Zajedno appealed to the IC for assistance in its campaign to 
have its victories recognised, forcing the issue o f Serbia’s internal political order onto
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the international agenda. The scale o f the demonstrations and the tenacity o f the 
demonstrators ensured that the IC could not ignore the attempts o f the regime to steal 
the elections. As had been the case in relation to the 1993 campaign to secure 
Draskovic’s release, the support o f the IC and international criticism o f M ilosevic’s 
undemocratic practices bolstered the opposition’s attempts to question the legitimacy 
o f the regime at the domestic level, contributing positively to the ability o f the 
democratic opposition to carry out this task. Additionally, in spite o f M ilosevic’s 
control o f much o f the Serbian media, to a certain extent the Zajedno leaders managed
I
to maintain a zone o f ideological autonomy during the protests as matters relating to 
the undemocratic nature o f the Milosevic regime were a key element o f political 
discourse inside Serbia. Given that the independent media covering the protests were 
a valuable asset in this regard, the key role that the IC played in ensuring that media 
outlets such as B92 were allowed to continue operating, assisted the democratic 
opposition in maintaining its zone o f ideological autonomy.
As was demonstrated in chapter five, international support was crucial in 
Milosevic’s decision to recognise Zajedno’s victories, and as such, in addition to 
enhancing the ability o f the democratic opposition to maintain a zone o f ideological 
autonomy and to raise questions about the legitimacy o f the regime, the IC also had a 
positive impact on the final outcome o f Zajedno’s campaign. However, while 
international support was undoubtedly significant, it is important to note that the 
persistence o f the Zajedno leaders in highlighting the regime’s abuses internationally 
and their determination to ensure that there victories were recognised, compelled a 
reluctant IC to demand that Milosevic concede defeat.
In the 1997 election campaign, the division between the opposition parties 
over whether they should compete in elections that would be held in grossly unfair
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conditions led to a split in the opposition with the SPO contesting the elections while 
the other parties boycotted them. The SPO’s decision to contest the elections ensured 
Milosevic an easy victory and to a large extent, the failure o f this party to fully resist 
integration into the regime at this time accounts for the opposition’s failure. However, 
in spite o f its stated preference that the opposition parties should contest the 1997 
elections, the IC exerted no significant pressure on the Milosevic regime to implement 
the recommendations contained in the Gonzalez report, which would have done much 
to improve the electoral conditions. As such, the IC did nothing to address the issue 
that was the main source o f dispute between the democratic opposition parties, and so, 
while not directly exacerbating the disunity o f the opposition, it is nevertheless the 
case that the IC also did nothing to help the parties overcome their differences.
In the period from the end o f 1997 to mid-1999, international policy had a 
major detrimental impact on the democratic opposition parties, creating an 
environment in which they were effectively unable to mount any significant 
challenges against the Milosevic regime. Furthermore, in spite o f the success that 
Zajedno enjoyed in placing the need for democratic reform in Serbia onto the 
international agenda, even at this stage, with Milosevic showing unwillingness to 
concede to international demands with respect to Kosovo, there was no attempt made 
by the IC to engage with the democratic opposition parties in an attempt to build a 
unified opposition to Milosevic or to gain support from the opposition parties for its 
attempts to resolve the Kosovo conflict. Given that there were no significant 
opposition campaigns against the regime at this time, the issue o f whether the IC 
contributed to the ability o f the democratic opposition parties to carry out the tasks 
necessary to effectively oppose the regime or to overcome its weaknesses did not 
arise in this case study.
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Mid-1999 saw a major change in international policy with respect to Serbia, 
with the IC now pursuing a policy o f  regime change, expressing open support for the 
opposition’s campaigns against the regime and offering financial and technical 
assistance to the opposition parties, in particular for the DOS election campaign in 
2000. This period saw the democratic opposition parties successfully carry out all four 
o f the tasks necessary to effectively oppose the regime while also overcoming the 
differences that had undermined them in earlier time periods. While the success o f the 
DOS campaign can be attributed to a variety o f factors, both internal and external, it is 
certainly the case that international policy at this time had a positive impact on the 
effectiveness o f the opposition’s campaign.
In contrast to earlier time periods, the IC made a deliberate effort to help the 
democratic opposition parties to overcome one o f the weaknesses that had 
consistently undermined it by pressuring the main opposition parties to unite against 
the regime. Towards the end o f 1999 and throughout early 2000, this was generally 
successful, though it is also clear that there was significant internal pressure in this 
regard. In addition, by finally rejecting any notion that Milosevic could become a 
legitimate leader again, the IC also assisted the opposition in challenging the regime’s 
legitimacy. Furthermore, as was noted in chapter seven, the IC made efforts to ensure 
that its comments and actions with respect to sensitive issues such as Kostunica’s 
rejection o f the ICTY and the opposition’s criticism o f international policy with 
respect to Kosovo, did not damage the opposition’s domestic credibility. In this way 
the IC enhanced the ability o f the opposition to maintain a zone o f ideological 
autonomy against the regime. The considerable success o f the opposition in this 
regard is evident in the fact that the only issue that counted in September 2000 was 
the need to rid Serbia o f the Milosevic regime.
3 7 9
The ability o f the democratic opposition to present a credible alternative to the 
Milosevic regime at the domestic level was also a distinguishing feature o f the 2000 
election campaign. While democratic forces within Serbia must take a considerable 
amount o f  credit for this, international assistance to the democratic opposition parties 
also contributed. Although the precise impact o f international assistance is difficult to 
assess, it is nevertheless possible to state that international financial and technical 
assistance to the DOS campaign certainly contributed to the success o f the campaign, 
and in so doing helped DOS to present itself as a credible alternative to the Milosevic 
regime. Furthermore, promises to lift the sanctions once Milosevic was removed from 
power added credibility to the opposition’s claims that the living conditions o f the 
Serbian population would improve if  they succeeded in ousting the regime. As such, 
and in marked contrast to earlier election campaigns, international policy had a 
positive impact on the ability o f the democratic opposition parties to carry out the 
tasks necessary to effectively oppose the regime and also to overcome the weaknesses 
that had undermined it in the past.
In summary, the impact o f international policy on the effectiveness o f the 
democratic opposition parties in their campaigns against the Milosevic regime varied 
over the course o f the eight years covered by this research. W^hile at times 
international policy increased the effectiveness o f the opposition, at other times it 
undermined it. The IC had a positive impact on the effectiveness o f the democratic 
opposition parties’ campaign against the Milosevic regime in the 2000 elections, in 
the campaign to ensure that the Milosevic regime recognised the electoral victories o f  
the Zajedno coalition in 1996/1997, and in the campaign to secure Draskovic’s release 
in June 1993. In all o f these cases, international policy impacted directly on the ability 
o f the democratic opposition parties to effectively challenge the regime. These three
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examples o f the positive impact o f international policy on the effectiveness o f  the 
democratic opposition’s campaigns constitute the only three cases o f international 
intervention in support o f the democratic opposition, suggesting that the IC may have 
had the potential to force Milosevic to make concessions on democratic reform had it 
chosen to do so. However, what is noticeable about the campaigns in which the 
international impact was generally positive, is that, with the exception o f the 2000 
election campaign, these were generally less significant than those in which the 
international impact was negative as they did not pose an immediate threat to 
M ilosevic’s hold on power.
In all other opposition campaigns against the regime, the impact o f 
international policy was largely negative, though this impact was often indirect. In 
considering the indirect impact o f international policy on the effectiveness o f the 
democratic opposition parties it is clear that between 1992 and 1999 international 
policy indirectly undermined the democratic opposition. The indirect negative impact 
o f the IC was greatest in the time period covered by the first two case studies. 
Throughout this time, international policy had a significant indirect impact on the 
democratic opposition parties’ effectiveness particularly in relation to the ability o f  
the democratic opposition parties to maintain a zone o f ideological autonomy against 
the regime, facilitating Milosevic in his attempts to ensure that the Serbian national 
question dominated political discourse, thereby narrowing the political space in which 
the democratic opposition could operate. In addition, by accepting the territorial 
division o f Bosnia and also by insisting on Milosevic as the chief Serb negotiator at 
Dayton, the IC also enabled Milosevic to portray his national policy as having 
successfully defended Serb interests, while perpetuating his self-generated image as 
the defender o f all Serbs. International policy also had a further indirect and negative
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impact on the democratic opposition parties’ 1993 election campaign by exacerbating 
the already existing disunity o f the democratic opposition parties as they divided over 
whether or not to support international efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia. 
Furthermore, the degree o f external legitimacy bestowed on Milosevic by the IC was 
used to strengthen his legitimacy internally, and this, in combination with the apparent 
willingness o f international representatives to appear on national television in the 
presence o f regime officials, strengthened Milosevic in the 1996 federal election 
campaign at the expense o f the democratic opposition. While the failure o f the 
democratic opposition to effectively challenge the regime in the 1997 republican 
elections was largely due to the split between the DS, the DSS and the GSS who 
chose to boycott the elections, and the SPO which contested them, the unwillingness 
o f the IC to exert any real pressure on Milosevic to implement the proposals contained 
in the Gonzalez report demonstrated an unwillingness on the part o f the IC to address 
the issue that was at the heart o f the opposition parties’ dispute. The negative impact 
o f international policy on the democratic opposition parties at the time o f the Kosovo 
conflict in 1998 and 1999 was so profound that it left them effectively unable to 
operate. As the result o f the severe international reaction to events in Kosovo, the 
political space in which the opposition could operate again significantly narrowed, 
virtually disappearing as the threat and eventual use o f force against Serbia dominated 
the political agenda throughout 1998 and the first half o f 1999.
In considering the impact o f international policy on the effectiveness o f the 
democratic opposition parties throughout the time period from 1992 to 2000, a 
number o f patterns are discernible. While the context dependent nature o f this 
research, and the variety o f internal and external factors that impacted on the 
effectiveness o f the democratic opposition parties mean that these patterns are an
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insufficient basis on which to draw firm conclusions beyond the case o f Serbia, they 
do, nevertheless, raise important questions which are worthy o f further investigation 
in other contexts.
While the democratic opposition used the initial imposition o f sanctions 
against the Milosevic regime, it is clear that their overall impact on the opposition was 
negative. The UN sanctions that were imposed in 1992 enabled Milosevic to portray 
Serbia’s dire economic situation as the result o f an unjust international policy rather 
than something for which he bore great responsibility. This contributed to the 
difficulties that the opposition parties faced in terms o f capitalising on economic 
catastrophes such as the hyperinflation that occurred in 1993. The sanctions that were 
targeted at the Milosevic regime directly may have done more to undermine 
Milosevic than the earlier UN sanctions, but there is little evidence that they had any 
direct impact on the democratic opposition parties. However, given that the targeted 
sanctions were imposed at a time when the IC was actively supporting the democratic 
opposition and calling for regime change in Serbia, it is not possible to isolate the 
impact o f the sanctions from the impact o f international support at this time.
Considering the circumstances in which international policy had a positive 
impact on the effectiveness o f the democratic opposition parties, one similarity 
between all instances is immediately clear, and this is that international policy only 
had a positive impact when the IC directly intervened in support o f the opposition. 
This was the case in the 2000 elections, and in the campaigns to secure Draskovic’s 
release and to ensure that the Zajedno coalition’s electoral victories were recognised. 
While this does not necessarily imply that international coercion cannot have indirect 
positive effects on democratic opposition parties in some contexts, this aspect o f
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Serbia’s experience does suggest that this is a question worthy o f consideration in the 
design o f international coercive interventions.
In terms o f the indirect effects o f international policy on Serbia’s democratic 
opposition parties, these were predominantly negative, as was seen in the elections 
held in 1992 and 1993, and to a certain extent in 1997. This suggests that, in the 
absence o f a specific policy or programme to aid Serbia’s democratic opposition, 
international coercion o f Serbia and the SRJ generally undermined the democratic 
opposition parties’ effectiveness in their campaigns against the Milosevic regime. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the indirect effects o f international 
policy operated in such a way as to reinforce the disadvantages that the democratic 
opposition parties experienced rather than to create disadvantages that would not 
otherwise have existed.
Looking at the findings o f the individual case studies, a further point is also 
worth noting and this is that there were two periods o f quite prolonged inactivity on 
the part o f the Serbian opposition, the first being between the end o f 1993 and the end 
o f 1996, and the second from the end o f 1997 to the middle o f 1999. Clearly a 
significant factor that accounts, at least in part, for the absence o f opposition activity 
during these periods was the lack o f elections held during either period. However, 
while this accounts for the fact that there were no formal electoral challenges to the 
Milosevic regime, it does not explain why there were no anti-regime protests or 
demonstrations organised by the opposition.
As was outlined in chapter six, the environment created by the threat and 
eventual use o f force in 1998 and 1999 made it practically impossible for the 
democratic opposition parties to operate at this time and to a very great extent this 
accounts for its inactivity during this period. In the earlier period o f opposition
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tinactivity, the extent o f opposition disunity would have made effective action against 
the regime almost impossible, and this must certainly be considered as a contributory 
factor in the lack o f opposition activity. However, there are similarities between the 
two periods o f inactivity that, while insufficient to form the basis o f firm conclusions, 
are, nonetheless, worth noting. The threat and eventual use o f military force against 
Serbia in 1998 and 1999 was a key element in explaining the lack o f opposition 
activity at this time. While there was not a comparable level o f threat to Serbia 
between the end o f 1993 and 1996, there were regular threats to use force against the 
Bosnian Serbs, and the actual use o f force against them in both 1994 and 1995. While 
this does not imply that that the threat and use o f force will always undermine a 
democratic opposition operating in a target state, it does suggest that this is a question 
that needs to be taken into consideration in evaluating coercive IC policies.
One key aspect o f the coercive approach o f the IC throughout much o f the 
1990s that had a detrimental impact on Serbia’s democratic opposition was that 
through attempting to achieve its goals by coercing the Milosevic regime, the IC’s 
focus was almost exclusively on Milosevic until as late as mid-1999. While this not 
only undermined the democratic opposition in that such an approach omitted support 
for the democratic opposition, it also had a detrimental impact by granting Milosevic 
a degree o f external legitimacy, giving the impression in the domestic arena that 
Milosevic was a credible and accepted leader from the IC’s perspective. This greatly 
undermined the ability o f the democratic opposition parties to dispute the legitimacy 
o f the regime. By treating Milosevic as the key factor in resolving conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia, the IC contributed to his ability to portray himself as the only 
potential Serbian leader who could achieve results for Serbia internationally, and also 
perpetuated the myth he had constructed that he was the ultimate defender o f all
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Serbs. The argument o f the Serbian opposition that as Milosevic was the cause o f  the 
conflicts he could not also be part o f their solution, went largely unheeded until the 
end o f the 1990s.
Following the resolution o f the conflict in Bosnia, and the relaxation o f  
international sanctions against Serbia, the IC continued to focus its efforts almost 
exclusively on the Milosevic regime. While there was a clear exception to this general 
rule as a result o f the winter protests o f 1996/1997, international assistance to the 
democratic opposition in this instance was a reaction to specific events rather than a 
conscious decision to assist the opposition in its efforts against the regime. As such, 
once the crisis was resolved the IC returned to the previous pattern o f engagement 
with the regime, pressuring Milosevic to ensure that the commitments entered into at 
Dayton were honoured. This period saw a considerable relaxation o f international 
sanctions against Serbia, and continued IC engagement with Milosevic, but did not 
see a significant increase in the effectiveness o f the democratic opposition, as is 
evident from its poor performance in the 1996 federal elections and the 1997 
republican elections. As such, this might suggest that it was the constant engagement 
with Milosevic, which resulted from the IC’s approach to dealing with Serbia 
(coercing the regime to achieve its objectives) rather than the sanctions themselves, 
that were causing the greatest damage to the opposition.
In conclusion, when considering the differential impact o f the various coercive 
policies that the IC adopted in its dealings with Serbia, the findings o f the case studies 
suggest a number o f conclusions. Firstly, it would appear that the sanctions that were 
imposed on Serbia in the first half o f the 1990s did more to undermine the democratic 
opposition than they did to undermine the Milosevic regime. Secondly, the threat to 
use force against Serbia had such a profound impact on the democratic opposition
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parties that they were effectively neutralised for much o f 1998 and 1999. A similar 
impact may also partly account for the inactivity o f the democratic opposition 
between late 1993 and 1996, although there is insufficient evidence to draw any firm 
conclusions in this regard. Thirdly, the relaxation o f the sanctions following 
M ilosevic’s decision to co-operate with international efforts to resolve the Bosnian 
conflict did little to improve the position o f  the democratic opposition parties, 
suggesting that it was the continued engagement with the regime rather than the 
coercive policies themselves that did more to undermine the democratic opposition.
As noted in chapter one, both analysts and policymakers have paid little 
attention to the impact o f sanctions on democratic opposition parties operating in 
target states, and this, according to Kaempfer and Lowenberg, who argue that for 
sanctions to be effective they must increase the relative power o f domestic opposition 
forces, has been a mistake. While it is not the purpose o f this research to evaluate the 
effectiveness o f international sanctions in achieving the goals o f the IC, the findings 
from the case studies above offer considerable support to Kaempfer and Lowenberg’s 
assertion that due consideration must be given to the internal politics o f the target 
state before embarking on a sanctions policy. However, there is little evidence to 
support their conclusion that sanctions will only be effective if  they strengthen the 
democratic opposition at the expense o f the ruling elite. WTiile there is evidence that 
the UN sanctions that were imposed against the SRJ in 1992 were effective in 
convincing Milosevic to abandon support for the Bosnian Serbs and to co-operate 
with international efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia, this was achieved without 
increasing the relative power o f the democratic opposition parties whose effectiveness 
was undermined by the sanctions rather than enhanced. While there is evidence to 
suggest that M ilosevic’s decision to co-operate with the IC was based on his desire to
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see the sanctions lifted, it is not possible to say with any degree o f confidence whether 
he considered the potential threat from the opposition when making these 
calculations.
Kaempfer and Lowenberg’s argument regarding the need for a better 
understanding o f the internal politics o f the target state before implementing a 
sanctions policy remains valid however. While the IC may have convinced Milosevic 
to apply pressure on the Bosnian Serbs in an effort to bring the war in Bosnia to an 
end, there is evidence that they miscalculated the degree o f influence that Milosevic 
had over the Bosnian Serb leadership by this time as it was a full two years later - 
following successful military campaigns by the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian 
government and a NATO air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs - that the conflict 
finally came to an end. Furthermore, the price that was paid for M ilosevic’s co­
operation with respect to Bosnia, and the belief that as a signatory o f the Dayton 
agreement he could act as some sort o f guarantor o f regional stability, was five more 
years o f his rule in Serbia.
This thesis demonstrates that the Serbian democratic opposition did represent 
a credible alternative partner for the IC throughout the time period covered by this 
research. International policy with respect to Serbia had a significant direct and 
indirect impact on the opposition, which often undermined its ability to effectively 
oppose the regime. However, ultimately it was the opposition which removed 
Milosevic from power and began Serbia’s reintegration into the IC. This dissertation 
therefore suggests that coercive policies by the international community towards a 
rogue state need to take much greater regard o f their impact on the internal democratic 
opposition than has been the case to date.
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